Hazardous Material Management in checmial industry

Hazardous Material Management in chemical industry

1. PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt
HAZOP Procedure for company
RISK = CONSEQUENCE (IMPACT) x FREQUENCY ( LIKELIHOOD)
OF OCCURRENCE

A measure of the consequence of a hazard and the frequency with
which is likely to occur.

2. PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt
HAZOP Procedure for company
WHAT ?
HAZOP is Hazard and Operability Analysis

WHEN ?
Hazop can be used at practically any stage. It is so widely used
that almost any form of process hazards analysis is referred to
as “ HAZOP”

ADVANTAGE ?
HAZOP is very thorough , because you force yourself to examine
most aspect

DISADVANTAGE?
HAZOP is very time consuming and costly. If not setup correctly
and managed properly , it can be ineffective. Needs leadership
by an Expert in the field of Hazop

3. PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt
HAZOP Procedure for company
A hazard and Operability ( HAZOP) analysis is the systematic
identification of every credible deviation in the system or process , usually
a chemical manufacturing process from the design intent. This method
was used UK Imperial Chemical Industries in the 1960’s

The purpose of a Hazop is to review a process or operation systematically
to identify whether deviations from the desired practices could lead to
undesirable consequences

Hazop is usually requires a series of meeting during which the team ,
using process drawings , systematically evaluates the impact of the
deviations from the desired practices

The risks of deviations are assessed and if deemed unacceptable , the a
set of recommended action is determined

4. Definition
“a system to identify, assess &
mitigate potential hazards to a
tolerable level by addressing not only
technology but also facility and human
using specific tools”


Objective :
To ensure that an adequate assessment of risk is carried out in order to
meet the
following :
1.To identify hazards and operability problems
2.To identify the consequences and evaluate the risk of hazard events
3.To analyse the adequacy of existing safeguards
4.To recommend additional safeguards to reduce the risks if necessary
What Is PHA ?

5. Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP)
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
Hazard Identification (HAZID)
Hazard Analysis (HAZAN)
Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT)
Safety Integrity Level Assessment (SIL)
Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
Which
technique?
It depends on:

The type of work
you are doing and
The type of potential
hazards
PHA Tools

6. Hazard &
Operability Problems
• PEOPLE - Fatality, injury
• ENVIRONMENT - air, water, land, ecological
• ASSET: Equipment, asset damage/loss
• REPUTATION: Loss of business, national
impact
Consequence
& Hazard Risk
Existing
Safeguards
Additional safeguards
& recommendations
• Highly explosive fuel gas
• Electric power
• High pressure steam of 54 bar
• High temperature superheated steam
• N
2, O
2, Argon
• Chemicals
 Tray collapsed
Tubes leak, not properly weld
Valve passing
• Procedure
• Alarm & operator intervention
• Interlock, LSHH, PSHH
• Lab analysis
• Scheduled DOSH inspection
• Preventive Maintenance
• Proper training program for new staff?
• Additional transmitter or alarm?
• Verification checklist?
• Review inventory of critical spare part?
HAZOP Process

7. Method Selection
CAUSE
DEVIATION
CONSEQUENCE
Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA)
HAZOP
Failure Mode &
Effect Analysis
(FMEA)
What-If Checklist

8. Examples of PHA Applications What
If/Checklist
FMEA HAZOP FTA
Conceptual


Basic



Design
Detailed

Existing process

Process change

Decommissioning

9. The Process Flow…
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
Managing Recommendations &
Tracking
Prioritized?Review/challenge?
Assign action party
Follow-up/track
Communicate to employees

Hazard Review
To cover Technology, Human
Errors, Facility Siting & Inherent
Safer Process
•To select the suitable tools e.g.
What-If?,HAZOP, FMEA, FTA,IPF

Assurance
Compliancy & Review
Communicate any findings
to affected employee
Hazard Identification
(HazId)
Field tour
Previous MOC & Incident?
Previous HazOp report?
Consequences Analysis
•Identify the potential
source of leakages
Type of event – F, E,TR
•Size of release
•Effect to PEAR

Planning
•Identify area of study/set
boundary
•Select Team comprises of PHA
leader, scribe & members
Supporting
Elements
Site visit for
verification,
ergonomics study,
fire safety review,

Up-to-date
Information and
Documentation
e.g. P&ID, O&M,
MSDS, Area
Classification
Resources –PHA
practitioners &
cross-functional
subject matter expert


Facilities Data
through PIMS, SAP
records, e-HSEMS, e-
CPA
start

10. What is HAZOP?
 HAZOP comes from the phrase “HAZard and OPerability study”

 It is a systematic method (team-based) for examining complex
facilities or processes to find actual / potentially hazardous
procedures / operation. These hazards shall be eliminated or
mitigated to a tolerable level (ALARP)

 Identification & assessment of hazards related to process deviation
or changes in process operating envelope

11. Importance of HAZOP
 How can we operate plants safety if we do not know the
hazards?
 How can we control the hazards if we don’t understand their
potential of release and impacts.
 How can we be confident that we are controlling the hazards if
we don’t know how we expect our controls to perform?
 How can we improve on the safeguards to ensure that the
hazards are adequately mitigated?

12. General way of doing HAZOP
 By considering the plant on section-by-section, line-by-line and
item-by-item; develop suitable node

 By defining ‘normal operation’

 By considering deviations from ‘normal operation

By using a keyword matrix to initiate discussion

13. General assumptions while doing HAZOP study
 One failure at a time (no double jeopardy) unless
It has the potential to happen
It has happened before
 The system will perform as the design intent
 The system is operated and maintained in line with the design
intent
Protective systems/safeguarding are functioning as designed

14. Outline of HAZOP Technique
 HAZOP systematically review deviations from design intent
 The study shall consists of a team of knowledgeable and
experience personnel
 Use guidewords to stimulate creative thinking
 Identify significant consequences and reasonable causes (reject
small, unimportant issues e.g. small release from valve packing)
 Review the available safeguards
 Develop recommendations to manage risks
 Proceed to the next deviation
 Put risk ranking for each of the cause (preferably later)

15. Outline of HAZOP Technique
 The results are qualitative in nature (quantitative
assessment is available by using QRA)
 Effective duration is 4-5 hours per day depending on the
team
 Further study may be required more in-depth analysis (i.e.
quantitative method) and it should be noted

16. Deviation List Causes
Possible?
Consequence?
Proposed Option
Existing
SAFEGUARD
sufficient?
Divide system into nodes and state design intent
No
No
No Yes
Yes
Yes
For each node, select parameter
HAZOP Process

17. HAZOP Process Flow Detail
Identify a Node
Describe design intent & operating condition
Consider first or next Guide Word
Identify all Causes and record
Identify all Consequences and record
List existing Safeguards and record
Identify the Risk Ranking and record
Provide any recommendations and record
Take a new Node
Last Guide Word?
No
Yes

18. HAZOP Process Flow
1. Identify a Node
2. Describe design intent and operating condition
 A node is defined as a segment of the system which have distinct
design intent
 The boundary of the node should be selected such that it is
manageable for the team to analyze
Typical node: One major equipment (vessel/column/storage tank etc),
associated minor equipment (pumps/valves etc), instrumentation and other
ancillary equipment
Team must understand the design intent of the node – specific information
on how the node is operated under design conditions (specific pressure,
temperature, flow etc)

19. HAZOP Process Flow
Normally, a node follows the process flow
Start at an isolation point (valve or equipment item) of where the
line enters the node being analyzed (INLET BOUNDARY)
Continue to the next change of design intent
OR
Continue to where a critical parameter (e.g. flow, pressure, temperature)
changes
OR
Continue to the next equipment item

The point of where the node stops is known as OUTLET BOUNDARY

20. Practical Tips for Node Selection
Aim for nodes which is planned to take no more than 1 – 2 hours to
study
Aim for not more than 5 causes for the first Guide Word
If the team needs to analyze the node in parts, then break the node
into smaller nodes
HAZOP Leader and Scribe may choose the nodes before the study session
starts. The proposed nodes shall be agreed by the team members
Be prepared to change the nodes if the team is struggling to analyze it

21. Example of Selection of Node: HAZOP Study on MOC

The following are nodes/area of study for HAZOP:
 Node 1: Line from V6-0204 to AGI
 Node 2: Line from V6-0207 to AGI
 Node 3: AGI
PV-1100
From V6-0204
AGI
From V6-0207
From Glycol
From LP fuel
gas
Node No:1
Node No: 2
Node No: 3
Replacement of PV-1100

22. HAZOP Process Flow
3. Consider Guide Word
Guide Word Process Deviation Definition
NO, NOT or
NONE
The complete negation of the design
or operating intent
No part of the intention is
achieved
MORE OF
Quantitative increase of the
parameter
More of the intention occurs or is
achieved
LESS OF
Quantitative decrease of the
parameter
Less intention occurs or is
achieved
AS WELL AS
Qualitative increase of the
parameter
All the intention is achieved with
some addition
PART OF
Qualitative decrease of the
parameter
Only some of the intention is
achieved
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intent
The reverse of the operating
intention occurs
OTHER THAN Something else happens No part of the intention occurs

23. Deviations obtained by using Guide Words
Parameter Guide Word Deviation
Flow No/Less No/Less Flow
Flow More More Flow
Flow Reverse Reverse Flow
Pressure More High Pressure
Pressure Less Low Pressure
Temperature More High Temperature
Temperature Less Low Temperature
Level More High Level
Level Less Low Level
Reaction More More Reaction
Reaction Other Other Reaction
Composition Other Off-specification
Contamination Other Contamination
Relief Other Relief
Sampling Other Sampling
Service No Power Failure
Service No Instrument Air Failure
Service No Cooling Water Failure
Service No Steam Failure
Service No Nitrogen Failure
Service No No Flushing Oil
Maintenance Other Maintenance

24. Consider other modes of operation
Normal Operation

Reduced Throughput / Turndown

Routine Start Up

Routine Shutdown

Commissioning

Emergency

Special Modes of Operation

25. Other Guide Words
Phase : Gas / liquid / solid
Composition : Two phase / changes with time / slugging / additives
Testing : Equipment / hydrocarbon streams / effluents /
sampling points
Operation : Operability / maintainability
Electrical : Area classification / isolation / earthing
Instrument : Sufficient for control / too many / correct location /
consistent philosophy / separate tapping for alarm
and IPF

26. Global Guide Words
Toxicity
Commissioning / start up
Shutdown (isolation / purging)
Breakdown (including services and utility failures)
Effluent
Noise
Fire / explosion
Safety equipment
Materials of construction
Quality, consistency & reliability
Efficiency and reliability
Ignition
Engineering issues


Corrosion / erosion
Previous precaution
Accessibility
Orientation
Safety/ ESD
Environmental
Viscosity

27. HAZOP Process Flow
The Causes identified must be within the Node
It must be a credible scenario
Typically done using a brainstorming technique without considering
the Consequences
It is possible that there are none or no new Cause identified for a
specific Deviation
4. Identify all Causes

28. HAZOP Process Flow
Wrong routing
Blockage
Incorrect blind plate insertion
Isolation in error
Burst pipe
Large leakage
Incorrectly installed check valve
Equipment failure (fail-close valve, pump, filter etc)
Incorrect pressure differential

Examples of Causes for NO
FLOW

29. HAZOP Process Flow
Surge problems
Thermal overpressure
Isolation of relief devices
Positive displacement pump running
Failed open PCV
Incorrect design pressure
Gas breakthrough (inadequate venting)
Connection to high pressure system
Specification of pipes, vessels, fittings & instruments


Examples of Causes for MORE
PRESSURE

30. HAZOP Process Flow
Phase change
Settling of slurries
Leaking isolation valves, exchanger tubes
Incorrect feedstock specification
Process control upsets
Uncontrolled reaction by intermediate or by-products


Examples of Causes for OTHER
COMPOSITION

31. HAZOP Process Flow
Wrong relief philosophy (process / fire etc)
Unsuitable type of relief device, blocking
Unsuitable relief device location
Multi-phase flow
Effect of debottlenecking on relief capacity
Effect of inlet/outlet piping & manifold configuration


Examples of Causes for RELIEF

32. HAZOP Process Flow
Wrong control philosophy
Wrong fail-safe philosophy
Unsuitable instrument location and response time
Time available for operator intervention
Panel arrangement and location
Fire protection
Unsuitable set points of alarms, trips and authorization of changes
Alarm and trip testing, auto/manual switches and human error


Examples of Causes for INSTRUMENTATION

33. HAZOP Process Flow
Failure of
Instrument air, steam, water & nitrogen
Hydraulic power, electric power
Telecommunications, computer and interfaces
Heating and ventilation

Contamination of
Instrument air, steam, nitrogen


Examples of Causes for SERVICE FAILURE

34. HAZOP Process Flow
Purging
Flushing
Start up
Normal shutdown
Emergency operation
Emergency shutdown
Inspection of operating machines


Examples of Causes for ABNORMAL
OPERATION

35. HAZOP Process Flow
Grounding arrangement
Insulated vessel/equipment
Low conductance fluids
Two liquid phases
Splash filling of vessel
Insulated components
Dust and powder handling
Electrical area classification
Flame arrestors
Hot work and hot surfaces
Auto-ignition and pyrophoric materials


Examples of Causes for IGNITION
SUPPRESSION

36. HAZOP Process Flow
Fire and gas detection
Testing of emergency equipment
Emergency shutdown
First aid, medical resources
Fire fighting response time
Effluent disposal
Emergency plan & training
Hazards created by others
Toxic and hazardous properties of process materials


Examples of Causes for SAFETY EQUIPMENT

37. HAZOP Process Flow
Consequences shall be linked to the cause identified
Safeguards is not considered in Consequences determination
(assume the safeguards fail)
Consequences can be within the Node or outside of the Node
(upstream and downstream)
One Cause can lead to many Consequences (list all of them)
Can be listed under People, Environment, Asset and Reputation
Meaningful and significant
Can be listed one by one starting from not-so-worse consequence
until the worst case scenario
5. Identify all Consequences

38. Examples of consequences
People
First aid injury, minor injury, major injury, fatality

Environment
Local spillage, effluent discharge to river, black smoke

Asset
Equipment crack, valve damage, fire/explosion on storage tank

Reputation
Media attention, public inquiry, disrepute to international image

39. HAZOP Process Flow
It is the designed system or administrative controls to prevent,
detect or mitigate the Consequences
May list the safeguards based on the Causes
Something to think about:
i.Does an indicator or a gauge being considered as a safeguard?
ii.Does working procedure being considered as a safeguard?
6. List existing Safeguards

40. HAZOP Process Flow
Safeguards for any system could be listed based on the system’s
Layers of Protection theory.

41. HAZOP Process Flow
The Risk Ranking for each Consequence shall be identified by
utilizing the PGB Risk Matrix
Consequence vs. Probability = Risk Ranking
In general, there are three levels of Risk Ranking i.e. HIGH
MEDIUM and LOW
The “Consequence” rating shall take into consideration of the
detection and mitigation safeguards available
The “Probability” rating shall take into consideration of the
prevention safeguards available
7. Identify the Risk Ranking

42. Sample of Risk Matrix
CONSEQUENCE INCREASING LIKELIHOOD ------>
People (P) Environment (E)
Assets
Loss (A)

Reputation (R)
A B C D E
Never heard
of in the
industry
Has
happened in
the industry.
Has
happened
once in the
company
Has
happened
several times
per year in
the company.
Has
happened
several
times per
year in
company
Negligible 1 time in > 20
years
1 time
between 4 to
20 years
1 time
between 6
months to 4
years
1 time in < 6
months
P0
No injury
E0
No effect
A0
No loss
R0
No Impact
L L L L L

P1
Slight Injury

E1
Slight effect
A1
Slight loss R1
Slight Impact
L L L L L
< 10k

P2
Minor Injury

E2
Minor Effect
A2
Minor Loss
R2
Limited Impact
L L L M M
10k ~ 100k

P3
Major Injury
E3
Localised effect
A3
Local Loss R3
Considerable Impact
L L M M H
100k ~ 0.5 M

P4
Fatalities
E4
Major effect
A4
Major Loss R4
National Impact
L M M H H
0.5M ~ 10M

P5
Fatalities

E5
Massive effect
A5
Extensive Loss
R5
International Impact
M M H H H
> 10 M

43. HAZOP Process Flow
If the team decided that the existing Safeguards are inadequate to
prevent, detect or mitigate the Consequences, they may recommend
additional safeguards to protect the system
The Recommendations must address the issue and bring the risk to
an acceptable level i.e. LOW
The Recommendations must be clear and use 3Ws – WHAT, WHY
and WHERE
A further study may also be recommended because HAZOP is not a
tool to solve safety issues in detail
Cost of the recommendations SHALL NOT be an issue for the HAZOP
analysis team


8. Provide any Recommendations

44. HAZOP Team Selection
The team shall consist of
oHAZOP leader – to facilitate the study
oScribe – to record the study
oOperation personnel
oMulti-disciplinary members, depending on the scope of
the study (e.g. instrument, electrical, mechanical,
inspection, piping, civil, HSE)
Balance of skills, knowledge and experience
Willing contributors, able to express thoughts clearly

45. Process Engineer & Operation Personnel’s Responsibilities
Provide simple description of the system
Provide design intention for each process unit
Provide information in process conditions and design conditions
Provide operational specialist input to the analysis

Check design for operational issues
Ensure design compatibility with existing work practices
Check design for operating procedure and training requirements

Provide details of process chemistry
Provide details of process hazards

46. Typical information required
As built / latest P&ID of the plant
PFD and material balances
Design parameters: temperature, pressure, flow etc
Operating parameters: temperature, pressure, flow etc
Equipment data sheet / drawing
Marked up P&ID / drawing of the system as reference
Operating procedures
Schedule of alarm/trip setting
Cause & effect matrix
Interlock logic chart
Properties and hazards of process materials

47. HAZOP Team dynamics
Everyone shall be involved
oEncourage quiet people, manage loud people

Maintain attention and motivation
oConcentrate on the task

Appropriate pace
oNot too rush or too drawn out

Appropriate orientation
oPrimarily process rather than content oriented

48. PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt
HAZOP Procedure – Existing Plant









Occupational Safety & Health Administration( OSHA) process
safety management ( PSM) regulation 29 CFR 1910.119
-Requires company to update or revalidate their PHA at least
every 5 years

-In addition , the US Environment Protection Agency’s (EPA) risk
management program rule , 40 CFR Part 68 requires companies
to performe quatitative off-site consequences analysis

49. Scheduled hazard study on existing plant
Risk assessment in this context is the process of quantifying the level of
risk associated with the operation of the equipment / machine

It should be a structured and systematic process that answers the following
4 specifics questions:-

i)How severe are potential injuries?

ii)How frequently are employees exposed?

iii)What is possibility of avoiding the hazards if it does occur?

iv)What is the likelihood of an injury should a safety control system fail ?
PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

50. Pilot Plant & Operational Lab

51. Pilot Plant & Operational Lab
HAZOP – GROUP PRESENTATION

52. HAZOP – GROUP PRESENTATION

53. PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt
How to perform HAZOP process ?
1.Preparation
P&ID
PFD plus material and energy balances
Equipment specifications
Layout drawing

2. Facilitator and Process Engineer

Break P&ID down into nodes

Nodes are equipment items
If nodes are too small you can loose sense of analysis and incur excessive
repetition

If nodes are too large , hard to handle and becomes confusing

54. How to perform HAZOP process ?
3. Prepare HAZOP outline with List of Deviations

4. Assemble HAZOP team

5. Facilitators Explains
The facilitator or one of the team members explains the purpose and scope of the
HAZOP and sets the rules of the study

6. Process Engineer Explains
Process in general
Immediate Node being Hazoped

7. HAZOP Each Node Using Deviation Listed in Outline Working Through the
P&ID
Produce Hazop worksheet recording the following :
Cause
Consequence
Safeguards
Action & recommendation
Remarks

55. PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt
How to perform HAZOP process ?
8.At the End of HAZOP , the Facilitators Issues Preliminary
HAZOP Report consisting of
Attendance
Outline
Detail report
Action/ recommendation Register.

9. Issues Final Report Giving Full Details

56. From BFW
Header
Steam
drum
Water drum
PI 7810
FT 7810
FC 7810
NC
NC
Demin W ater
TI 7801
TI 7801
PT 7801
PI 7801
PI 7802
FV 7810
NC
FC 7810
LT 7810
LC
7810A
FY 7810
TW-1"-7801-A1031-H(N20A)
BW-3"-7801-D6103-H(N20B)
LT 7809
LA 7809
LSLL 7809
LALL 7809
Economizer
BV
BV BV
Boiler Feed Water for F4- 781
BV Example of Single Node on Boiler System
NODE 1

57. NODE
1
Design intent:
Replacement of B/Valve at
D/ Stream & U/ Stream FV
7801
GUIDE
DEVIATIO
N
CAUSES
CONSEQUENC
ES
SAFEGUARD
S
REMARKS &
RISK
RANKING
ACTION BY/ DATE:
STAT
US
WORD RECOMMENDATION
S

P

E

A

R
More More
Pressure
 BV at
Econo
mizer
partial
ly
close
1.Increased
backpressure
on Steam
turbine
2.ST tripped
 PI 7801
, PI
7802
and PI
7810
(indicati
on only
 To install
vibration sensor
to all ST pump
L L M L 1. MTA
( Q3 Fy
2010/11)
No Pressure
BV at
U/stream or
D/ Stream
FV 7810 is
fully close

1.,No water
supply to
steam drum
leading to low
level
2.Boiler tripped
3.Slow down the
process

LSLL 7809

To implement “
Tagging system “ to
critical valve
L L M L
1.POA
( 1
st
May 2010 )
Less Less
pressure
NA
HAZOP Worksheet