Hot work activities in the oil and gas industry.pptx

hot work activities in the oil and gas industry

1. National Institute of Technology, Tiruchirappalli Department of Mechanical Engineering Industrial Safety Engineering Under: Dr. Raghu Ram Karthik Desu Subject: Fire Engineering and Explosion Control Presented by: Tirupathi 211223007 Y. Sandeep Rao 211223019 Fire Prevention and Protection in Hot work facilities @ Oil & Gas Case study on San Carlos de la Rapita

2. 2 INDEX Importance of Fire prevention Hot Work –Definition & Work Activities Hazardous Zones Regulatory Requirements for Hot Work Permit to work system flow What is Hot work permit

3. Contents : Overview of the campsa oil refinery Incident Overview Casualties and Damage Investigation and Findings Response and Recovery Efforts Regulatory Impact Lessons Learned and Suggestions Reference 3

4. Importance of Fire Prevention and Protection 1 Mitigate Catastrophic Incidents Effective fire prevention and protection measures are critical to safeguarding personnel, assets, and the environment from the devastating consequences of oil and gas fires. 2 Ensure Business Continuity Robust fire safety systems help minimize downtime and disruptions, allowing operations to resume quickly after an incident. 3 Comply with Regulations Adherence to fire safety regulations is mandatory in the oil and gas industry, and non-compliance can result in legal and financial penalties.

5. Hot Work –Definition & Work Activities An activity that can produce a spark or flame or other sources of ignition having sufficient energy to cause ignition, where the potential for flammable vapour , gas, or dust exists. Require hot work permits in areas where hazardous materials are stored and cannot be removed. Maintenance works, mechanical valves, Sensors, gaskets replacement etc. Activities like welding, cutting, brazing, soldering, grinding, burning, using fire- or spark-producing tools, or other work

6. Hazardous Zones Classified according to the frequency and duration with which potentially explosive atmospheres may occur. In these zones hydrocarbons and/or gases may be present during either normal or abnormal operation, respectively.(refer " The Petroleum Rules - 2002" ) Zone 0 –Potentially explosive atmosphere will always be present. Zone 1 -Potentially explosive atmospheres may be present occasionally. Zone 2 –Potentially explosive atmosphere may be be present only rarely and will be of a short duration. According to OISD norms, Hot work activities are not allowed within a 15-meter radius.

7. HAZARDOUS ZONE LAYOUT

8. Principles Reduce risk by applying the hierarchy of controls : First: Eliminate hot work activity whenever possible Second: Conduct the hot work activity outside the classified area whenever possible and practical Third: Eliminate ignition sources by selecting alternative work methods or equipment Fourth: Implement controls to avoid co-existence of flammable materials and ignition sources during hot work.

9. Regulatory Requirements for Hot Work Compliance PNGRB Regulations The Board monitor these rules either by itself or by using a certified third party (T4S) The Factories Act, 1948 As per Section 37 in The Factories Act, 1948, OISD Regulations The OISD has established specific standards for hot work activities in the oil and gas industry. Contractor Compliance Contractors performing hot work must comply with all applicable safety requirements and be properly trained and equipped.

10. OISD - STD - 105 WORK PERMIT SYSTEM ANNEXURE – IV ANNEXURE – V Identification of Routine/ Non Routine Works/ Jobs Non-Routine Work/ Job Routine-Work/ Job (3.12 ) Availability of SOP & Risk Assessment Work/ Job Authorization Work/ Job Execution Job Planning: Request for Work/ Job Identification: Type of Work Permit Field Visit, Perform JSA & Implement Controls (6.3.1) Verify Controls: Hazardous Energy Sources (6.3.2) Tool Box Talk Issuance of Work Permit Issuer/Receiver (6.4.1) Initial & Refresher Permit Trainings to Persons authorized for Permit Roles Random Visit(s) by Issuing Authority/ F& ō S Officer/Officer Authorized (6.5.1) Permit Suspension (6.5.3) Permit Extension (6.5.2) Review JSA for Previous Identified Job for which JSA Execution & Display of Work Permit (6.4.5) Continuous Supervision by Permit Receiver or Nominated Representative If Conditions are not safe to Communication to Issuer/Receiver for Restoration of Work on ensuring Compliance or Issue of New Permit Site Clean Up & Permit Closer Request by Receiver (6.6.a) Job Complete N Y Permit Closer by Issuer on Inspection of Work Area (6.6.b) Retention of Work Permit Form for Six Months (6.7) Internal & External Safety Audits Permit issuer/receiver : A designated person authorized to issue/ receive the work permit. the competency defined by the organization for executing his roles and responsibilities.

11. Proper hand tools Continuous gas monitoring Where is the Gas Detector, Gas Technician, or a constant air/LEL/gas monitoring device? a valid Permit Hot Works is HIGH RISK , and therefore requires all 3 documents: Work Clearance Job Hazard Analysis (JHA), and Permit to Work (PtW) by a Permit Issuer to a Permit Holder . Proper Barricading Fire extinguishers Fire extinguishers on the columns are great, however, where are they within the Hot Works area? What about a Fire Watch during grinding? Protect against Slips, Trips and Falls What control barriers needed to be in place before starting? 11

12. Job safety analysis for pump repair/replacement Discussion on JSA Type of work permit and color codes :

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14. Overview of the Campsa oil Refinery 14 The Campsa oil refinery was a major industrial facility operated by the state-owned oil company, Campsa (Compañía Arrendataria del Monopolio de Petróleos, Sociedad Anónima ).- The refinery was established to process crude oil and produce a range of petroleum products, including gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, lubricants, and other petrochemicals.- It employed a significant number of workers and contributed to the economic development of the region through job creation, tax revenue, and industrial activity .

15. Incident overview 15 On July 11, 1978, a fire broke out at the Campsa refinery, likely due to a combination of factors such as equipment failure, human error, or improper handling of flammable materials. The fire quickly escalated, leading to a series of explosions within the facility . The truck, which consisted of a Pegaso tractor unit (registered M-7034-C) and a Fruehauf semitrailer tanker carrying liquified proplyene (registered M-7981-R), was owned by Cisternas Reunidas S.A. It was being driven on the day of the explosion by 50-year-old Francisco Imbernón Villena .

16. Casualties and Damage: 16 The accident at the Los Alfaques campsite was a tragedy with 243 deaths that occurred on July 11, 1978, in a beach camp. The campsite was located in the municipality of Alcanar, Montsiá region in the province of Tarragona (Spain), just 3 km from the town of San Carlos de la Rápita. A very serious accident was caused by the explosion of a tanker truck carrying liquefied propylene. The result was 243 dead, more than 300 seriously injured, and most of the camp was destroyed.

17. Investigation and Findings 17 The truck carried 23.47 tons of liquid propylene, which was 4 tons more than the maximum design load of the tanker. The tanker drivers were under instructions to take the smaller N-340 national road. instead of the A-7. In the late 1970s, the N340 was still a narrow and winding coastal road that passed directly through several densely populated urban areas. The daily temperature for this part of Spain in Summer was between 20 °C (68 °F) and 35 °C (95 °F), this would mean the internal pressure within the tanker could have been between 1,200– 1,700 kPa (170– 250 psi) The tank had been used to carry other substances, some of which were highly corrosive. Tests on the remnants of the steel tank revealed microscopic stress cracks consistent with corrosion caused by previous loads of improperly overpressurized anhy drous ammonia.

18. Response and Recovery Efforts 18 Emergency responders, including firefighters and local authorities, mobilized to contain the fire and mitigate its effects. However, the scale and intensity of the disaster posed significant challenges to the response efforts. It took considerable time and resources to bring the fire under control and prevent further damage.In the aftermath of the disaster, there were efforts to assess the causes of the incident, investigate any negligence or regulatory violations, and implement measures to improve industrial safety standards and emergency preparedness. Lessons learned from the Campsa disaster contributed to the development of stricter regulations and protocols governing the operation of oil refineries and other industrial facilities in Spain.

19. Regulatory Impact 19 Following the accident, Cisternas Reunidas accepted responsibility for the disaster, but denied any order or prohibition to the drivers to use the motorway instead of the national road, claiming that it was the driver who chose which road to take. The official inquiry determined that the truck had been severely overloaded, and also lacked emergency pressure release valves, which are designed to help prevent a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) in case of a fire. After the tragedy, the transit of populated areas by vehicles carrying dangerous cargo was prohibited in Spain, and would only be driven at night. In 1982, four employees of ENPETROL and two of Cisternas Reunidas were convicted of criminal negligence, and were sentenced to prison for between one and four years.

20. Lessons learned and Suggestions 20 Regular inspections and maintenance of industrial facilities to identify and address potential hazards before they escalate like weighing bridge before boarding. Implementation of advanced monitoring systems to detect abnormal conditions and potential safety risks early on. Training and education programs for employees to increase awareness of safety protocols and emergency procedures. Development of comprehensive emergency response plans, including evacuation procedures and coordination with local emergency services.. Integration of modern technologies, such as drones or remote sensors, to enhance surveillance and response capabilities.. Collaboration with regulatory agencies and industry associations to establish and enforce stringent safety standards across all industrial sectors.

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22. References : 22 https://www.scribd.com/document/477833508/SHELL-Retail-Permit-to-Work-System-5-1-Forms(SHELL GIDS) https://www.pngrb.gov.in/pdf/public-notice/DraftRegulation05012021.pdf https://www.oisd.gov.in/Image/GetDocumentAttachmentByID?documentID=10257 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_Alfaques_disaster#

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