Hydrogen Safety Engineering Btech Group project PPT

Process Hazard Analysis of hydrogen discharge at dispensing unit

1. Risk assessment of storage unit of hydrogen at a fuelling station Project Guide : Prof. Dr. G. Madhu Deepak Kumar Gaurav Kumar Pawan Yadav Saurabh Chaubey Raunak Kumar Jha Shubham Sinha Sumit Mandal

2. Contents Why HYDROGEN Aim & Objective Literature review Methodology Project schedule

3. Aim and objective Aim : Quantitative risk analysis of release of hydrogen from storage tank at a fuelling station Objective : To analyse scenario of release via various quantitative and qualitative tools. Methodology HAZOP of storage facility Fault tree analysis for root causes Dispersion modelling of the release Risk analysis using Probit equations

4. Literature review Junji Sakamoto et.al. (2016) : Analysis of accidents at fuelling station based on leakage types gives insight into various reasons leading to a leak from storage tank Li Zhiyong et.al. (2010) describes the frequency calculations for a overpressure in storage refuelling station. Liang Pu et. al. (2018) studies the dispersion model in terms of conc. and its impacts. HyRAM+ Technical Reference Manual (Sandia NL, DOE USA) National Renewable Energy Laboratory(NREL), USA

5. Typical LH2 storage at refuelling station Source : Sakamoto et.al. 2016

6. Methodology HAZOP

7. Node 1: Lorry connection Point Parameter Dev. Causes Consequence Protection Hydrogen flow No Lorry valve not open Filling interruptions Proper human monitoring less Loose fitting Leakage -Proper hose design -Careful valve op. -Maintenance -Operator training Valve partially open Leakage from lorry valve

8. Node 2: Piping Network Parameter Dev. Causes Consequences Protection Hydrogen flow No Valve v1 closed Interruption in filling   Check valve position before operation Valve V2 closed   Less Leakage from flange joint Hydrogen leak Corrosion resistance coating Leakage from valve Maintenance Partially open valve Flow meter accuracy check Pipe rupture   More Flow meter malfunction Over pressure Check Flow meter accuracy

9. Node 2: Piping Network Parameter Dev Causes Consequences Protection Pressure High Valves not in simultaneous position Overpressure Check valve position before operation Verify accuracy of PG PG malfunction Burst Jet fire in case of ignition Low Leakage in pipe Hydrogen leak Leakage in valve Interruption in filling

10. Node 3 : Storage Vessel Unit Parameter Dev. Causes Consequences Protection Pressure Low NO flow from inlet Unfilled tank Check valve position before operation Rupture in vessel Leakage Vessel integrity maintenance High PG malfunction Leakage PG accuracy check Safety vent in-actuation Explosion Cooling system operability check Cooling system breakdown Burst Valve operability check Inlet control valve inoperable Valve maintenance

11. Methodology 2. Fault tree analysis

12. 2. Fault tree analysis

13. Methodology Source : NREL Consequence Modelling

14. Cases considered for consequence modelling Pool fir e VCE Plume Dispersion

15. POOL FIRE Heat flux 4.96 kJ/m^2

16. Vapour Cloud Explosion Calculation of scaled overpressure from peak overpressure (P/14.6) Mass Equivalent

17. Cryogenic plume Source: CCPS guideline for CPQRA Plume Dispersion Model

18. Results Individual Risk