عاونأVPNs
RemoteAccessVPN(لاصتلاانعدعب)
Site-to-SiteVPN(عقومىلاعقوم)
–رفويةيناكمإطبرعورفةسسؤملاعماهضعبضعبلا.
–تليلقةفلكتلاصتلاانعقيرططوطخلاةصاخلاةرجؤملا.
Corporate
Site
Branch
Office
Internet
عاونأVPNs
RemoteAccessVPN(لوادتلنعدْعُب)
Site-to-SiteVPN(عقومىلاعقوم)
ExtranetVPN(ةكبشتامولعملاةدعاسملا)
Client/ServerVPN)ليمع/مداخ)
–يمْحَت ُتلااصتإ ُةيلخاد ُةساّسح
– ُأشْنَترثكأ تامجهلانمضةسسؤملا
Internet
LAN
clients
Database
Server
LAN clients
with
sensitive
data
Layer 2 Forwarding Protocol (L2F)
IP, IPXPayload
Private
Network
Internet
IP
ISP NASRemote Client Network Access Server
PSTN
PPP
over PSTN
PPPIP, IPXPayload
PSTN
Layer 2
IP
UDP Port 1701
over IP
UDPL2FPPPIP, IPXPayloadLayer 3
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)
CombinesbestfeaturesofL2FandPPTP جمدتلضفأتازيم) )
–DevelopedbyIETF[RFC2661]
AllowstunnellingofPPPdatagramsbetweenL2TPClient,and
L2TPserver, موقيلصفب NAS دوجوملايف PPPىلا
–L2TPAccessConcentrator(LAC)
NetworkaccessdevicesupportingL2TP
–L2TPNetworkServer(LNS)
Corporate(VPN)Gateway
Allowsmultipletunnelswithmultiplesessionsinsideevery
tunnel (قافنأةددعتموتاسلجةددعتملكلقفن)
CPEbaseddeploymentmodebyincludingLACfunctionalities
withinuserterminal
Commonly used with IPSec -> L2TP/IPSec
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)
IP, IPXPayload
Private
Network
Internet
IP
ISP NASRemote Client Network Access Server
PSTN
PPP
over PSTN
PPPIP, IPXPayload
PSTN
Layer 2
IP
UDP Port 1701
over IP
UDPL2TPPPPIP, IPXPayloadLayer 3
Transport mode vs Tunnel mode
Transport mode
–secures packet payload and leaves IP header
unchanged
Tunnel mode
–encapsulates both IP header and payload into
IPSec packets
IP header
(real dest)
IPSec headerTCP/UDP header + data
IP header
(gateway)
IPSec header TCP/UDP header + data
IP header
(real dest)
Authentication Header (AH)
Provides integrity and origin authentication
Authenticates portions of the IP header
Anti-replay service (to counter denial of service)
No confidentiality
Next header
(TCP)
Payload length Reserved
Security parameters index (SPI)
Sequence number
ICV: Integrity Check Value
(HMAC of IP header, AH, TCP payload)
Identifies security
association (shared
keys and algorithms)
Anti-replay
Authenticates source,
verifies integrity of
payload
Authentication Header (AH)
IP HDR IP Payload
New IP HDR AH HDR IP HDR IP Payload
Tunnel Mode
authenticated
IP HDR AH HDR IP Payload
Transport Mode
authenticated
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
Adds new header and trailer fields to packet
Confidentiality and integrity for payload
Optionally provides authentication
Identifies security
association (shared
keys and algorithms)
Anti-replay
TCP segment (transport mode)
or
entire IP packet (tunnel mode)
Pad to block size for cipher,
also hide actual payload length
Type of payload
HMAC-based Integrity
Check Value (similar to AH)
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
IP HDR IP Payload
Transport Mode
IP HDR ESP HDR IP Payload
ESP
Trailer
ESP
Auth
encrypted
authenticated
Tunnel Mode
New IP HDR ESP HDR IP HDR IP Payload
ESP
Trailer
ESP
Auth
encrypted
authenticated
SA Establishment
Phase 1 -IKE SA is established
Cookie exchange(يكوكلا لدابت)
Protects responderby requesting that initiator submits valid
cookie before value exchange and Diffie-Hellman key
exchange
( يمْحَيبيجتسملا ةميقلا لدابت لبق َحيحص يكوك ُمّدقُي ئدابلا ّنأب بَلَطلابلدابتوحيتافملا )
Valid cookie: computed and verified by the responder
Need cookie exchange
Value exchange(ميقلا لدابت)
Establishes a shared secret key(كرتشم يرس حاتفم ءاشنا)
Uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange ( حاتفملا لدابت ةقيرط مادختسا)
Negotiate parameters
Result: shared, un-authenticated secret key
Authentication exchange(ققحتلا لدابت)
Keys and SA are authenticated
Methods: preshared keys, DSS, RSA digital signature,
encrypted nonce with RSA
SA Establishment
Phase 2 -IPSec SA is established
IKESAisusedtoestablish( مدختسيءاشنلا)IPsec
SAbetweencommunicatingpeers(رئاظنلا
ةلصتملا)
Quickmodeexchange( طمنلدابتلاعيرسلا )
Negotiate(تاضوافم)IPsecSAunderthe
protectionof(تحتةيامح)IKESA
KeysderivedfromIKEsecretstate
Plain IPSec
Outgoing Packets: SAD Selects SA
Network A
Network B
Network C
SA #1
SAD
Selector SA
<A,B,*,*,*> #1
<A,C,*.*.*> #2
SPD
Selector Action
<A,B,*,*,*> Encrypt
<A,C,*.*.*> Encrypt
<A,*,*,*,*> Drop
A -> B
A -> B
A -> B
Plain IPSec
Incoming Packets: SAD Checks SA
Network A
Network B
Network C
SA #1
SAD
Selector SA
<A,B,*,*,*> #1
<A,C,*.*.*> #2
C->A
Let’s
Spoof C
C->A
Packets from
SA#1
Should match
<A,B,*,*,*>
Drop !
Plain IPSec
Incoming Packets: SPD Checks
Network A
Network B
Network C
SPD
Selector Action
<A,B,*,*,*> Encrypt
<A,C,*.*.*> Encrypt
<A,*,*,*,*> Drop
Let’s
Spoof C
Packets
<A,C,*,*,*> should
be encrypted
Drop !
Plain IPSec
Preventing Traffic Injection
Network A
Network B
Network C
SPD
Selector Action
<A,B,*,*,*> Encrypt
<A,C,*.*.*> Encrypt
<A,*,*,*,*> Drop
No
spoofing,
I’m D
Packets <A,*,*,*,*>
must be dropped !
Encryption Explained
Usedtoconvertdatatoasecretcodefor
transmissionoveranuntrustednetwork
ُلمعَتسُيليوحَتل تانايبلاىلإمروزيرس لاسرلإلىلعش ةكب
ريغ ةنمَتْؤُم
Encryption
Algorithm
“The cow jumped
over the moon”
“4hsd4e3mjvd3sd
a1d38esdf2w4d”
Clear Text
Encrypted Text
What are Keys?
A series of numbers and
letters… ةلسلس نمدادعلأاولافورح
…usedinconjunctionwithan
encryptionalgorithm… لمعتست
طابترلإابعم َةيمزراوخ ريفشت
…toturnplaintextintoencrypted
textandbackintoplaintext
ليوحَتل ّصنيداعىلإ ّصَن رّفشموسكعلاب
Thelongerthekey,thestronger
theencryption
حاتفملالوطلاايطعيريفشتىوقأ
Asymmetric Encryption رظانتملالا ريفشتلا
Differentkeysusedtoencryptanddecryptmessage(Onepublic,
oneprivate)
حيتافمةفلتخمريفشتللوكفلريفشتلا(دحاوماعورخآصاخ)
Providesnon-repudiationofmessageormessageintegrity
رفويةملاستانايبلا
ExamplesincludeRSA,DSA,SHA-1,MD-5
Alice Public Key
Encrypt
Alice Private Key
Decrypt
Bob Alice