Minerva mill case ltd

Anuja tripathy student of KIIT SCHOOL OF LAW

1. MINERVAMILLCASELTD.ANDORS.V.UNIONOFINDIAANDORS
AIR1980SC1789
CASESTUDYOFCONSTITUTIONALLAW
NAME:AnujaTripathy
ROLLNO.:1783019
BRANCH:B.A.LLB.(A)
SUBJECT:ConstitutionalLaw
SUBMITTEDTO:Ms.DiyaSarkarMaam

2. INTRODUCTION
Minervamillsltdandorsv.UnionofIndiaandors(casecitation-AIR1980SC1789)
isalandmarkdecisionoftheSupremeCourtOfIndiawhichevolvedthebasicstructuredoctrine
oftheConstitutionOfIndia.Thedoctrinei.e;the“basicstructure”isajudgemadedoctrine,
wheretherearecertainfeaturesofConstitutionOfIndiawhichisbeyondthelimitofthepowers
ofamendmentsoftheParliamentOfIndia..Nopartoftheconstitutionmaybesoamendedby
Article-368soasto“alterthebasicstructure”oftheConstitution.Orinacontextinwhich,any
constitutionalamendmentthatviolatesthe‘basicstructure’oftheConstitutionwouldbeinvalid.
NeithertheDoctrineofBasicStructurenorthebasicfeaturesoftheConstitutionhavebeen
explicitlymentionedintheconstitutionofIndia.Thedoctrineofbasicstructureofthe
ConstitutionowesitsevolutionintheratioofthemajorityjudgmentoftheSupremeCourtinthe
landmarkcaseKeshvanandBhartiv.StateofKerala.Intheaftermathoftheenunciationofthe
doctrineofbasicstructureoftheConstitutionbytheSupremeCourtinthecaseof
KeshavanandhaBhartiv.StateofKerala5,thiscase6involvedafurtheranalysisofthebasic
structureoftheconstitutioninthecontextofthelimitationstotheamendingpowersofthe
parliamentandthebalancebetweenfundamentalrightsanddirectiveprinciplesofthestate
policy.
TheJudgesinvolvedinthecasewereY.V.Chandrachud(CheifJusticeOfIndia),A.C.Gupta,
N.L.Untwalia,P.S.Kailasam,P.N.Bhagwati.

3. FACTSOFTHECASE:
1.Petitioner1whichwasalimitedCompanywhichownedatextileundertakingcalledMinerva
MillssituatedinSTATEOFKARNATAKA.Thisundertakingwastakenoverandnationalised
bytheCentralGovernmentundertheprovisionsofSickTextileUndertakings(Nationalisation)
Act,1974,Petitoner1hassomeshareholdersi.e:petitioner2to6someofwhomarealso
unsecuredcreditorsandsomesecuredcreditors.
2.Respondent1istheUnionofIndia.Respondent2istheNationalTextileCorporationLimited
inwhichthetextileundertakingofMinervaMillscomestobevestedunderSection3(2)ofthe
NationalisationActof1974.Respondent3isasubsidiaryofthe2ndrespondent.
3.OnAugust20,1970,theCentralGovernmentappointedaCommitteeunderSection15ofthe
Industries(DevelopmentandRegulation)Act,1951tomakeafullandcompleteinvestigationof
theaffairsoftheMinervaMillsLtd.,asitwasoftheopinionthattherehadbeenorwaslikelyto
besubstantialfallinthevolumeofproduction.ThesaidCommitteesubmitteditsreporttothe
CentralGovernmentinJanuary1971,onthebasisofwhichtheCentralGovernmentpassedan
orderdatedOctober19,1971underSection18AoftheActof1951,authorisingRespondent2to
takeoverthemanagementoftheMinervaMillsLtd.onthegroundthatitsaffairswerebeing
managedinamannerhighlydetrimentaltopublicinterest.
4.Bythesepetitions,thepetitionerschallengetheconstitutionalityofSections4and55ofthe
Constitution(42ndAmendment)Act,1976anditisthiscontentionalonewithwhichthey
proposetodealinthesepetitions.

4. CONSTITUTIONALISSUESUNDERQUESTION:
Thematterswhichwereunderquestioned:
1.WhethertheamendmentsintroducedbySections4and55oftheConstitution(42nd
Amendment)Act,1976damagethebasicstructureoftheconstitution?
2.WhetherdirectiveprinciplesofStatepolicycontainedinPartIVcanhaveprimacyover
fundamentalrightsconferredbypartIIIoftheconstitution?

5. ARGUMENTSADVANCEDFORTHEPETITONER:
1.Thecontentionofthepetitionerswasthat,therewereimpliedorinherentlimitationson
theamendmentpowerandthereforeParliamentdoesnothavethepowertoconferon
Article368toamendtheConstitutionsoastodestroyoremasculatetheessentialorbasic
elementsoffeaturesoftheConstitution.
2.ThebasicstructureoftheConstitutionrestsonthefoundationwhilethedirective
principlesarethemandatoryendsofgovernment,thoseendscanonlybeachieved
throughthemeanswhicharesetoutinPartIIIoftheConstitution.
3.Section4ofthe42ndAmendmenthasthefundamentalrightsoftheirsupremacyasif
therewereaemergencywhichispermanentinoperation.
4.Itisnotpossibletoenvisagethatdestructionoffundamentalfreedomsguaranteedby
PartIIIoftheConstitutionisnecessaryforachievingtheobjectofsomeofthedirective
principles.
5.IndianConstitutionisfoundedonthebedrockofthebalancebetweenPartsIIIandIV
oftheConstitution.Togiveabsoluteprimacytooneovertheotheristodisturbthe
harmonyoftheConstitution.Thisharmonyandbalancebetweendirectiveprinciplesand
fundamentalrightswhichisanessentialfeatureofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.
6.Effectofgivingimmunitytolawsenactedforthepurposeofgivingeffecttoanyone
ormoreoftheDirectivePrincipleswould,beinrealityandsubstancetowipeout
Articles14and19fromtheConstitutionandthatwouldaffectthebasicstructureofthe
Constitution.
7.TheconsequenceofthisexclusionofthepowerofjudicialreviewbySection55ofthe
Constitution(42ndAmendment)Act,1976,whichinsertedSub-sections(4)and(5)of
Article368wouldbethat,thelimitationontheamendingpowerofParliamentwould
becomenon-existentandtheamendingpowerofParliamentwouldstandenlarged.

6. ARGUMENTADVANCEDFORTHERESPONDENT:
1.Securingtheimplementationofdirectiveprinciplesbyeliminatingtheobstructivelegal
procedureswhichcannoteverbesaidtodamageordestroythebasicfeaturesoftheConstitution.
2.Further,lawsmadeforsecuringtheobjectivesofPartIVwouldnecessarilybeinpublic
interest.
3.AlawwhichfulfilsthedirectiveofArticle38isincapableofabrogatingfundamental
freedomsorofdamagingthebasicstructureoftheConstitutioninasmuchasthatstructureitself
isfoundedontheprincipleofjustice–social,economicandpolitical.
4.TheunamendedArticle31ChavingbeenupheldbythemajorityinKesavanandaBharaticase,
theamendedArticle31Cmustbeheldtobevalid,especiallysinceithasnotbroughtabouta
qualitativechangeincomparisonwiththeprovisionsoftheunamendedarticleandcomeswithin
thesweepingpowersofamendmentunderArticle-368.
5.Besides,thedirectiveprinciplesbeingthemselvesfundamentalinthegovernanceofthe
country,noamendmentoftheConstitutiontoachievetheendsspecifiedinthedirective
principlescaneveralterthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.
6.Theissueistoowideandacademicanditisthesettledpracticeofthecourtnottodecide
academicquestions.
7.Thedeprivationofsomeorthefundamentalrightsforthepurposeofachievingwelfareof
peoplecannotpossiblyamounttoadestructionofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.

7. PRINCIPLEFOLLOWEDBYTHECOURTS:
IntheMinervaMillscase,theSupremeCourtprovidedkeyclarificationsontheinterpretationof
thebasicstructuredoctrine.Thecourtunanimouslyruledthatthepoweroftheparliamentto
amendtheconstitutionislimitedbytheconstitution.Hencetheparliamentcannotexercisethis
limitedpowertograntitselfanunlimitedpower.Inaddition,amajorityofthecourtalsoheld
thattheparliament'spowertoamendisnotapowertodestroy.Hencetheparliamentcannot
emasculatethefundamentalrightsofindividuals,includingtherighttolibertyandequality.
InthiscaseofMinervaMillvs.UnionofIndia,thevalidityof42ndamendmentActwas
challengedonthegroundthattheyaredestructiveofthe‘basicstructure’oftheConstitution.
TheSupremeCourtbymajorityby4to1struckdownclauses(4)and(5)ofthearticle368
insertedby42ndAmendmentoftheIndianConstitution,ontheopinionthattheseclauses
smashedtheessentialaspectofthebasicstructureoftheconstitution.
Itwasruledbythecourtthatalimitedamendingpoweritselfisabasicfeatureofthe
Constitution.ThisJudgmentlaiddownthat:TheamendmentmadetoArticle31Cbythe42nd
AmendmentisinvalidbecauseitdamagedtheessentialfeaturesoftheConstitution.Clauses(4)
and(5)areinvalidonthegroundthattheyviolatetwobasicfeaturesoftheConstitution:
Limitednatureofthepowertoamend
Judicialreview
Thecourtscannotbedeprivedoftheirpowerofjudicialreview.Theprocedureprescribedby
Clause(2)isobligatory.TheJudgmentoftheSupremeCourtthusmakesitclearthatthe
ConstitutionisSupremenottheParliament.Parliamentcannothaveunlimitedamendingpower
soastodamageordestroytheConstitutiontowhichitowesitsexistenceandalsoderivesits
power.
TheFundamentalRightsandtheDirectivePrinciplesarerequiredtobeviewedasthetwosides
ofthesamecoin.Bothshouldbecomplementarytoeachotherandthereshouldbeno
confrontationbetweenthem.Undoubtedly,PartIVisapartoftheConstitution.
AnyimportanceontheDirectivePrinciplesalone,intotaldisregardoftherightsandliberties,
mayleadtoabsolutism.HenceaharmoniousbalanceshouldbemaintainedbetweenPartIIIand
PartIVoftheConstitutionandrealblendshouldcomeoutonlyfromharmonizingthespiritof
politicaldemocracywiththespiritofeconomicdemocracy.

8. JUDGEMENT
Byamajorityof4:1,theCourtheldtheSection4oftheConstitution(42ndAmendment)Act,
1976asbeingunconstitutionalonthegroundofviolationofthebasicstructure.Similarly,the
Section55oftheConstitution(42ndAmendment)Act,1976washeldunconstitutional
unanimously.
ThemajorityopinionwasdeliveredbyChiefJusticeChandrachudonbehalfofGuptaJ.,
UntawaliaJ.andKailasamJ.
(1)ValidityofAmendmentstoArticle368
Chandrachud,C.J.,discernedtheratioofKeshavanadaBharti’scaseas‘Parliamenthastheright
tomakealterationsintheConstitutionsolongastheyarewithinitsbasicframework’.26The
aforesaidamendmentstendtoconferunlimitedamendingpowerontotheParliamentextending
uptotheeffacementoftheConstitutionitself.Inthewordsofthemajority:27
Parliamentcannot,underArticle368,expanditsamendingpowersoastoacquireforitselfthe
righttorepealorabrogatetheConstitutionortodestroyitsbasicandessentialfeatures.The
doneeofalimitedpowercannotbytheexerciseofthatpowerconvertthelimitedpowerintoan
unlimitedone.
Thus,clause(5)wasdeclaredasunconstitutionalonthegroundofdamagingthebasicfeaturesof
theConstitution.Movingfurther,clause(4)whichbarredjudicialreviewincasesof
constitutionalamendmentswasheldunconstitutionalasitsoughttomaketheentirePartIII
unenforceableandthus,enlargethepoweroftheParliamentlimitedbyArticle13.TheCourt
reasonedthatifaconstitutionalamendmentgoesbeyondthepaleofjudicialreviewthen
ordinarylawsmadeinpursuancethereofwillescapejudicialscrutinybyvirtueofprotection
offeredbysuchanomnipotentamendment.Hence,suchaclausewasintransgressionofthe
limitationsontheamendingpowerandhenceunconstitutional.28
(2)ValidityofAmendmentstoArticle31C
TheamendmentmadetoArticle31Cvastlyextendeditsscopefromprotectionoflawsmadefor
thepurposesofArticle39(b)and(c)toalltheArticlesunderPartIVfromchallengeonthe
groundofArticle14and19.
ThemajoritythenundertookthetaskofweighingDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicy
[hereinafter‘DPSPs’]againsttheFundamentalRights.InrespectofDPSPsitobserved:29
However,thepreservationofbasiclibertiesprovidedunderPartIIIhasalsobeenasolemn
endeavouroftheIndianConstitution.InviewofthedraftinghistoryofIndianConstitution,both
PartIIIandPartIVformedanintegralandindivisibleschemeandthusintheopinionofthe
majority‘todestroytheguaranteesgivenbyPartIIIinorderpurportedlytoachievethegoalsof
PartIVisplainlytosubverttheConstitutionbydestroyingitsbasicstructure.’30Therelation
betweenthetwopartswasexplainedinthewordsquotedunderneath:31
GranvilleAustin’sobservationbringsoutthetruepositionthatPartsIIIandIVareliketwo
wheelsofachariot,onenolessimportantthantheother.Yousnaponeandtheotherwillloseits

9. efficacy.Theyarelikeatwinformulaforachievingthesocialrevolution,whichistheideal
whichthevisionaryfoundersoftheConstitutionsetbeforethemselves.Inotherwords,the
IndianConstitutionisfoundedonthebedrockofthebalancebetweenPartsIIIandIV.Togive
absoluteprimacytooneovertheotheristodisturbtheharmonyoftheConstitution.This
harmonyandbalancebetweenfundamentalrightsanddirectiveprinciplesisanessentialfeature
ofthebasicstructureoftheConstitution.Thoserightsarenotanendinthemselvesbutarethe
meanstoanend,TheendisspecifiedinPartIV.
Hence,themajoritydeclaredtheamendmenttobebeyondthepowersofParliamentasviolative
oftheessentialfeaturesoftheConstitutionwhileemphasizingthat:32
ThreeArticlesofourConstitution,andonlythree,standbetweentheheavenoffreedominto
whichTagorewantedhiscountrytoawakeandtheabyssofunrestrainedpower.Theyare
Articles14,19and21.Article31Chasremovedtwosidesofthatgoldentrianglewhichaffords
tothepeopleofthiscountryanassurancethatthepromiseheldforthbythePreamblewillbe
performedbyusheringanegalitarianerathroughthedisciplineoffundamentalrights,thatis,
withoutemasculationoftherightstolibertyandequalitywhichalonecanhelppreservethe
dignityoftheindividual.
Fortheremovalofdoubts,itisherebydeclaredthatthereshallbenolimitationwhateveronthe
constituentpowerofParliamenttoamendbywayofaddition,variationorrepealtheprovisions
ofthisConstitutionunderthisarticle.
Theaboveclauseswereunanimouslyruledasunconstitutional.ChiefJusticeY.V.
Chandrachudexplainedinhisopinionthatsince,ashadbeenpreviouslyheldinKesavananda
Bharativ.StateofKerala,thepowerofParliamenttoamendtheconstitutionwaslimited,it
couldnotbyamendingtheconstitutionconvertthislimitedpowerintoanunlimitedpower(asit
hadpurportedtodobythe42ndamendment).
SincetheConstitutionhadconferredalimitedamendingpowerontheParliament,theParliament
cannotundertheexerciseofthatlimitedpowerenlargethatverypowerintoanabsolutepower.
Indeed,alimitedamendingpowerisoneofthebasicfeaturesofourConstitutionandtherefore,
thelimitationsonthatpowercannotbedestroyed.Inotherwords,Parliamentcannot,under
Article368,expanditsamendingpowersoastoacquireforitselftherighttorepealorabrogate
theConstitutionortodestroyitsbasicandessentialfeatures.Thedoneeofalimitedpower
cannotbetheexerciseofthatpowerconvertthelimitedpowerintoanunlimitedone.
Section4ofthe42ndAmendment,hadamendedArticle31CoftheConstitutiontoaccord
precedencetotheDirectivePrinciplesofStatePolicyarticulatedinPartIVoftheConstitution
overtheFundamentalRightsofindividualsarticulatedinPartIIIofIndianCostitution.Bya
verdictof4-1,withJusticeP.N.Bhagwatidissenting,thecourtheldsection4ofthe42nd
Amendmenttobeunconstitutional.
[2]
ChiefJusticeChandrachudwrote:
ThreeArticlesofourConstitution,andonlythree,standbetweentheheavenoffreedominto
whichTagorewantedhiscountrytoawakeandtheabyssofunrestrainedpower.Theyare
Articles14,19and21.Article31Chasremovedtwosidesofthatgoldentrianglewhichaffords
tothepeopleofthiscountryanassurancethatthepromiseheldforthbythepreamblewillbe
performedbyusheringanegalitarianerathroughthedisciplineoffundamentalrights,thatis,
withoutemasculationoftherightstolibertyandequalitywhichalonecanhelppreservethe
dignityoftheindividual.

10. MATCHORCONTRASTWITHTHEINDIANSCENARIO:
Theverdictintheminervamills1980caseisconsideredassupremecourt’sreactiontothe42nd
CAA,1976byindiragandhigovt.
Indiragandhiin1976hadvehementlyincreasedthepowersoftheparliamentandalso
significantlyreducedtheroleofjudiciary.itcanbeseeninfollowingprovsisionsof1976act1
article31C.theDPSP’sweregivenpoweroverFR’s(i.e.Anylawmadebylegislaturetobring
DPSPintoeffectshallnotbevoidiffoundincontraventiontoFR’s)2article368any
ammendmentunderart368shallnotbequestionedincourt.
TheSCverdictstruckdownpoints(4)&(5)ofart368andsaidthateveryconstitutional
ammendmentshallbeunderjudicialreview.
TheSCalsomodifiedthearticle31CtoitsoriginalpositionstatingthatnotallDPSP’sbutonly
article39(b)and39(c)oftheDPSP’sshallbeconsideredaboveFR’s(i.eonlyart.14&19
notallFR’s).
Wellinthese2popularcasesofKeshavNandaBhartiAndMinervaMillcase
S.CheldthateachandeveryprovisionofconstitutioncanbeamendedincludingFundamental
rightsalsosothatswhyart-31wasrepealedbutacceptthebasicstructureofconstitutioncan’tbe
amendedinanycase.

11. CASEANALYSIS
Thiscasesubstantiatedthe‘basicstructure’doctrinebyemphasizingovertheimportanceofthe
balancebetweenfundamentalrightsandDPSPasbeingapartofthebasicstructureofthe
constitution.Thiscasehasfurtherbroadenedtheconceptofthe‘basicstructure’ofthe
constitutionwhichhasensuredthesurvivalofthefundamentalaspectsoverwhichthe
constitutionisbasedupon.BasicstructureoftheConstitutionisofprimeimportanceasit
preventstheparliamentfromhavingunconditionalpowerandbecomingthemasterofLawitself.
OnecertaintythatemergedoutofthistusslebetweenParliamentandthejudiciaryisthatalllaws
andconstitutionalamendmentsarenowsubjecttojudicialreviewandlawsthattransgressthe
basicstructurearelikelytobestruckdownbytheSupremeCourt.InessenceParliament’spower
toamendtheConstitutionisnotabsoluteandtheSupremeCourtisthefinalarbiteroverand
interpreterofallconstitutionalamendments.
FinallytheBasicStructureoftheconstitutionreiteratesawellsettlednotionthatnoneisabove
theConstitution,neithertheparliamentnorthejudiciary.