Mischief Rule of Interpretation of statutes

Mischief Rule

1. Mischief Rule Dr.Shobhna Jeet Associate Professor School of Legal Studies KR Mangalam University

2. This is a very important rule as far as the Interpretation of Statute is concerned. It is often referred to as the “rule in  Heydon’s Case “ [ i ] .  This very important case reported by Lord Coke and decided by the Barons of the Exchequer in the 16th century laid down the following rules:

3. That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law; four things are to be considered – 1)      What was the common law before the passing of the Act? 2)      What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? 3)      What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the “disease of the Commonwealth”. 4)      The true reasons for the remedy.

4. Case Laws ( Smith v. Hughes ) The brief facts were that the defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon Street, London and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959, between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the balcony being some 8–10 feet above street level). The defendant’s method of soliciting the men was:

5. i )  to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal object and by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and (ii) having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside the premises with such words as ‘Would you like to come up here a little while?’ at the same time as she indicated the correct door of the premises.

6. I t was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the balcony was not ‘in a Street’ within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no offence had been committed. “The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution’.

7. Lord Parker CJ  said Case that she ‘ being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959.’ It was found that the defendant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the solicitation was in a street. The defendants in this case were not themselves physically in the street but were in a house adjoining the street, on a balcony and she attracted the attention of men in the street by tapping and calling down to them. At other part the defendants were in ground-floor windows, either closed or half open. The sole question here is whether in those circumstances each defendant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of  section 1(1)  of the Act of 1959 are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.’

8. Elliot v Grey The defendant’s car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its battery removed. He was charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using an uninsured vehicle on the road. The defendant argued he was not ‘using’ the car on the road as clearly it was not driveable . It was held: The court applied the mischief rule and held that the car was being used on the road as it represented a hazard and therefore insurance would be required in the event of an incident. The statute was aimed at ensuring people were compensated when injured due to the hazards created by others.

9. RMDC v. UOI  In RMDC v Union of India the definition of ‘prize competition’ under  s 2(d)  of the  Prize competition act 1955 , was held to be inclusive of only those instances in which no substantive skill is involved. Thus, those prize competitions in which some skill was required were exempt from the definition of ‘prize competition’ under  s 2(d)  of the Act. Hence, in the aforementioned case, the Supreme Court has applied the Heydon’s Rule in order to suppress the mischief was intended to be remedied, as against the literal rule which could have covered prize competitions where no substantial degree of skill was required for success.