Political and Economic Aspects of Turkey EU Relations.pptx

Turkey EU Relations

1. Political and Economic Aspects of EU-Turkey Relations

2. Accession Negotiations Framework for Turkey (29 June 2005) The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the « absorption capacity of the Union » , if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership, it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.

3. Accession Negotiations Framework for Turkey (29 June 2005) The European Council also agreed that parallel to accession negotiations , the Union will engage with every candidate State in an intensive political and cultural dialogue involving civil society . “This dialogue will prove valuable in improving mutual understanding and encouraging a debate on both sides on all aspects of our relationship .”

4. Accession Negotiations Framework for Turkey (29 June 2005) In the case of a serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will , on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption.

5. Accession Negotiations Framework for Turkey (29 June 2005) applied to all candidate countries through negotiations .  Conditionality : If you meet the criteria , you will become an EU member . The advancement of the negotiations will be guided by Turkey's progress in preparing for accession, within a framework of economic and social convergence and with reference to the Copenhagen criteria , which set down the following requirements for membership:

6. Accession Negotiations Framework for Turkey (29 June 2005) * the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; * the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; * the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union and the administrative capacity to effectively apply and implement the acquis;

7. Negotiation process The substance of negotiations will be conducted in an Intergovernmental Conference with the participation of all Member States on the one hand and the candidate State on the other . The Commission will undertake a formal process of examination of the acquis, called screening , in order to explain it to the Turkish authorities, to assess the state of preparation of Turkey for opening negotiations in specific areas and to obtain preliminary indications of the issues that will most likely come up in the negotiations . For the purposes of screening and the subsequent negotiations, the acquis will be broken down into a number of chapters, each covering a specific policy area.

8. Negotiation process Building on the Commission's Regular Reports on Turkey's progress towards accession and in particular on information obtained by the Commission during screening, the Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by the Commission , will lay down benchmarks for the provisional closure and, where appropriate, for the opening of each chapter.

9. Negotiation process Turkey will be requested to indicate its position in relation to the acquis and to report on its progress in meeting the benchmarks. Turkey's correct transposition and implementation of the acquis, including effective and efficient application through appropriate administrative and judicial structures, will determine the pace of negotiations.

10. Negotiation process To this end, the Commission will closely monitor Turkey's progress in all areas, making use of all available instruments, including on-site expert reviews by or on behalf of the Commission. The Commission will inform the Council of Turkey's progress in any given area when presenting draft EU Common Positions. The Council will take this assessment into account when deciding on further steps relating to the negotiations on that chapter.

11. Screening Process S creening process or analytical examination of the  acquis  is a preparatory phase of accession negotiations . The screening process is carried out jointly by the Commission and each of the candidate countries. This process allows the latter to familiarize themselves with the  acquis  and, subsequently, to indicate their level of alignment with EU legislation and outline plans for further alignment. The European Commission started the screening process for Turkey on the 20 th  October 2005 and the process was completed on the 13 th  October 2006 as agreed by the parties.

12. Negotiation Chapters During the negotiation process, chapters are opened depending upon the candidate country’s fulfilment of opening benchmarks, which are determined by the EU Council, and once again chapters are provisionally closed depending upon the candidate country’s fulfilment of closing benchmarks, which are also determined by the EU Council.   One single member country by declaring its negative opinion can block the opening or closing of the chapters . In T urkey ’s EU accession negotiations, 16 chapters are opened whereas only 1 chapter is temporarily closed. 

13. Negotiation Chapters – Opened : 4 ) Free Movement of Capital 6 ) Company Law 7 ) Intellectual Property Law 10) Information Society and Media 12) Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy

14. Negotiation Chapters – Opened : 16 ) Taxation 17 ) Economic and Monetary Policy 18 ) Statis tics 20 ) Enterprise and Industrial Policy 21 ) Trans-European Networks

15. Negotiation Chapters – Opened : 22 ) Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments 25 ) Science and Research * ( provisionally closed ) 27 ) Environment 28 ) Consumer and Health Protection 32) Financial Control 33) Financial and Budgetary Provisions

16. Turning point ! According to the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council Decision of 11 December 2006, fulfilment of T urkey ’s commitments under the Additional Protocol is opening benchmark for 8 chapters and closing benchmark for all chapters .  Turkey did not open it's harbors and airports to the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus despite the Additional Protocol

17. Chapters suspended by the General Affairs and External Relations Council Decision of 11 December 2006: 1) Free Movement of Goods 3) Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services 9) Financial Services 11) Agriculture and Rural Development 13) Fisheries 14) Transport Policy 29) Customs Union 30) External Relations

18. Turning point -2! Moreover, during the EU General Affairs Council meeting of 8 December 2009, Greek Cypriots declared that the unilateral “ normalisation ” of relations was set as a precondition for the progress in 6 chapters.

19. Chapters unilaterally blocked by Southern Cyprus: 2) Free Movement of Workers 15) Energy 23) Judiciary and Fundamental Rights 24) Justice, Freedom and Security 26) Education and Culture 31) Foreign, Security and Defence Policy

20. France as a veto player While bilateral relations between Turkey and Cyprus affected Turkish accession negotiations , France emerged as another veto player in the EU blocking the opening of chapters where the Commission and Turkey have already agreed to common negotiation positions . A prime example was the then newly elected French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s veto on the opening of Chapter 17 on Financial and Economic Integration in June 2007, despite the Commission’s recommendation that Turkey has adopted the rules for that chapter .

21. France as a veto player France from 2007 to 2013 vetoed the opening of 5 Chapters , ranging from economics and financial matters to regional policy , based on its notion that ‘ opening these chapters would prejudge the outcome of negotiations as accession ’. Similarly , in 2007 Sarkozy came up with the idea of a “ Union for the Mediterranean ” and suggested that Turkey’s role in this Union would be substantial , and this might be a better strategy for Turkey’s relations with the EU, rather than full membership .

22. Chapters Whose Closing Benchmarks Were Confirmed to Be Fulfilled : 6 ) Company Law 20) Enterprise and Industrial Policy 21) Trans-European Networks  28) Consumer and Health Protection 32) Financial Control

23. INSTRUMENT FOR PRE-ACCESSION ASSISTANCE (IPA ) I 2007-2013 First period of IPA (IPA I) was implemented between 2007 and 2013 . In this period, 4.87 billion Euros was allocated for Turkey under the five components of IPA I which covered priorities defined according to the needs of Turkey with the aim of ensuring targeted, effective and coherent action.

24. IPA II 2014-2020 In the IPA II period that covers the period from 2014 to 2020, priorities and policy areas are determined in line with the components of the framework of IPA I financial assistance. Accordingly , several sectorial and sub-sectorial have been identified and Ministry for EU Affairs and respective Ministries in Turkey are assigned to coordinate the project activities under the framework of identified sectors.

25. IPA III 2021-2027 The   priority sectors   for funding in this period are :   Democracy & governance    Civil society Rule of law & fundamental rights Home affairs Environment & climate action Transport Energy Agriculture & rural development Regional and territorial cooperation

26. The i mpact of the EU membership process in Turkey : Economy Th e Turkish economy in the post-crisis era experienced one of its most successful phases of growth. Fiscal and monetary discipline was established and inflation was reduced to single digit levels for the first time for several decades . Important institutional reforms helped to create a relatively autonomous central bank and a more robust banking and financial system which created stability conducive to long-term growth .

27. The i mpact of the EU membership process in Turkey : Economy Turkey , for the first time in its recent economic history, started to attract considerable amounts of foreign direct investment . The prospect of EU membership was critical in terms of providing the kind of longer-term anchor which the IMF program alone could not accomplish. The fact that Turkeys foreign direct investment boom effectively started in 2005, following the decision to initiate the formal negotiation process, constitutes further testimony to the importance of the kind of powerful signals that rapid progress in meeting the formal EU criteria helped to provide to key economic actors .

28. Updating the Customs Union With regards to economic integration, the revamping of the 1995 Customs U nion sits at the center of the current debates . On March 28, 2014, a World Bank study evaluated the economic benefits of the Customs Union, and its published report recommended its update as a strong imperative to reap further material gains for both parties .

29. Updating the Customs Union On 2 May 2015, EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and then Turkish Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekçi agreed to update the Customs Union to modernize the current agreement by extending it to cover services, right of establishment, public procurement and agriculture . In December 2016, the European Commission proposed to modernize the Customs Union and to further extend bilateral trade relations between Turkey and the EU to areas such as services, public procurement and sustainable development.

30. Updating the Customs Union The needs for the modernization of the agreement are tied to the absence of dispute settlement mechanisms, the asymmetry caused by the EU’s free trade agreements as well as the diverging rights that other non-EU members without an EU accession perspective – Ukraine and Moldova at the time- have negotiated with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements that allow greater trade concessions compared to the Turkish Customs U nion .

31. Updating the Customs Union However, in 2018, the European Council adopted a freeze on talks for upgrading the Customs U nion due to political reasons , and the General Affairs Council concluded in June 2018 that no work could be conducted for the modernization of the Customs U nion. That is because upgrading the Customs Union is not only an economic process but is highly political. The political ramifications are clearly indicated by the European Parliament in its March 2019 statement as follows:

32. Updating the Customs Union A s the uncertainty persists, other problems began to emerge in the implementation of the already agreed upon decisions of the Customs Union. For example, according to the 2019 Commission report on Turkey, Turkey’s level of alignment with the Common Commercial Tariff has backslided in 2019 when Turkey applied additional customs duties, and further diverged from the EU’s generalized scheme of preferences.

33. Updating the Customs Union While Turkey aligns itself with the EU’s Free Trade Agreements- for example- has done so when the EU signed the FTAs with South Korea and Canada, there is a significant problem with regards to the asymmetrical opening of the Turkish market to these 3rd parties without a reciprocal opening of these markets to Turkish products . In other words, Turkey is affected from these free trade agreements concluded with third parties as they erode its own trade preferences, and create trade asymmetries both for Turkey’s own trade with the EU, as well as those with third parties.

34. The impact of the EU membership process in Turkey : Democratization Turkey took important steps , progressing from a formal representative democracy toward a consolidated or substantive democracy during this period . Critical reform packages introduced by the Parliament represented important advances , dramatically extending the boundaries of civil and human rights as well as the rule of law in Turkish politics . The abolition of the death penalty and the steps taken towards the recognition of Kurdish identity  by offering a set of cultural rights which involved the use of the Kurdish language for education and broadcasting purpose

35. D emocracy is an absolutely necessary precondition for accession . The political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria act as the precondition for an applicant country to be accepted as a candidate and later for the opening of accession negotiations .

36. The Turkish accession negotiations proceeded very slowly . The prospects for Turkey’s admission to the EU were not very bright a decade after Turkey began accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005. As of July 15, 2016 , 16 of the 35 negotiation chapters were open and only one was provisionally closed .

37. 2016 Progress Report The EU strongly and immediately condemned the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, which represented a direct attack on democracy in Turkey , and expressed its solidarity to the Turkish democratic institutions . Turkey and the EU enhanced their dialogue on foreign and security policy , including counter-terrorism , Syria , Libya and Iraq . The fight against terrorism was recognised as a priority at the EU- Turkey Summit of 29 November 2015. The cooperation on migration was stepped up .  Turkey and the European Union have launched a dialogue on visa liberalisation and signed the Readmission Agreement (Dec 16,2013).

38. 2016 Progress Report  In the wake of the post- coup measures , the EU called on the authorities to observe the highest standards in the rule of law and fundamental rights . The broad scale and collective nature of these measures raised a number of very serious questions . 2018 Turkey Report  However , the broad scale and collective nature , and the disproportionality of measures taken since the attempted coup under the state of emergency , such as widespread dismissals , arrests , and detentions , continue to raise serious concerns . Criticism : the Parliament’s role, the President’s increased power , civil society , freedom of expression . 2019 Turkey Report  Serious backsliding remains in terms of human and fundamental rights .

39. 2020 Turkey Report Despite the lifting of the state of emergency in July 2018, the adverse impacts of the two-year long emergency ruling continued to significantly impact on democracy and fundamental rights. Certain legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the government authorities and retaining several restrictive elements of the emergency rule have been integrated into law. The constitutional architecture continued centralizing powers at the level of the Presidency without ensuring a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, legislative and the judiciary.

40. 2021 Turkey Report The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary have not been addressed. Relations with the EU deteriorated until December 2020, mostly due to actions taken by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, directly challenging the rights of the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus in its maritime zones. In addition, there was a sharp increase in provocative action taken by Turkey against Greece, a failure to advance in the Cyprus settlement process, and assertive action by Turkey in most of the surrounding regional conflicts, in ways that often were at odds with broader EU interests.

41. 2022 Turkey Report After some positive developments in 2021, relations with the EU deteriorated in the first half of 2022, due to repeated violations of Greek airspace by Turkish fighter jets in the Aegean and threatening Turkish statements regarding the sovereignty of Greek islands, and against Cyprus . In addition, Turkey continued to carry out military exercises in the maritime zones of the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus , and Turkish warships illegally obstructed survey activities in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

42. 2022 Turkey Report There are serious deficiencies in the functioning of Turkey’s democratic institutions . During the reporting period , democratic backsliding continued . Structural deficiencies in the presidential system remained in place . Parliament continued to lack the necessary means to hold the government accountable . The constitutional architecture continued to centralise powers at the level of the Presidency without ensuring the sound and effective separation of powers between the executive , legislative and the judiciary . In the absence of an effective checks and balances mechanism , the democratic accountability of the executive branch continues to be limited to elections .

43. 2023 Turkey Report serious deficiencies in the functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions . powers centralised at the level of the Presidency and does not ensure a sound and effective separation of powers between the executive , the legislature and the judiciary . deterioration of human and fundamental rights . w eak fight against corruption.

44. Recent Developments Turkey-EU relations has been directly affected by changes in the international system and European integration & recent developments in our region and the crises faced by the EU . Last example of this was seen in 2015 with the transformation of the human tragedy in Syria into a refugee crisis for the EU. 

45. Recent Developments I n the General Affairs Council Conclusions of 26 June 2018, it was stated that ‘‘ Türkiye has been moving further away from the European Union . Türkiye's accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernisation of the EU-Türkiye Customs Union is foreseen .’’ Besides , the Foreign Affairs Council of 15 July 2019 decided to adopt some measures regarding Türkiye’s activities in Eastern Mediterranean and this decision also negatively affected Türkiye-EU relations .

46. The most popular objections to Turkey's full membership 1 ) In case of its full membership to the EU, Turkey w ill receive a significant part of the EU structural funds and will impose an additional burden on countries that are major contributors to the EU budget. 2 ) The Turkish economy is not mature enough for the single market, and the Turkish industry is not competitive w ith that of the EU. 3 ) There is also a problem of free movement of the labour force in case of Turkey's full membership. It is expected in the medium and long terms that migration pressure from Turkey will continue and will lead to a too big influx of Turkish immigrants into the EU countries, particularly in Germany.

47. The most popular objections to Turkey’s full membership: 4) Turkey as an obstacle to creating a European demos European history often points out to ‘the Turk’ as the ‘other’ with fundamental differences from the Europeans. It is too hard to digest the cultural/religious traits of ‘the Turk’ within a common European identity. They further comment that “their integration was also impeded by sharp differences between Turkish and European cultural views on the roles of men and women, by the deep significance of Islam in the daily lives of many Turks.”

48. The most popular objections to Turkey’s full membership: 5 ) Turkey as a civilisational outsider “for many European politicians, Europe is not a geographical or political culture, but a modern reincarnation of the ancient Christianity” “Christianity has been not only an integrating factor, but a means also of differentiating Europe from Islam” “ Christianity is a key component of European identity, even though it may not be its principal or overriding constituent. In the EU’s relations with Turkey, this dimension of the European identity comes to the surface and plays a major determinant role .”

49. The most popular objections to Turkey’s full membership: 5) Geographical problem “Turkey is an Asian, not a European country” It is a common theme of European conservatives that Turkey’s inclusion in the EU is also wrong for geopolitical reasons.

50. The most popular objections to Turkey’s full membership: 6) Security concerns T he Turkish membership will extend the borders of the EU well into the Middle East and expose the EU to dangers of this region, such as terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, civil war, and so on.

51. The most popular objections to Turkey’s full membership: 7) Institutional concerns Allocation of the seats in the European Parliament  The number of MEPs  for each country is roughly  proportionate to its population , but this is by degressive proportionality: no country can have fewer than 6 or more than 96 MEPs and the total number cannot exceed 705 (704 plus the President).  Voting system in the Council of the EU  to be passed, decisions usually require a qualified majority : 55% of countries (with 27 current members, this means  15 countries ) representing at least 65 % of total EU population

52. Recommended Sources & Reading Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs https:// www.ab.gov.tr/turkey-eu-relations_4_en.html Ali Tekin, “ Future of Turkey -EU relations : a civilisational discourse ”, Futures 37 (2005), pp.287-302. Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “ Turkey’s Ambivalent Relationship with the European Union : To Accede or Not To Accede ”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, 2016, Vol.13, No:52, pp.89-103. Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “ External Differentiated Integration: The Modalities of Turkey’s Opting into the European Union ”, EUI Working Paper RSC 2021/19. Ziya Öniş , “Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate”, Insight Turkey, 2008, Vol.10, No:4, pp.35-50.