Powerpoint presentation Process Safety 22

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1. Wells Process Safety Pyramid

2. Process Safety Event Definitions
Event
Type
Operational Example Example Treatment
Significant
Loss of primary well control observed during
well operations. Secondary containment
arrangements fail to control well, leading to
release of hazardous substance to the external
environment having a RAM 4+* ACTUAL
consequence.
Loss ofprimary well control
leading to release of gas at
surface and subsequent
explosion and fatalities.
•Notify/Report –
Business/Function Head, Sr.
Business/Function Leader,
Business/Function HSSE & SP
VP, EVP Safety and
Environment
•Investigation type -TRIPOD,
TRIPOD Beta, Causal Learning
•SIR Meeting
•Incident Owner –VP
Deepwater Wells
High
Potential
1.Loss of primary well control observed
during well operations. Secondary
containment arrangements fail to control
well, leading to release of hazardous
substance to the external environment
having a RAM 4+* POTENTIAL
consequence.
2. Design load case exceeded, e.g. influx
volume greater than design volume, barrier
envelope experiences applied pressure
greater than design pressure, actual pore
pressure outside the predicted range
Isolation valveopened whilst
well was under-balanced,
leading to reservoir fluid at
surface. Well successfully shut
in with minor environmental
consequence.
Seal assembly released
unexpectedly, leading to gas
release and subsequent fire on
drill floor. No injuries, moderate
PLD to rotary, elevators and
TDS.
•Notify/Report –EVP Wells,
Regional Wells Manager,
Business/Functional HSSE &
SP VP
•Investigation type -Discretion
of Business HSSE & SP VP
•SIR -Discretion of Business
HSSE & SP VP
•IncidentOwner –Well Delivery
Manager

3. Process Safety Event Definitions
Event
Type
Operational Example Example Treatment
Single
Barrier
Failure
A single barrier fails to fulfil its function during
well operations. Alternative barriers provide
containment. Reference active barriers defined
in well programme.
•Kick (influx). Well shut in on
BOP.
•Gravel pack sleeve opened,
well flowed once displaced
to base oil. Well shut in on
BOP.
•BOP test fails but fluid
column remain in tact,
providing primary barrier.
•Notify/Report –VP Deepwater
Wells, Well Delivery Manager
•Investigation type –Root
Cause Analysis type,
discretionof WDM
•Final incident review withVP
Deepwater Wells, DWLT
•Incident Owner –
Superintendent
Other
Incidents
Process safety related systems or behaviour
exceptions are observed, all activebarriers
remain intact.
•Flow control devices are
discovered to be inoperable
•BOP test frequency reduced
without appropriate
authorisation
•Inappropriate repairs
performed on well control
equipment
•Inadvertent closure of BOPs
•Notify/Report –Well Delivery
Manager, Line Manager
•Investigation type –Rot Cause
Analysis type, discretion of
WDM
•Incident Owner –Rig Site
Supervisor

4. Wells Process Safety Triangle mapping to RAM
Other Incidents
Single Barrier
Failures
Other
Incidents
DLT/WALT Input: High
Potentials to be all RAM 4
& 5 (not just RAM Red)

5. RAM Protocol for Wells Process Safety Events
Event Type RAM Protocol
Significant
Actual RAM 4 or5
Potential RAM 4 or 5
High
Potential
Actual RAM Consequence3 or less
Potential RAMRed and all additional
level 4 or 5 (A4, B4, C4, A5, B5)
Single
Barrier
Failure
Actual RAM Consequence3 or less
Potential RAM willbe equal to actual
consequence level with D Frequency
(e.g., RAM potential will be D0, D1,
D2 or D3 for events with actual
consequence levels of 0, 1, 2 or 3,
respectively)
Other
Incidents