The New Institutional Economics and Gender Empowerment The new institutional economists (Coase, 1998; Nee, 1998) examine the relationship and interaction between formal regulations and incentives and informal incentives or constraints. For example, high government regulation and high tax rates discourage individuals and private enterprises from engaging in economic activities involving a high level of investment and considerable risk-taking. At the same time, if the informal incentives are low but constraints are high, the combined disincentives of formal and informal regulations will produce a considerable adverse impact on economic and social transactions in the country.
The demise of the neo-classical state has given rise to a conflict between the need for a “third-party” state to facilitate the complex transactions that must be carried out if a society is to attain higher levels of well-being for its individual members and the danger that the concentration of power in the hands of such a third-party state will lead to the perversion of that power to benefit some people at the expense of others
But this in turn has placed the women of developing countries in the following triple jeopardy in pursuit of their empowerment: In many developing countries, for the same kind of economic or social transaction, women are treated less fairly than men under the formal laws. An example is the payment of lower wage to women relative to men for the same kind of job in an urban office or in rural agriculture. As a result, women have far greater difficulty than men in alleviating their poverty and to attain empowerment. (ii) The perversion of state power to benefit the politically powerful groups at the expense of others increases the economic and social well-being of group members most of whom are men. Hence, women’s empowerment is hampered.
(iii) The capture of state powers by the politically powerful groups increases the flow of government largesse to these group members, prevents efficient allocation of resources and increases the monopoly power of state-sponsored enterprises. The result is that the actual rate of economic growth continues to fall below the potential rate. Consequently, the trickle down effect of this growth rate on women’s empowerment continues to weaken.
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Institutional Non-Compliance Score (INCS) Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain and measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among a country’s public officials and politicians. A higher corruption level also implies a higher level of institutional non-compliance which in turn implies a lower level of gender empowerment.
Calculate Deprivation Scores Gender Deprivation Scores provide the best picture of the relative status of women in a given society. In essence, these scores rate women on a score of 0 to 100 on a specific quantitative indicator, such as average years of schooling or maternal mortality rate. Gender Deprivation Index = 100 × (Maximum Value - Country’s Value)/ (Maximum Value - Minimum Value)
Gender Deprivation Ratio using highest level of schooling For example, women in Canada have the highest level of schooling with an average of 14.2 years, while those in Chad have the lowest at 0.5 years. To calculate the Gender Deprivation Ratio for women’s average number of years in school for Indonesia, therefore, that country’s value of 6.8 years is substituted into the preceding equation: GenDep = 100 * (14.2 - 6.8)/(14.2 - 0.5) = 54.0
Gender Deprivation Ratio using nation’s fertility rate The calculation for fertility rate is only slightly more complex. Here, Niger has the highest rate at 8.0 and Hong Kong the lowest at 1.0. Since lower fertility rates are associated with women’s empowerment, though, we need to invert the scale by, for example, subtracting a nation’s fertility rate from 9 to get the “country score”. For India with a fertility rate of 3.0, this produces: GenDep = 100 * (7.9 - 3.1)/(7.9 - 0.9) = 68.6
Power, privilege and gender From the very start of life in many contexts, power, male privilege and perceptions of gender- specific entitlements result in girls and boys being assigned different sets of rights and privileges. Gender relations assign authority, agency and decision making power. Thus, males tend not only to obtain more material resources in terms of food, healthcare and so forth, compared with their sisters, but also to have non- material advantages such as the ‘right’ to play and have fun. These are key factors in developing boys’ self- confidence and perception of having superior ‘rights’ vis- a- vis females .
The fact that women all over the world perform most work in the home, without pay, for example, is neither biologically self- evident nor based on physical sexual attributes, but the result of a gender- based distribution of power. The ‘reproductive’ role assigned to women has decisive consequences in terms of their dependence, power, long working hours for little pay, financial insecurity, and so on, in relation to men, in the family, in the group/clan and in society as a whole.
Gender- based discrimination is expressed from discrimination de jure through law texts to stereotypes, norms and codes which de facto limit the individual’s freedom and distribute resources asymmetrically. Gender is literally a man- made construction, generally apportioning more power and advantages to men, above all certain men.
Men as a group have been able to use their privileged access to resources both in the household and in the public domain to both defend and promote their own interests, often at the expense of women