Problems at independence

1. Problems at Independence
In August 1947, Pakistan was faced with a number of problems, some immediate but
others long term. The most important of these concerns was the role played by Islam.
Was Pakistan to be a secular state serving as a homeland for Muslims of the
subcontinent, or was it to be an Islamic state governed by the sharia, in which non-
Muslims would be second-class citizens? The second question concerned the
distribution of power between the center and the provincial governments, a question
that eventually led to the dissolution of the country with the painful loss of the East Wing
(East Bengal, later East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) in 1971, an issue that remained
unresolved in the mid-1990s.
The territory of Pakistan was divided into two parts at independence, separated by
about 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory. The 1940 Lahore Resolution had called for
independent "states" in the northwest and the northeast. This objective was changed,
by a 1946 meeting of Muslim League legislators to a call for a single state (the acronym
Pakistan had no letter for Bengal). Pakistan lacked the machinery, personnel, and
equipment for a new government. Even its capital, Karachi, was a second choice--
Lahore was rejected because it was too close to the Indian border. Pakistan's economy
seemed enviable after severing ties with India, the major market for its commodities.
And much of Punjab's electricity was imported from Indian power stations.
Above all other concerns were the violence and the refugee problem: Muslims were
fleeing India; Hindus and Sikhs were fleeing Pakistan. Jinnah's plea to regard religion as
a personal matter, not a state matter, was ignored. No one was prepared for the
communal rioting and the mass movements of population that followed the June 3,
1947, London announcement of imminent independence and partition. The most
conservative estimates of the casualties were 250,000 dead and 12 million to 24 million
refugees. The actual boundaries of the two new states were not even known until
August 17, when they were announced by a commission headed by a British judge. The
boundaries-- unacceptable to both India and Pakistan--have remained.
West Pakistan lost Hindus and Sikhs. These communities had managed much of the
commercial activity of West Pakistan. The Sikhs were especially prominent in
agricultural colonies. They were replaced largely by Muslims from India, mostly Urdu
speakers from the United Provinces. Although some people, especially Muslims from
eastern Punjab (in India), settled in western Punjab (in Pakistan), many headed for
Karachi and other cities in Sindh, where they took the jobs vacated by departing Hindus.
In 1951 close to half of the population of Pakistan's major cities were immigrants
(muhajirs--refugees from India and their descendants).
The aspirations for Pakistan that had been so important to Muslims in Muslim-minority
provinces and the goals for the new state these urban refugees had fled to were not
always compatible with those of the traditional rural people already inhabiting Pakistan,
whose support for the concept of Pakistan came much later. Pakistani society was
polarized from its inception.

2. The land and people west of the Indus River continued to pose problems. The most
immediate problem was the continued presence of a Congress government in the
North-West Frontier Province, a government effective at the grassroots level and
popular despite the loss of the plebiscite. Led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his
Khudai-i-Khitmagar (Servants of God, a Congress faction), this group was often referred
to as the Red Shirts after its members' attire. Ghaffar Khan asked his followers not to
participate in the July 1947 plebiscite.
Pakistan also had to establish its legitimacy against a possible challenge from
Afghanistan. Irredentist claims from Kabul were based on the ethnic unity of tribes
straddling the border; the emotional appeal of "Pakhtunistan," homeland of the
Pakhtuns, was undeniable. However, Pakistan upheld the treaties Britain had signed
with Afghanistan and refused to discuss the validity of the Durand Line as the
international border (see The Forward Policy , this ch.). Relations with Afghanistan were
hostile, resulting in the rupture of diplomatic and commercial relations and leading
Afghanistan to cast the only vote against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations
(UN) in 1947.
The India Independence Act left the princes theoretically free to accede to either
dominion. The frontier princely states of Dir, Chitral, Amb, and Hunza acceded quickly
to Pakistan while retaining substantial autonomy in internal administration and
customary law. The khan of Kalat in Balochistan declared independence on August 15,
1947, but offered to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan. Other Baloch sardar
(tribal chiefs) also expressed their preference for a separate identity. Pakistan took
military action against them and the khan and brought about their accession in 1948.
The state of Bahawalpur, with a Muslim ruler and a Muslim population, acceded to
Pakistan, as did Khairpur.
The maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, unpopular among his subjects, was reluctant to
decide on accession to either dominion. He first signed agreements with both Pakistan
and India that would provide for the continued flow of people and goods to Kashmir--as
it is usually called--from both dominions. Alarmed by reports of oppression of fellow
Muslims in Kashmir, armed groups from the North-West Frontier Province entered the
maharaja's territory. The ruler requested military assistance from India but had to sign
documents acceding to India before that country would provide aid in October 1947.
The government of Pakistan refused to recognize the accession and denounced it as a
fraud even though the Indian government announced that it would require an
expression of the people's will through a plebiscite after the invaders were driven back.
Pakistan launched an active military and diplomatic campaign to undo the accession.
The UN Security Council eventually brought about a cease-fire between Pakistani and
Indian troops, which took place on January 1, 1949, thus ending the first Indo- Pakistani
War, and directed that a plebiscite be held. The cease- fire agreement formalized the
military status quo, leaving about 30 percent of Kashmir under Pakistani control (see
India , ch. 4; The Formation of Pakistan , ch. 5).

3. Partition and its accompanying confusion also brought severe economic challenges to
the two newly created and antagonistic countries. The partition plan ignored the
principles of complementarity. West Pakistan, for example, traditionally produced more
wheat than it consumed and had supplied the deficit areas in India. Cotton grown in
West Pakistan was used in mills in Bombay and other west Indian cities. Commodities
such as coal and sugar were in short supply in Pakistan--they had traditionally come
from areas now part of India. Furthermore, Pakistan faced logistic problems for its
commercial transportation because of the four major ports in British India, it was
awarded only Karachi. But the problem that proved most intractable was defining
relations between the two wings of Pakistan, which had had little economic exchange
before partition.
The two dominions decided to allow free movement of goods, persons, and capital for
one year after independence, but this agreement broke down. In November 1947,
Pakistan levied export duties on jute; India retaliated with export duties of its own. The
trade war reached a crisis in September 1949 when Britain devalued the pound, to
which both the Pakistani rupee and the Indian rupee were pegged. India followed
Britain's lead, but Pakistan did not, so India severed trade relations with Pakistan. The
outbreak of the Korean War (1950-53) and the consequent price rises in jute, leather,
cotton, and wool as a result of wartime needs, saved the economy of Pakistan. New
trading relationships were formed, and the construction of cotton and jute mills in
Pakistan was quickly undertaken. Although India and Pakistan resumed trade in 1951,
both the volume and the value of trade steadily declined; the two countries ignored
bilateral trade for the most part and developed the new international trade links they had
made.
The assets of British India were divided in the ratio of seventeen for India to five for
Pakistan by decision of the Viceroy's Council in June 1947. Division was difficult to
implement, however, and Pakistan complained of nondeliveries. A financial agreement
was reached in December 1948, but the actual settlement of financial and other
disputes continued until 1960 (see Structure of the Economy , ch. 3).
Division of the all-India services of the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service
was also difficult. Only 101 out of a total of 1,157 Indian officers were Muslim. Among
these Muslim officers, ninety-five officers opted for Pakistan; they were joined by one
Christian, eleven Muslim military officers transferring to civilian service, and fifty Britons,
for a total of 157. But only twenty of them had had more than fifteen years of service,
and more than half had had fewer than ten years. These men formed the core of the
Civil Service of Pakistan, which became one of the most elite and privileged
bureaucracies in the world. Members of the Civil Service of Pakistan were the architects
of the administrative, judicial, and diplomatic services. They proved indispensable in
running the government machinery during Pakistan's first two decades, and their
contributions to government policy and economics were profound during the era of
Mohammad Ayub Khan. The Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government in the 1970s precipitated a
major reorganization and reorientation of the bureaucracy, however, which resulted in a

4. noticeable decline in both the morale and the standards of the bureaucracy (see Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional System; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-77 , ch. 4).



Pakistan-Problems at Independence INDEPENDENT PAKISTAN
Pakistan Index
In August 1947, Pakistan was faced with a number of problems, some immediate but others long term.
The most important of these concerns was the role played by Islam. Was Pakistan to be a secular state
serving as a homeland for Muslims of the subcontinent, or was it to be an Islamic state governed by the
sharia, in which non-Muslims would be second-class citizens? The second question concerned the
distribution of power between the center and the provincial governments, a question that eventually led to
the dissolution of the country with the painful loss of the East Wing (East Bengal, later East Pakistan, now
Bangladesh) in 1971, an issue that remained unresolved in the mid-1990s.
The territory of Pakistan was divided into two parts at independence, separated by about 1,600 kilometers
of Indian territory. The 1940 Lahore Resolution had called for independent "states" in the northwest and
the northeast. This objective was changed, by a 1946 meeting of Muslim League legislators to a call for a
single state (the acronym Pakistan had no letter for Bengal). Pakistan lacked the machinery, personnel,
and equipment for a new government. Even its capital, Karachi, was a second choice--Lahore was
rejected because it was too close to the Indian border. Pakistan's economy seemed enviable after
severing ties with India, the major market for its commodities. And much of Punjab's electricity was
imported from Indian power stations.
Above all other concerns were the violence and the refugee problem: Muslims were fleeing India; Hindus
and Sikhs were fleeing Pakistan. Jinnah's plea to regard religion as a personal matter, not a state matter,
was ignored. No one was prepared for the communal rioting and the mass movements of population that
followed the June 3, 1947, London announcement of imminent independence and partition. The most
conservative estimates of the casualties were 250,000 dead and 12 million to 24 million refugees. The
actual boundaries of the two new states were not even known until August 17, when they were
announced by a commission headed by a British judge. The boundaries-- unacceptable to both India and
Pakistan--have remained.
West Pakistan lost Hindus and Sikhs. These communities had managed much of the commercial activity
of West Pakistan. The Sikhs were especially prominent in agricultural colonies. They were replaced
largely by Muslims from India, mostly Urdu speakers from the United Provinces. Although some people,
especially Muslims from eastern Punjab (in India), settled in western Punjab (in Pakistan), many headed
for Karachi and other cities in Sindh, where they took the jobs vacated by departing Hindus. In 1951 close
to half of the population of Pakistan's major cities were immigrants (muhajirs--refugees from India and
their descendants).
The aspirations for Pakistan that had been so important to Muslims in Muslim-minority provinces and the
goals for the new state these urban refugees had fled to were not always compatible with those of the
traditional rural people already inhabiting Pakistan, whose support for the concept of Pakistan came much
later. Pakistani society was polarized from its inception.

5. The land and people west of the Indus River continued to pose problems. The most immediate problem
was the continued presence of a Congress government in the North-West Frontier Province, a
government effective at the grassroots level and popular despite the loss of the plebiscite. Led by Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai-i-Khitmagar (Servants of God, a Congress faction), this group was
often referred to as the Red Shirts after its members' attire. Ghaffar Khan asked his followers not to
participate in the July 1947 plebiscite.
Pakistan also had to establish its legitimacy against a possible challenge from Afghanistan. Irredentist
claims from Kabul were based on the ethnic unity of tribes straddling the border; the emotional appeal of
"Pakhtunistan," homeland of the Pakhtuns, was undeniable. However, Pakistan upheld the treaties Britain
had signed with Afghanistan and refused to discuss the validity of the Durand Line as the international
border (see The Forward Policy , this ch.). Relations with Afghanistan were hostile, resulting in the rupture
of diplomatic and commercial relations and leading Afghanistan to cast the only vote against Pakistan's
admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1947.
The India Independence Act left the princes theoretically free to accede to either dominion. The frontier
princely states of Dir, Chitral, Amb, and Hunza acceded quickly to Pakistan while retaining substantial
autonomy in internal administration and customary law. The khan of Kalat in Balochistan declared
independence on August 15, 1947, but offered to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan. Other
Baloch sardar (tribal chiefs) also expressed their preference for a separate identity. Pakistan took military
action against them and the khan and brought about their accession in 1948. The state of Bahawalpur,
with a Muslim ruler and a Muslim population, acceded to Pakistan, as did Khairpur.
The maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, unpopular among his subjects, was reluctant to decide on
accession to either dominion. He first signed agreements with both Pakistan and India that would provide
for the continued flow of people and goods to Kashmir--as it is usually called--from both dominions.
Alarmed by reports of oppression of fellow Muslims in Kashmir, armed groups from the North-West
Frontier Province entered the maharaja's territory. The ruler requested military assistance from India but
had to sign documents acceding to India before that country would provide aid in October 1947.
The government of Pakistan refused to recognize the accession and denounced it as a fraud even though
the Indian government announced that it would require an expression of the people's will through a
plebiscite after the invaders were driven back. Pakistan launched an active military and diplomatic
campaign to undo the accession. The UN Security Council eventually brought about a cease-fire between
Pakistani and Indian troops, which took place on January 1, 1949, thus ending the first Indo- Pakistani
War, and directed that a plebiscite be held. The cease- fire agreement formalized the military status quo,
leaving about 30 percent of Kashmir under Pakistani control (see India , ch. 4; The Formation of Pakistan
, ch. 5).
Partition and its accompanying confusion also brought severe economic challenges to the two newly
created and antagonistic countries. The partition plan ignored the principles of complementarity. West
Pakistan, for example, traditionally produced more wheat than it consumed and had supplied the deficit
areas in India. Cotton grown in West Pakistan was used in mills in Bombay and other west Indian cities.
Commodities such as coal and sugar were in short supply in Pakistan--they had traditionally come from
areas now part of India. Furthermore, Pakistan faced logistic problems for its commercial transportation
because of the four major ports in British India, it was awarded only Karachi. But the problem that proved
most intractable was defining relations between the two wings of Pakistan, which had had little economic
exchange before partition.
The two dominions decided to allow free movement of goods, persons, and capital for one year after
independence, but this agreement broke down. In November 1947, Pakistan levied export duties on jute;
India retaliated with export duties of its own. The trade war reached a crisis in September 1949 when
Britain devalued the pound, to which both the Pakistani rupee and the Indian rupee were pegged. India
followed Britain's lead, but Pakistan did not, so India severed trade relations with Pakistan. The outbreak
of the Korean War (1950-53) and the consequent price rises in jute, leather, cotton, and wool as a result

6. of wartime needs, saved the economy of Pakistan. New trading relationships were formed, and the
construction of cotton and jute mills in Pakistan was quickly undertaken. Although India and Pakistan
resumed trade in 1951, both the volume and the value of trade steadily declined; the two countries
ignored bilateral trade for the most part and developed the new international trade links they had made.
The assets of British India were divided in the ratio of seventeen for India to five for Pakistan by decision
of the Viceroy's Council in June 1947. Division was difficult to implement, however, and Pakistan
complained of nondeliveries. A financial agreement was reached in December 1948, but the actual
settlement of financial and other disputes continued until 1960 (see Structure of the Economy , ch. 3).
Division of the all-India services of the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service was also difficult.
Only 101 out of a total of 1,157 Indian officers were Muslim. Among these Muslim officers, ninety-five
officers opted for Pakistan; they were joined by one Christian, eleven Muslim military officers transferring
to civilian service, and fifty Britons, for a total of 157. But only twenty of them had had more than fifteen
years of service, and more than half had had fewer than ten years. These men formed the core of the
Civil Service of Pakistan, which became one of the most elite and privileged bureaucracies in the world.
Members of the Civil Service of Pakistan were the architects of the administrative, judicial, and diplomatic
services. They proved indispensable in running the government machinery during Pakistan's first two
decades, and their contributions to government policy and economics were profound during the era of
Mohammad Ayub Khan. The Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government in the 1970s precipitated a major
reorganization and reorientation of the bureaucracy, however, which resulted in a noticeable decline in
both the morale and the standards of the bureaucracy (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional
System; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-77 , ch. 4).
Data as of April 1994
Problems at Independence
In August 1947, Pakistan was faced with a number of problems, some immediate but others long term.
The most important of these concerns was the role played by Islam. Was Pakistan to be a secular state
serving as a homeland for Muslims of the subcontinent, or was it to be an Islamic state governed by the
sharia, in which non-Muslims would be second-class citizens? The second question concerned the
distribution of power between the center and the provincial governments, a question that eventually led to
the dissolution of the country with the painful loss of the East Wing (East Bengal, later East Pakistan, now
Bangladesh) in 1971, an issue that remained unresolved in the mid-1990s.
The territory of Pakistan was divided into two parts at independence, separated by about 1,600 kilometers
of Indian territory. The 1940 Lahore Resolution had called for independent "states" in the northwest and
the northeast. This objective was changed, by a 1946 meeting of Muslim League legislators to a call for a
single state (the acronym Pakistan had no letter for Bengal). Pakistan lacked the machinery, personnel,
and equipment for a new government. Even its capital, Karachi, was a second choice--Lahore was
rejected because it was too close to the Indian border. Pakistan's economy seemed enviable after
severing ties with India, the major market for its commodities. And much of Punjab's electricity was
imported from Indian power stations.
Above all other concerns were the violence and the refugee problem: Muslims were fleeing India; Hindus
and Sikhs were fleeing Pakistan. Jinnah's plea to regard religion as a personal matter, not a state matter,
was ignored. No one was prepared for the communal rioting and the mass movements of population that
followed the June 3, 1947, London announcement of imminent independence and partition. The most
conservative estimates of the casualties were 250,000 dead and 12 million to 24 million refugees. The
actual boundaries of the two new states were not even known until August 17, when they were
announced by a commission headed by a British judge. The boundaries-- unacceptable to both India and
Pakistan--have remained.

7. West Pakistan lost Hindus and Sikhs. These communities had managed much of the commercial activity
of West Pakistan. The Sikhs were especially prominent in agricultural colonies. They were replaced
largely by Muslims from India, mostly Urdu speakers from the United Provinces. Although some people,
especially Muslims from eastern Punjab (in India), settled in western Punjab (in Pakistan), many headed
for Karachi and other cities in Sindh, where they took the jobs vacated by departing Hindus. In 1951 close
to half of the population of Pakistan's major cities were immigrants (muhajirs--refugees from India and
their descendants).
The aspirations for Pakistan that had been so important to Muslims in Muslim-minority provinces and the
goals for the new state these urban refugees had fled to were not always compatible with those of the
traditional rural people already inhabiting Pakistan, whose support for the concept of Pakistan came much
later. Pakistani society was polarized from its inception.
The land and people west of the Indus River continued to pose problems. The most immediate problem
was the continued presence of a Congress government in the North-West Frontier Province, a
government effective at the grassroots level and popular despite the loss of the plebiscite. Led by Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai-i-Khitmagar (Servants of God, a Congress faction), this group was
often referred to as the Red Shirts after its members' attire. Ghaffar Khan asked his followers not to
participate in the July 1947 plebiscite.
Pakistan also had to establish its legitimacy against a possible challenge from Afghanistan. Irredentist
claims from Kabul were based on the ethnic unity of tribes straddling the border; the emotional appeal of
"Pakhtunistan," homeland of the Pakhtuns, was undeniable. However, Pakistan upheld the treaties Britain
had signed with Afghanistan and refused to discuss the validity of the Durand Line as the international
border (see The Forward Policy , this ch.). Relations with Afghanistan were hostile, resulting in the rupture
of diplomatic and commercial relations and leading Afghanistan to cast the only vote against Pakistan's
admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1947.
The India Independence Act left the princes theoretically free to accede to either dominion. The frontier
princely states of Dir, Chitral, Amb, and Hunza acceded quickly to Pakistan while retaining substantial
autonomy in internal administration and customary law. The khan of Kalat in Balochistan declared
independence on August 15, 1947, but offered to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan. Other
Baloch sardar (tribal chiefs) also expressed their preference for a separate identity. Pakistan took military
action against them and the khan and brought about their accession in 1948. The state of Bahawalpur,
with a Muslim ruler and a Muslim population, acceded to Pakistan, as did Khairpur.
The maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, unpopular among his subjects, was reluctant to decide on
accession to either dominion. He first signed agreements with both Pakistan and India that would provide
for the continued flow of people and goods to Kashmir--as it is usually called--from both dominions.
Alarmed by reports of oppression of fellow Muslims in Kashmir, armed groups from the North-West
Frontier Province entered the maharaja's territory. The ruler requested military assistance from India but
had to sign documents acceding to India before that country would provide aid in October 1947.
The government of Pakistan refused to recognize the accession and denounced it as a fraud even though
the Indian government announced that it would require an expression of the people's will through a
plebiscite after the invaders were driven back. Pakistan launched an active military and diplomatic
campaign to undo the accession. The UN Security Council eventually brought about a cease-fire between
Pakistani and Indian troops, which took place on January 1, 1949, thus ending the first Indo- Pakistani
War, and directed that a plebiscite be held. The cease- fire agreement formalized the military status quo,
leaving about 30 percent of Kashmir under Pakistani control (see India , ch. 4; The Formation of Pakistan
, ch. 5).
Partition and its accompanying confusion also brought severe economic challenges to the two newly
created and antagonistic countries. The partition plan ignored the principles of complementarity. West

8. Pakistan, for example, traditionally produced more wheat than it consumed and had supplied the deficit
areas in India. Cotton grown in West Pakistan was used in mills in Bombay and other west Indian cities.
Commodities such as coal and sugar were in short supply in Pakistan--they had traditionally come from
areas now part of India. Furthermore, Pakistan faced logistic problems for its commercial transportation
because of the four major ports in British India, it was awarded only Karachi. But the problem that proved
most intractable was defining relations between the two wings of Pakistan, which had had little economic
exchange before partition.
The two dominions decided to allow free movement of goods, persons, and capital for one year after
independence, but this agreement broke down. In November 1947, Pakistan levied export duties on jute;
India retaliated with export duties of its own. The trade war reached a crisis in September 1949 when
Britain devalued the pound, to which both the Pakistani rupee and the Indian rupee were pegged. India
followed Britain's lead, but Pakistan did not, so India severed trade relations with Pakistan. The outbreak
of the Korean War (1950-53) and the consequent price rises in jute, leather, cotton, and wool as a result
of wartime needs, saved the economy of Pakistan. New trading relationships were formed, and the
construction of cotton and jute mills in Pakistan was quickly undertaken. Although India and Pakistan
resumed trade in 1951, both the volume and the value of trade steadily declined; the two countries
ignored bilateral trade for the most part and developed the new international trade links they had made.
The assets of British India were divided in the ratio of seventeen for India to five for Pakistan by decision
of the Viceroy's Council in June 1947. Division was difficult to implement, however, and Pakistan
complained of nondeliveries. A financial agreement was reached in December 1948, but the actual
settlement of financial and other disputes continued until 1960 (see Structure of the Economy , ch. 3).
Division of the all-India services of the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service was also difficult.
Only 101 out of a total of 1,157 Indian officers were Muslim. Among these Muslim officers, ninety-five
officers opted for Pakistan; they were joined by one Christian, eleven Muslim military officers transferring
to civilian service, and fifty Britons, for a total of 157. But only twenty of them had had more than fifteen
years of service, and more than half had had fewer than ten years. These men formed the core of the
Civil Service of Pakistan, which became one of the most elite and privileged bureaucracies in the world.
Members of the Civil Service of Pakistan were the architects of the administrative, judicial, and diplomatic
services. They proved indispensable in running the government machinery during Pakistan's first two
decades, and their contributions to government policy and economics were profound during the era of
Mohammad Ayub Khan. The Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government in the 1970s precipitated a major
reorganization and reorientation of the bureaucracy, however, which resulted in a noticeable decline in
both the morale and the standards of the bureaucracy (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional
System; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-77 , ch. 4).
NEW
The nation state of Pakistan is going through convolutions of many constraints. For
developing state like Pakistan however, the problem is from within, due to fragmentation
along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. The cohesiveness of these entities is crucial to
nation building. An absence of this process on the contrary could threaten the very
existence of a state and so is the case with Pakistan. The end of the Second World War
introduced strategic sophisticated and deadly weapons system and new aid, defense and
security concepts. Security is increasingly being interpreted as “security of people, not
just territory, security of the individuals, not arms; security of all people every where, in
their homes, on their jobs, in their streets, in their communities and in their environment
Security issues are surrounded by the threat perceptions and different constraints.

9. Over a half century has been passed since the birth of Pakistan,no development of
democracy and institutions have been experienced. Since 1958, again and again military
rule has deteriorated the system of this state. Army has penetrated into every system of
Pakistan.Democracy did not get its roots and as a result the problems of
ethnicity,sectarianism, integration, kalashnikolf and drugs,terrorism, suicide bombing,
economic downfall,food shortage and power shortage, etc have been flourished with the
passage of time. The threats confronted by the Pakistan democracy and security
undoubtedly are interlinked and good governance is required to remove all the domestic
constraints in the way to the security of Pakistan.

Security perceptions of Pakistan are directly linked with the real and perceived threats
confronting her from time to time.“Threat is a geopolitical environment condition for
which the price and penalty will have to be paid by the target state if it fails to build its
own effective warding-of mechanism” Major threats/constraints to Pakistanare national
integration, national development and national security. These three are interrelated with
each other. Internal threats to Pakistan come from several sources. Pakistan has to set its
own housein order.National security and national integration areintimately interconnected
and interdependent. Pakistan has been subverted from within.

Pakistan is an Islamic ideological state and it should safeguard its ideology jealously, for it
is the repository of its nationalism, national spirit,interest and power“Any programme for
national integration would pre -suppose a graceful acceptance and realistic recognition of
the fact that Pakistan is a multi-cultural/lingual and ethno-national nation-state and
society. Pakistan’s ethnicity is a positive asset”. Cultural co-existence is required for
democratic system.Cultural co-existence resulting from cultural confluence and interaction
is the answer for Pakistan.Pakistan has passing through the culture of political intolerance
and by passing the true Islamic ideology and as a result, having no national integration in
the real sense. There are some more constraints which come out from the above
mentioned constraints have been harassing Pakistan since its birth like Pakhtoonistan,
Provincialism, Kashmir, Indo-Pak wars, parity, East Pakistan, Bangladesh, Four
Nationalities, Secession, Parochialism, Aggression, Poverty, Terrorism, Talibanization of
Society, suicide bombing, corruption etc.

Pakistan is facing multi dimensional threats and problem is far more serious, for our very
survival is at stake. Pakistan should plan their remedial measures and Pakistan’s national
security can be ensured through national integration. True democracy is the binding force
between national security and integration. The gap between the rulers and the ruled
continue to be increased.

M.P.Singh and Veena Kukreja in the book Pakistan Democracy, Development and Security
Issues explain that Pakistan is a nation still in the making. It continues to be domestically

10. unstable and politically weak. Pakistan is facing internal war like situation against the
terrorists. Basically nations resort to war when diplomacy fails. A state which is truly
democratic can face the challenge to its survival otherwise it will face stresses and strains
of insecurity and in ability. Rule of law, fundamental rights, a free press and strong
opposition is required for the security of Pakistan otherwise it will remain weak and
vulnerable at the hands of all domestic problems and constraints. Pakistan has wanted its
state moderate, free, open, peaceful, progressive, Islamic and democratic.

Identity is one of the major constraints towards the security of Pakistan, even after the
secession of East Pakistan in 1971 was severe, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan faced the
rebellious politics of Bengalis, Baloch nationalistic assertions in 1970’s were seen and
Bhutto used force in order to put down Baloch tribesman, Sindhi nationalism in the 1980’s
and Muhajir Qomi movements have been gathering strength since 1990’s. Zia Ul-Haq sent
the army to suppress rural Sindh and Musharaf used army against Balochies and tribal
areas. The all have developed separatist tendencies.

Today’swounded Pakistan is facing democratic turmoil; all the ethnic groups are feeling
alienated by the Punjabi elite and Blouch, Pashtoon and Sindi nationalists are against the
hegemonyofPunjab.Ethnic unrest is another kind, the domination of Punjabis in all aspects
of life is resented by smaller ethnic groups .In early 1990’s the civil unrest is seen in
Sindh. Smaller provinces have been demanding provincial autonomy. Baloch nationalists
groups have their grievances and this threat should be treated as early as possible.
Sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shias have been intensified the domestic
constraints to the security of Pakistan.

A path chartered by the military regime of Ayub Khan,Yahya Khan then of Zia- Ul Haq was
altered by yet an other military regime that of Musharaf. All these military regimes
produced political instability, poor governance, institutional paralysis, by passing the rule
of law, socio-economic down fall and so on. No civil government has been able to establish
and maintain its legitimacy for more than brief periods. Democracy was very weak and
democratic institutions could not be strengthened by military rule. Military rule in Pakistan
by paralyzing the democratic institutions is one kind of threat to Pakistan. Pakistan is
passing through the `most difficult period of its existence and facing domestic threats
and constraints to its security. Insecurity is increasing; people do not feel secure in the
streets or in their homes. There is erosion in the legitimacy of the state when political
institutions are unable to provide security to its citizens who may no longer perceive the
central governments as the manager of conflicts. In such circumstances, groups perceiving
deprivation tend to resort to violent solutions to their grievances.A diffusion of small arms
and light weapons can promote the process of state breakdown due to violent internal
strife. The Pakistani paradigm fits with this scenario.

Economic instability is a fundamental variable of internal security threats to Pakistan. The

11. absenceofgenuine socio-economic development hasprovided ethno-sectarian elements and
regional forces grounds to exploit and weaken Pakistan internally. Economic security we
mean whether a country can pursue, without being threatened from the outside,
independent economic and foreign policies or not. Per capita income and gross national
product are required for security. Self sufficiency is also required. Pakistan being the
developing state is clearly at a disadvantage and its security will be threatened. All
Pakistani governments have failed to attain socio-economic equality.8 Low level of
investment and social services are seen. Pakistan under heavy debt and rely on foreign aid
for financing the investment. Security and peace are the two important prerequisites for
the stability of economic and political systems of the state.Corruption and poor
governance have had a threat to Pakistan. No proper economic planning except late 1950’s
and 1960’s has been seen there and since 1990 it is facing the worst economic crises. The
British Foreign Secretary David Miliband said that Pakistan faced more threats from
internal terrorism, as it is facing various lingual, ethnic and sectarian problems. Suicide
bombing is increasing due to serious short comings in internal security measures and in law
enforcement, failure to fully stop financing of terrorism , only banned selective terrorist
organizations, half hearted efforts for education, anti American sentiments, militants
suicidal attacks, economic weaknesses etc.War on Taliban and Al-Qaida created tussle
within Pakistan and the religious fundamentalist groups have reacted in a hostile manner.
Suicide bombers as resentment against government operations in lal masjid, wana, swat and
waziristan has been increased. Most of the bombings in Pakistan have targeted security
forces and civilians. At present any move to dismantle the terrorists is facing resistance.
These are worst ever security threats for the citizens of Pakistan and these threats have
heightened anxiety for the people of Pakistan day by day. These threats undermine the
writ and credibility of the state as well as the security of lifeand property of the citizens.
Pakistani educational
institutions have been closed for some days because of fears about militant
attacks after suicide bombing at the International Islamic University.

Thereligious extremism and sectarian militancy got closely identified with proliferation of
seminaries across Pakistan is noteworthy. The talibanization of Pakistani society has been
an issue of concern in many quarters in the country. An increasing number of sectarian
killings were a pointer to this phenomenon. Madrasas are not only responsible for breeding
grounds of terrorism but other factors are also responsible. For Pakistan’s national
security the 11 years of war in Afghanistan was the most dangerous time period. Pakistan
supported the freedom struggle in Afghanistan which lead the kalashankof, smuggling,
refugee problem and drug culture in Pakistan. According to UN data in Pakistan in 2009
there are about 2.5 million Afghans who are scattered around Pakistan .They are about 1.7
million registered Afghans with 45 percent residing in refugee villages and the rest
scattered in whole of the Pakistan .When USSR moved out of Afghanistan,Pakistan was out
of the nut cracker like situation ,America dumped Pakistan .Expanding terrorism and
suicide attacks have raised concerns regarding the safety and security of nuclear arsenals.

12. U.S media is writing stories about the threats to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.


Pakistan was pushed into judicial crisis on March 9th 2007 by suspending Chief Justice of
Supreme Court. It has been widely held as a dramatic move to constrain the judicial
activism. Lawyers movement as well as the electronic media played a vital role for launching
voices against the dismissal of chief justice of Supreme Court. Threats and attacks
against journalists were common and many journalists and lawyers were killed during this
movement. Media remained under government pressure through laws and threats. Media
houses were attacked, raided by police and security agencies and freedom of press came
under attack as a result of two ordinances. Anti media laws and closure of channels were
imposed.Civil society and politicians alsojoined hands with this movement and after the
long march in 2009, the Chief Justice of Pakistan was restored on 16th march of this year
and Pakistan came out from this constraint within a time span of two years.

Another alarming threat is food security, due to lack of proper planning. It is the need of
the time to take some bold steps to ensure food security. Firstly the wheat shortage and
now sugar crises have traumatized the people.

Election results of 18th February 2008 have rejected the status co. Last government
failed to live up to the expectations of the people.A new government has come to power in
March 2008. However, this government did not make any fundamental change of policy
towards domestic issues which are threatening Pakistan’s security except the Swat
operation and now in Waziristan military operation of army. No proper planning is seeing
regarding the management of food and electricity shortage.

Territory of Pakistan is home to a complex nexus of ethno-linguistic and religious groups.
This range of actors combined with underdevelopment has created tensions in Pakistan
that threaten to undermine the territorial unity of the country. Domestic stability involves
a wide range of factors including human security, economics, politics, regional stability,
environment, education, and religion. Interdependence of all these multifaceted threats
and their over all impact on internal security should be removed. Pakistan needs
development in political, social, and economic field.In political field the real constraint is
the lack of political framework in which all the ethnic groups are ignored. The distribution
of power must be equal for all the provinces and people’s participation is required in all
issues and must be acknowledged by the government. In economic field Pakistan needs
structural changes. Economic motivations are required. Among them social development by
introducing fresh incentives for the improvement of the standard of people is also
required on early basis. The role of military in politics must be eliminated. Ethno-Sectarian
threats should be countered. Enforcement of rule of law should be there. Law
enforcement agencies should be equipped with new technologies, techniques, training and
equipments forstopping terrorist activities in country.Pakistan should develop think tanks

13. which will predict and stop the future threats to security. There isgoing to beno quick end
to the domestic security threats/constraints faced by Pakistan. Long term policy is
required.Pakistan needs a strong democratic government with a clear vision and clearly
announced policies for the state.