Short history indo pak 1965 war 1st pd.ppt

Learn indo pak war

1. INDO-PAK WAR
(1965)

2. PREVIEW
PH I: POLITICO-MILITARY
CONDITIONS
PH II: EVENTS LEADING TO
CRISIS
PH III: CANAL DEFENCE
PH IV : RUNN OF KUTCH
CRISIS
PH IV : GIBRALTAR FORCE
AND OP GIBRALTAR

3. PH I : POLITICO –MILITARY
CONDITIONS

4. POLITICO-MILITARY CONDITIONS
POLITICALLEADERSHIP:PAKISTANUNDERAMILITARY
DICTATORAYUBKHANANDMILITARYFLUSHWITH
MODERNWPNSCHALLENGEDINDIANLDRSHIPOFA
DIMINUTIVELALBAHADURSHASTRIANDAMILITARY
THATWASHUMILIATEDINEASTERNHIMALAYASIN
1962.

5. POLITICO-MILITARY CONDITIONS
MILITARYALLIANCES:PAKCONCLUDEDMILITARY
ALLIANCEWITHUSA-SEATOANDCENTOAND
AGREEDTOESTBOFUSBASEINPAKISTAN.
INRETURNPAKISTANRECEIVEDMILITARYAIDAMTTO
$100,000,000.
PAKISTANALSORECEIVED:100F-86SABREJETS,18F-
104STARFIGTERS,30B-57BOMBERS,4C-130TPTAC
AND200PATTONTANKS.

6. POLITICO-MILITARY CONDITIONS
CHINAFACTOR:PAKISTANVOTEDFORCHINA’SENTRYINTO
UN.CHINAAPPRECIATEDTHISSHIFTANDCONCLUDEDA
BORDERAGREEMENTON2MAR1963WHEREINPAKISTAN
CEDED6475KMKASHMIRITERRITORIESINHONZA,SOUTHOF
MINITAKAPASSTOCHINA.
CHINAASSUREDPAKISTANFULLSUPPORTONKASHMIRISSUE.
PAKISTANHADANTICIPATEDTHATCHINAWILLOPENA
SECONDFRONTAGAINSTINDIA,THEREBYTYINGDOWNA
MAJORPORTIONOFINDIANRESERVESONITSEASTERN
FRONT.

7. FORCE COMPARISON
INDIA
CENTURION&SHERMANTANKSOF
WORLDWARIIVINTAGE
FOURREGTSOFCENTURIONS
8REGTSOFSHERMANS
2REGTSOFPT-76&AMX-13,WHICH
WERELIGHTTANKS&INEFFECTIVEIN
OFFENSIVEOPSAGAINSTPATTONS&
SHERMANS
INDIAN1ARMDDIVHADONLY1
ARMDBDEWITHNOINF
PAKISTAN
PATTONTANKSHAVINGMORE
MANEUVERABILITY & COULD
OPERATEATNI
NINEREGTSOFPATTONS
5REGTSOFSHERMANS
PAKISTAN1ARMDDIVWASORG
INTO3COMBAT GP,EACH
CONTAININGAMIXOFTKREGTS
ANDMECHBNSCARRIEDIN
TRACKED,AMPHIBIOUSAPC

8. FORCE COMPARISON
INDIA
INDIANDIVHADONLYTOWEDGUNS
INDIANREGTSHADVINTAGEEQPT
(25PDRSAND5.5MMGUNS)
PAKISTAN
PAKISTANDIVHADAMEDARTY
REGTANDADVANCEDTYPEOF
ANTI-ACGUNS
PAKISTAN’SANTI-TANKPOWER
WASDOUBLEOFINDIA.
PAKISTANHAD105MMGUNSAND
155MMHOWS

9. FORCE COMPARISON
INDIA
9INFDIVONTHEWESTERNBORDER
OFWHICHFOURWEREUNDERSTR.
PAKISTAN
SEVENINFDIVOUTOFWHICHONE
WASDEPLOYEDONEASTPAKISTAN
PAKISTANAIRFORCEWASSMALLER
BUTMODERN.
EARLYWARNINGRADARSETS
WERESETUPATPESHAWAR,
MULTAN,SARGODHAANDBADIN.
THEIRSTARFIGHTERSWERE
EQUIPPED WITH MODERN
SIDEWINDERAIRTOAIRMISSILES.

10. PH II : EVENTS LEADING TO THE
CRISIS

11. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
INDIA-CHINACONFLICTOF1962-LOWMORALE.
POSSIBILITYOFTWOFRONTCONFLICT.
SINO-PAKRELATIONS.
HAZRATBALSHRINEINCIDENT(26DEC1963).
DEATHOFNEHRUIN1964ANDTRANSFEROF
POWERTOSHASTRI.

12. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT
CANALDEFENCEINPAKISTAN
-MARALA-RAVILINKCANAL(MRL)CONNECTS
CHENABANDRAVI.
-BAMBANWALA -RAVI–BEDIAN(BRB)/
ICHHOGILCANAL/AYUBLINECONNECTSRAVI
ANDSUTLEJ.
-ANTITKOBSTACLE:90TO140FTWIDEAND18
FTDEEPWITHCONCRETEPILLBOXESANDGUN
EMPLACEMENTS

13. CAUSES OF CONFLICT
REFUGEEPROBLEM–AFTERTHEPARTITION
MILLIONMUSLIMSREMAINEDININDIAAND
10MILLIONHINDUSINEASTPAKISTAN
DIVISIONOFSTATEASSETS–DISPUTEOVER
MATERIALANDFINANCIALASSETSAFTER
PARTITION

14. CAUSES OF CONFLICT
INDIAPAKISTANTRADE–DIFFERENCESOVER
SHAREOFTAXESANDEXCISEDUTIESANDEST
OFTRADEANDCUSTOMBARRIERSAFTER
PARTITION
DIVISIONOFINDUSWATERS-MOSTOFTHE
PAKISTANICANALSORIGINATEDFROM
RIVERSANDHEADWORK’SLOCATEDINAND
CONTROLLEDBYINDIA

15. CAUSES OF CONFLICT
RATIONALISINGTHEBORDERS–SPECIALLY
ALONGRANNOFKUTCH
INTEGRATIONOFPRINCELYSTATES-PAK
MADEFRUITLESSEFFORTSTOWINOVER
MANYSTATESFALLINGWITHINTHEORBITOF
THEINDIANDOMINION

16. CAUSES OF CONFLICT
KASHMIR-ON01JAN1949BOTHTHE
GOVERNMENTSORDEREDTHEIRTROOPSTO
CEASE-FIRE.
SINCETHENTHECEASE-FIRELINEREMAINED
THELINEOFCONTROLFORTHECOUNTRIES

17. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CONFLICT
UNEASYCEASEFIREAFTER47-48CONFLICT
COLLECTIVEDEFENCETREATIES–PAKJOINED
SEATOANDCENTO;GAVEITASENSEOF
SECURITY
USMILAIDTOPAKISTAN–PAKBECAME
BOLDER
NOMILAIDTOINDIA

18. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CONFLICT
SINO-PAKCOLLUSION
KUTCHMISADVENTURESBYPAKISTAN-A
PRELUDE
PAKINFILTRATIONINTOJ&K

19. AYUB KHAN LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI
PERSONALITIES

20. GEN JN CHAUDHURI COAS,
19 NOV 1962 -07 JUNE 66
ARMD CORPS,
16 CAV AND 7 LC

21. PH III : CANAL DEFENCE

22. CANAL DEFENCE
PAKISTANHADBUILTTWOCANALSBETWEENRIVERS
CHENABANDSUTLEJTOPROVIDEANTI-TANKOBSTACLES
INSIDEWESTPUNJABBORDER,THUSSTRENGTHENINGITS
DEFENCES.
MARALA-RAVILINK(MRL)CANALCONNECTSRIVERS
CHENABANDRAVI.
STARTSFROMMARALAHEADWORKSONCHENAB,FEW
MILESNWOFSIALKOTANDEXTENDSSOUTHWARDSTO
SIALKOTANDPASRURANDTHENMEETSRAVIRIVER
NORTHOFVILLAGEICHHOGILUTTAR.

23. CANAL DEFENCE
SECONDCANAL,BAMBANWALA-RAVI-BEDIAN
(BRB)CANALCOMMONLY REFERREDAS
ICHHOGILCANALCONNECTSRAVIANDSUTLEJ
RIVERS.
STARTSFROMRAVIRIVER,FROMOPPOSITETHE
PLACEWHEREMRLCANALMEETSTHERIVER
ANDMOVESSOUTHWARDSTODOGRAI,BARKI
ANDKASURANDJOINSDEPALPURCANAL.

24. THOUGHICHHOGILCANALWASBUILTASAN
IRRIGATIONCANAL,ITWASREALLYMILITARYIN
NATURE.
THECANALISCONCRETELINED.ITIS90-140FEETWIDE
AND18FEETDEEP.ITSBANKSARESTEEPLEAVINGNO
DOUBTTHATITHADBEENBUILTASANANTI-TANK
OBSTACLE.
ONTHEWESTERNSIDEOFTHECANALTHEREWERE
PILLBOXESANDGUNEMPLACEMENTS.ITALSOHAD
RAMPSTOENABLETANKSTOCLIMBTHEBANKSANDTAKE
SUITABLEPOSNSFORENGAGINGTPSANDTKSON
EASTERNSIDEOFTHECANAL.

25. WESTERNBANKSOFBRBCANALARESLIGHTLYHIGHER
THANTHEEASTERNONESTOFACILITATEENGAGING
TARGETSONEASTERNSIDE.
ITWASDEVELOPEDOVERSEVERALYEARSASOUTER
DEFENCEOFLAHOREANDCONSTITUESATKOBSTACLE.
THECANALISCALLED‘AYUBLINE’BYPAKISTANIOFFR.
THEALIGNMENTOFTHECANALISIMPORTANTFROM
STRATEGICPOINTOFVIEW.ITRUNSPARALLELTOIBINTHE
LAHORESECTOR.

26. PATTON TANK

27. PH IV : RANN OF KUTCH CRISES

29. ANINIDANARMYCONTINGENTRUSHEDINTHESAMEAFTERNOON
ANDOCCUPIEDSARDARPOSTWHICHWASUNOCCUPIEDBYTHEEN.
THESMALLPOSTWASOVERWHELMEDANDFORCEDTOWITHDRAW.
9
TH
APR1965:PAK51INFBDEATTACKEDAPOSTTHREEMILES
SOUTHWESTOFKANJARKOT,WHICHWASMANNEDBYTWO
COMPANIESOFCRPF.
RANN OF KUTCH CONFLICT –PRELUDE TO THE WAR

30. THISFORAYBYPAKISTANWASTOTESTTHEIRNEWLY
ACQUIREDAMERICANPATTONTKS,ARTYANDOTHERMIL
HARDWAREANDTHECONCLUSIONARRIVEDATMADE
THEMPLUNGEINTOAFULLSCALEWARWITHINDIAAFEW
MONTHSLATER.
INDIANSSUFFEREDLOSSESBOTHINTERRITORYANDPERS.
24
TH
APR1965:PAK8INFDIVAGAINSTINDBDEATTACK
ONKANJARKOT,SARDARPOSTANDVIGKOTWITHPATTON
TKSAND100POUNDERARTYGUNS.
RANN OF KUTCH CONFLICT –PRELUDE TO THE WAR

31. CFLVIOLATION:MEANWHILETOMAKEANEXHIBITIONOF
HERGOODWILLTOCHINA,PAKISTANTRIEDTOCUTTHE
SRINAGARLEHRD,INDIA’SLIFELINETOLADAKH,AT
KARGIL.
30THJUN1965:BRITISHPMHAROLDWILSONPLAYEDA
PROMINENTROLEINPOLITICALMEDIATIONTORESOLVE
THECRISESANDTHEKUTCHAGREEMENTWASSIGNED
RETAININGSTATUSQUOINTHEAR.
RANN OF KUTCH CONFLICT –PRELUDE TO THE WAR

32. INDIALATERWITHDREWFROMTHESEPOSTSON
UNASSURANCETHATPAKISTANWOULDNO
LONGERDISTURBOURCONVOYS.
ITWASAVERYDIFFICULTMILOPASOURTPSHAD
TOSCRAMBLETHROUGHAHUGEROCK
WASTELAND,COMMANDEDBYPAKISTANIGUNS.
OURLOCALCDRASACOUNTERMEASURE
CAPTUREDTWOPAKISTANIPOSTSON16MAY
1965.
RANN OF KUTCH CONFLICT –PRELUDE TO THE WAR

33. PH V : GIBRALTAR FORCE & OP
GIBRALTAR

34. INFILTRATION BY GIBRALTAR FORCE

35. HIGHLYTRAINEDGUERILLAFORCEOF30,000MEN
INFILTBYPAKDURING05AUG-10AUG1965FOR
PURPOSEOFSABOTAGE,UNDERMINETHELOCAL
GOVTANDMAKETHEENVIRONMENTCONDUCIVE
FORLANDOFFENSIVE.
PAKINFLITRATORSINKASHMIR:GIBRALTOR
FORCE.
GIBRALTOR FORCE

36. INFILFORCESEQUIPPEDWITHPAKARMS,AMN,EQPT
ANDCLOTHING/RATIONS
COYCOMMANDEDBYREGULARPAKORPOKARMY
OFFRS.
NOOFTASKFORCESRAISED,EACHCOMPRISING3-6
COY’S:EACHCOYCONSISTEDOF35-40POKSOLDIERS,
3-4ORFROMSPLSERVICEGPANDABOUT66
MUJAHIDS.
GIBRALTOR FORCE

37. FOURTRGCENTRESWEREOPENEDINPOK
WHEREINFILTWEREPUTTHROUGHASIX
WEEKCOURSEINSABOTAGETECHNIQUESAND
GUERILLAWARFARE.
MAJGENAKHTARHUSSAINMALIK,GOC12PAK
DIVWITHHEADQUARTERSATMURREE,PUTIN
CHARGEOFTHEFORCES.
GIBRALTOR FORCE

38. THOUGHTHEINFILTWEREUNABLETOBRINGANY
REVOLUTIONINTHEVALLEYTHEYWEREABLETO
CREATESOMENUISANCEINOUTLYINGPLACES.
THEINVASIONMISCARRIEDBECAUSETHEINFILTDID
NOTGETANYSPFROMTHELOCALPOPULATION
EXCEPTAFEWPAKAGENTSANDCOLLABORATORS.
THEINFILTINSMALLGPSSLIPPEDINTOJ&KALONG
THE470MILECEASEFIRELINEDURINGTHEMONTH
OFAUG1965.
GIBRALTOR FORCE

39. GIBRALTOR FORCE
CONSISTED OF FOLLOWING TASK FORCES
TARIQ FORCE-AREA KARGIL
QASIM FORCE-AREA GURES
KHALID FORCE-TITHWAL SEC
F FORCE IN URI

40. GIBRALTOR FORCE
SALAHUDDIN FORCE-AREA GULMARG-SRI
AND MANDI
NUSRAT FORCE-AREA RAJAURI-
MENDHAR
GHAZNAVI FORCE IN AREA DARHAL-
THANAMANDI-BUDIL
BABUR FORCE IN AREA NAUSHERA-
CHHAMB

41. BACKGROUND
DURINGTHISPERIOD,DESPITEBEINGNUMERICALLYSMALLERTHAN
THEINDIANMILITARY,PAKISTAN’SARMEDFORCESHADA
QUALITATIVEEDGEINAIRPOWERANDARMOUROVERINDIA,
WHICHPAKISTANSOUGHTTOUTILISEBEFOREINDIACOMPLETEDITS
DEFENCEBUILD-UP.
THEOPENINGCAMEAFTERTHESINO-INDIANWARIN1962AFTER
INDIA’SWARWITHTHECHINAANDASARESULTTHEINDIAN
MILITARYWASUNDERGOINGMASSIVECHANGESBOTHIN
PERSONNELANDEQUIPMENT.
FOLLOWINGTHEFIRSTINDIANOCCUPIEDJAMMU&KASHMIRWAR
WHICHSAWINDIACAPTUREDTHEMAJORITYOFTHEDISPUTED
AREAOFKASHMIR,PAKISTANSOUGHTANOPPORTUNITYTOWIN
BACKTHEAREASLOST.

42. THERANNOFKUTCHEPISODEINTHESUMMEROF1965,RESULTED
INSOMEPOSITIVESFORPAKISTAN.
INDECEMBER1963,THEDISAPPEARANCEOFAHOLYRELICFROM
THEHAZRATBALSHRINEINSRINAGAR,CREATEDTURMOILAND
INTENSEISLAMICFEELINGAMONGMUSLIMSINTHEVALLEY.
ASSUMINGTHATAWEAKENEDINDIANMILITARYWOULDNOT
RESPOND,PAKISTANSENT“MUJAHIDEENS”ANDPAKISTANARMY
REGULARSINTOINDIANOCCUPIEDJAMMU&KASHMIR.
OPERATION,CODENAMEDGIBRALTAR,WASPREPAREDIN1950.
AIMWASAN“ATTACKBYINFILTRATION”BYASPECIALLYTRAINED
IRREGULARFORCEOFSOME40,000MEN,HIGHLYMOTIVATEDAND
WELLARMED.

43. EXECUTION OF PLAN
THEOPERATIONWASSETINMOTIONINTHEFIRSTWEEK
OFAUGUST1965.
PAKISTANITROOPS,MEMBERSOFTHESSGCOMMANDOS
ANDIRREGULARSBEGANTOCROSSTHECFL.
SEVERALCOLUMNSWERETOOCCUPYKEYHEIGHTS
AROUNDTHEKASHMIRVALLEYANDENCOURAGEA
GENERALREVOLT,WHICHWOULDBEFOLLOWEDBYDIRECT
COMBATBYPAKISTANITROOPS.
ACCORDINGTOINDIANSOURCES30,000–40,000MEN
HADCROSSEDTHELINE,WHILEPAKISTANISOURCESPUTIT
AT5,000-7,000ONLY.

44. EXECUTION OF PLAN
THESETROOPS—CALLED“GIBRALTARFORCE”—WERE
GIVENDIFFERENTCODENAMES,MOSTLYAFTER
HISTORICALLYSIGNIFICANTMUSLIMRULERS.
PLANWASMULTI-PRONGED.
INFILTRATORSWOULDMINGLEWITHTHELOCAL
POPULACEANDINCITETHEMTOREBELLION.

45. EXECUTION OF PLAN
MEANWHILEGUERRILLAWARFAREWOULDCOMMENCE,
DESTROYINGBRIDGES,TUNNELSANDHIGHWAYS,HARASSING
ENEMYCOMMUNICATIONS,LOGISTICINSTALLATIONSAND
HEADQUARTERSASWELLASATTACKINGAIRFIELDS,TOCREATE
CONDITIONSOFAN“ARMEDINSURRECTION”INKASHMIR—
LEADINGTONATIONALUPRISINGAGAINSTINDIANRULE.
ITWASASSUMEDTHATINDIAWOULDNEITHERCOUNTER-
ATTACK,NORINVOLVEITSELFINANOTHERFULL-SCALEWAR,
ANDTHELIBERATIONOFKASHMIRWOULDRAPIDLYFOLLOW.

46. MAJORITYOFTHEINFILTRATORSWERECAPTUREDBY
THEINDIANTROOPS,ALTHOUGHSOMEMANAGEDTO
ESCAPE.
THELOCALKASHMIRISDIDNOTCOOPERATEAS
EXPECTED.INSTEAD,THEYCONVEYEDNEWSOFTHE
PLANNEDINSURGENCYTOTHELOCALAUTHORITIES.
DESPITETHEOPERATIONALPLANNING,THE
INTRUDERSWEREDETECTEDBYINDIANFORCES.
INDIAN RETALIATION

47. THEIRSUCCESSINCOUNTERINGPAKISTANIPLANS
PROVEDTOBEAMORALEBOOSTERFORINDIAN
TROOPS.
ONAUGUST15,INDIASCOREDAMAJORVICTORY
AFTERAPROLONGEDARTILLERYBARRAGE.
ASARESULT,MANYOFTHESEPOSTSFELLTOINDIAN
ATTACKSRESULTINGINTERRITORIALGAINSFORINDIA.
INDIASWIFTLYLAUNCHEDCOUNTERATTACKSACROSS
THECEASEFIRELINE
INDIAN RETALIATION

48. THISHOWEVERRESULTEDINMOREPROBLEMSFORPAKISTAN,
ASINDIACOUNTEREDBYCROSSINGTHEINTERNATIONAL
BORDERFURTHERSOUTHINPUNJAB,STARTINGTHEWAROF
1965.
THEINDIANOFFENSIVERESULTEDINPANICAMONGPAKISTAN
TROOPS,WHOURGENTLYLAUNCHEDOPERATIONGRANDSLAM
TOCONTAINTHESITUATIONSINCETHEREWASNO
CONTINGENCYPLANNEDINCASEOFGIBRALTAR’SFAILURE.
FIGHTINGCONTINUEDUNTILTHEENDOFTHEMONTH,ASVITAL
POCKETSLIKEHAJIPIRPASS—WHICHWASTHELOGISTICAL
SUPPLYROUTEOFTHEINFILTRATORS—ANDOTHERNEARBY
AREASWEREALSOBROUGHTUNDERINDIANCONTROL.
INDIAN RETALIATION

49. MUSAKHAN,PAKISTAN’SCHIEFOFTHEARMYSTAFF,
WASSOCONFIDENTTHATTHEPLANWOULDSUCCEED
ANDCONFLICTWOULDBELOCALIZEDTOKASHMIR
THATHEDIDNOTINFORMTHEAIRFORCE,ASHE
BELIEVEDTHEOPERATIONWOULDNOTREQUIREANY
MAJORAIRACTION.
THEREWASLITTLECOORDINATIONAMONGSTTHE
MILITARYSERVICESONTHEIMPENDINGOPERATION.
THEPLANWASWELL-CONCEIVEDBUTWASLETDOWN
BYPOOREXECUTION.
REASONS FOR FAILOURE OF OP GIBRALTOR

50. THERESULTINGWAROF1965HADAGREATERNEGATIVE
IMPACTONPAKISTANTHANONINDIA.
MANYSENIOROFFICIALSALSOWEREAGAINSTTHEPLAN,ASA
FAILURECOULDLEADTOANALL-OUTWARWITHINDIA,WHICH
MANYWANTEDTOAVOID.
FEWPEOPLEINKASHMIRWEREREALLYINTERESTEDIN
REVOLTINGAGAINSTINDIA,AFACTLARGELYIGNOREDWHILE
PLANNING.
MANYSENIORPAKISTANIMILITARYOFFICERSWEREUNAWARE
OFTHEIMPENDINGCRISIS,THUSSURPRISINGNOTONLYINDIA,
BUTALSOPAKISTANITSELF.
REASONS FOR FAILOURE OF OP GIBRALTOR