survey of some major developments in the Palestine problem, Abid Husni Gama, 1969.pdf

Survey of some major developments in the
Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict to
1967: some aspects of United States involvement
Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic)
Authors Gama, Abid Husni, 1943-
Publisher The University of Arizona.
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except with permission of the author.
Download date 13/04/2024 10:38:33
Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318195

SURVEY OF SOME MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
PALESTINE PROBLEM AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI
■ OONFLIOT TO 1967s SOME ASPEGTS OF
UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT
by
Abid Husni Gama
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
19 6 9

STATEMENT BY AUTHOR
This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfill
ment of requirements for an advanced degree at The Univer
sity of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library
to be made available to borrowers under rules of the
Library#
Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable
without special permission, provided that accurate acknowl
edgment of source is made# Requests for permission for
extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript
in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major
department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his
judgment the proposed use of the material is in the inter
ests of scholarship# In all other instances, however,
permission must be obtained from the author,
SIGNED: fct • ^7
______
APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR
This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:
NEAL D. HOUGHTOt^ V ' D6te ^ 7
Professor of Government

AGKM 0 WLEDG-MM T S
The author wishes to express his appreciation to
the entire staff of the Department of Government for their
guidance and aid* He especially wishes to extend his deep
gratitude and appreciation to Dr, Heal D, Houghton$ the
major professor and the thesis adviser.
The author wishes also to express his appreciation
for the encouragement and Invaluable recommendations given
to him hy Dr, William <J, SSLlsom and Dr, Clifton E, M l son
of the guidance Committee in the preparation of this
thesis, ,
Finallya the author would like to express his deep
gratitude to his family for their financial provision which
made it possible for the author to attend The University of
Aris.ona,
iii

TABLE OF CONTESTS
ABSTBAO T o o o o o o a o o o o o o o o o o o o oooo
CHAPTER
Xo XNTROLWC TXON OOOOOOOOGO OOOOOO O X
Xo Palestine Throughout the Ages 0 o = =, 0 0 X
XX0 Persecution of the Jews „ e . * « 3
Ao The Jews in the West ««o. ««»«» 3
Bo The Jews in the East * <, „ * '<, * o „ 5
Co The Search for a Solution 0 = » o o » 5
Bo ^ %Om S%% oooooo ooeoooooo. 3
la PalestineI Meaning and
i e oooodoooo o XO
PLEDGES AND COUNTER PLEDGES 1912=1920 , • . , 15
Xo The Straggle for Palestine ,
XXo Zionism and Britain ooooooooooo l 8
Ao The Balfour Declaration o , o o o o » 23
Bo Meaning and Significance o o o o 0 o 23
XXXo Pledges to the Arabs o o o o 0 0 o 0 o o 26
Ao Sir Henrj McMahon . . * , , ^ 26
Bo Commander David George Hogarth « « » 30
Co Lto Colonel Jo Ro Bassett o o o o o o 31
Do Declaration to the Seven 0 o o o e o 32
So Anglo"French Declaration , o 0 o o 0 33
XVo Palestine at the Paris Peace Con=>
ference 000000000000000 3^4*
Ao Arab Demands 000000000000 34
Bo Zionist Plans 000000000000 3*Z
Co Woodrow Wilsons: - Between Arab
and bZionist ooooooooooo 39
lo American Delegation's
-Recommendations 0000000 I4D
2o King=Crane Commission 000000 41
iv

V
TABLE OF CONTENTS”-Continued
Page
3o PALESTINE: UNDER THE MANDATE 1920-1947 o o o „ . 47
I, Mandate for Palestine » = ® » o <.«.<. o 47
A, Provisions of the Mandate 0 <> 0 0 o 4®
Bo Zionist Aims #0
IIo ‘ Jewish Immigration into Palestine 0 » o Si
Ao OonseQmenees oooooooooooo 03
111o British Reaction oooooooooooo 04
Ao Churchill Shite Paper o o o » o o o 04
Bo MacDonald White Paper 0 » o » » » 0 00
Co Zionist Reaction oooooooooo 07
IVo Churchill and Zionism ooooooooo 08
A® Roosevelt6s Reaction 0 o o o o 0 = 0 60
Vo Zionism in the United States o o o * o o 61
VIo - Truman and Zionism ,««•*>.'*<»*.* 64
Ao Position of Palestine 0 o » 0 o o 0 64
Bo Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry oooooooooooo 66
Co Truman-Bevln Dispute o o 0 e o 0 o 0 6?
VIIo Zionist Terrorism in and out of
Palestine § Its Meaning and
Consequence oooooooooooo 69
VIIIo Britain Places.Palestine Befire the
United Nations ooooooooooo 70
4o PARTITION OF PALESTINEs 1947=1949 = » » o « 0 0 71
I, Palestine Before the United Nations 0 o 71
IIo United Nations Special Committee
on Palestine oooooooooooo 72

vl
TABLE OF CONTENTS-“Continued
IIIo Partition with Seonomic Union * « , <, „ , 73
A, The Jewish State 0 » = » = <. » o <. 0 73
B0 The Arab State » » « » o » 0 » » » » 74
Co Je m s al ezn oooooooooooooo 7 5*
IF, Partition and Pressure Politics o 0 o o » 75
Vo Consequences of Partition » » » 0 » 0 0 0 79
Ao Arab Be s^onse oooooooooooo 79
Bo Zionist R e s p o n s e • » » » 80
Co Early United States-Israel
Relations oooooooooooo Si
VIo The Arab-Israeli Sffar of 1948 o o 0 o » 0 84
Ao The Arabs in the Jewish State = o o 0 84
Bo The Position of the Arab States o o 0 88
Go The Official ifer oooooooooo 90
Do The Role of the United Rations o o o 92
lo UoMo Mediators Count Folke
Bernadette ooooooooo 92
2o Peace and the Refugees e *. » » e 95
VIIo The 1949 Arab-Israeli Armistice
Agreements .0000 00000 0000 98
VIOLENT TRUCE, 1949-1956 oooooooooo. 99
Io Ere 1 2 Israel oooooooooooooo 99
H o Tri-Partite Declaration ooooooooo 103
/
III* Israeli Aggression * * * , * o * * * o * IOI 4.
Ao • On 3^ria <> 0 0 0 0 0 0 o <? 0 000 10^
IBq Oxi orc^axi © o o © © © © © © @ o © © © 103
0 0 Oil o o 0 0 0 0 0 o o o-o d o 0 108
Do The Davom Affairs 195^ Spy
8oaxi^,ai © © © © o <» © o 0 © o © o H O
E© Israeli Military Reprisals: Causes
axic^ Reasons ©©o©©©©©©©© 111

vii
o 0 oo o o o o o
ooooo
lo lorded Qlaahea with Syria * - * . ,
2« Israeli Threats to Syria 0 « » »•o
TABLE ©F GOHTEHTS— Gontimmed
IYo Outside Proposals for Feaee „ 115
Ao The Dulles Proposal „ o <, „ , , « « , 115
Bo The Eden Proposal o o » = = o 0 = o o 117
THE EG'YFTIAN“ISRAELI WAR OF 1956 0 «, „ » . » > 119
Io CauseS OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 119
Ao Masser ooooooooooooooo 119
Bo Arms for Egypt 0 o = 0 » 0 o = o „ 120
Go The Sues Ganal ooooooooooo
11o Operation Musketeer ooooooooooo 127
Ao Erets Israels 1956
Bo Kafr Qasim Incident <> « « « . o o « o 129
IlJLo The Situation at the United
Hations ooooooooooooooo 129
Ao The General Assembly and Israel 0 0 o 131
Bo The Role of the United States « o 0 o 1J2
Go The BoHoE©Fo ooooooooooo© 1
7© IG HAR © © © HO PEACE, 1957-1966 © © © © © © « 136
lo The Arab-Israeli Borders ©o©©©©©© 136
Ao Egypt ooooooooooooooo© 13^
B© Syria ooooooooooooooo© 137
Go lordan ooooooooooooooo 13^
IIo The Kennedy-Basser Gorrespondenee © © © © 139
8© T H SBOOHD ARAB-1SRAEL1 MARS 1967 © © © © © © 1%3
I © Syria ©©©ooooooooooooooo llj-3
A© Support of A1-Fatah © © © © © © - © © © 1%3
B© Israeli Reaction to Syria ©

vili
TABLE OP C01TB1TS— Orotimed
Page
IIa Arab Reaction and Response @ 0 « o o =. = II4.7
Ao Mobiltsation of Poress « e <> 0 0 * « lij.7
B 0 Tb© BqMoEoPo o a o o o 0 0 o o o o o
Go The Strait of Tiraa lj?0
lo Israeli Reaotxoxi 00000000
2o United States Reaction 0 o 0 » 0 151
3o Meaning and Significance 0000
III o The Sxx**]Da^r War 000000000000 1^^
Ao Israeli Preparations 00000000 155
Bo The Arabs 0000000000000 157
Go Monday j) June 5 9 19i>7 00000000 loO
Bo XTo So So Liberty 00000000000 .
IVo The Role of the United States In the
United Hations 00000000000
Ao On Mar 000000000000000 lb5
Bo On Jerusalem 000000000000 lb 7
Go On Arab Refugees 0000000000 170
3D o On Peace 000000000000 00 173
Bo On the Jarring Mission 0000000 177
APmMBIX As HUSAII-MGMAHON GORRBSPOMDENGE 00 186
Sharif Husain9s Letter of July 34, 1915 = 186
Sir Henry McMahon9 s Letter of October
249 1 9 1 5 000000000000000 188
APPENDIX Bs BASSET9S LETTER 000000.00 193
APPENDIX Gt DEGLARATION TO THE SEVEN 0 . 0 . 196
APPENDIX BS ANGLO-PREHGH DECLARATION 0,00 199
APPENDIX Is RESOLUTIONS OP THE GENERAL
SYRIAN CONGRESS 201
APPENDIX PS RECOMMENDATIONS OP THE KING- ' ,
CRANE COMMISSIONS = 0 . = . =

£x
TABLE OF GOMTMTS-^Oontinued
APPENDIX 62 PALESTINE'S POPULATION 1922-
19^7 6 O 0 0 0 0-0 O O O 0 D O 212
LIST OF B1F1RENGES , o- . • o . . o . * « • . • 213
B

ABSTRMf
throughout history9 Palestine has often been con
quered in a series of experiences* But, with the Arab con
quest in the seventh century» the inhabitants of Palestine
became and remained predominantly Arab for thirteen cen
turies *
Palestinians^ who were subjects of the Ottoman
Empire at the outbreak of World War Is were promised inde
pendence by Britain and France* Following the war,
independence was denied and Palestine -was ruled by Britain
through a League of Rations Mandate* Britain; thus
entrusted with the task of preparing Palestine for inde
pendence, preoccupied itself, however, with the establish
ment in Palestine of a national home for Zionism* The
Zionists worked toward•the establishment of a Zionist state
in Palestine, through large scale Jewish immigration and
major land purchase*
Israel was established at the expense of dispos
sessing nearly a million Arabs in Palestine* The Arab-
Zsraeli conflict, which developed out of the Palestine
problem, concerned itself with the rights of the Palestin
ians who were rendered homeless* On the one hand, the Arab
states took it upon themselves to bring justice to the
Palestinians, by way of repatriation and compensation, in

accordance with ad hoc United Bations Resolmtions, On the
other hand» Israel, has continually refused to repatriate
and compensate the Palestinians in defiance of those reso
lutions O
The United States, which had played an Important
role in the Palestine problem, and the key role in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, could commend its influence again to help
secure a just and lasting peace in the Middle Mast,

0H A M BR 1
INTRODUCTION
I. Palestine Throughout the Ages
Palestine has always been the battleground for the
great powers throughout hist©ry 0 From man's earliest his
tory to our modern eras Palestine has often been conquered
and reconquered in a series of experiences^
There is some doubt as to who were the original
people of Palestines which is true of many countries» But
there is little doubt as to who were the first rulers known
to hair© ruled that area* and those who have succeeded
them* "L ,
lo The Egyptian Eharoahs were known to have ruled Pal
estine before the Israelites came in 110# Bo Co
2* During the 8th century Bo Co the Assyrians took
overo
3o From the 7th to the 6th century B,C, Babylonions
ruled ito
I4.0 In 539 Bo Co Cyras of Persia conquered Babylomo
So In the ^.th century. B0G0 Alexander took ever*
60 In 63 BoCo the Romang Pompey9 occupied Jerusalemo
lo To Reidg ^Should a Jewish State be Established
in Palestinefgg Papers on Palestine* II (May, 1 9 4 7 2 9 = 3 1 o

7<> About the middle of the 7th century A 0B o the Arabs
conquered ^Palestine,,
80 From the 11th century A,Do to 1918» Palestine
remained under Muslim Turkish rule, except for a
brief period during the Crusade 0
9o From 1910 to the creation of the State of Israel in
1911-85 Great Britain ruled Palestine*
1 0* Today@ Israel is the present ruler of that area
known as Palestine*
With the advent of each power, significant changes
occurred in Palestine’s population* But for our purposess
perhaps the most significant changes were those which came
under Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* A Jewish majority
was dispersed by pagans, but a minority remained to witness
the rise of a new Christian majority* Islam was the last
religion that came to Palestine* It was brought by the
Arab conquerors in the middle of the seventh century, and
ever since then. It has become the dominant religion in
Palestine under an Arab majority* Although, the Arabs were
conquered by Turks, the Turks were Muslims, and that left
things basically unchanged for 1300 years* Throughout
these thirteen centuries, Palestine’s population was Arab,
and Palestine was a part of the Arab world* The Christians
in Palestine became Arabs and were a part of that majority*
But the Jews, who remained in Palestine, and like their

’ 3
counterparts elsewhere, were a relatively small minority 0
Hot an oppressed and persecuted minority, hut a minority
that lived in peace with the Arab majority0. The Arabs in
Palestine, by nature of their religion, included both
Ghristians and Muslims» The Holy Land was indeed Holy,
until the twentieth century, when the land of 8milk and
homey8 became the land of blood and violence o'
H o Persecution of the Jews v
The majority of the Jews who fled from Palestine,
escaping annihilation under Hebuchadne 2sar, sought refuge
in Europe' centuries before the Arabs conquered Spaino The
majority of them settled in Eastern Europe and Russia, and
the rest resided in lie stern Europe« It is difficult to
determine when and where such extreme forms of persecution
began, but it can be ascertained that the Jews were perse
cuted by Christians, and the situation later became more
tragic in Eastern Europe than in Western Europeo
Ao The Jews in the West
The Jews in the West were often rejected by society
and were forced to become secluded groups that were alien
to the countries in which they resided* In Western Euro
pean Countries, commonly they had only restricted rights,
dominantly far from the rights of Christians* In some
countries, notably Spain and Portugal, they were forced to

change thein religion or suffer extreme forms of physical
torture»
ifith the advent of the Muslim Empire in the Iherian
Peninsulap the Jews were spared persecution for many centu
ries* Many Jews fled to Arab Spain, but by 1^92, when the
Arabs retreated to North Africa, some Jews left with them,
s>
to live as normal human beings and equals* Those who
remained behind had to wait a long time for equality*
Gradual emancipation of the Jews took place under
Napoleon8s revolutionary France* The Edict of Fraternity
became the motto for all men in France, then dominantly for
Western Europe* Slermont-Torrere, delegate to the French
National Assembly said: ®T© the Jews as a nation we grant
nothing; to the Jews as men.we grant all*
In ISOT, Napoleon^" convened a Sanhedrim of Jews in
his Empire* The-Jews declared to Napoleon that France was
their country, and that Frenchmen were their brothers*
Under Napoleon, the Jews were admitted to full rights of
citizenship as men, as Frenchmen who had a religion, but
not as Jews per se* Since then there has never been
8* A* Mo .Mlienthal, The Other Side of the Coin
(New Yorks Devin Adair, 19651," p* 214.3» Arnold Toynbee, A
Study of Hi story (Domdons Oxford University Press, X95W,
Yol* VIII, pp* 272-312*
3* A* Mo Mlienthal, What Price Israel (Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1953)$ PPo 11-12*
ij.* Ibid*

,eJewish Mationalism® in Frances and the attitude of the
French Jews paved the way for the rest of Western Europe to
liberate its Jewish subjects® By 1874 .9 most of the Western
European countries had granted full rights to its Jewish
subjects® The Jews in the West were assimilated by-society,
and had their place under the sun as free, equal citizens®
B® The Jews in the last
The most distressing situation in the East was in
Russia® Russia had the largest number of Jews, and it was
there that despair and misery prevailed most of all® For
them emancipation was out of the question® They hardly
expected any change in their situation except more misery
and death® For them the solution was one of life or death®
They hardly thought about emancipation or equality® They
turned to '^Jewish nationalism*1 as an answer®
0O The Search for a Solution
•Jewish Rationalism* meant to the Russian Jews a
•Jewish Rational Home,• at first® The concept of ‘Jewish
Rationalism® meant a home where the oppressed Jews could
salvage themselves® The concept denied and rejected assim~
Hation® It condemned the very country they lived in®
They said. In one way or another, ; "1 was never anything but
Jewish, I could not conceive that a Jew could be anything

else® .(this quotation is from Chaim ¥eimanns a Russian
Jew, who became the first President of Israel)0^
heo Zinsker, a communal worker from Odessa, was the
first Russian Jew who was known to have advocated a 'Jewish
National Home1 for the oppressed Jews* hike all Jews, he
realized that there was a strong spiritual attachment
between Judaism and Jerusalem,, It seems only natural that
he should have selected Palestine, but that was not the
case. About Palestine, he said, 5,1 Me must not attach our
selves to the place where our political life was once vio
lently Interrupted,,Rejecting Palestine as a 'Jewish
National Home' he was willing to accept anything that would
pose as an immediate solution to a tragic human problem,,
Zinsker counted on the support of Western Jews, but
he met with failureo Out of despair he joined a local
Russian organization that was bent on the very thing he
warned againstg Palestine,
The Jewish organization which Pinsker joined was
named 'Choveve 2ion' (Lovers of Zion), Choveve Zion had as
its goal, the colonization of Palestine by oppressed Rus
sian Jews, Its goals were similar to those prescribed by
5, Chaim leizmann. Trial and Error, Illustrated
Edition (London: Harper and Brothers, 19493* 555°
6, Po Andrews, The Holy Land Under Mandate (Cam-
.bridgei Riverside Press, 193D» Is P° 3©9<>

7
Moses Hess in his hook 8Rome and Jerusalem*8^ Hesss
another Russian Jew, wanted to strengthen the ties between
Jerusalem and Judaism0 He realized the spiritual connec
tion, but he wanted a physical connection with Palestine*
He wanted the Jews to buy "many towns, fields, and vine
yards in the Holy land,11® as necessary to establish Jewish
colonies for the oppressed Jews* Unlike Mmsker, the idea
of Hess had better success among rich Jews* The most
notable contributor was Baron Edmond de Rothschild of
France, who spent over 2 0 million dollars * ^ The coloniza
tion process was slow, but it did have as its object the
Holy Band* Its finaneers were Western Jews, but its colo
nies were made up of Eastern Jews*
The Jews of the East chose to migrate, rather than
wait for emancipation* Some of them went to Palestine, and
others to Western Europe* The majority of the Jewish
migrants headed for the United States as early as 1892*^
Mnsker, Hess and Ghoveve Zion were in existence
before the coming of Herzl and Zionism* Although Eerzl
7* Moses Hess, Rome and Jerusalem fZew Yorks
Bluch, 19k$}o
8* Andrews, op* cit*, p* 289*
9* Ibid* * p* 305*
10* Ibid*, p* 298*

never made any reference to them, a nacent Zionist movement
was already in existence, awaiting a leader*
Zionism
In 1 8 9 6 9 a young Austrian Jewish publicist, by the
name of Theodor Hersl, was covering the 'Dreyfus Affair 8
for a French newspaper, The Dreyfus Affair left a deep
impression on him; in fact, it must have convinced him that
' Jewish assimilation was not possible, Herzl knew about the
persecution of Jews in Eastern Europe and Russia, But that
did not move him to write anything. It only moved men like
Pimsker^ (Auto-Emancination, 1882), and Hess (Rome and
Jerusalem, 1862), The 'Dreyfus Affair 8 moved Herzl to
write Judenstaat in 1 8 9 6,^^
Judenstaat was unique in that it was the first
piece of literature written by a lestern Jew rejecting
assimilation and calling for a Jewish state, Naturally, it
caught the attention of Eastern Jews and this literary con
tact led to the formation of the !l#orld Zionist Organiza
tion8 under the leadership of Theodor Herzl,
11, Translated into English by A, L, Finkenstein,
London, 1891,
12, Translated into Ehglish by Sylvie D ’Avigdor,
New Yorks Scopus, 1943»■

Herzl's Zionisms, according to ¥eizmanns was a ,sphi-
lantferopyoIt was based on the suffering of Jews 9 and
had as its object the proemrement of money from rich Jews
to buy land for poor distressed Jews, There is no doubt
that Zionism was caused by the suffering of Jews* Other
wise » why would the Jews leave their countries and go else
where? Hhy was it that a national home or state was called
for only when Jews were persecuted and rejected? Why did
it appear in the 18908 s and not before? Shy was it that
only a handful of Jews thought otherwise? How does it
explain the case of Western Jewry before and after Dreyfus?
Herzle s Zionism was the one that developed then and out of
these conditionse Judenstaut. Auto-Emancipation 0 Home and
Jerusalem» support the view that the cause was Jewish suf
ferings o The Zionism that Bfeizmann was talking about was
the one that developed out of Herzl8s Zionism., replaced it
and completely changed its objectives* It was imposed
Zionism3 never an acquired one* It was Russian Zionisms
it was -Weizmann? s Zionisms
The sufferings of Russian Jewry never were the -
cause of Zionism* The fundamental cause of Zion
ism was9 and iss the ineradicable national striv
ing of Jewry to have a home of its own— a national
centres a national home with a national Jewish
life,1^
1 3* Eeizmann, op* cit* s pp* 6 2-6 3* -
lij.o Ibid* g p* 233*

Sfeigmam fails to say what eaused Zionismj, bmt he smeoeeds
in trying to explain some of its objectives at the tim @ 0
Biatever was the cause of Zionism, . it eamot be said that
it was an aoeident that Herzl and Zionism came at a time
when anti-Judaism was high in Prance=
Russia’s Zionist Jewry were the most uncompromising
Jews at the World Zionists 6 Organization6s First Congresss
in Basle, Switzerland, 1897° Their pronounced stubbornness
as to the cause of Zionism never failed to appear when a
solution was sought for the distressed Jews of Russia and
Eastern Europe«
The Jews of the East and West sent their delegates
to this Congress, with the hope of solving the problems of
distressed Jews in accordance with Herzl8s Judenstaato
Herzls like Mmsker, called for a Jewish state in
any country but Palestine» He said: l!I»et the sovereignty
be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to
satisfy the reasonable requirements of a nation and the
rest we cam manage for ourselvese . To the hard line
Zionists like, Weizmann, he said: 11 If anyone thinks that
the Jews can steal into the land of their fathers, he is
!*>. Andrews, op3 cito a p» 3 1 0,

11
deceiving either himself or others» To the Russian Jews
who were bent on colonizing Palestine, he saids "An infil
tration is bound to end in disaster , . , it continues till
the inevitable moment when the native population feels
itself threatened and forces the government to stop the
further influx of Jews, "-^7
The majority of the Jews recognized that Palestine,
which was under Turkish rule, already had a well-established
Arab population for the last 1300 years.
The hard-line Sionists, however, adopted an
entirely different approach,. They said that God had prom
ised the children of Abraham Palestine, and that the Jews
in the Diaspora, according to the ©Id Testament, spoke of a
Q
return from the exile to rebuild their home in Palestine,
Regarding the concept of Jewish return to Palestine, Alfred
Guillame, Professor of Old Testament at the University of
Ikondon said:
Such views are a distortion of the Old Testament
Prophecies which predicted a return from Babylon
and from all the land whether the Jews had been
exiled. And these prophecies were fulfilled.
The Jews did return to Judae, they did rebuild
1 6, Ibid, , pe 3 1^,
17, Ibid,, p, 310,
18, I, M, Rabinoviteh, "The Jewish Problem,"
Papers on Palestine, Vol, II (May, 19i|-7)s ii-9-62| Henry
Morgenthau, "Zionism and Palestine," Papers on Palestine,
Vol. II (May, 1947), 32-48,

12
the Temples and after fluctuating they did
rescue a brief period of political independ-
• ence and expansion under the Meecabbeeso Thus
the prophecies of the return have been ful
filled* and they cannot be fulfilled again*
Eithin the Canonical Literature of the Old
Testament there is no prophecy of a second
return after the return from the Babylonian
exile,19
The real reasons behind the insistence on Palestine
as the only solution to the Jewish problem are alleged to
be more blunt and naked than it seems. For Meizmann saids
Hothimg but a deep religious conviction
expressed in modern political terms could keep
the movement alive» and that this conviction
had to be based on Palestine and Palestine
alone, Any deflection from Palestine was--
well9 a form of i&olatory <, „ , the Jewish
people would never produce either the money
or the energy required in order to build up a
wasteland and make it habitable^ unless that
land was Palestine,20
The Zionist Organization's First Congress in 1897
was controlled by Russia’s Jews, and they insisted on
Palestine as a home because that was the only way to get
money from the Western Jews, The means by which Palestine
was to become a home had to be colonization, a process
which Russian Jews began long before 1897* Subsequently,
the Congress bowed to Russia's majority votes and agreed on
the following declarations 11 The aim of Zionism is to
19o Quoted in “Tension and Peace in the Middle
Bast, 18 Palestine Arab Refugee Office (Hew York, 1965),
ppo
2 0, Weizrtiann, op, oit,, p, 1 4 3=,

13
create for the Jewish people a legally assumed home in Pal"
e stine 0
The Zionist Organisation® under Her si® began to
negotiate with the Turks® for the fulfillment of the Zion
ist aiaio Herzl asked Western governments to mediate on his
behalf® he offered to pay ten times as much for land in
Palestine® but Turkey refused--not only Sultan Abdul Hamid®
but the Young Turks too® refused to sell Palestine land.
The land that was bought previously® was bought by Western
Jews through their governments, never by the World Zionist
Organization e.
At the turn of the Oentury® the situation was hope
less for the Zionists® and the distressed Jews in Eastern
Europeo It was about this time that Britain came in and
offered Uganda to the Zionists through English Jewry»
Other offers included El-Arish® Sinai® Argentina® Dutch
West Indies® French Ouiana and Australia. The most signif
icant offer was that of Uganda. The Seventh Oongress of
the Zionists voted: 295 yes® 175 no® and 100 abstained on
22
Uganda. Although the majority voted yes® those 295 votes
failed to reach the two-thirds votes required to pass the
Uganda Resolution. The moderate Zionists said yes® and
2 1. Andrews, op. cit.. p. 313»
22. Weizmann® op. cit., pp. 113-115•>

amongst those 295 were Meizmann’s father and brother® Some
Zionists„ like Max Iordan, were willing to accept Uganda as
a mid-station to P a l e s t i n e ® p 03® Seizmann and other hard
line Zionists, it was Palestine or nothing®
23® Ibid®fl p® 11%®

CHAPTER 2
PLEDGES AID COUITER PLEDGES 1912-1920
I, The Struggle for Palestine
Pales time 9 at the outbreak of World War Ia had a
population of 700s000o There Mere 61^$000 Arabs and $6,000
Jewso"^ Like most of the Arab world, Palestine was a part
of the Ottoman Ebipire»
When Turkey joined the Germanic Powers against the
British~French=>Rmssian Allies in librld War I, the security
of the Sues 6anal was considered at stake0 Palestine,
according to the British, was important strategically for
the defense of the Sues Canal<> It was thought of as an
eastern shield for the canal, and due to its location. Pal-
2
estine became the 11 Sues Canal of the air»1$ The West could
not afford to see strategic Palestine fall into enemy hands,
or run by a government that was hostile to the Westo Too
much was at stake*
Palestine witnessed a fourfold struggle in which
success depended upon winning the participation of the Arab
inhabitants* The Allies and Axis lowers had strategic
1* F* Andrews, The Holy Land Under Mandate (Cam
bridge! Riverside Press, 1931)s I» p* 33#*
2* Ibid, 9 pp, 33ii-~335»
15

16
motives0 The Zionists had a colonial motivea The Arabss
who were the majority of Palestine’s inhabitantss had
patriotic motives»
Turkey appealed to the Arabs to join in a Holy War
against the British-Prench-BEsaian Allies# but the Arabs#
who had long "suffered under Turkish rule# were hesitant to
place their future behind Turkey# Bulgaria and the Germanic
■Powerso The British-Freneh-Bussian Allies must have sensed
Arab reservations regarding Turkey# and like Turkey#
appealed to the Arabs to revolt against Turkish rule by
joining the war on the side of the Westo The Arabs again
had their own reservations about the West# but they seemed
to be more inclined at the time towards Britain than
©arkey« The Arabs were willing to revolt# but only for a
priceo The price was independence# which became a subject
of major controversy between the Arabs and Britain,
The Zionists Jews were the only major involved ele
ment who had a clear objective that was less demanding than
the Arabs, They wanted a ’Jewish Home’ in Palestine# and
were willing to sell their services to the side that would
agree to their terms, The Ottoman Turks rejected the Zion
ists’ appeal prior to the war# but the Zionists of World
War I were far stronger and richer than the pre-war Zion
ists , Turkey and its associated allies must have been
tempted by the Zionists' appeal for it was said that they

17
were willing to agree to the Zionist goals of 1 8 9 7, bmt the
terras which were demanded from the Zionists were far beyond
their reach ands eonseqmently, the negotiations collapsed*^
The Allies were aware of the negotiations between
the Tnrks and Zionists =, They were also aware that Pales
tine was part of the Ottoman, not British, Empireo Their
only hope was with the Arabs, not the Zionists= Bmt Zion
ism was an important movement, and some Zionists, like
Seizmanm, played an important part in the war effort. If
Britain could not concede Palestine to the Arabs or to the
Zionists, then it might compromise Arab and Zionist
demands, for both gromps were important to the Allied cause
and the fmtmre of Palestine.
On Hay 16, 1916, fl,The Anglo-Franco-Rmssian Agree
ment0 was concluded in London. This ’secret agreement , 8
generally known as the "Bykes-Picot Agreement , 0 concerned
itself with the Arab portion of the Ottoman Empire, namely
"Greater Syria0 and Iraq. The area in question was divided
between Britain and France, with the exception of Pales
tine. Palestine, however, was to become an international
area (except for the ports of Haifa and Acre, which were
accorded to Britain) whose future was to be decided after
3« Ibid., pp. 335-37=

18
the war$he future of Arab Palestine was left undecided
to maintain the much needed support of both the Arabs and
the Zionists, Britain was not in a' position to commit
itself too far at this stage of the game,
IIo Zionism and Britain
British involvement with Zionism dates back to 1905
when Britain offered Uganda as a possible location for the
Jewish Hational Borne, The Zionists regarded the Uganda
offer as a gesture of friendship^ and hoped that Britain
would extend its good offices in the future to the cause of
Zionism,
The Zionists did not waste time in planting them-
selves in England to mould public opinion in their favor.
Through men like Herbert Sidebotham,^ of the Manchester
Guardian, they helped establish local Zionist organizationss
like the British Palestine Committee, (a process which
developed in many countries later) in all parts of Britain
t© mould public opinion in their favor. Through the years,
the Zionists managed to establish strong contacts and win
friends such as^ Sir Mark- Sykes (who became Ghief Secretary
4, George Antoninus, The Arab Awakening (Beiruts
Khayat8s, 1955), PP» ij.28-ij.30o
5- Ghaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, Illustrated
Edition (Londons Harper and Brothers, 1949), p, 233,
6, Ibid, 3 pp, 230-32,

19
of the War Cabinet under iloyd Beorge)» lord Robert Geeil,
Sir Ronald Graham, Sir Alfred Bmd» Lord Cramer*, Leopold
Amerjj, and Herbert Samuel (a Jew she became the first
British High Commissioner for Palestine)„ Mr0 Weizmann
himself testifies to the fact that had it not been for
those men mentioned, among others, "We, with our inexperi
ence in delicate diplomatic negotiations, would undoubtedly
7
have committed many dangerous blunders* British gentiles
and British pro-Zionist Jewry were important factors that
led to the many successes of the Zionist movement» They
not only arranged meetings between British (and non-British)
statesmen and Zionists, but they also kept the Zionists
informed about major secret negotiations that were detri
mental to the Zionist cause* Mr* Weizmann, in 1914,
informed a surprised Lord Balfour that the secret treaty
(Sykes-Pieot Agreement) "was unjust to England, fatal to
O
us, and not helpful to the Arabs*"
In 1905, Mr* Chaim Ifeizmann, through influential
local British Zionists, met Lord Balfour to inform him
about the Zionist rejection of the Wganda offer* This
first meeting was quite significant to Mr* Weizmann for Mr*
Weizmann later remarked that Balfour expressed a deep
7* Ibid*, p* 230*
8* Ibid** p* 241 0

interest and admiration for the Zionist movement* On Jmly
9
Xoj 1917s Mr* Ohaim Weizmann went to see Lord Balfour with
Sir Ronald Graham and Lord James Rothohilds who arranged
for this meeting* The Zionist diplomat wanted to obtain a
definite statement from Balfour regarding Britain8s posi
tion in relation to Zionist aims im Palestine* The British
were aware that the Zionists were eondaoting similar nego
tiations with the Axis powerss whose demands were unsatis
factory to the Zionists* Nevertheless* the Central Allies
were believed^® to have been willing to issue a statement
in favor of Zionist goals* The British who were unwilling
to concede anything* until then* had to make some sort of a
statement* But then again* they did not want to make a '
unilateral statement* Lord Balfour asked Mr* Weizmann to
give him a declaration that was acceptable to"the Zionists*
so that he (Lord Balfour) could put it before the British
Ear Cabinet* Lord RothchiXd handed the ’Zionist formula’
to Lord Balfour on July 18* 1917» which read as followss
HoM, Government* after considering the aims of the
Zionist Organization* accepts the principle of
recognizing Palestine as the National Home of the
Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people
to build up its National life in Palestine under a
protection to be established at the conclusion of
Peace* following upon the successful issue of the
war*
9o Ibid* * pp* 2f?J>~5>6*
10* Andrews* on* oit* * pp* 335”337<>

21
Ho Me Severment regards as essential for the real-
■ izatien ©f this principle the grant ©f internal
autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine,
freedom of immigration for Jews, and the estab
lishment of a Jewish National Colonising Corpora
tion for the re-settlement and economic develop
ment of the country.
The conditions and forms of the internal
autonomy and a charter for the Jewish National
Colonising Corporation should, in the view of H„
M 0 Government, be elaborated in detail and
determined with the representative of the Zionist
Crganizatione.
The Zionists had an important task before them, but
it was a task for which they were ready, Britain was not
the only country in which the Zionists chose to build up
some influence. The same objective was pursued throughout
Europe, and most of all, the United States,
In the United States, the Zionists had men like Mr,
houis Brandeds, Mr, Felix Frankfurter, Mr, Stephen1 Wise and
many others who carried on the work for Zionist goals and
aspirations, Perhaps the most influential Zionist in Amer
ica was Mr, Semis B, Brandeds, friend and advisor to Presi
dent Wilson, Mr, Brandeds also was the Chairman of the
Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs,
an organization which was created by him in New York in -
l^if.^12 It was through the pressure exerted by Mr,
Brandeds that President Wilson agreed to use his influence
11, Seizmazm, op, clt,, pp, 235-36,
12, Andrews, op, cit,, p, 334»

TO
on behalf of a Jewish Palestine«, ' Mr# Heimann appealed
to Mr# Brsndeis to obtain President Wilson8s supportand
on October 16, 1917$"^ 6 0lone1 E0 M0 Hottse, acting for
President fill son,, cabled the British ©overmen t Hashing-
ton8s smpport of the Zionist declaration 0 Britain did not
have to make a unilateral declaration, the American support
was followed by French, Italian and Japanese s u p p o r t
Despite the support that came from the United
States, France and Italy, the members in the British Ear
Cabinet were not entirely for the Zionist formula# Cabinet
members like Sir Edwen Montagu (a British Jew) were opposed
to the formula as' it contemplated a Jewish State in Pales-
17
tine# To recognize Palestine as the 'National Home 8 of
the Jewish people, would not prevent them from turning
Palestine into a Jewish state# The present formula, as it
stood, spelled nothing short of a Jewish State in Palestine,
although such terms ai 8National Home 8 were used# The
opposition, therefore, concerned itself mainly with the
ultimate objective of Zionism in Palestine (which was a
13= Julius Haber, The Odyssey of an American Zion
ist (Hew Yorks Twayne Publishers, 1956)* pp# 160-162=
lij.e Ifeizmann,'op# pit#, p. 2^8#
is># Ibid# # p= 262#
16# Andrews, op# clt#, pp# 3 3 1-3^#
17= leizmann, op# clt#„ p# 257=

Jewish State), and. if a declaration were to be made, then
the objective had to be change&« A compromise was reached,
although not all of the Ministers agreed, and Lord Balfour
sent a letter on. Hovember 2, 1917s to herd Rothehildo That
letter became known as the 8Balfour Declaration*8
A* The Balfour Declaration
November 2, 1917
©ear lord lothehilds
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on
behalf of his Majesty8s Government, the following
declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspi
rations which has been submitted to and approved
by the CabinetI--
His Majesty8s Government views with favour
the establishment ■ in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people, and will use their best
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this
object, it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non^Jewish communi
ties in Palestine, or the rights and political
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country*
I should be grateful if you would bring this
declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist
Federation*-8-®
B* Meaning and Significance
The Balfour Declaration differs considerably from
the original Zionist formula* First; the Declaration did
not specify nor accept Palestine as the National Home for
18* Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration
CLondons ?alientine, Mitchell and"Oo*, Ltd*, 1961)*

the Jews* though it viewed with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national Home for the Jewso Second* the
Declaration said a national Home* not a state or Jewish
Hation, Thirds the Declaration seemed to limit the scope
of Jewish immigration to colonize Palestine by stressing
that Mit being clearly understood that nothing shall be
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non=Jewish Communities in Pales tine11 $ the Zionist
formula had made no reference to the "non-Jewish community"
in Palestine, Fourths the Declaration did not proclaim any
right of the Jews to resettle or rebuild a Home in Pales
tine, It clearly stated that nothing shall be done which
may prejudice "the rights and political status enjoyed by
Jews In any other country,8
Britain issued the Balfour Declaration because it
needed the help of the Zionist movement to win the war,^
Since Zionism had an aim to colonize Palestine and even
tually turn it into a Jewish State* Britain wanted a
friendly government east of Suez, Although the Balfour
Declaration did not realize Zionist aims in full* it was
considered satisfactory to the Zionists as they did not
object to it. The only adjustment needed was to reconcile
the term 8national Home8 with Jewish State, The Zionists
19, Andrews* on. clt,* pp. 33$~37«

did adjmsfc the terms to mean the same thingMr, Mahum
Sokolows the President of the World Zionist Organization,
said that Zionism did not eontempl&te a Jewish state| Mr0
Eeizmann said that either Zionism was misunderstood or the
Arabs were deliberately lying0 They all denied that Zion-
PI
ism eomtemplated political domination in Pales tine o
The British too, did their share of double t&lko^
It became commonly known, according to Sir Winston
Ghurehill, that the Balfour Declaration did not prohibit
the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine,Mrc
Churchill went further than Lord Balfour, mot only in
asserting the Zionist goal, but in rationalising Britain's
decisions
If, as may well happen, there should be created
in our own life time by the banks of the Jordan a
Jewish State under the protection of the British
Crown which might comprise three or four millions
of Jews, an event will have occurred- in the his~
tery of the world which would from every point
10® Sir John Hope Simpson, “The Palestine Mandate,M
The Fortnightly, OLXIX (December, 1944341=349°
21 o Hahum. Sokolow. History of Zionism (Londons
Longmans, Green and Co„, 191937 PP» xxiv-xxv0
22a 0n the establishment of a Jewish State in Pal
estine, Lord Balfour saids “Personally this is what I
should like to see“s quoted in Carrol Quigley, “Lord Bal
four's Personal Position on the Balfour Declaration,“ The
Middle last Journal0 DCXII (Summer, 1968), 341“349°
23° United Hations Special Committee on Palestine,,
Volo I, 1947s PP° 20-21°

of view be bemefieials and would be especially
in harmony witbujfehe truest interests of the
British Empireo
The United" States welcomed the Balfour Declaration.
and President Eilson expressed his approval in a letter to
Mr, Stephen Mises then President of the Zionist Federation
in imeric&o^ On September 21, 1922, a joint resolution,
adopted by the 6 7th Congress of the United States, was
signed by the President, The resolution reads
Besolved by the Senate and the House of Repre
sentatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, that the United States of
America favors the establishment in Palestine
of a national home for the Jewish people, it
being clearly understood that nothing shall
be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of Christians and all other
nom«Jewish communities in Palestine; and that
the Holy places and-religious buildings and
sites in.Palestine shall be adequately pro-
teetedo^®
III, Pledges to the Arabs^
At the outbreak of World War I, as mentioned ear
lier, most of the Arab world were still ruled by the Otto
man Empire, The Turks asked the Arabs to join them in a
2ij.« Ibid, o ?©1, III, p, 11,
25o Andrews, on, clt,, p, 3%1,
26, The United States Department of State, "Man
date for Palestine,® Washington, 1927 9 P»
27, Eo If, Bethmann, Decisive Years in Palestine
(Hew Yorks American Friends of the Middle East, Inc,,
1957), P» 20, In 1922 the Ghristians in Palestine were
71,464s the Jews were 83,790, and the Arabs 589,177°

Holy War against the British-French Allies, and the British
asked the Arabs to revolt against farkejo To some. It may
have seemed that the Arabs were in a dilemma, but the
choice was a simple ©ne6 The Arabs wanted independence,
and if they joined Turkey, and had Turkey won the war
against the Allies, independence would have been denied to
the Arabs, since they were a part of the Ottoman Sapireo
If they joined the Allies, then it would have been for a
price, and that was independence« It is doubtful whether .
the Arabs would have revolted against Turkey on the side of
the Allies, had not independence been promised to them. It
would have been a waste of Arab blood and effort. It must
also be recalled that Britain wanted the Arabs to revolt to
protect Palestine, lest it may fall into hands hostile to
the British, thus endangering the Suez Ganal. The British
knew that they had to agree to pay the price for Arab
revolt, and that promise came in the form of pledges to the
Arabs by Britain, British statesmen, and Allied declara
tions. The Arabs relied upon the pledges, and they did
revolt against Turkey. But much to their surprise, Britain
did not honor all of its pledges!

28
Ac Siy Henry McMahon^
The first of these pledges came through letters
exchanged between Sharif Husain of Mecca and Sir Henry
McMahon» the first British High Commissioner for Egypt0
The four letters written by each statesman respectivelys
became k n o m as the Hmsain-McMahon correspondence* Our
prime e©noern here is with Sharif Husain6 s first note to
Sir McMahon^ dated July 1915a and Sir McMahon's second
note of reply$ dated October 2%p 19l5»
Sharif Husain's letter of July 1^., 1915s clearly
stated the demands of the Arabs in return for aiding the
Allies against the Turks* Sharif Husain wanted Britain to
recognize the independence of the Arab countries which he
specified in his letter* The countries weres Greater
Syria (which included at that time Syria proper, Lebanon,
Palestine and the boundaries of present day Jordan)| Iraq;
and all of the Arabian Peninsula*
Sir Henry McMahon replied to Sharif Husain on
August 30, 1915s and clearly stated that it was premature
to accept the boundaries which Sharif Husain outlined*
Sharif Husain replied to Sir McMahon on September 9S 1915s
insisting that Britain should officially accept his pro
posed boundaries* It is Sir McMahon's reply of October 2i|.,
^See Appendix A for the Husain=MeMahon Correspond
ence*

1915$ with whieh we are concerned as the basis of the
pledge made by Britain*
- Sir Henry McMahon informed Sharif Husain in his
letter of ©et©her 214.* 1915$ that Britain agreed to the
boundaries proposed to Sharif Husain with a few exceptions*
Those exceptions were Western Syria (which included Lebanon
and Goastal Syria proper) and Iraq (which was to be under
British rule)* Sir McMahon said those portions of Syria
lying to the West of Damascus.^ Horns $ Hama and Aleppo? it is
clear that Palestine was not excluded# and that the British
agreed to Palestine as part of the boundary' proposed by
Sharif Husain* Regarding Palestine# Sir McMahon said that
Britain would guarantee the ’Holy places against all
external aggression and will recognize the obligation of
preserving them from aggression!8
Britain did not keep its promise regarding Pales
tine # for in 1916# according to the Sykes^Pieot Agreement#
Palestine was to remain under international control till
the war was over* In 1917$ according to the Balfour
"declaration# Palestine was to allow the lews to' establish
a “Home11 in Palestine* At the peace conference# independ
ence was denied to Palestine# and Britain ruled through a
League of Nations Mandate until Palestine became a Jewish
State in 194©* There was nothing to indicate from Sir
McMahon1 s exclusions# that Palestine was not a part of

Slaarif Husain9s scheme of proposed boundaries, and yet,
Palestine never beeame independent, even though its popu
lation was overwhelmingly Arab„
B<, Goiamander David George Hogarth
Mhen Britain issued the Balfour Declaration in
1917s two years after the Husain-McMahon Correspondence,
and eighteen months after the Arab Revolt, Sharif Husain
was greatly disappointed and asked for a definition of the
meaning and scope of the Balfour Declaration*
On January 1918, Commander David George Hogarth,
one of the heads of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, was instruc
ted by the British Foreign Office to deliver an oral
message to Husain* Mr* Hogarth informed Sharif Husain that
Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so
far as it ^would be consistent with the political and eeo-
momic freedom of the Arab population*13 The Balfour
Declaration said "civil and religious rights," but Mr*
Hogarth, as a British official, said "political and eco
nomic freedom*51 The Balfour statement could not have pro
tected or safeguarded Arab Palestine, but the Hogarth
statement was more hopeful to the Arabs in Palestine* .81 th
this new assurance, Sharif Husain informed Mr* Hogarth that
the Arabs would welcome persecuted Jewish refugees in
28* Antonious, op* elt** p* 268,

31
Palestine $ provided it was clear that complete Arab sover
eignty should prevail in Palestine* where 92% of the popu
lation was then Arab„ Mr, Hogarth’s message was an empty
British reassurance designed to maintain Arab support
against Turkey<> The Arabs were deceived once more by Brit
ain., Palestine became a Jewish state in 19^8* largely
through unlimited Jewish immigration.,
Go Lto Colonel J„ lo Bassett
The secret l$Sykes-Pieot Agreement11 became known to
the Arabs* thanks to Russia* through Turkey= The Turks*
who wanted the Arabs to join them in a Holy Mar against the
Entente Allies* informed the Arabs that the Allies were
deceiving them* and that this secret treaty really aimed at
dividing the Arab world between Britain and France* thus
denying the Arabs independence., Turkey* once more* called
upon the Arabs to join Turkey in the war against the
Entente Allies»
The British* obviously embarrassed* needed to
relieve the Arabs of their suspicions and doubts= The act
ing British Agent in Jedda* Lto Gol® J« Ro Bassett* was
instructed by Britain to re-assure Husain of Britain’s
honest intentions* and to deny the designs ascribed in the
Sykes-Picot Agreement. On February 8* 1918* Mr. Bassett

sent a letter* t© Sharif Basaixa stating that fttrkey. wanted
to sow saspielon' and. dombt between the Arabs and the
Allies9 and that Britain re-affirmed its pledges to the
Arabss in so far as their liberation was ©oneernede
®he British deceived the Arabs for the third time,
through Bassetts in denying that Britain and France had any
designs on the Arab countries0 .
©o Declaration to the Seven
Seven Arab leaderss domiciled in Cairos sent a
/
memorial to the British foreign Office through the Arab
Bureau in Cairo* The British government, through the Arab
Bureau, delivered its Declaration to the seven Arabs on
June 16,.191#***, The seven Arabs were lafiq al»Azm$ Shaikh
Kamel al~^assab? Mukhtar al-Sulhi Abdul Rahman Shahbandarf
Khaled al=lakim| Fauzi al-Bakrij Hasan Himadeho
The Declaration to the Seven, was a British promise
to recognize Arab independence in the territories that were
free and independent before the Ear, and to those terri
tories that were liberated from Turkey by the Arabs them
selves during the tfar. In so far as the territories that
were liberated from Turkey by the Allies, and those terri
tories that were still under Turkish rule, Britain promised
*8ee Appendix 1 for Bassett6s letter*
» See Appendix 0 for the Declaration to the Seven*

independence and a local government that was based on the
consent of the governed, Palestine was liberated by the
Allies» but it never received independence, The consent of
the governed* in this case, the Arabs, who were 92$ of the
population, was never sought or attained. The future
government of Palestine was British, not Arab, The Declara
tion to the Seven was one of those Declarations made, but
never effectuated.
Be Anglo-French Declaration
On lovember 7, 1918, a year after the Balfour
Declaration, Britain and France issued a declaration* in
Palestine, Syria and Iraq in the form of an official com
munique from General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary
Force,
The Anglo-French Declaration stated that the goal
of the Allies was to liberate the peoples who have for so
long suffered under Turkish rule, and to establish national
governments who derive their authority from the people,
Heither Britain nor France said that communique would
impose any system in any liberated area. Instead, they
would offer their services to set up popularly elected
governments in such areas, - Presumably, Palestine was
covered by the Declaration, but it never received
#See Appendix D for the Anglo-French Declaration,

3k
imdependeBoe$ and the government established was not based
on the consent of the governed* Palestine*, like the rest
of the "liberated^ countries in Arabia*, was colonized by
Britain and France* Such an outcomes hardly confirms the
noble goals expressed by Britain and France*
IVo Palestine at the Paris Peace Qonference
According to the Sykes-Pieot Agreement*, Palestine
was to remain under international administration until its
future was decided upon at the peace conference* According
to the previous pledges made by Britain*, and France*, as
discussed here, Palestine was to become independent through
Allied aid, once it had been liberated by the Allies, Pal
estine was liberated by the British and was garrisoned by
the British pending further instructions from the peace
conference*
A, Arab Demands
In so far as Palestine was concerned, the Arabs
reiterated their demand for independence, in accord with
the pledges made to them by the Allies promising them inde
pendence* The Arabs were informed by Britain and France
that independence could not be granted to all of the Arab
countries* There were some Arab countries that were not
ready for independence, and the Allies thought it best that
they help such countries attain independence under their

35
guidanee and control= It was suggested that France rule
Syria and Lebanon through a League of Nations Mandate, and
that Britain should do the same with Palestine, Transjordan
and Iraq* The Arabian Peninsula was to be independent at
once, since it was liberated by the Arabs„
The Arabs, however, objected. The first objection
came from Prince Faisal, King Husain8 s son, who informed
29
the laris Peace Council on January 1, 1919$ that inde
pendence must'be granted to all of the Arab countries.
However, due to the Anglo-French desires in Arabia, Prince
Faisal suggested that a great power could commend itself to
help those Arab countries gain independence, provided a
representative local government is erected in each country
upon the consent of the governed,
The Arab people, however, were totally disappointed
with the prospects for their future in laris. Their objec
tions were made clear when on July 2, 1919, a General
Syrian Congress assembled in Damascus, with representatives
from all of Greater Syria (Syria proper, Lebanon, and
Palestine), Their objections and demands became known as
the "Resolutions of the General Syrian Congress,!H$" Only
29= J, Go Hurewits, Diplomacy in the Near and
Middle East (New Yorks D, Van No strand Gor7™195t) , 11,
pp, 3b-39,"’
#Bee Appendix B for the Resolutions of the General
Syrian Congress,

full reviewal of those resolutions can adequately reveal
their scope and significance,, But they declared for:
a. Full and absolute independence for all of Syria
(including Palestine, as it was part of Syria
bo The establishment of a constitutional monarchy
under Amir Faisal as Kingo
Go The rejection of Article XXII of the proposed
Beague Covenant which considered Syria as insuff±=
eiently developedo The Congress said, MWe are not
less fitted or gifted than the Bulgarians, Serbs,
Greeks and Rumanians»18
do If a mandate is required for Syria, then the Arabs
want the United States as the mandatory power,
since it had no colonial designs on Syria0 The
duration of that mandate should not exceed twenty
yearso
e» If the United States is unable to accept the man
date, then we prefer Britain reluctantly®
fo Under no condition do we accept France as a manda
tory powero
go lie oppose the claims and aims of Zionism in Pales
tine (referred to as 18that part of southern Syria* )<
We also oppose Jewish immigration as it menaces
i8our national, political and economic life®*
ho The integrity. and inseparability of all of Syria®

37
io Independence for Iraq,
j0 Re-a£f£mati<m of President Wilson!a ©ondemnatlon
of secret treatiess and the nullification of the
agreements reached between Britain9 France# and
Zionismo
ko The Oongress looked to President Wilson for support
in determining their own future0
lo The Congress demanded that the peace conference
maintain Arab freedom# security and independenceo
®hat in essence the Arabs wanted was national self-
determination and that meant independence for all of the
Arab countries* They wanted to be free and independent to
live in their own countries amongst their own people* They
objected to foreign domination and intervention in all of
its forms and aspects* The Arabs demanded what was prom
ised to them by the Allies* The Arabs demanded their
rights as equal human beings# who# like others# want to
determine and shape their own future and destiny in their
own country*
B* Zionist Plans
The Zionist organisation presented a memorandum to
the Paris'Peace Council# outlining Zionist aims and goals

in ZaXestine63° The Zionist memo of February 3S 1919»
noted the following as its objectives and demandss
a.o The right of the Jewish people to reconstitute a
national Home in Palestine, The territorial bound
aries of that Hational Home should include parts of
Lebanon» Transjordan, Hejas» Syria and all of Pal
estine,
bo The Zionists wanted a League of Nations Mandate for
Palestine$ with Britain as the mandatory power. The
purpose of the mandate would be to facilitate the
establishment of the Jewish National Home in the
areas prescribed,
a. The Zionists reiterated the Balfour Declaration,
and hoped that Britain would work with them in
making Palestine truly and wholly Jewish,
The Zionists were bent on colonising Palestine through a
mandate by the League, Britain was to facilitate Pales
tine 8 s becoming Jewish, rather than to prepare the existing
Palestine for independence. The Zionists’ proposal was
submitted at a time when the Jews were a mere Q% of the
total population. Again, Zionism referred to the Arab.
majority as non-Jewish, apparently, in fact, as non-existing.

39
even though the Arabs constituted 92% of the population in
Palestine,
0, Moodrow Silsons Between Arab and Zionist
President Hilson., prior to the laris Peace Oonfer-' ■
ence9 did not hesitate to acknowledge United States support
for Zionist goals in Palestine, President Wilson supported
the Zionist formulas and later welcomed the Balfour Declara
tion, It was through men like Mr, Brandeiss Mr, Prank-
furtera and Mr, Wise that the United States became openly
pro-Zionist,
It may be questioned whether President Wilson was
aware of the ultimate goals of Zionism in Palestine, But
certainly the Zionist memo at the laris Peace Council
should have confirmsd@ or informed* President Wilson and
others* of the true goals and aims of Zionism in Palestine,
The Zionist memo was no secret* at least not to President
Wilson,
The Arab demands and aspirations became known to
President Wilson at the Peace Conference too. There was
Prince Faisal’s memo* and the resolutions of the General
Syrian Congress, The Arabs let it be known that they
wanted to be free; free to rule and live in their own coun
tries, Host of all* free from being controlled or occupied
by any power. The Arabs made no secret of their demands.

Iresident Wilson must have been aware of the .
dilemmao the Zionist goals ran against the Arabs' demands«
Palestine was awaiting a solution, and something had to be
" done.
The ideals which President Wilson expressed in his
fourteen points, could have guided him in making up his
mind about Palestine« President Wilson asked for reports
on Palestine by Americans in order to make up his mind.
The reports, he said, should coincide with the aspirations
and wishes of the people in that area. The people must
decide, and President M l son wanted to know the decision of
the people of Palestine.
1. American Delegation's Recommendations
©h January 21, 1919, the Intelligence Section of
the American Delegation to the Peace Conference submitted
tentative recommendations to President Wilson regarding the
hear and Middle East.
Regarding Palestine, the Report r e c o m m e n d e d : ^
1. The establishment of an independent state in Pales=
tine, with Britain as the mandatory power.
2. Palestine, the report said, is important to the
Jews and Christians. The relations of the Muslims
with Palestine was not so intimate.

41
3» The report said that Palestine was the ancestral
home of the Jews, and it is right that Palestine
should become a Jewish States 8eF@n though the Jews
form barely a sixth of the total population of
700,000 in Balestineo 8 (An incorrect figure, as the
Jews formed )
( .
This is, perhaps, one of the most shocking reports
about Balestineo It is poor, inaccurate mad biased* The
Muslim Arabs lived in Palestine for 1,300 years, yet the
report said Palestine is mot so ,,intimate,t to the Arabs*
Amy student of Muslim history could very well verify that
Palestine was mot only ’’intimate*1 to Muslims, but is as
sacred as Mecca itself to all of Islam* And then to recom
mend that a Jewish State be established in Palestine against
the wishes of 92|» of the population hardly conforms with
the principle of elemental justice*
S« Kimg-Grane Commission
President 111 son at the Paris Peace Council in
1918, suggested that the ’Big Three’ send two delegates
each as part of a unified commission to determine the
wishes of the people in Syria and Iraq*France refused!
later, Britain refused and 011 son alone held his ground*
The majority of the American Delegation in Baris objected
32* Antomious, on* eit* fl pp* 294=298*

k2
to smeh an inquiry= They thought that their recommenda
tions were adequate» However, President iiilson sent Br0
Henry Go King and Mr» Charles B0 Crane to investigate for
him 0
The King-Grane Commission arrived in Jaffa on June
10® 1919® and spent six weeks visiting Palestine and Syria
proper* The Commission visited forty towns® received 1®S00
petitions® and interviewed a large number of delegations0
©n August 28® 1919® the Commission submitted its report®
known as the King-Crane Report® to President ifLXson, The
Report covered Syria® Palestine and Iraq*
On Palestine® the Report recommended the follow^
inggw .
1* The report reaffirmed the Arab position stated in
/
the General Syrian Congress® that Palestine be
included in a united Syrian State with Prince
Faisal as its head* The report also recommended
that the United States accept the Mandate for
Syria® as it coincides with the wishes of the peo
ple » If the United States chooses not to accept®
then Britain is their second choice® and under no
circumstances do the Arabs want France® as France
*See Appendix P for the section on Palestine*

harbprs colonial aims, not independence, for Pal
estine «
Regarding Zionism, the report said, 11 the commis
sioners began their stwdy of Zionism with minds
predisposed in its favor,13 but after investigating
the facts, they recommended the following serious
modifications to the Zionist programmes
a0 Palestine is Holy to Muslims, Christians and
Jewso $he places which are sacred to Muslims
and Christians are not only not sacred to Jews,
but are abhorrent to them0 The Jews cannot be
entrusted to safeguard the sanctity of the Holy
Places, but the Muslims- can, as they respect
all religions6
b s The Zionist claim that the Jews have a "right6
to Palestine "can hardly be seriously consid
ered, 11 90% of the Arabs in Palestine are
opposed to the Zionist programme in Palestine,
which aims to establish a Jewish state. The
Zionists did acknowledge that they aimed at
dispossessing the non-Jewish community in Pal
estine by, various forms of land purchase. To
this effect, the report said, a Jewish state
cannot be established except by force, and by
damaging the civil and religious rights of

non-Jews» The report said that Jewish immigra
tion should he limited, and Palestine should
remain Arab, and a part of a united Syrian
Stateo
The report also mentioned that the government
of the United States might be embarrassed in
becoming objective, regarding Palestine, due to
,?her large influential Jewish population®11 But
the report recommended "the settlement of every
question, whether of territory, of sovereignty,
of economic arrangement, or of political rela
tionship upon the basis of the free acceptance
of that settlement by the people immediately
concerned, and not upon the basis of the mate
rial interest or advantage of any other nation
or people which may desire a different settle
ment for the sake of its own exterior influence
or masteryog This principle had been stated by
President SElson on July 4, 1918$ as one of
four great ends for. which "the associated peo
ples of the world were fighting®" The report
said that "if that principle is to rule, and
so the wishes of Palestine8s population are to
be decisive as to what is to be done with Pal
estine, then it is to be remembered that the,

Bon-Jewish population of Palestine is emph&tl-
eally against the entire Zionist programme.*
President Milson was aware that8
1. The British and the French promised independence to
the Arabs in Palestine, and the Arabs made it known
that independence was theirs by right.
2. If independence was not possible, and if a mandate
by the'league for Palestine was inevitable, then
the Arabs let it be known that they preferred, in
order, the United States, Britain, France, as the
mandatory power, and then for a limited period
only.
3. The Zionists were promised by Britain (later sup
ported by France and the United States) a National
Home in Palestine, and the Zionists made it known
that they wanted to establish a Jewish - State in
Palestine, with Britain as the mandatory power,
through large scale Jewish immigration.
President Mil son, however, was advised by men like
Mr. Braudels, a Zionist, who advised him to support the
Zionist programmeL In fact. President Wilson supported the
Balfour Seclaration, and as his term in office came to an
end with the defeat of the league of Nations Covenant,
there was little that he could have done. Ifhat mattered.

thoughj, was that despite the King-Grane Report, President
Wilson did not support the Arab ease*

CHAPTER 3
BALES T H E UNDER THE MANDATE 1920-194-7
10 Mandate for Palestine
On April . 25g 1920$, the SBpreme Oomneils which was
sitting at San Remo9 assigned the Mandate for Palestine and
Transjordan to Britain* in accordance with Article XXII of
the Covenant of the League, of Nations<, Although the United
States had not joined the League of Nations* President
Wilson supported the British Mandate for Palestine at the
Peace Conference* and ©m December 3s 1924.* the ^American-
British Palestine Mandate Convention*M was Gmmoluded
between those governments* in London*
The League of Nations9 Supreme Council8 s decision
was a fulfillment of British and Zionist aims in Palestine*
The British made it clear at the start of the war that they
wanted to see a friendly government east of Sues* Now the
League assigned Britain as the mandatory power for Pales
tine * The Zionists* whose object was to establish a Jewish
state in Palestine through large scale immigration* wanted
Britain as the mandatory power* It was Britain that issued
the Balfour Declaration* and in accord with this
1= The United States Department of State* ^Man
date for Palestine*18 Hashing ton* 1927* p* 107*

Beolaration# the Zionists hoped to fulfill their aim in
Palestine,
A, Provisions of the Mandate
The purpose of the heague of Nations’ Mandate Sys
tem* according to Article XXII of the Covenant* was to
further the development and well being of the ^peoples not
yet able to stand by themselves, *! This serious responsi
bility in each case was entrusted to a mandatory power and
it was expected that the provisions of the Mandate would*
in essence* reaffirm the noble goals and methods by which
the Mandatory power was to prepare the people for self-
government.
The provisions of the Mandate for Palestine were
geared more towards the fulfillment of Zionist aims through
British Administration than toward preparing Arab Palestine
for self-government. The preamble to the Mandate held
Britain "responsible for putting into effect the declara
tion originally made on November 2* 1917s by the Government
of His Brittanic Majesty,ts Unlike the Balfour Declaration*
but similar to the Zionist formula of July 1@* 1917s the
preamble recognised "the historical connection of the
Jewish people with Palestine*" and considered that connec
tion as the necessary grounds for Zionism to "reconstitute"
the Jewish National Home, in Palestine, The preamble

ks
referred to the Arab majority as the ^existing mon^Jewish
GommnitieSg^ whose civil and religions rights were to be
protected while the Mandatory power facilitates the
re-cons traction of the Jewish National Home in Pales tine o
Out of the 2? Articles of the Mandate assignments
six dealt with Zionist goals, 21 with the goals and methods
of administration, and none mentioned the word Arab or
Palestinian by name» They were referred to as the "exist
ing non-Jewish CommunitiesThe six.Articles that dealt
with Zionism, reaffirming and stating Zionist goals, were
2, 6, 7s 11 and 22, Article 2 held Britain responsible
for the establishment of the Jewish national homes Article
4 recognised the Zionist organisation as the appropriate
Jewish Agency* to advise and cooperate with Britain in
establishing the Jewish national home; Article 6 facili
tated Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine;
Article 7 facilitated the acquisition of Palestinian citi
zenship by immigrant Jews taking mp their permanent resi
dence in Palestine, a privilege denied to everyone else
save Jews; Article 11 enabled the Jewish Agency to perform
the tasks of a state in the Jewish areas; Article 22
#The Jewish Agency was recognized as the repre
sentative of the Zionist Jewish population in Palestine and
the Eorld Zionist Organization which was considered as the
representative of Zionism,

established. Hebrew as one ©f the three official languages
in Palestine, (The other two were Arable and English,>
The Mandate assigned to 'Sieaism a most favorable
position, la faet 9 the Mandate became a charter for Zion
ism to ©eloaize Palestine through immigration with Britain
as the helping hand. The provisions of the Mandate
defeated the very goals expressed in Article XXII of the
Covenants, which, in essences created the Mandate system.
The Mandate was written to serve an end other than the end
desired by the majority inhabitants. The means prescribed
eould only serve one end, and that end was very much '
similar to the Zionist goal,
B, Zionist Aims
The Zionist aim in Palestine was to establish a
Jewish state, although such terms as 8Home8 were used. The
Zionist formula, the Eing-Crame Report, and other similar
statements verified the Zionist goal. Secretary of State
Sansing asked Mr, Sal mama to define the term $ Jewish
national Home8 for M m s and Mr, Weizmann replied: ®I
define the Jewish .Hational Home to. mean the creation of an
administration which would arise out of the natural condi
tions of the country— always safeguarding the interests of
non-Jews--with the hope thats by Jewish immigration/ Pal
estine would ultimately become as Jewish as England is

p
English,* This isP perhaps 9 the key word that earn explain
forthcoming events and interpret past activities. The goal
was to make Palestine sas Jewish as England is Stoglish ,u
The Zionists never contemplated amalgamation of the
Jews with the Arabs, rather, they feared that unless the
two were kept apart, Jewish standards would inevitably be
lowered and the Zionist raison d’etre would be destroyed,^
The Zionists had no place for the Arabs in their scheme,
even though they were the majority of the population, Mhen
Mr, Einstein asked Mr, Weiraann about the status of the
Arabs if Palestine became Jewish, Mr, Weimann replieds
“Shat Arabs, they are hardly of any consequence,
II, Jewish Immigration into Palestine4*’
Jewish immigration to Palestine was permlssable in
so far as it would not “prejudice the civil and religious
rights of the existing non=Jewish communities,M said the
Balfour Declaration, The Mandate, however, allowed greater
latitude, Jewish Immigration was limited to the economic
2, Chaim Veismann, Trial and Error, Illustrated
Edition (Londons Harper and Brothers, 1949), p, 305°
3® oQuincy Bright, “The Palestine- Problem, * PLSQ 5
XLI (September, 1926), 4.02,
4= A, M, Mlienthal, ~'lhat Price Israel (Chicagog
Henry Regnery, 1953)s PP» 172-173°
#8ee Appendix @ for both Jews and Arabs in Pales
tine,

©ajiaeity of Pales tine« In both -eases, however, the Manda-
,t©ry power, Britain, was authorised to determine how many
Jews could ©erne in and whem*
• The ratio of Jewish immigration was not uniform
throughout the years» Much ©f it depended tapon the ability
of the lionists to pressure Britain into opening the gates
of Pal©stin©o ' When Zionism was sufficiently persuasive
immigration figures reached 7 3 , 0 0 0 1m one year 4l93%-193$)#
when Zionism was less persuasive, the number of Jews in
Palestine remained essentially the same {1926-1927I*
Jewish immigration ©am. be divided into three
stagest 1922-193#; 1931-1W©! lfl|,l-1947» From 1922-193©,
the number of Jews rose from @l|.,©0@ to l6f,0©©, am increase
of about 96$>0 She Arabs rose from 661,@00 to 818,00®, by
natural birth, am increase of about 23 $ 0 The peak years
for Jewish immigration were 192^.-1926, when 55sO©© Jews
came in, aoeomnting for more than 3 2$ of the increase in
population during this eight year periods
'Prom 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 4 0 9 the Jews increased from 1 7 5,©©® to
464,©0©, an increase slightly less than 165$° The Arabs
rose from 8 4 8,0©® to 1,0 6 9,0 0®, am increase of about 2 0$o
Si© peak years for Jewish immigration were 1932-36, 1938-39,
where 226,000 Jews came in, accounting for more than 22$ of
the increase in population during this nine year period*

From 19%l=19^7g the number of Jews rose from
%.7%g0@0 to 50®s>900? an increase of 3k-s000» about 7^° The
Arabs rose from 1,069s00© to 1,222,000 by natural birth*
The reason for the low figure of 3%,000 is largely due to
the restrictions placed, by the Mandatory power, which
wanted to limit Jewish immigration*
through legal and illegal immigration |a process
used whenever Britain closed the gates of Palestine to the
further influx of unauthorized Jews), the Jews of 1917 rose
from a mere to become, in 1947» 3©# of the population in
Palestine* From the time of the Balfour Declaration to the
Partition of Palestine, the Jews increased by a ratio of
more than 8 0 7$ and during the same thirty years, the Arabs
natural increase by birth was less than 89%*
A* Consequences
In 1897? the founder of the # 0rid.Zionist Organiza
tion, Theodor Herzl, cautioned the Zionists against
unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine* Herzl said
wan infiltration is bound to end in disaster * * * * It
continues till the inevitable moment when the native popu
lation feels itself threatened and forces the government to
stop the further influx of Jews*
So P* Andrews, The Holy Band Under Mandate (Cam
bridge 2 Riverside Press, 1931), I, p* 3 1 0* “

lersl's prophecy did materialize 0 The mative Arab
population in Palestine did feel itself threateneds and
asked the British government to put an end to Jewish immi
gration,, The Arab protest came as early as 1929, and at
first it was directed against Britain* The protest was
developed and then exploded into unrest and open violence*
The protest reached its height in 1933 and extended from
1936-1939= The Arab rebellion was directed at first
against Britain, then it moved to Jewish settlements in
Palestine* If the Arabs could not pressure Britain into
curtailing Jewish immigration, then they might at least
make Palestine unsafe for farther Jewish immigration* ^
III. British Reaction
British reaction, to the acute tensions in Pales
tine, came in the form of major policy statements and
efforts to effectuate solutions that followed every major
crisis in Palestine*
A* Ghurchill Shite Paper
The Churchill Shite Paper of July 1, 1922, came as
an answer to the charges that Britain and Zionism intended
to create a wholly Jewish state in Palestine*
6* E* S* Bethmsnn, Decisive Years in Palestine
(lew Yorks American Friends of the Middle Bast, Inc*,
195?I, PP» 26-22*

Mins ton C2anreh£llg who was Colonial Secretary thenp
denied that it was the intention of Britain to make Pales
tine a Jewish national Home<, Mr<. Ghnrehill said that the
Balfour Declaration contemplated a 'home * in Palestine, and
that 'home8 was already in existence after admitting 2 $ , 0 0 0
Jewso Mr, Ghmrehill, went on to say that unauthorized
statements have been made to the effect that "Palestine is
to become as Jewish as England is English'" (referring to
Mr« Eeimannlo Churchill denied such alms.# and said that
the Jewish national home meant developing the existing
Jewish community in Palestine, mot "the imposition of a
Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a
whole, 11
The Jewish national home, according to the Shite
Paper, was already in existence by 1922, Jewish immigra
tion should have ceased after 1 9 2 2, in order to further the
development of the existing Jewish community. But that was
not the ease, immigration declined for two years, only to
7
rise again in 1925, when 27,000 Jews went to Palestine,
Bo" MacDonald Hhite Paper
The White Paper of May 17, 1939, was the first
official British public statement which purported to
7, J, 0, Burewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and
Middle East (Mew York! D, Yan 1©strand Go,, 1956), II,
pp, 1 0 3-T0F0

restrict drastically Jewish immigration# in order to
resolve the rising tensions in FaXestime= Xt was based
upon the recommendations and findings of previous invest!=
gations conducted by Britain over a period of nine years 0
Here are some of its stipulationst
i) Like the Churchill Shite Paper of 1922$, the 1939
Hhite- Paper stated that a Jewish Hatienal Home does
ezist9 not a -state# It was the intention of
Britain to create such a home in Palestine and that
has been established*
ii) Similar to the Simpson Report of 1930, which con
cluded that Jewish colonisation had caused the dis
placement of many Arabs, the 1939 Paper prohibited
the transfer and sale of land by Arab to Jews and
limited Jewish immigration to 7^,000, over a period
of five years* The Paper also warned the Zionists
that it would deduct the number of illegal Jews
smuggled into Palestine from the 75,000 quota* The
Paper also stated that any further Jewish immigra
tion, after the 7 5,0 0® quota, would be subject to
Arab consent* - '
iii) The loyal "Peel" Commission of 1937, following the
riots in Palestine, recommended the partitioning of
Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state as the only
. solution* The Arabs protested, the Zionists

accepted* but the Partition •Mbodhead* Sommission
of 193@ rejected' partition of Palestine as the
Jewish state would he Arab, The 1939 Paper
reaffirmed this principle, and rejected the parti
tion of Palestine as a solution* The Paper chose
to deal with the cams© of the problem, which was
Jewish immigration and major land purchase*
iv) In accordance with the aims of the Mandate, the
1939 Paper said that Palestine would be independent
by 1949a The country was to remain one and indi
visible,®
6 0 Zionist Reaction
Prior to 1939* there were slight restrictions on
Jewish immigration and no restrictions at all on Jews pur
chasing land in Palestine, The British Zionist honeymoon
ended with the MacDonald Shite Paper in 1939® Previous
)
reports had verified the causes of Arab unrest and rebel
lion, and the 1939 paper purported to come to grips with
them* It was the intention of Zionism to create a Jewish r
state in Palestine through unlimited immigration and land
purchase. The Arabs feared it, the British knew of it,
but did nothing to stop it prior to 1939® After many casu
alties in a period of virtual civil war, the Arab Rebellion

in Balestime subsided, only to give way to a Jewish Zionist
rebellion against Britain*
The official lionist reaetion oame in 1942$ but
existed prior to that* In Mays 19^2S the Zionists met in
Hew York and issued their famous "Biltmore Program*15^ The
- ' i .
Biltmore trogram was an attack on the 1939 Paper and the
Mandate itself* The provisions of the program declared the
1939 Paper' illegal, and sought to establish "Palestine as a
Jewish Commonwealth" by large scale Jewish immigration
through the Jewish Agency* The Mandate no longer served
Zionist aims to create a Jewish state* The war between
Zionism and the Mandate began with the Biltmore Program in
1942*
IV* Churchill and Zionism
Winston Churchill was a Zionist sympathizer* U s
sympathy dates back to 1920, when he declared himself to be
in favor of a "Jewish State" west of the Jordan* In the
early 194° 8 §» Mr* Eeizmarm called on Mr* Churchill and
informed him that Zionism, after the war, would want to
"build" a Jewish state in Palestine, with three or four mil-
lion Jews* Mr* Churchill replied, “Yes, indeed* I quite
agree with that*®^®
9* Ibid* * pp» 234=23#*
1 0* geizmann, op* clt** p* 2l4«

59
later* Mr0 Eeismann called again on Mr<> Ghurehill
and discmssed with him partitioning Palestine and the for
mation of Jewish units in the British a m y 0 On partition
ing* Mr* Churchill expressed his approval* and supported
the granting of the southern part of Palestine* the legev
11
Desert* to the Jewish state* On the subjeet of a Jewish
army* Mr* Ghurehill approved* and on September 20* 19Ww
the Zionist demand met with approval when the British Ear
Office agreed to the formation of a Jewish Brigade with its
own flag* the flag of Israel today* The Jewish Brigade was
realized in 1911%* but there remained the Jewish state* Mr*
1
Ghurehill did not hesitate to lend his efforts towards
realizing this objective*
Zionist spokesmen reported to Mr* Ghurehill that
President Roosevelt had called upon Mr, ifeizmann to assist
the American government in some sort of synthetic rubber
research* Mr* Ghurehill was reported to have told Mr*
Ifeizmann about a plan he had* The Ghurehill ELan^ was to
make Ibn Baud* King of Saudi Arabia* “Lord of the Middle
East*'" and as a price for that title* King Baud was to bar
gain with Mr* Iffeizmanm toward a Jewish Palestine* Mr*
11. Ibid* * p* 536*
12* Alan Taylor* Prelude to Israel (Hew Yorks
Philosophical library* 1959)* pp* 70-72*
1 3* ifeizmann* op* cit** pp* 5 2 5-5 2 6*

GhmFcM.ll said to Mf0 Wei maim, “Of course we shall help
you. Keep this confidential, but you might talk it over
with Roosevelt when you get to America, There's nothing he
and I cannot do if we set our minds on it,11*^
A, Roosevelt's Reaction ■ -
President Roosevelt is reported to have carried on
negotiations with King Ibn Saud on behalf of a Jewish Pal
estine, but only to meet with failure,3"^ King Baud reaf«=
firmed his position on Palestine, which was the position of
many Arabs, and expressed his resentment and rejection of
Zionist aims in Palestine, Furthermore, King Saud
requested from President Roosevelt an assurance that the
United States would be fair and impartial. Such an assur
ance came, when on April 5s 1945* President Roosevelt wrote
to King Saud sayings "I assured you that I would take no
action, in my capacity as Ghief of the Executive Branch of
this Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab peo
ple,e The creation of a Jewish state, in all or part of
Palestine, was considered to be hostile by the Arabs, and
1 4, Ibid,
15, Fred Khouri, The Arab-Xsraeli Dilemma (lew
Yorks Syracuse University Press, 1 9 6 8), pp, 31-51°

Ire si dent Roosevelt assured. King Sand that he would not
take sueh aetiono^
Even though President Roosevelt was considerate of
Arab aspirations in Palestine, he was also aware of the
necessity for a solution to the Jewish problem, President
Roosevelt suggested to a friend, Mr, Ernst Morris, that he
would accept 150,000 immigrant Jews in America, to be
matched in England, and by 200,000 or 300,000 to be settled
in other areas in the Western Hemisphere, A solution for
half a million Jews was a good start, but according to
President Roosevelt, the problem lay with the lionists, who
said that Zionism would not accept any place other than
Palestine, Zionism again rejected alternatives to Pales
tine, and insisted on Palestine as the only solution to the
■ 17
Jewish Hational Home aspiration,
T, Zionism in the United States
As has been stated earlier, the Zionist honeymoon
with Britain ended with the publication of the 1939 White
Paper, After that, the Zionists attacked Britain and the
Mandate itself. The Zionist alternative to Britain was the
United States for obvious reasons. Firsts America”s past
16, The Department of State Bulletin, ©ctober 21,
1#5, P= 623»

history with Zionism was favorable, especially under Eresi™
dent Wilson, who supported Zionist aims in Palestine,
Seconds The United States was the new rising power in
world affairs, a possible ally whose aid must be solicited
to achieve Zionist aims, Thirds Britain8s position as a
world power was already diminishing, and was becoming
heavily dependent upon .American support. This made Britain
vulnerable to pressure from the United States on behalf of
Zionist aims, Fourths Jewish Americans, who belong to the
Zionist movement, have represented the largest number of
Jews assembled anywhere, who have been able to exert pres
sure to recruit pro-Zionist sympathisers in stateside
politics. As British Jews helped Zionism obtain the Bal
four Declaration, so American Jews can help solicit Ameri
can support on behalf of Jewish Zionist aspirations in
Palestine, As far back as 1919, the King-Crane Report
recognized the importance of American Jews in American
politics on matters relating to Palestine, The Report
expressed apprehension that such pressure might affect
18
American impartiality.
The Zionist organization in the United States, with
its state, and 3 8 0 local branches, was charged with the
task of moulding public opinion on behalf of Zionist
18, George Antonious, The Arab Awakening (Beiruts
Khayat8 s, 1955), pp, 1)43"14-5 8,

aspirationso Under pressure from the American Palestine
0©mmittee9 the Christian Council in Palestine, and other
Zionist-created organizations, clergymen, AFh-CIO, state
legislatures, major political parties and other influential
19
groups, passed resolutions favoring Zionism*
The American Congress had ” 6? senators and lij.3
representatives” who were alleged to be members of the
p n '
American Palestine Committee,
Prior to the 1939 White Paper, the Zionists had
Britain’s official support, After 1939, the picture was
different, they needed American support, and they sought
support from the American presidency* The Zionists had
little success with President Roosevelt, but they did
manage to capture his attention to Zionist aspirations*
Roosevelt’s proposed solutions did not satisfy Zionist
desires, but nevertheless, he did offer his services toward
resolution of the Jewish problem*
After President; 'HIson, no American President
played a more important role in the Zionist cause than
Roosevelt’s successor. President Truman* President Truman
came into office at a time when the Zionists were badly in
need of American support to resist British restrictions on
Zionism in Palestine, President Truman became the target
19* Taylor, op* eit,, pp» 78-81*
2 0* Ibid*, p * 81*

of intense Jewish pressmre* to commit his government on
behalf o f Jewish Zionist aims in Palestine,
VI, Traman. and Zionism
A, Position on Palestine
President Truman came in at a time when Britain had
refused to partition Palestine and had placed severe
restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine, The
Zionists8 as far back as 19%2, had made it clear that they
regarded the restrictions on immigration as illegal* and
had stated that they wanted to have their own state in Pal
estine,
The Zionists approached President Truman as early-
as I9k$» .after. President loosevelt8s death, and in Presi
dent Truman1s words, "top Jewish leaders in the United
States were patting all sorts of pressure on me to commit
American power and forces on behalf of Jewish aspirations
in Palestine,H President Truman did not commit American
forces, but he did commit American power on behalf of Zion
ism,
On August 3 1, 1910, President Truman wrote to Prime
Minister Atlee on the subject of Jewish immigrations "As I
said to you in Potsdam, the American people, as a whole,
21, Harry S, Truman, Memoirs (New Yorks Doubleday
andUoo, Inc,, 1956), 11, p, 153»

firmly "believe that immigration into Palestine shouM not
be closed and that a reasonable raamber of Barope8s perse-
cm ted Jews shomldj, in accordance with their 'wishes* be
permitted to resettle thereo11^ The reasonable number
which President Traman asked for was 10©9 000 Jews,
On October 19%6, the Zionists contacted Presi
dent Truman and suggested to him the partitioning of Pal
estine and the immediate entry of 100*000 Jewish immigrants,
Mr, Truman8 s reaction* in his own words * was 8 "It is my
belief that a solution along these lines would command the
support of public opinion in the Fnited States , « , 0 To
such a solution our government could give its support,"^
On December 2* 1%6* President Truman once more
committed American support on behalf of Zionism, ©n that
date the President wrote a letter to Mr, Bevin informing
him of the Fnited States” support for partitioning Pales
tine * in accordance with Zionist beliefs* and that Zionism
would like to have Britain's support,^ Mr, Bevin made no
commitments,
22, The Department of State Bulletin* Hovember 18®
1945* Po 791,
23, The Department of State Bulletin® October 13*
194-6* pp, 669-570, ~ * • “ ’
24.0 Ibid, | also see The Department of State Bulle
tin* December 15* 194-6* pp, 1105-1106,

Ib some recognisable contracts however. Secretary
of State Byrnes offered assurance in October, 1945s that
,sno decision shall be made without reference to Arab and
Jewish representatives11 in so far as Palestine was con*=
eernedo^ The Arab and Zionist positions on Palestine were
clear, and President Truman's position on Palestine was
openly pro-Zionist0
Bo Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry
President Truman's insistence upon the entry of
100,000 Jews and the partitioning of Palestine was the
basis for the formation of the Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry in 1946® Established by the Anglo-United States
Agreement, the Committee was to investigate the feasibility
of Mr, Truman's proposal on behalf of Zionism,
#m April 20, 1946, the Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry submitted its report to Britain and the United
States, respectively:. The report included some ten reeom-
OA
mendations on the situation in Palestine s
i) Reiterating Truman's request, the Report acknowl
edged that Palestine was the only hope for the
25® The Department of State Bulletin, October 21,
1945, P® 623,
26, She Department of State Bulletin, May 12, 1946,
pp, 784-787,

Jewss and, called for the Immediate entry of 100s000
Jewso -
ii) Nullifying the White Super of 19399 the Report
mrged Britain to facilitate further Jewish immigra
tion and freedom for sale of land*
iiil The report said that "Palestine shall be neither a
Jewish state nor an Arab State*" The report said
that Palestine should remain under the Mandate
until a new United Nations trusteeship could be
arranged*
The report was essentially an acceptance of President
Truman®s proposals* in accord with Zionist wishes*
Go Truman-Bevin Dispute
The source of the dispute between both statesmen,
relates mainly to the difficulty over admitting 1 0 0 , 0 0 0
Jews into Palestine* The British refused because of the
difficulties that would develop from such a large number
entering Palestine* Mr* Truman insisted because the Zion
ists said it was the only solution to the Jewish Problem*
On April 30, 1914-6, President Truman endorsed the
resolutions recommended by the Committee, saying he was
happy that the Committee called for the entry of 100,000

Jews5 abrogated the SOaite Paper; and called for more immi
gration and mnlimited land pmrchase by Jews in Palestine
Gn July 2, 19k.os President frmaan met with American
Zionists and indicated that 11 the government of the United
States was prepared to assume technical and financial
responsibility for the transportation of these immigrants
oA
(100sOOO Jews) from Europe to Palestine, " He made that
known to Britain, but the British government would not com
mit itself or endanger the security of Palestine,
Mr, Truman appeared to be a champion of Zionism by
his own conviction; Mr, Bevin became the “Champion of
Arabss“ according to Zionists and pro-Zionists, by limiting
29
Jewish immigration, President Truman promised to consult
the Arabs5, before making any decisions , ^ 0 But, apparently,
under Zionist influence and pressure, it mattered little
what the Arabs thought. The President had, in fact, com
mitted American support as early as to the cause of
Zionism,
27, Ibid,. p, 7@3>
28, The Department of State Bulletin, July lij.,
19%6, p, 70 o
29, Wrewita, on, oit, 0 p, 2 6^,
3 0, The Department of State Bulletin, May 26,
19#, p, 917,

-. : ' 6t
Vile Zionist--Teproriam-In. and out of Palestine g . Its
Meaning and Gonseguenoe
Zionist terror In Palestine was Sire©ted primarily
against Britain and the Mandate authorities as early as
1940° Ever since the Biltmore Programme in 1942» the Zion™
ists heoame openly anti-Britisho lBritain became a threat
to Zionist demands =, and therefore9 had to abandon Bales™
tineo - '
The plan to drive Britain out of Palestine was eon™
due ted by the laganah» the . Balmaeh9 the 'Irgun Zvai Leimii 9
and the Stern Sang. All of these Jewish military organise™
\
tions were banned by the government of Palestines and were
illegal under Palestine’s laws®^^
The methods used were bloody and violent,, The
Zionists attacked and destroyed major British installationsi
incited Arab™Jewish rebellions and were bent on creating an
explosive situation for Britain in Palestine. The British
paid dearly to maintain the Mandates but only until they .
gave in to Zionist terror in Palestine
In 1939s when Britain refused to allow unauthorized
Jews into Palestine* the Bagamah blew up ships that carried
those Jews, to force Britain’s hand to accept them, at the
31. United Hatlons Special Committee on Palestine
Vol.; I, p. S3.
3 2. Taylor, op. - cit.

same tiiaes creating an unfavorable propaganda against Brit
ain a For example g on November 2 6 s 19i}.0» the Haganah blew
mps in Haifa Port* a ship carrying 1*800 Jews* which
resulted in the death of 2?6 Jews(,33
VIZI* Britain Places Palestine Before the United Nations
The Zionists* who considered Britain as a set back
to the Zionist program* were successful in creating an
intolerable situation for Britain in Palestine«, Conse
quently* following the Zionist acts of terror* Britain
decided to refer the Palestine issue to the United Nations
General Assemblye 34
33» Ao M.- Mlienth&l* The Other Bide of the Coin
I'New 'forks, levin-Adair* 1965>)s PP° 99=100»
34= Taylor* op0 clt.

CHAPTER k
PARTITION OF PALESTINE9 19^7-1949
I0 Palestine Before the United Nations
Noting Britain's failure to resolve the Palestine
qmestion in a manner aceeptable to both Arab and Jews Great
Britain decided to refer the Palestine -question to the
United Nations on April 2 8s 1947*^
On April 289 1947s the General Assembly convened in
a special session, requested by Britain on April 3s to form
a special committee on Palestine. The purpose of the com
mittee was to report to the next regular session of the
General Assembly its findings and recommendations on Pales
tine. On May 15, 1947s the United Nations Special Commit
tee on Palestine was created by the General Assembly to
submit its proposals on Palestine no later than September
1, 1947o (This committee shall be referred to as
W.l.SoC.OoP.)
1. On British efforts to resolve the Palestine
question with the Arabs and Zionist Jews, see Fred Khoury,
The Arab-lsraeli Dilemma (New Yorks Syracuse University
71

72
II, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
Between May 1$ and September 1, 1947, the eleven
members (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala,
India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugo
slavia ) of the UNSOQJF conducted their investigations in
Palestine and New York, The UNSCOi consulted Arabs and
Jews, and on the basis of the investigation, they came up
with several proposals on the future of Palestine, The
B1SG0P unanimously called for an end to the Mandate and
independence for Palestine, But on the nature of a future
government for Palestine, the members disagreed, UNSCOP
suggested three possible solutions. Proposal (1| called
for the partitioning of Palestine into an independent Arab
and Jewish States (linked together with an economic union
as an option), Jerusalem was to be internationalised.
Proposal (2) suggested the establishment of a unitary Arab
state, since the Arabs were the majority in Palestine,
Proposal (3) called for a single state with a federal, can
tonal or binational structure. The first proposal was the
majority proposal. The remaining two were the minority
proposals,3
2, United Nations--Special Committee on Palestine,
1947s Vol, I, Oh, I, pp, 1-9,
3» Ibid,, Ch, V, pp, 42-65,

Illo Partition with Economic Union
The majority members of the Committee favored the
majority plan with economic xmlon (the vote was seven to
four) o O T S C O P was aware that the Jews3 who made up less
than 3 ,0 % of Palestine's population, owned only 6$ of the
total land area of 10,000 square miles. The rest of Pales
tine was Arab so some members felt that a just solution
would be one of the other two proposals, where the majority
would be dominant. However, I3HSG0P did propose safeguards
for Arab rights in the Jewish state, and made the same pro
posals for the Jews in the Arab state,
A, The Jewish State
The projected Jewish state was to have approxi
mately 56oi4.7^ of the total land of Palestine, The Jews
owned only 9,83$ of the $,893 square miles assigned to the
Jewish state. The number of Jews in the Jewish state would
be ij.98,000, and there would be 1|.97»000 Arabs,^
For the prospective 'minority-by-lOOOe Arabs, the
plan allowed freedom of religion, speech and equality with
the 'major!ty-by-lOOO* Jews, Moreover, to insure that Arab
4., Ibid,, Oh, VI, p, k l $ (The seven countries were
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Motherlands, Peru,
Sweden, Uruguay),
$» Ibid,, pp, i4.7-56f Samai Hadawi, Palestine 8
hoss of a Heritage (San Antoniog Haylor Co,, 19631s p* 25=

7k
(.
land, would not be confiscated* in order to increase Jewish
ownership* the plan clearly stated in Chapter 2* paragraph
8* that* % o expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the
Jewish state (by a Jew in the Arab state) shall be allowed
except for public purposes*In all cases of expropria
tion full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall
be paid previous to dispossession0^ The Jewish state* in
which Jews owned only 9*83$ of the area* Arab land could be
expropriated only for ^public purposes * % and only by paying
for land acquired* “Public purposes" was not meant to
authorize expropriating 9 0$ of the land* and without com
pensation,, Stretched beyond reasonable imagination* the
Jewish state might double or triple its land ownership* but
not increase it by 9 0 0$!
Bo - The Arab State
The prospective Arab state would control some
42=88$ of Palestine (4@4T6 square miles ) 0 Jewish ownership
in that proposed state was 0„84$o The Arab state included
725*000 Arabs and 1 0 * 0 0 0 Jews* The Jews owned less than 1$
60 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 0
QPo cit* a Vole- I* Oh* ¥1* Paragraph 6* p« 5d« " '
7o Ibid.

75
of the lands and Jews constituted less than 1„5^ of the
total population,)®
Go Jerusalem
The citj of Jerusalems according to UNSGOPs "shall
he placed under an International Trusteeship System by
means of a Trusteeship Agreement which shall designate the
United Hations as the Administering Authoritys in accord
ance with Article 81 of the Sharter of the United Nations 0
IVo Partition and Pressure Politics
The majority plan to partition Palestine that was
recommended by UHSGGP was placed before the General Assem
bly on November 22s 1914-7° Between November 2 2-2 6$, 1947» an
informal "straw vote" was taken on the partition plan, but
failed to indicate the required two-thirds vote to pass the
piano The key countries that voted against partitions
besides the Arabss were Haitis Mberia, Philippiness Ohina,
Bthiopias and Greeeeo
The pressure employed to urge member governments to
vote for the partition plan was applied primarily by Amer
ican statesmen and international Zionisms often the latter
working through the former»
8o Ibido s ppo 47“561 Hadawi, op, cito3 pD 25°
9° United Nations Special Committee on Palestinen
QPo cito 0 Volo Is Gho Vis Part 3S pp° 57=58°

76
jQae first attempt was to pressure President Epuman
to use his official capacity as President to urge other
nations into voting for the partition plan. The President
was known to have approved partition since 1 9 4 6, and the
time had now come for soliciting his support= Hr* Truman
wrote in his Memoirs!
The facts were that not only were there pressure
movements around the United Nations unlike any
thing that had been seen there before* but the
Shite House too was subjected to a constant bar
rage » I do not think I ever had as much pres
sure and propaganda aimed at the White House as
I had in this instance* The persistence of a
few of the extreme Zionist leaders--actuated by
political motives and engaging in political
threats-=disturbed and annoyed me* Some were
even suggesting that we pressure sovereign
nations into favorable votes in the General
Assembly*^®
The Zionists failed to move President Truman into using his
influence to pressure other nations on behalf of partition.
But they did succeed In soliciting the support of other
prominent United States officials for partition,The men
solicited by Zionists used their official positions to
pressure and threaten nations who voted against partition.
They threatened nations with Gongressional reprisals
10, Harry Truman* Memoirs (lew Yorks Double day &
Go,* 1956)* II, p, 158,
11, For the names see Alan Taylor, Prelude to
Israel (lew Yorks Philosophical Mbrary* 1959), pp, 103-
104f A, M, Lilienthalo What Price Israel (Chicago s Henry
Regnery* 1953)* pp, 64-73* Sydney Fisher, The Middle East
(lew Yorks Knopf* 1969), p, 6 4 6,

77
affecting foreign aid bills* They msed American business
men with interests in Liberia and other countries as a
leverage for pressure on behalf of Zionism* Mr* Bean Rusk
acknowledged these pressure movements, but he said that
these men were not acting on official instructions* Those
nations whose interests were threatened by these American
' 12
officials yielded to pressure and voted for partition*
Hr, James Porrestal, who was Secretary of the Havy in 19^7,
stated in his memoirs that ’’the methods that had been used
to bring coercion and duress on other nations in the
General Assembly bordered closely upon scandal*Without
this pressure from Americans on behalf of Zionists, accord
ing to Professor Safran, it is doubtful whether partition
would have been accepted by the General Assembly*^
Professor Safran, an Israeli Jew, also believed
that #out of ignorance and State Department objections
President Truman ordered the American delegation to support
Td
partition* The American delegation, in trying to make
partition acceptable to the Arabs, voted against the inclu
sion of the Uegev desert in the Jewish state* The Hegev
12* Ibid*
13* Walter Hlllis, ed*, The Porrestal Diaries (Hew
Yorks Viking, 195l)s> p* 363°
lij.0 Hadav Safran, The Wnited States and Israel
(Cambridges Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 3), p*35*
15° Ibid*, p* %1*
(

desert was all Arab as there was not a single Jewish
settlement in the Hegevo The Negev desert was vital to the
proposed Jewish state as an access to the Red Sea 9 even
though it did not harbor any Jewo*^ The Zionists objected*
and Mr* Ohaim Weizmann went to see Mr<, Truman who immedi
ately ordered the American delegation to reverse its offer
of the Negev to the Arabs
By November 29, 19^7, the pressure employed by
Zionists and their American supporters seems to have paid
off„ The General Assembly* by a vote of 33-13, with 10
l8
abstentions* passed the partition resolution, Siberia*
the Philippines and Haiti voted for partition* after they
had voted against partition; China and Ethiopia abstained.
Had it not been for the pressure exerted on behalf of Zion
ism* the partition plan would never have been passed or the
19
Jewish state created.
The General Assembly requested the Security Council
to effectuate the resolution* and called upon the British*
Arabs* and the Jews to put the plan into operation. The
1 6, John Bagot Glubb* A Soldier Ulth the Arabs
(New York: Harper* 1957)a P= 61^,
«- '
17= Taylor* op, cit,, pp, 102-103,
18, General Assembly Resolution 181 (II)* November
29* 1947o
19= Mlienthal* op, cit , 0 pp, 64-73* Taylor* op,
cit,, pp, 103=104l Safran* op, cit,, p, 35* Khoury* op,
Cit,, pp, 43-6?e

79
British governments prior to the passage of the partition
resolutions had indicated that it would withdraw from Pal-
estines thus terminating the Mandates by August 1, 1948* if
mot before* in accordance with the resolution* if it were
passed*
Vo Consequences of Partition
Ao Arab Response
Arab reaction to the partition of Palestine had
come as, early as' September 16, 1947s when the W S 6 0 P voted
in favor of partition as a solution to the Palestine prob
lem* Representatives of the Arab states met in Sofar*
Lebanon* and declared that the establishment of a Jewish
state in Palestine would lead to uncontrollable violence
which the Arab governments were not prepared to prevent*
The Arab Palestinians demanded that justice be done
to them* Palestine was 70$ Arab* and the Arabs owned more
than 93$ of the total land* They declared that any solu
tion that would not be based upon the consent of the major
ity of the inhabitants of Palestine would be rejected* The
Whited Nations* they declared* was entrusted with the main
tenance of peace and security* and the establishment of a
Jewish state in an Arab country would endanger peace and
2 0* Jon and David Eimche* A Clash of Destinies
(New Yorks Praeger* I960), pp* 36=37% ’"r

seoiaritjo The Arab Palestinians reaffirmed the fundamental
right of all nations9 great and small5, to self determina
tion,, The establishment of a Jewish state would be a
repudiation of the principles for which the United Nations
stood* The establishment of a Jewish state in an Arab
country would be unjust, dangerous, and a menace to world
peace and order* The Palestine Arabs, on the basis of
their being the majority inhabitants of Palestine, refused
to accept the United Nations partition resolution of
November 29, 1947123'
B* Zionist Response
/
The partition resolution was a partial fulfillment
of the long sought Zionist goal in Palestine* Although not
all of the areas claimed by the Zionists was assigned to
the Jewish state, some 5^*47% of Palestine was so assigned*
The Zionists, however, were faced with major prac
tical problems* The Arabs mad© up roughly $0% of the new
Jewish state's population, and owned 9 0$ of the land* The
proclamation of a Jewish state would be met with opposition
by the Arabs, and its effectuation could only come by
force* Apparently, the Zionists were not yet ready by
November, 1947, to proclaim their Jewish state*
21* Per a further exposition of the Palestinians
views, see Professor Hadawi, op* clt** himself a Palestin
ian and considered by his countrymen as am expert*

8 l
Mro Eelsmann tried t© obtain fresident Trumanf s
support before declaring the Jewish state* The formal
backing of Mr* Truman could be helpful» should the Arabs
resist the Jewish state by force* But Mr* Truman refused
to see any 'Zionist leader* The Zionists then called upon
one Eddie, Jacob sons a friend of Mr, Truman $, to arrange for
a meeting between the President and Mr* leizmann* Mr*
Jacobson, a prominent American Jew, did use his influence
on behalf of Zionism and managed to arrange the meeting for
March 18, 1948*^ Mr* Sfeizmann left that meeting with an
assurance that the United States would recognize and sup
port the Jewish state as soon as the British Mandate
expired*^
The British government announced in November, 1947»
that the Mandate for Palestine would terminate as of May
IS, 1948e and her troops evacuated before August 1, 1948°
The reason for this early withdrawal was the cost involved
in maintaining British personnel in Palestine, Britain
was in the midst of an economic crisis, and the United
Nations did nothing to effectuate the resolution of 1947°
22* Truman, op* elt*, pp* 160-161,
23° See Chaim Sfeizmann, Trial and Error, Illus-
trated Edition (Bondons Harper & Brothers, 1949/I and Abba
Eban, My People (New Yorks Random, 1968), p. 442*

82
In faetj the United States sought to extend the British
Mandate until a settlement could be reached on implementing
partitiono The British de©limed 9 and the hastening of the
termination of the Mandate 9 was defended as a necessary
step to expedite the solution of the Palestine probleuio
Mr, lliahu Epstein, agent for the Provisional
Government of Israel, sent a note to President Truman
informing him that as of one minute after 6 : 0 0 P,M,, .Wash
ington time. May Ihs 19%8, the State of Israel would be
declared, ^ That date was set one day before the Mandate
came to an end. At 6sll P,M,, May 1%, 19h8» President
Truman announced de facto recognition of the State of
Israel, without notifying the men in charge of executing
American foreign policy,American de .jure recognition
followed on January 31, 19%9<.
The British Mandate, which expired on May 15, 1948»
left a vacuum, in Palestine, Palestine was on the verge of
a civil war, with no internal authority to supervise the
transition.
Rationalizing his support of partition, and the
immediate recognition of the Jewish state. President Truman
offered humanitarian reasons as his motives "It was my
24* The Department of State Bulletin, May 23,
1948, Po 6 7 3,
25, Truman, op, clt, „ p, 164*

belief that world peaee woulds in the long run, be best
served by a solution that would accord justice to the needs
and the wants of the Jewish people who had so long been
persecuted***^ “Justice1* may have come for Zionists, but
only at the expense of the Arabs, who were painfully forced
to experience partition of their country* As the Arab Pal
estinians saw the matter, they had to pay the price for
Western guilt over Western Jewish persecution* When asked
about the fate of the Palestine Arabs, Mr* Truman1s reply
was not even purportedly humanitarian* ” 1 am sorry, gen
tlemen, but I have to answer hundreds of thousands who are
anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds
of thousands of Arabs among my constituents,
Secretary of the Havy, James Forrestal, realized
that American statesmen were heavily pro-Zionist due to a
large Jewish vote* Mr* Forrestal did not ask Americans to
abandon the Jews or support the Arabs* In the 194® presi
dent ail campaign, he cautioned Americans about being, too
pro-Zionist, and tried to keep the matter of Israel out of
party polities in the states. The politicians said that
they feared their opponents might win the Jewish vote if
they should remain impartial * Forrestal said **I think it
26* Ibid,, p* 135*
27* Quoted in M* T* Mehdi, A Hation of M o n s * * *
Chained (San Franciscos lew BTorld Press, 1962), p, 95*

%
is about time that somebody should pay some consideration
qQ
to whether we might not lose the United States,n
VI, The Arab-Israeli *ar of 19h8
A, The Arabs in the Jewish State
The Arabs in the Jewish state# according to the
partition plan# were guaranteed equality and were offered
protective clauses against Jewish expropriation of Arab
land. The Arabs owned 90$ of the land and were almost equal
to the number of Jews in the new proposed Jewish state.
The lionists# however# were faced with a dilemma.
Ever since their movement began# it denied that Arabs and
Jews could live together. The Zionists not ohly detested
living and mixing with the Arabs# but called for a Jewish
Palestine# ,$as Jewish as England is English # 11 according to
Mr, lei smarm. The presence of an Arab population that was
equal to the Jews posed a basic threat to Zionism,
The Zionist answer was that !,a few calculated meas
ures will soon get rid of them (the Arabs), Although
2 8, Mlienthal# op, eit, fl p, 9 8,
29# Slubb# op, cit,a p, 81, David Ben-durion
acknowledges the fact that the Arabs were evicted before
the Mandate expired# thus giving validity to the Arab story
that the Arab armies moved in only after May-15# 1948# when
news of Zionist evictions reached them, Ben-Gurion wrote
in Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (lew Yorks Philosophical
Library# 1954)# PP* 530-5312 "Until the British left# no
Jewish settlement# however remote# was entered or seized by

the state of Israel was proclaimed ora May 11 ls 1%.8, the
Israelis openly began driving the Arabs out of their homes
as early as Aprils 19^8* A Jewish state could not be said
to be Jewish with an Arab population equal to the Jews.
The Jews wanted the Arabs out* and their method was large
scale massacres. The most notable massacre was that of
Beir Yasin.
On April 9» 19%.8g the Irgura forces attacked the
Arab village of Beir Yasim, Beir Yasin, according to a
Jewish observer9^® was a friendly Arab village. This
friendly village was attacked by the Irgura forces 9 and
Begin, the leader of the Irgun Zvai Beumi, said that he
warned the inhabitants to leave before the attack. The
Arabs did not leave and the Irgun attacked. Begin recalled
in his book that he suffered heavy casualties, four dead
and forty wounded. He denied killing any civiliahs
intentionally. But, it was responsibly reported, the
Irgun, contrary to Begin6s statements, did attack and
Arabs, while the Haganah » . . captured many Arab positions
and liberated Tiberias and Haifa, Jaffa" and Safad ....
So, on that day of destiny, that part of Palestine where
the Haganah could operate was almost clear of Arabs.M
30= Harry levin, I Baw the Battle of Jerusalem
(lew Yorks Schuken.. Books, 1950), p. 57
...
31o Menachem Begin, The Revolts Story of the
Irgun (Hew Yorks Sehuman, 19f?i)» pp. 162=165.

murder 21$ men9 womens and children in Deir Yasino ^ The
Zrguns allegedly to cover up the Morgy of slaughter and
deliberate murder,threw the 2 $ 1 corpses in a wells A
representative of the International Red Cross, Jacques de
Reyneir, went to Deir Yasin and excavated the bodies from
the wello Reyneir counted 2$1 corpses, the majority of
whom were women and childrens ^ Mr» Bo Berger, a pro-
Zionist writer, and Mr* Uri Avnery, an Israeli , wrote
that the massacre of Deir Yasin ledd to the exodus of
200,000 Arabs from the Jewish state«^ The Arabs of Pal
estine were reminded, according to Mrs, Tester of the
American Missionary Hospital in Palestine, that "If they
did not get out at once, they would suffer the same fate of
the people of Deir Yasin,
Prior to Deir Yasin, according to Mr, E, Berger, the
expulsion of Arabs was not a national policy by Jews,
32, Terence frittie, Israel (Hew Yorks Praeger,
19671» p, 177,
33° Devin, on, elt,, p, $7°
3 4° Prittie, on. cit,
3$. lari Berger, The Covenant and the Sword
(Londons Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1965), pp. 124-132,
Dri Avnery, Israel #1 thout Zionists (Hew Yorks The
Macmillan Co,, 1 9 6 8”), p. 197°
3 6. Freda Wtley, #111 the Middle East #o West?
(Chicagos Henry legnery, 195?)» PP° 117 118, ,

87
Expulsion became a national policy as of July* 194.8«
Major GigBallance9 a British military expert* wrote that
”many Israeli sympathizers were appalled at the ruthless
way in which the Arab inhabitants were ousted from their
homes*British historian* Arnold J» Toynbee wrote that
the Jews became persecutors for the first time in history
since A*D. 135$ and Mthe Jews had even less excuse in A*Bo
194-8 for evicting Palestinian Arabs from their homes than
lebuehadnezzar and Titus and Hadriane"^9
Bver 4-00*000 of the 497*000 Arabs in the new Jewish
state were evicted prior to the formal launching of the
state of Israel* Some left in protest against partition*
and others were horrified by Beir Yasin* The Zionists said
that they asked the Arabs to stay and build Israel* but
they failed to warn the Arabs of their fate if they chose
to remain in the Jewish state* Massacres and evictions
began before Israel was formally proclaimed* On May 15$
1948$ the official Declaration of Independence by Israel
offered this pledge for the Arabs:
Sfe call upon the sons of the Arab people dwell
ing in Israel to keep the peace and play their
37* Berger* op, clt** pp. 124-132*
3 8* Edgar 0 sSalience* The Arab-Israeli Bar,. 1948
(Hew Yorks Sraeger* 19571*
39* Arnold Toynbee* A Study of History (London:
Oxford University Press* 1954)$ VIII$ PP* 289-290*

part in Wilding the state on the basis of full
and equal citizenship <, , * . The state of
Israel will maintain complete equality of social
and political rights for all of its citizenss
without distinction of creed, race or sex0^Q
Zionist writers acknowledged the massacre of Arabs
as early as April, 194-8 =, Pro "Zionist writers mentioned
eviction of Arabs as a national policy conducted by the
state of Israel as of July, 1948« The Zionist deeds before
and after independence hardly give any meaning to the
Israeli plea for Arabs to remain6 The Arabs left to save
their lives, and some of those who remained were massacred
or evicted until they became a minority of 10$ in the
Jewish state, which had promised them equality and justice,,
B» The Position of the Arab States
The Arab countries that took an active part in the
Palestine issue in 1948 were Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon
and Iraq* Jordan was the only country that had any inter
est or designs on Palestine» It is often recalled that as
late as 1946, King Abdullah of Jordan was in favor of
intervening in Palestine on behalf of the Arab Palestinians»
The other Arab states favored non-intervention,, Instead,
they proposed to arm the Palestinians to defend and main
tain Palestine, an idea which the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem
welcomedo The Mufti was against intervention, and urged
40» Ao Mo BilienthaX, The Other Side of the Coin
(lew Yorks Bevin-Adair, 1965), p« 222»

89
the feraation of a Palestinian go’rerament and an a m y to
defend Palestine» Jordan’s King Abdullah wanted to annex
Palestines and it was said that he met in November* 1947s
with members of the Jewish Agency in contemplation that
Abdullah was to annex the Arab state to Jordan and come to
terms with the Jewish stateNeither the Arab Palestine
Ians nor the other Arab states knew about Abdullah’s plan*
Unlike the Jews, the Arabs in Palestine had neither
an army nor sufficient arms to stand before the advancing
Jewish forces* The Arabs stood helpless before Deir Yasim
and other massacres which led to their eviction*
According to ht* General Glubb@ the Arab states had
no plan regarding the invasion of Palestine* The Arabs
were unaware of Jewish strength and of their own military
potential* The only man who had a plan was King Abdullahs
and following the many requests received from the Pales
tinians to help and protect them. King Abdullah decided to
send in the Arab Legion "to occupy only the Arab state
bordering Jordan*
The Jordan invasion was not a surprise to Israel*
It was agreed that King Abdullah would occupy the Arab
state* The other Arab states decided to intervene only
after hearing about Jewish expulsion of Arabs from most of
41* Jon & David Kimche, on* eit* * pp* $9-60*
4 2* Glubb, on* eit* * p* 6 3°

Palestine* Prior to that* the Arabs stated that they were
mot ready or prepared to check the violence that might
empt in Palestine *
0O The Official War
The war in Palestine began on May 15s 1948$ when
the Arab armies entered Palestine from Egypt$ Lebanon*
Syria $ Jordan* and Iraq* Although "six armies representing
40 million Arabs" marched into Palestine* the total number
of the Arab soldiers at the start of the war was estimated
to be somewhere between 20$000 and 23*000*^ The guesses
on the Israeli forces differed widely* Some have said
10$000$ others have said perhaps 19»000* The Arabs* how
ever* estimated the Jewish force to be as much as 65$000
men* for the 1948 war* British Zionists said that at the
outbreak of the war the Jews had 19,000 men* That is*
during the first phase of the war (May 15 to June 11$ 19481
the Jews had 19*000 men* However* there was a truce from
June 11 to July 8$ 1948* and during this period the Jewish
forces rose from 19*000 to 60*000* while the Arabs
increased from 20*000 to 4O9QOQ0 As it turned out* the
Arabs never outnumbered the Jews* The Jews outnumbered the
Arabs *^"
43o Ibid* $ pp* 92-93S Jo b & ©avid Kimche* on* cit*
pp* 162$ 223*-
44* Ibid*

91
The first phase of the war was from May 15 to June
11,. 19*$. The United. Nations arranged a truce from June 11
to July 8j, 1910 c The first trace was broken by the Arabss
because Egypt refused to renew the traceJordan was in
favor of renewal9 as the Arab state was almost under the
control of the Arab Legion,^ farts of the Arab state were
taken by the Israelis, but Abdullah stood to gain, rather
than lose® Egypt chose to renew the war because it lost
the first phase® The Egyptians were facing a domestic
political crisis, mid they needed the war to bring stabil
ity at home and regain what was lost during the first
phase„
The second phase of the war began on July 8, and
lasted until July 19, 1948, when another truce was arranged
by the United Nations® The Arabs this time accepted, but
Israel refused® It was during the second phase that the
Israelis occupied 20% of the Arab state and were in control
of the entire Jewish state® Jerusalem was contested
between Jordan and Israel® Although the city was to become
international, Israel invaded the Arab quarter and wanted
to annex Jerusalem® Jordan checked Israel and saved most
of Jerusalem from falling into Israeli hands®
45® Glubb, op® oito, pp® 149-150°
46® Ibid®

The deciding factor in the war* according to some
military observerss was the arms purchased from Gaeeho-
Slovakia by Israel0 The Waited lations placed an embargo
on all arms to Balestime and the Arab states, but Russia,
through Czechoslovakia, offered arms to Israel and sold
them fighter planes and other heavy equipment that was not
made locally by the Jews0^
The Arab states, save Jordan, hoped to redeem all
of Balestine» In the process, they failed, lost ZQ% of the
Arab state, and never redeemed an inch of the Jewish statee
Jordan saved most of the Arab state bordering it0
B<, The Role of the United Rations
lo WoHo Mediators Count Folke Bernadette
#m May 17, 19^8, Count Folke Bernadette of Sweden,
was appointed as the United Hations8 Mediator in Bales-
timeo^® Count Bernadette managed to arrange for the one
month truce in Palestine, which lasted from June 8 to July
11, 19^8o During this one month truce. Count Bernadette
suggested on June 27, 1948, that the Arab Palestinians who
had left their homes be allowed to return, without restrie-
k9
tions, to their property and homes0 But that Israel
47» Ibido, p„ 191o
48e United Rations Documents, A/5£4? May 17, 1948«
49o United Rations Documents^ S/ 863, July 3, 1948»

9 3
allow the Arabs to return was only a part of the compromise
@©unt Bernadotte suggested. He suggested that if the war
was to end and peace maintained* the Jews would have to
give the Hegevs Lydda and Ramieh hack to the Arabs* as
there were no Jews in those areas» The Bernadotte plan
would reduce the Jewish state from S»S79 square miles to
2*121}. square miles with no provision for economic union
with part of the Arab state* which was to be annexed to
Jordano Israel refused to abandon the assigned and annexed
territories* and refused to allow the Arabs to return to
their homes,, Mr. Aubrey lb an voiced Israel6 s objections on
July 7* 19#«^® ■ '
Gount Bernadotte* however* insisted that the refu
gees be allowed to return to their homes with no restrie- e
tions and with full compensation paid to them. In his
final report to the United Nations, he wrotes
Bo settlement can be just and complete if recog
nition is not accorded to the right of the Arab
refugee to return to the home from which he has
been dislodged by the hazards and strategy of
the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews In
Palestine . . . it would be an offense against
the principle of elemental justice if these
innocent victims of the conflict were denied
the right of return t,© their homes while Jewish
immigrants flow Into Palestine* and indeed* at
least offer the threat of permanent replacement
£>©. United Nations Documents* S/870* July 8* 1948»

of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the
land for eentmries051
Sount Bernadotte wrote to Secretary of State
Marshall on August 16# 1948# informing him that the con
dition of the refugees was desperate,, Shirty percent were
children under five years of age# over 10% were pregnant
women and nursing mothers» She Mediator urgently needed
aid to feed these refugees# while trying to get them back
to their homes.^
Israel made it known during the summer of 1948 that
it would not repatriate the Palestinian Arabs or return
those parts of Palestine acquired during the war.Oount
Folke Bernadotte and Colonel Serot# a Senior (French)
United nations Observer# were murdered by the Israelis on
September 17# 194®°'^' Count Bernadotte was shot 7 times#
Colonel Serot# 17 times. The murderers were known to the
Israeli government# but no action was taken.^ Mr. lalph
Bunche# Count Bernadotte?s successor# held Israel
51. United Nations Documents. A/648# September 17#
194®°
52. The - Department of State Bulletin. August 29#
194®» PPe 226-227°
53» United Nations Documents# S/870# July 8# 194®°
54° United Nations Documents „ S/1004# September
18# 1948.

responsible for this -'Murder in Gold Bloodg through a
letter he sent to Israel8s Foreign Minister» Mr. Moshe
Shertok.
' 2. geaoe and the Refugees j
#n December 11, 1948s the General Assembly, in its
third session, passed Resolution number 194 which created
the Balestine Conciliation Commission. The Commission was
composed of representatives of Turkey, France and the
Suited States, who were entrusted with three taskss First,
a peaceful settlement of the war in Palestine in accordance
with the partition plan of 1947? Second, the international--
iaation of Jerusalem; and third, on the refugees, the
General Assembly declared that §
■ lie Resolves that the refugees wishing to return
to their homes and live at peace with their neigh
bors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practical date, and that compensation should be
paid for the property of those choosing not to
return, and for loss or damage to property which,
under privileges of international law or in
equity should be made good by the governments or
authorities responsiblej (and)
Instructs the Gonciliation Commission to
facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and
economic and social rehabilitation of the refu
gees and the payment of compensation (Resolution
194s 111, Bee. 11, 1948b
The State of Israel refused to accept resolution
194 I m )° Israel refused to abandon the territories
56o MMurder in Sold Blood,M The United Nations
Bulletin, ¥ol„ V, (October 1, 194®)> T P ^ W T ™ ™ " - ™

aequia?eds about 2.0% of the Arab state = Israel refused to
Internationalise Jerusalem,, Israel refused to allow the
Arabs to go baek to their homes in the areas acquired* and
the Jewish state* Israel has not eompensated the Arabs in
aeeordanee with the partition plan of 194? and resolution
194 (III)o
The Arab states accepted the 1947 plan as the basis
for a peaceful settlement* provided Israel should allow the
Arabs to return to their homes in accordance with resolu
tion 194 (HIls and should pay full compensation to those
who might not wish to return, The Arabs were ready to
negotiate a peaceful settlement* provided Israel should
implement resolution 194 (lll)o But Israel refused to
implement any such resolution,
VII* The 1949 Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements
Through the efforts of Mr* Ralph Bunehe* United
Nations Mediator* a General Armistice Agreement was con
cluded between Israel and the Arab states* Once Egypt
signed the Armistice on February 24* 1949* Lebanon followed
on March 23? Jordan on April 3s and Syria on July 20* Fol
lowing the Agreement* the Arabs and Israel established a
Mixed Armistice Commission (MAO) between Israel and each
neighboring Arab state* with the United Nations Chief of
Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization as chairman of
the four commissions respectively.

®£ all the Articles Included in the Agreements,,
eaeh party had the right t© revise and suspend any article
exeept Articles I and HI, Article I prohibited the use of
military threats and aggressive actions against any party.,
and established the Security Souncil as the final judge =
Article III mutually forbade the use of the military? para"
military9 or non-regular forces,
The partition plan had assigned Israel of
.the total land of Salestine» Following the war* Israel was
in actual control of 77=4-0% of the total land in' Palestine,
Israel did not withdraw to its boundaries of 194.7$ nor did
It implement resolution Ifi}. Cilll of December 11 @ 194.8,
Consequently) as of 1949g the United Eations General Assem
bly estimated the Arab refugees rendered homeless to be
more than 70Og®OU»^^ The total number of Arabs in the Jew
ish state was estimated to be 497@G0Ge The 203)000 had
come from those areas occupied by Israel after the 194® war.
Later9 in 1950» the total number of Arab refugees was esti
mated at 9&0,.021.^® The 1949 General Armistice Agreements
did not bring peace between the Arabs and the Israelis, It
579 Report of the Commissioner General of the
United Eations Relief and: Work Agency for the Palestinian
-RefugeesHEn the Hear East, July la 1 9 6 6-June 3 0 5 19673 """""
Official Records ^ of the General Assembly^ 22nd Session 9.
'Supplement #13s (A/6713) 9 p, 59= .
SB, Ibid, . '

was a true© rather than a peace treaty» The Arabs demanded
that Israel implement resolution'll (III) in order to
effectuate a peaceful settlementg but Israel refused*, and
the ensuing years were neither peaceful nor pleasant*, for
both Arab and Israeli,

CHAPTER 5
VIOLENT TRUQE, 1%9«1956
I» Eretz Israel* -
In 1897a the First Congress of the Zionist Organi=
zation declared that the “aim of Zionism is to create for
the Jewish people a legally assumed home in Palestine
The British White Paper of 1922 declared that such a home
did exist in 1922, and the British Shite Paper of 1939
p
re-affirmed the existence of such a home in Palestine»
For the Zionists, however, the terms “home and
state “ were synonymous, meaning the same thingo While they
had as their objective a state, they allegedly used the
term % o m e “ to evade the suspicions that Zionism contem
plated a Jewish state in PalestineThe territories of
*Eretz Israel is the land of Israel which existed
about 2000 years ago, and included then Palestine and parts
of present day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt^
1= Fo Andrews, The Holy Land.Under Mandate (Cam
bridge 2 Riverside Press, 19311s I, p. 3 1 3.
2„ For the "White Papers of 1922, and 1939, see Jo
Co Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Hear and Middle East0 Volo
II (lew York: Do Van lostrand, 195b)o
3= Sir John Hope Simpson, “The Palestine Mandate,11
The Fortnightlyo CLXII (December, 19Wi), 3^1 “3^9$; Fred
Khoury, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (lew York: Syracuse
University Pross, 19681, p 0 6.

1 0 0
the Jewish ehomeM were omtlined in a memorandum presented
hj the Zionists to the peace conference in Baris on
February 3s 1919° The boundaries envisaged in 1919
included all of Palestine; parts of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan,
and EgyptA
The Jewish state, following the United lations
partition of 1947s was given of Palestine, Following
the Mar of 1948, Israel, by 1949s controlled 77°4®$ ©f Pal
estine, The state of Israel, according to Mr, Ben Ourion,
"has been established in only a frontier of the Land of
Israel (or Brets Israel)," and the new state by no means
6
derogates from the scope of historic Brets Israel,
The Land of the State of Israel (Iretz Israel) was
what the Zionists envisaged in 1919° Israel exists "in
only a frontier of the Land of Israel," and the state of
Israel does not exist for its own sake, but as an instru
ment for the implementation of the Zionist ideal, which is
7
Sretz Israel,
If the aim of the Zionist movement was to "create a
legally assumed home In Palestine for the Jewish people,11
4° Bhrewitz, op, cit,s pp» 45~49°
£>»" Alan Taylor, Prelude to Israel (Hew Yorks f
Philosophical Library, 1959), pp, 106-1097
6, Israel Government Yearbooks 1955s P° 320,
7« Taylor, op, cit.

101
then Zionism should have eeme to a natural dissolution in
1922 or no later than 1939» If the aim of Zionism was to
resolve the tragic Jewish dilemma3 then it should have dis
solved following World Bar lie If the aim of Zionism was
to create a Jewish state in Palestine, then Zionism should
have dissolved in 19%7« But those were no t the sole aims $
according to Professor Alan Taylor® The hasie objective of
Zionism is the re-establishment of the Band of Israel in
the territories envisaged in 1919> and the state of Israel
is the instrument for the implementation of the Zionist
idealo8 .
Brets Israels then, according to the Arabs, cannot
be restored except by force of arms and territorial expan
sion into the boundaries of neighboring sovereign states0
Such a state cannot be classified as a Mpeaee loving
stateV11 A state that is created for future territorial
expansion is an aggressive state that can only achieve its
aim by force of arras®^ This is then, the state of Israel,
'
which, according to Mr® Ben (Mrion, "has been established
8v Ibid®
9® See the Arab Information Center® "Israeli
Expansionism,11 Mew York, 19671 also see lavid. len-Qmrion,
Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (Mew Yorks Philosophical
Library, 1954), P® %19,,where Mr® Ben-(Mrion wrotes "To
maintain the status quo will not do ® ® « ® ife have set up
a dynamic State, bent upon creation, reform, building, and
expansion®"

1 0 2
in only a frontier of the Land of Israel,11 and by no means
derogates from the scope of historic Brets Israels
Edwin M 0 Kretsmann (Public Affairs Advisor, Bureau
of Hear Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs) of the
United States Department, has said at a speech on December
11, 1957$ before the Institute of World Affairs at Pasadena
that ®Jewish nationalism resulted 1m the establishment of
an aggressively national Jewish state in an area inhabited
by Arabs for 2,000 years011 Mr0 Kretzmann also said that
Israel, which "was achieved at the expense of dispossessing
a million Arabs, is a challenge and irritant to the area as
a whole0M^®
What then, has been the attitude of the American
government towards Zionism, which created the allegedly
aggressive state of Israeli Deputy Under Secretary of State
Murphy, in a speech before the Zionist Organization of
America saidi
It is an honor and a privilege to participate in
this 57th Hational Convention of the Zionist
Organization of America,, It is an honor because
I know this organization reflects some of the
finest ideals of the American Jewish eommunityo
It is a privilege because of the opportunity it
affords to emphasize the appreciation and under
standing of our government for these idealso11
10» The Department of State Bulletin,, January 20,
1958$ PP° 83=-88o -
11= The Department of State Bulletin, July 5,
1954$ Po 3* _ _ _ _ _ _

Senator John Wo Kemxedj^ for example 9 had a long history of
pro-lsraeli statements and speeches before elected Presi
dent, Bxeerpts from M s pro-Israeli and pro-Zionist
speeches were collected by the Zionist Organization of
America and made into a book titled! "John F, Kennedy on
Israel,:Zionism and Jewish Issues 9n 1965, Senator J, F,
Kennedy was quoted as having saids in several speechest
It is time that all the nations of the world, in
the Middle Sast and elsewhere, realized that
Israel is here to stay; she will not surrender,
■ she will not re ire at, and we will not let her
fall , , , » The record of accomplishments of
the free State of Israel stands as a beacon of
inspiration to all free men everywhere , , , ,
She ideals of Zionism have, in the last half
century, been endorsed by both parties and
Americans of all ranks in all sections.
Friendship for Israel is not a partisan matter,
it is a national commitmenti
II,: Irl-fartlte Declaration
In May, 19S>@, Britain, France and the United States
issued the fri-partite Declaration regarding security in
the Near East, Ehe Declaration allowed the purchase of
defensive arms by all- countries in the area and prohibited
their use against ©me another. She three powers also pur
ported to guarantee the new territorial status quo there
12, See the Zionist Organization of America9 MJohn
F, Kennedy on Israel j,™Zion3.sm and Jewish Is'sues, (New.;
York: Herzl Press, 1965), pp. 1^, 11, 60,
13» The Department of State Bulletin, June $, IfSO,
p, @@6, , " -■

Srofessos? Safran believed that the Tri-#artite
Beelaratiom giaapaBteed Israel6 s reeent military gains and
insured her against Arab attacko^^- Israel had occupied 20^
of the Arab Palestine state,..and contrary to United Nations
Resolution 194 (111)® did not withdraw from the oeempied
territories9 The Tri-Partite leelaration purported to
guarantee the new status quo and to prohibit aggressi©n6
The Tri-Partite leelaration did not require Israel to
abandon the fruits of the 1949 liar*
III* Israeli Aggression
The ©eneral Armistice Agreements concluded between
Israel and the Arab states in 1949® prohibited the aggres
sive use of military force against one another* The United
Nations Truce and Supervisory Srganization (TOTS©) was
established by the Security Council to help keep the truce
between Israel and the Arab states, with the Security
Council as the final Judge in all disputes*3*^ luring the
period from 1949 to the Suez War of 19^6, Israel was con
demned several times by the Security Council for aggression
against Syria, Jordan and Egypt* The Arab states bordering
Israel were never condemned by the Security ©ouncil for
14® Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel
(Cambridges Harvard University Press, 19633%
1*5 ® See David Brook, frefaee to Peace (Washington §
Sublie Affairs fress, 1964), for information on.the UITSO*

attacking Israel„ Hie United Nations Truce and Supervisory
Organization accused. Israel in most of the complaints that
were presented to the Security Council s in that seven-year
periods
From 19l|.f ~1956s> Israel was condemned twice by the
United Nations Security Council for "aggression9 against
Syria0
On May 18$, 1951s the Security Council (Resolution
S/2157I accused Israel for violating Syrian territory* The
Council demanded that Israel allow the Arabs who had been
evacuated from the demilitarized zone to return and held
1 8
Israel responsible for their eviction*
0n January 19* 1956s the Security Council (Resolu
tion S/35381 condemned Israel for attacking Syria on Decem
ber 11* 1955»17
The United States representative voted against
Israel on both occasions*
16* United Nations Security Council Official
Records* 6th Year* 547th Meeting* 1951, pp. 7~10*
17o United Nations Security Council Official
Records * 11th Year* 715th Meeting* 195"6T ppr"T3T" -

106
Bo .On Jordan
The Israeli-Jordan border was the most violent one
daring the period 1949-1956# as it is the largest# and
therefore# most difficult to protect and control adequately0
Of all the incidents that occurred between Israel
and Jordan# only one managed to reach the United Nations
Security Council» The remaining border incidents were
investigated by the Mixed Armistice Commission between
Jordan and Israel,
On November 24s 1953s the Security Council (Resolu
tion S/3191 Rev, 2} condemned Israel for attacking the vil
lage of Qibya in Jordan, The Qibya incident took place on
October 14# 1953 at 9§30 F,M* and lasted till October 15 at
4§30 AoM, The military forces of Israel carried out this
raid which inflicted-heavy casualties on the residents of
%ibya. According to the United Nations official# Major
¥agn Bennike# head of the UNTSO# the inhabitants were
forced to remain inside until their houses were blown up
over them. The Israeli forces blew up 42 houses which
resulted in the death of 4 2 men# women and children# with
15 wounded. Those that did not remain in their houses#
were machine gunned by the Israeli forces# and the presence

of bullet-riddled bodies near the doorways verified the
1 8
brutal manner in which the people of Qibya were killed*
The Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) between Israel
and Jordan received about 3,000 complaints between 19%9-
1954-» according to Mr* E* 1* Hutchison,3’^ of the TINTS©.
Israel was condemned by MAG on 95 counts, and Jordan on 60*
In the opinion of Mr* Hutchison, had Israel cooperated with
the UHTSQ and MAG investigations, they would have been con
demned for most of the complaints brought before the
Of\
Israeli-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission*
According to Mr* Hutchison, * there were many * small
Qibyas9 but they were never publicised*Those small
Qibyas were partially investigated, and in W o eases fully
investigated. Major Vagn Bennike brought them in his report
to the Security Council during the Qibya debate* Major
Bennike reported that on January 28-29s 1953s Israeli mili
tary forces attacked the Arab villages of Falame and Bantis
for four and a half hours* On August 11, 1953s Israeli
military forces attacked the villages of Idra, Surif and
1 8* Wnlted Nations Security Gomel! Official
Records * 8th Tear%^6I{l2nd Meeting, 1953» pp* %.-5«
19* Bo H* Hutchison, Violent Truce (New York:
Devin-Adair, 1956), pp* 90-92*
20 * Ibid*

Ifadi Fokino In all these incidentss the Israeli forces
blew up houses9 destroyed dwellings and inflicted casual
ties on the inhabitantsd In all these incidentss Israel
go
was condemned by the Mixed Armistice Oommlssion.
Go On Ezw&t
Egyptian-Israeli border troubles began in early
1955o $rior to that* the borders were relatively peaceful
for a period of six years until Israel launched Its attack
on Gaza0
On March 29s 1955s the Security Council |Resolu-
tion S/3378)^ condemned Israel for attacking Gaza on
February 28» 1955° The Gaza attack resulted in 3 8 killed
and 31 wounded0 The casualties were Palestinian refugeess
including women and children*^
The Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission
condemned Israel for three incidents that were as grave as
those of Gaza* 0m August 31s 1900» Israeli forces attacked
Khan Yomai.Ss, killing 20 and wounding 20,^ On October 27s
220 United Nations Security Gouncll Official
Records« 8th Year9 632nd Meeting9 October 29-30; 1953°
Also see the Agenda of the 6 3 0th Meetings during the same
period*
23* United Rations Security gouncll Official
Records, 10th Year9695th Meeting* 1955s pp* 1-2*
2^* Hutchisons on* cit * 0 p* 117»'
25* Ibid* p p* 119°

1955» Israeli forees attacked Emmtilla, killing 5 and
wotanding 23=^ @n November 2S 1955s Israeli forces
attacked Al-Anjas killing 5 0,^' In all cases, the victims
oA
were mostly refugee men, women and children,
Israel’s military raids were not confined to the
Gaza Strip alone* Major Yagn Bemike reported that Israel
carried out air bombardment raids against Arab bedouins
living south of Gaza* Israel, according to Major Bennike,
drove out the bedouins from the demilitarized zone in order
to prepare for the establishment of Israeli settlements
instead* The settlements of Abu =■ Ruth and Rabel were cited
• 29
as an example*
General Moshe Dayan wrote in his book, "Diary of
the ilnai Campaign,,*1 in 1965s that between September 1 2 and
October 10, 1956, Israeli military forces carried out four
assaults against Rahawah, Gar an dal, Busan and Kalkiliah*
Israeli casualties were listed at 100, and Arab casualties
30
at 200* General Dayan also wrote that those efforts came
as a reaction to the "murders" committed by the Egyptian
26* Ibid*, p* 111}.*
27- Ibid*
28* Ibid* * pp» 114-119*
29* United Rations Security Oouncll Official
Records * 8th Year, 630th and 632nd Meetingr^Oobober™29-3G,

110
'Mfed.aje@ne M The Mfed.ayeeni! were organized by President
Masser in i.ug$ista 1955s for sabotage retaliations in Israel
in response to Israeli aggression whieh dated back to
®° The Savon Affairs 195k Smr Beandal
In 1954s Hoshe Dayan and other officials in the
Israeli Ministry of Defense sent Israeli spies to blow up
Safran wrote in his book. The United States and Israel„
1963s that the purpose of the lavom Affair was to poison
relations between the Waited States and Egypt by letting it
appear that Egyptians were responsible for blowing up
American and British installations» The Israeli spy ring*
including Egyptian Zionist Jews, were caught by the Egyp
tian authorities before their plan was put into effeeto It
was not until I960 that Israel referred to the Davon Affair
as a Mtop security disaster" which led to the resignation
of Ben Our ion in 1961
31e Brskine Childers, The Road to Suez (London§
Maegibbon and Kee, 1962), p» 133°
32o A» Mo Lilienthal, The Other Side of the floin
(Bew forks Devin-Adair, 1965)? pp. 251=52; Uri Aimery,
Israel Without Zionists (lew Yorks The Macmillan Goo $
February, 1955° ^
American and British installations in Sgypto^ Professor
33° Safrann on, elt.* p, 237

Ill
Bo Israeli Military Reprisalsg Causes and Reasons
General Moshe Dayan wrote in his books Diary of the
Sinai Campaign0 1965s that 1:,We cannot continue in this
. • - ■ i
state of no peace and no war, and that we must compel our
Arab neighbors to choose between stopping the terrorism and
meeting ms in'a full scale war,:l8*^
Mr0 Dayan8s statement suggests two motives behind
Israel8® military undertakings against the neighboring Arab
stateso The first motive concerns the state of affairs
between Israel and the Arabs, that being one of Mmo peace
and no war,*8 The second motive suggested is the so-called
sterrorism® against Israel by the Arab states.
This statement suggests that the Arab states
adopted a policy of terrorism against Israel as a national
policyo But the record shows that during 19^9-1956, not a
single Arab state adopted an official- or unofficial policy
i A
of sabotage against Israel, Egypt adopted such a policy
only, as mentioned earlier, in August, 1955# following
Israel8s military undertakings as early as. February, 1955°
Syria chose sabotage in 1966-67, but not during 1949=1956=
Jordan is the only country that could be held responsible
as it was the country from which the Palestinians came,
35° Dayan, on, eit,, p, 57°
3 6, See Fayes Sayegh, Arab-Israell Conflict (Hew
forks Arab Information Genter, 1956) and Border Incidentsg
A Background (Hew Yorks Arab Information Genter, 1955)°

112
Jordan was against9 rather than for9 infiltration against
Israels and the Jordanian government took severe measures
to curb infiltration from its borders against Israel» The
OTTSO verified the measures taken by Jordan to curb Arab
Infiltration and reported the progress made by Jordan to
the Security Council0
The terrorism that General Dayan mentioned was
carried out by embittered Palestinian refugees who resided
in Jordan* Jordan has a border of several hundred miles
with Israels and to control effectively the movements of
the refugees, is nothing short of impossible* If efficient
•and strong Israel could not prevent the movements of the
refugees, the Arabs maintain, how could Jordan be blamedt
The fact that some of the refugees do come and go unnoticed
indicates the complexity of the border problems between
Israel and Jordan* Jordan, according to the Arabs, can be
blamed for being the country from which the refugees sabo
tage Israel, but it cannot be said that Jordan supported -
and facilitated the movements of the Palestinian saboteurs
against Israel*
Rather than work through the iSTS© and the Mixed
Armistice Commission, Israel, according to General Dayan,
^adopted a policy of reprisal, or more accurately, of
37* Hutchison, op* cit*, p* lOif*

military reaction a „ „ „ The purpose of this policy was
to show the Arabs that 0 » 0 the country responsible for
the saboteurs would not get off scot free,*3® General
Bayan said that the Israeli army would strike at 11 a mili
tary objectire-^an army camp or a police fort-~in the Arab
territory from which the terrorist detachment had eome.*^
While the statement, according to the Arabs, explains some
of Israel$s military movements against Jordan, it fails to
explain the reaction against Syria and Egypt„ It also
fails to explain Qibya and the other small Qibyas where the
Israelis were condemned by the United Hations for killing
Palestinian women and children in refugee camps and vil
lages that were neither military nor hostile.
The motive behind these military incidents, how
ever, is explained by another Israeli, Moshe Brilliant who
believed in 195S that s “Those bloody 6border incidents 9
are seldom accidental „ 0 . = They are retaliation, part
of a deliberate plan to force the Arabs to the peace table.
Some call it 8realistic, 8 others 1cynical8— but it promises
to be effective.The reason given is the product of the
first motive which is the state of “no war and no peace . 18
General Dayan said that.Israel could not continue in this
38. Dayan, op. clt,, pp. 8-9.
39. Ibid.
4.0. Hutchison, op. cit., p. 116.

I l k
state, and the Arabs must choose between war and peace»
Dayan said that “we must compel our Arab neighbors to
chooseo ^
The Arabs maintain the position that while they did
not choose war, they certainly did not support infiltration
against Israel, The Arabs chose peace in 1949» peace on
the basis of United Hations Resolution 194 (HI) of Decem
ber 11, 1948, which would have provided a settlement for
the refugee problem, Israel refused to accept Resolution
1 9 4 (HI) of December 11, 194® aud Resolution 394 (V) of
December 14, 1950s and Resolution 512 (?1) of January 26,
1952, which reiterated its call upon Israel to implement
Resolution 194 (HI), ilhat then, the Arabs ask, does
Israel consider as a basis for peacef General B, £«, M,
Burns, Ghief of Staff of the UHTSO, explains in his book.
Between Arab and Israeli 0 1962s $llThey proclaim almost
daily that they want peace— a peaceful settlement as soon
as possible— that they are willing to sit down and negoti
ate with the Arabs any time, any place. But, of course,
what they want is peace on their own terms,sl^"
41, B, Be M, Burns, Between Arab and Israeli
(Bondens Bar rap and Go,, BtdL,', 1 9 6 2), p, 31*

J¥ 0 Outside Proposals for Peace
Ao The Dulles Proposal
In 1955® President Eisenhower sent Secretary of
State Dalles on a fact finding mission to the Middle Easts
The purpose of the Dulles mission was to seek a solution to
the Arab"Israeli conflict* which hindered the further
development of friendly relations between the United States
and the Arab world*
Secretary Dulles* after conferring with Arab and
Israeli spokesmen* suggested a peace proposal* that might
deal with the underlying issues of the Arab"Israeli eon"
flict* namely the question of refugees* the matter of
boundaries* and the security of each nation*
Regarding refugees* Mr* Dulles suggested repatria"
tion* compensation and resettlement* He realized that
Israel was neither big enough to repatriate all of the
refugees* nor rich enough to compensate the refugees* He
suggested that the United States and other nations aid
Israel in compensating the refugees and that they might
help resettle those who cannot be repatriated* elsewhere*
As far as the boundaries were concerned* Mr* Dulles
suggested that the demarcation lines of 191|.9 be accepted as
the official frontiers of each state* if agreeable to the
*The Dulles Proposal was delivered in the format of
a speech before the Uoumcil on Foreign Relations in lew
York on August 2 6* 1955»

116
parties concernedo Iii ease of disagreements, his plan
offered the services of the Waited States to resolve the
question in a manner acceptable to both sides»
Finallyg Mr* Dalles suggested that in order to rid
each nation of its fear from Invasion* all parties to the
conflict conclude a separate formal defense treaty with the
Waited States*
The Dulles proposal sought a compromise between the
conflicting Arab and Israeli demands* The Arabs demanded
that Israel allow all of the refugees to return and com
pensate those who do not wish to return* Mr* Dulles did
not specify how many refugees should be repatriated by
Israel* which refused to accept any refugees* but he hoped'
that both parties could agree on a sizeable number and com
pensate those not repatriated*^
Hhereas Israel had made its basic position clear on
the subject of the refugees* that is compensation and mo
repatriation* it remained vague on the question of frontiers*
The Arabs demanded that Israel withdraw to the boundaries
specified in the 19^7 partition resolution* Israel had
refused to abandon any of the territories gained during the
!%.@-19%9 Bar* Mr* Dulles hoped both sides might agree
upon an acceptable boundary*
%2* The Department of State Bulletin* September
19^5$ pp» 370^3^0°"

117
Despite the fact that the Dulles proposal did
accommodate some of the conflicting Arab-Israeli demandss
both the Arabs and the Israelis rejected the proposals*
Neither side was willing to accept them*^ However9 the
Dulles proposal was the first major attempt by the United
States to resolve the Arab=lsraeli conflict in a manner
that might have been acceptable to both sides as the neces
sary grounds for a peaceful settlement*
Bo She Idem Proposal
On November 99 190? Sir Anthony Eden delivered a
speech in Bondons generally referred to as the “Guildhall
Speech#'- in which he, proposed to compromise between Arab
and Israeli on the basis of the 1947 partition resolution*
The Arabs# and in particular President Nasser# agreed to
the Eden proposal as the basis for a Middle Bast settlement*
The Israelis# however# rejected Eden's proposal* Israel's
Ambassador to Dondon# replying on Eden's proposal said that
“Israel does not admit any claims on the part of the Arabs#
whether alone or supported by other powers# to any of the
territory Israel now holds*The Israeli Ambassador did
not say why Israel refused# but he did reiterate what we
43« Khoury# op* clt*9 p* 143# Hurewitz# op* cit*#
p* 413*
4 4Hurewitz# op* cit* * pp* 413=415°
45° Mlienthal# op* clt* # p* 284°

. 118
already know about Israel 8 s refusal to withdraw baek to the
19i|T boundaries or repatriate the Palestinian refugees*
Mr, Ben Gurions replying to Sir Anthony Eden 9 s
proposals does hint as to the underlying causes of Israel9s
rejection, that being the desire of lionism to restore baek
Eretz Israel through the state of Israel, Mr, Ben Gurion
said that “History does not begin with the United Nations
General Assembly resolution of November 29» 194-7 , * , ,
A state of Israel was in existence in this country in a
period when human history knew nothing of the existence of
America or Britain, And Jerusalem was the capital of
Israel when the world was unaware of the existence of Lon
don, Moscow or laris,
The peace proposals came at a time when a great
deal of considerable tension developed between Israel and
Bgypt-=-=the Israeli attack of February, 1955$ set the
Sgyptian-Israeli borders on fire and hardly a day passed
without border troubles. The situation was grave, and the
outside peace proposals failed to lessen the developing
tension.
46, Burns, op, clt,a pp, 126=127=

O M M S B 6
THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI WAR OF 1956
lo Gamaes
Ao. Nasaep
In 1955 Gamal Abdul Nasser emerged in Egypt as a
new and dynamic leader0^ President Nasser 9 s dynamic and
well-organized leadership sought to take the lead in liber
ating the Arab countries from the yoke of foreign influence 9
domination, and in achieving the long sought goal of Arab
unity., ^ He was wa product and ardent promoter of irrepres
sible Arab nationalism*' in the Arab world. ^
Israel's Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, declared
before the Knesset (Israel's Parliament) that "he had
always feared that & personality might arise among Arabs
like Turkey's Kemal Ataturk after the Turkish defeat in
1. Srsklne B0 Ghilders, The Road to Bmes (Dondon 8
Macgibbon and Kee, 1 9 6 2), p. iSl.
2o Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revo
lution (Gairog Ministry of National Guidance, 19557^
3° Neal Do Houghton, "The Gold Hhr and the Chal
lenge to Academic and Political Deader ship 0,jl Wmoublished™
Paper, Tucson, Arizonao
119

120
World War I--a personality who might inject new dynamism»
nnlty, progressive development and heart into the Arabso,t?^'
Mr, Nasser1s personality became obvious and pro
nounced by January, 195#* On February 17, 1955s Mr, Ben
©urion took over Israel’s Befense Ministry, and on November
2, 1955s he became Israel’s IFrime Minister,^
Israel's new Prime Minister was one of the hard
line Zionists who sought to ’’restore '1 Bretz Israel (the
ancient Band of Israel) through the state of Israel which
had been established in only a portion of the land of
Israel,^ But if Bretz Israel is to be restored and made
secure in a hostile Arab land, then, according to Israeli
statesmen, ’’every slightest sign of militant, dynamic,
well-organized Arab leadership--both political and mili
tary— must be exposed as weak and hollow by clear-cut and
*7
shaming military defeats
B, Arms for Bgypt
' Israel’s policy to diminish President Nasser’s
8
stature began in February, 1955s when Mr, Ben-Gurion took
5*
6,
7*
8.
Ohilders, op, cit.
Ibid,, p, 102,
Israel Government Yearbook, 1952, p, 15*
Ohilders, op, cit,, p, 101.
Ibid,

121
over Israel's Ministry of Defense* Mr* Ben-Gurion launched
the “biggest and bloodiest attack into Gaza since 19^9
The United Hations Security Gouncil condemned Israel on
March 29a 1955s for the attack on Gaza which took place on
10
February 289 1955® The Gaza casual!ties amounted to 38
killed, and 31 wounded* The Egyptian-1sraeli Mixed Armi
stice iommission* condemned Israel for three other attacks
that were as grave as that of February 28, 1955° On
August 31, 1955s Israel attacked Khan Younis, killing 20
and wounding 20*12- On October 27s 1955s Israel attacked
1 P
Kuntllla, killing 5 and wounding 23* On November 2,
1955s Israel attacked Al-Auja, killing $0°^ Although Mr*
Ben-Gurion stated that the attacks on Gaza were retaliation
against Egyptian “fedayeen (commando)“ raids, the Israeli
attacks began in February, 1955? while Egypt's retaliation
came as late as August, 1955°^
#This body was established bilaterally between
Israel and the Arabs in 1949 to facilitate co-operation
among the parties for the purpose of lessening tension*
9* Ibid*, p* 182*
10* United Nations Security Council Official
Records * 10th Year, 695th Meeting, 1955? PP° 1=2*
11* So H* Hutchison, Violent Truce (lew Yorks
Bevin-Adair, 1958), p* 119=
12* Ibid* * p« llij.*
13* Ibid*
1 4® Childers, op* cit*, p* 133=

©n September 27» 19S5» President Nasser announced
in a speech in Oairo an Egyptian agreement with Ozecho-
IS
Slovakia for the purchase of arms* 9 In his speech, Presi
dent Nasser said 19Iff© went to Britain; we went to France; we
went to America; we went to the rest of the states to get
weapons for the army in the interest of peace and
1 d e f e n s eThe French, according to President Nasser,
refused to sell Egypt arms because of Nasser”s position on
North Africa, which was independence for all of the colo
nized Arab states* The British, according to President
Nasser, agreed to supply Egypt with arms, but the arms
received were insufficient for Egypt4s defense * The United
States, according to President Nasser, refused to sell
arms unless Egypt should sign a mutual security pact
Nor some fora of alliance with the United States*
President Nasser said in his speech, M¥e humiliated
l
ourselves when we requested arms--we begged for arms— but
at the same time we were determined to hold to our prin
ciples and we were determined to preserve our high ideals
go** He declared that we would not arm our troops at
the expense of our f r e e d o m *Czechoslovakia, according
I S * For the full text of the speech see J* 0*
Eurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle last (New Yorks
D* Van Nostrand, 19561s II, pp* ij.Ol-i 4.0 5* ”
16* Ibid*, p* 4.03®
17* Ibid*

to Iresident ITass©rs was the only country that agreed to
sell arms to Egypt on a commercial basis, arms in exchange
for cotton and rice<>^®
fhe Czech arms deal, concluded with Egypt to
strengthen Egypt's army following the mounting military
raids by Israel against Egypt, was publicised by Israel's
■Premier and Foreign Minister Mo she Share tt on October 10,
195>5>» as the beginning of Egypt's attempt to annihilate the
state of Israel« Mr* Sharett stated that Egypt's army,
alone, was capable of destroying the state of Israel and
19
that Israel was defenseless before the army of Egypt, On
March 10, 195>6>, Mr, Bem-Gurion warned that war within a few
months, between Israel and Egypt, could be avoided only if
20
Israel received arms. In response to Israel's request
for arms against potential "Egyptian invasion,# Mr, Dulles
advised the Israelis that "Israel should rely on collective
security and the United nations for her national defense,
not on arms alone,Although the United States did not
supply Israel with arms directly, the United States
10, Ibid,, p, %.(%,
19, For the full text of the speech see Ibid,,
pp, 4.0^71*1 2,
20, Hadav Safran, The United States and Israel
(Cambridgeg Harvard University Press, 1963), pp, 237-239,

aequieseed in the diversion of some NATO equipment to
OP P 3
lsrael9 and urged Canada to sell sabre jets to Israel* ^
On November 2S 1955s when Mr* Ben-Gurion became the
Premier of Israel, he declared that he was ready to meet
with President Nasser and with any other Arab leaders as
soon as possible to achieve a mutual settlement without any
prior conditions*^ But, on November 2, 1955s Mr* Ben-
Gurion sent over a thousand Israeli soldiers to raid
Al-Suja, which resulted in the death of fifty lalestin-
pq
ians* ^ That Israeli raid was condemned by the Egyptian-
26
Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission* Mr* E* B* Ghilders,
a British journalists stated in his book. The Road to Suez*
1962, that 55seldom in the history of diplomacy has there
been a stranger way of appealing for peace, whatever the
background of self-defensive fear. No one seriously study
ing this event could avoid the conclusion that something
about Israeli policy did not add up*
22* Ibid*, p, 239*
23* Childers, on* clt*, p* llj.8*
2 4.* The Jerusalem Post* November 3s 1955*
25* Childers, op* clt*, p* 182*
26* Hutchison, op* clt*, p. 114*

Go The 8uez G&nal
BetweeB 1951“1954# Egypt had allowed more than
sixty ships not owned by Israels bnt with Israeli cargo 9 to
transit the Ganal*^® In 1954# the first Israeli owned
ships Bat Qalim9 sought to pass through the Suez ©anal =
Bat G-alim was seized by the Egyptian authorities and
refused passage through the CanalIsrael protested that
seizure as being contrary to international law, The Egyp
tian governmentg following the Bat G-alim incident 9 then
prohibited the passage of Israeli cargo through the Canal,
0n July 26, 1956# President Hasser, following the United
States refusal to finance the EgyptianyAswan High Bam, (a
project vitally needed by Egypt to meet the needs of its
rising population) announced the nationalization of the
Suez Canal Company, fhe desire to nationalize the Suez
Canal Company was an objective sought by many Egyptian
leaders even before Mr, Hasser, !Ehe Dulles refusal to help
finance the Aswan High Bam expedited the nationalization of
the Canal9 whose revenue was badly needed by the impover-
3q
ished Egyptian economy,
Britain and France, the principal stock owners of
the Suez Canal Company, denounced the nationalization, even
28= Ibid,= p, 132,
29, Ibid,,

126
though Egypt promised to compensate the shareholders and
maintain free navigation 0 Britain and France proposed to
Mr» Nasser an international control over the 8anal, but
only in vain* President Nasser refused to allow any gov
ernment or body other than Egypt to operate and own the
Canalo3 1
Britain and France did not trust Mr 0 Nasser<> He
was considered to be unfriendly to the presence of France
in North Africa» In facts he had openly favored the liber
ation of North Africa from France* In Britain, Mr* Nasser
was viewed as a menace to the presence of Britain in the
Arab worldo*^ Both France and Britain feared that their
security would be at Nasser* s mercy if he came into control
of the ianalo Viewing Israel as an example, both countries
must have feared that Nasser would use the Canal as a
leverage to pressure and endanger British and French inter
ests in the Arab world* It was not merely the Suez Canal
that troubled France, Britain and Israel* It was Nasser*
Prime Minister Eden declared on August 8, 1956, that #,our
quarrel is not with Egypts still less the Arab worlds it is
with Colonel Nasser* 1,33
31* Ibid*, Appendix A*
32* Ibid*, pp* 171-193*
33* Ibid*, Appendix A*

H o Operation Musketeer
@p©i»ati©ia Musketeer was the code name given to the
joint British$, French, Israeli plan to invade Egypt in
response to the takeover of the Ganalo The plan called for
Israel to invade Egypt and to come within fifteen miles
east of Suez., ©le presence of Israeli troops near the
Oanal, according to the plan, would endanger the security
of the Canal, thus necessitating the intervention of Britt
ain and France to protect the security of the Oanal-,^'
@n October 29, 19^6, Israel invaded the Sinai area
of Egypt and proceeded towards Suez* On the following day,
Britian and France issued a 2£j. hour ultimatum to Israel and
Egypt requiring both sides to withdraw ten miles from the
Canalo Israel was no where close to ten miles of the Canal»
$he closest the Israelis ever did get to the Canal was 120
mileso However, despite the fact that the fighting was at
the Mitla Pass, which was 120 miles south of the Canal,
Britain and France invaded Egypt from the north on October
31, 1956, when the ultimatum expired0^ She British-French
invasion hardly seemed essential to protect the security of
the Canal, as the fighting was In the south and at least
120 miles away from the Canal, fhe plan, however, which

©ailed for the seizure of the Canal by Britain and Franceg
also contemplated the forcible overthrow of President Nas~
36
ser0
h 0 Iretz Israels 19B6
The Israelis had indicated that an Arab leaders
such as Hasser, would have to be exposed as weak and hollow
by military defeatss in order to restore Brets Israel
The “Israeli drder of the. Bays to the troops
launched into Sinai on October 29® 1956# was expressly to
enclose the lile Army in its own countryo Mr* Ben-
#urion told the Knesset that the aim of the campaign was
“the liberation of that part of the homeland which was
occupied by invaders0 On November 7# 1956# Mr» Ben-
durion congratulated the troops who reached Mt 0 Sinai by
saying to them in the Israeli Knesset, “You have brought us
back to the place where the Law was given, and where we
were commanded to be a Chosen People 0
36* Ibid*, pp0 207-2114.0
37* Ibid,0 p. 181,
3 8 0 Ibid,, pp, 175=176,
39® Ibid, 0 p. 176,
ij-O, The Jerusalem Post, November 8, 1956,

129
Bo Kafr Qasim Incident
©b October 29» 195^s coincidental with Israel's
invasion of the Sinai Peninsula* the Israelis imposed a
daily curfew on all Arab villages in Sinai from $200 p.mo
to 6§00 aomo Kafr Qasim was one of the Arab villages in
Sinai o The Mayor of the village * who was notified at
Pom. of the curfew* informed the Israeli army that a number
of villagers who were working in the fields had not yet
returned* and that they were unaware of the curfew. The
Israelis' replied that they would take care of them.
After S?g0G p.m. * 10 villagers* of whom lij. were
women and children began their return to their village*
Kafr %aslm. On the way* the Israeli soldiers* under orders
from Sieutenant Joubrall Dahan* fired and machine gunned to
death all of the I0 villagers. Lt. Dahan* who gave the
orders and took part in shooting the 10 villagers* was
released from prison by an Israeli military court and
appointed by the Israeli army as Officer responsible for
Arab affairs in the Arab city of Ramieh* in Israel.^*
Il l . The Situation at the United Nations
Due to the presence of France and Britain as perma
nent members of the Security Oouncil with the power to veto
any draft resolution brought before the Security Sonneil*
ill. The Manchester Guardian* December 19* 196©.

130
tlaere was no hope of reaching an agreement in the Security
Council to bring about a cease fire in Egypt#m October
31s 1956s the United States and the Soviet Union submitted
separate draft resolutions calling for a cease fire and
withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from
Egypt, but in vain6 France and Britain vetoed the draft
resolutionso
On the same day, the representative of Yugoslavia
submitted a draft resolution calling for an emergency
session of the #eneral Assembly (due to the inability of
the Security Council to take any effective measures regard
ing the armed conflict in Egypt, such a resolution has
precedent under the Uniting for Beace Resolution)* The
Yugoslav resolution received more than seven affirmative
votes, and was carried out promptly
The United Rations' General Assembly passed five
resolutions calling for the withdrawal of British, French,
and Israeli troops from Egypt* Bith the exception of
Britain, France, Israel, Australia and Hew Zealand, the
remaining members of the General Assembly voted in favor of
all five resolution with very few abstentions* In fact,
had it not been for those five countries (Britain, France,
lj.2o United Rations Documents* S/3710, October 30*
United Nations Security Council Official
Records, ■ 11th Year,~f|£Lst' Meeting, October 31, 19^ 7 " P<> 22*

131
Israels Australia and Hew Zealand)s the five resolutions
would have been passed unanimously,^"
t
A, She General Assembly and Israel
On November 2» 1956s the General Assembly called
for a cease fire and asked Israel to withdraw behind the
Armistice bines of 19i|-9o^ On November 7» 1956, the Gen
eral Assembly* meeting in an emergency session* called on
Israel to withdraw behind the Armistice Lines of 1949
On November 24, 1956* the General Assembly called again on
Israel to withdraw behind the Armistice Lines of 1 9 4 9 * ^
On January 19, 1957, the General Assembly called on Israel
to withdraw and urged the Secretary General of the United
Nations to secure Israeli withdrawal within five days<A^
On February 2* 1957, the General Assembly deplored Israel
44* For the debate see United Nations General
Assembly Official Records, 1st Emergency Special Session*
561st Meeting* November-!* 1956, pp„ 1-34*
45* United Nations Documentsa A/3256* November 2*
1956, " '
46, United Nations Documents, Res, 1002 (ES-1)*
November 7, 1956, "
47* United Nations Documents, Res, 1120 (XI)*
November 24, 195b,
4©, United Nations Documents, A/RES/453, January
19, 1957*

for not withdrawing back behind the Armistice lines of
1949s and called mpon Israel to withdraw immediately
Bo The Bole of the United States
The United States., under President Eisenhower* did
not support Israel's invasion® Bather* the United States
opposed the invasion and sought through the United Nations
to secure Israeli withdrawal from Egypt0^0
Israel was reluctant to withdraw unless Egypt agreed
to accept Israel's demands before withdrawal® The Israeli
conditions for withdrawal were recognition of the state of
Israeli the establishment of permanent frontiers with Egypt
and assurance of passage of Israeli ships through the Suez
Oanal and the Gulf of Aqaba® President Eisenhower8 s reac- .
tion was8
Should a nation which attacks and occupies for
eign territory in the face of United Nations dis
approval be allowed to impose conditions on its
own withdrawal? „ ® ® I do not* myself* see how
this could be reconciled with the Charter of the
United Nations ® ® ® I would* I feel* be untrue
to the standards of the high office to which you
have chosen me if I were to lend the influence
of the United States to the proposition that a
nation which invades another shouldjae permitted
to exact conditions for withdrawal®^1
49® United Nations Documents® A/RES/460* February
2* 1957«
50® The Department of State Bulletin* March 11*
1957» p. 389®
51® Ibid®

133
Israel's Ambassador to ilasM.ngtons Mr, Abba Ebans
©ailed on Secretary of State Dalles and Informed him on the
possible consequences that might occur in the 195>& elec
tions if the Waited States insisted on Israeli withdrawal
without any conditions In exchange for withdrawal, Mr,
DulleSs according to President Eisenhower, informed Mr,
Ebans "If he (Mr, Bban) thought that (American) Jewish
sympathy would have any part, iota of influence on the (¥,
So) election, or that that would have any influence on me
as to what this Administration would do to prevent any out
break of hostilities, he should disabuse his mind about
President Eisenhower thus proclaimed that he
refused to allow Zionist Jewish votes to influence his
actions and refused to allow Israel to impose conditions
on its own withdrawal, President Eisenhower, along with
the General Assembly, was considering sanctions against
Israel, if Israel continued to ignore the United Rations
General Assembly resolutions for withdrawal. The Christian
Science Monitor reported that Senator Byndon B, Johnson,
Senate Majority Deader, who "strongly backed Israel,M went
52, The Hew York Times, January 27, I960,

to see President Eisenhower about preventing the imposition
of any form of sanctions against Israel.^
Despite all attempts to Influence Bresident Msen-
howers Israel withdrew in February» 1957s without United
Mations sanctions against Israel* But 9 Israel withdrew on
one stated conditi©ns and that was passage through the Gulf
of Aqaba in exchange for withdrawal„ Largely through the
efforts of President Eisenhower, Israel was allowed passage
through the Gulf of Aqaba and withdrew from all territories
occupied*^
0. fhe g.K.S.F.
The emergency session of the United Nations General
Assembly, through resolutions 1©0O (ES-l) of November 5s
1956* and 1001 (BS-I) of November 7s 1956s established a
United Nations command, and a United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEP), to operate in Egypt to keep the peace between
Egypt and Israel* The UNEP was permitted to establish
itself along the Egyptian-lsraeli borders upon the approval
of Egypt, and its presence was subject to Egypt’s consent*^
53° The Ohristian Science Monitor, Hay 23, 19&7°
5%° David Ben-Gurion, Israels Years of Challenge'
(New Yorks Bolt, Rinehart and Binston, 1963)9 PP° 161-160*
55° United Nations Annual Report of the Secretary
General on the Work of the. Organization (June 1 6* 1956-
June 15, 1 9 5 7 ) 9 pp° 12-13°

Israel refused to allow any W B F on its side of the
border6 The Egyptians» however, welcomed the W B F in order
to maintain the badly needed peace along the .Egyptian-
Israeli borders. The UNEF was a shield, a barrier against
the development of further hostilities between Israel and
56, For further information see 11 Bayed 11
Rayesss ^The Peace°Keeping Functions of the United Rations,M
(MoA, Thesis, Wniversity of Arizona, 1966),

S H A M R 7
NO MAR o = 0 10 F M 0 E g 1957=1966
a
I. The Arab-Israeli Borders
The Arab-Israeli borderss from the time of the
Israeli withdrawal from Egypt in Februarys 1957s to the end
of 1 9 6 6 5, were less violent, than in any previous periods
With two exceptions, in both of which Israel was condemned
1
by the Security Councils the daily minor incidents along
the Arab-Israeli borders rarely developed into open hostil
ities between the Arabs and Israel 0
\ 1
Ao E g H t
The Egyptian-Israeli border situation was more
peaceful from 1957 to 1966 than either the Syrian or the
Jordan!ano In fact, both sides maintained a tight control
over their borders until the second Arab-Israeli War of
June 5, 1 9 6 7 »
The factor primarily responsible for this rela
tively quiet period was the presence of the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEP) along the Egyptian side of the
SSJPtian-Isr&eli borders» The strong UNEP border patrols,
between Egypt and Israel, made it difficult for saboteurs
lo ©n March 1 6, 1962 against Syria? and on Novem
ber 1 3, 1 9 6 6 against Jordan«,
136

137
to infiltrate' the territory of either country0 Conse
quently, there was little tension between Israel and Egypt,
B, Syria
With the exception of one incident, the Syrian-
Israeli borders were also relatively less violent from 1957
to 1 9 6 6 than in any previous period.
On April 9» 1962, (Resolution S/5111), the United
Nations Security Council condemned Israel for attacking
Syria on March 16-17, 1962,^ Despite the minor incidents
which normally take place along the Israeli-Syrian borders,
the Israeli attack of March 16-17, 1962, was the only act
of aggression that was condemned by the United Nations
Security Council from 1957-1966,
It is important to note, however, that while Syria
was united with Egypt from February, 1958, to September,
1 9 6 1, there were even relatively few minor incidents along
the Syrian-Israeli borders, The Israeli attack came seven
months after Syria broke away from the union with Egypt,
It is possible, therefore, that the presence of Mr, Nasser,
as the President of the United Arab Republic (Syria and
Sgypt) could have been a main factor in preventing the
development of any hostilities between Syria and Israel, a
goal which was desired by both Egypt and Israel,
2, United Nations Security Council ©fficial
Records, 17thTYear, 1006th Meeting, 1962, pp, 3-%,

138
Co Jordan
Jordan has the largest common border with Israel*
The length of the Israeli"Jordanian border is about 6j?0
kilometers, which makes it difficult for either Jordan or
Israel to control it effectively=
From 1949 to 19$&s the Israelis complained'about
acts of sabotage carried out by Palestinians from Jordan*
The Israelis, who carried out reprisal policies against
Jordan, to discourage possible movements of Palestinian
Msaboteurs,® were unsuccessful in their policy* Jordan,
from 1 9 4 . 9 to 1 9 6 7, was opposed to the acts of "sabotage®
against Israel by Palestinians residing in Jordan* The
Jordanians, who suffered the reprisal consequences of these
acts of "sabotage,® took effective measures from 194-9 to
1967 to curb acts of sabotage from its borders* The United
Nations Security Council, based on the reports received
from the UNTSG, verified the fact that Jordan was con
stantly taking effective measures to curb i n f i l t r a t i o n * ^
The measures taken by Jordan included better border patrols,
imprisonment of known and possible "saboteurs® and the
removal of hostile village leaders along the Israeli bor
der A
3* Mr* Hutchison of the UNTSO verifies the meas
ures taken by Jordan in his books Violent Truce (New Yorks
Devin-Adair, 1958), p* 104«
4.0 Ibid*

Despite the measures taken by Jordan, on November
25s 1 9 6 6 (Resolution 228), the Security Council condemned
Israel for attacking Jordan on November 15, 1 9 6 6 0^ Never
theless, other than this aggression by Israel against
Jordan, the borders were less violent than during the pre
ceding yearsa
Twice, in fact, not a single Arab country was con
demned by either organ of the United Nations for any act of
aggression against Israel from 19^9-1966° But, as in the
1949=1957 period, Israel was alone condemned by the Secu
rity Council for aggression against the Arabs* • •
I!* The Kennedv-Nasser Correspondence
On May 11, 1961, iresident John Pa Kennedy sent a
letter to President Nasser concerning Arab-American rela-
* .
tioaSb The purpose of President Kennedy8a letter was, in
Mr, Kennedy8s words, 11 to be certain that you and other
Arab leaders have mo misunderstanding of our attitude
towards the Arab people* It continues to be one of sincere
friendship oS^
5* United Nations Security Council Official
•Recordsa■ 21st Year, 1328th Meeting, 1 9 6 6, p* 11*
60 Full texts of the Kenmedy-Nasser correspondence
can be found in "The Palestinian Problem , 11 United Arab
Republic Embassy* Information Dept*, Washington, 0*0*, nod*
and "Exchange of Letters Between John F* Kennedy and
Nasser,iS Middle Bast Affairs* XIII (November, 1962),
pp* 2 6 9 ^ 2 7 6 0

President Kennedy9 s attitude on the MArab“IsraeX
Controversy** as a senator and before becoming President had
been essentially pro-Zionist and pro-lsraelo? President
Kasser was aware of that earlier attitude, for he replied
to President Kennedy by stating that **I felt through what I
read from you directly or what has been attributed to you
on this matter, that there were angles in the problem that
called for further clarification/"®
President Kennedy8 s letter to President Nasser was
significantly different from his earlier comments on the
ttArab"Israel Controversy»0 In this letter, he expressed
the desire of his administration to apply "justice in the
settlement of international disputes/*1 The heart of the
"Arab-lsrael Controversy,11 according to President Kennedy,
appeared to be the unresolved question of the "Palestine
Refugee Problem/" Mr« Kennedy informed Mr, Nasser that 4%e
are willing to help resolve the tragic Palestine Refugee
Problem on the basis of the principle of repatriation or
compensation for properties," President Kennedy, however,
did not rule out the United Nations9 resolutions on the
subject of repatriation and compensation for the refugees.
In this letter he wrote, "I wish to state unequivocally
7« See The Zionist Organization of America 3 "John
Fo Kennedy on Israel, Zionism and Jewish Issues ,*1 Herzl
Press, New York, 1965»
8, Kennedy-Nasser Correspondence, op, cit.

Ikl
that this govermnemte s position is anchored and will con
tinue to be anchored in the firm bedrock of support for
General Assembly recommendations concerning the refugees*
and of active* impartial concern that those recommendations
be implemented in a way most beneficial to the refugees»M
Then he went on to say that “We are determined to use our
influence to assure that the Commission (Palestine Concil
iation Commission) intensify its efforts to promote progress
toward a just and peaceful solution, I can assure you that
there will be no lack of United States interest in seeing
that effective action is taken,
President Hasseres reply to President Kennedy's
letter* which was written on August 22* 1961* was essen
tially an elaboration of the Arab side of the "Arab-Israel
Controversy,m He stated that "My aim was to explain to you
that the right of the Arab Palestinian is connected with
the right of the Palestinian Motherland* and that the other
Arab nations cannot isolate themselves from the aggression
launched on one of them,
While President Nasser's view did not always coin
cide with President Kennedy's view* both leaders were in
agreement that the Palestinian refugees should be repatri
ated and compensated in accordance with the ad hoc
9» Ibid,
10, Ibid,

resolutions passed by the General Assembly and the Security
11
Council regarding the Palestinian refugees, Israel, how
ever, has consistently refused since 1 % . 9 to effectuate any
of the United Rations1 resolutions on repatriation and com
pensation for the Palestinian refugees.
Despite the fact that President Kennedy stated that
fl¥e are determined to use our influence,* the Palestinians
remained as refugees and were not compensated, largely due
to Israel's attitude towards those United Rations' resolu
tions, President Sasser expressed to President Kennedy his
pessimism that an American president could act effectively
under pressure from pro-Zionist voters in the States,^
Mr, Kennedy was reported to have told a friend, in
1961, according to Mr, Joseph Johnson, (President of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) with respect to
a peace proposal applicable to the Arabs and Israelis that
41 If the Israelis don't want it, then what's the use of
fooling with it, let's forget it,
11, United Rations General Assembly Resolution 19i|-
(III |, December 1 1, 1 9Ii-8, which has been re-affirmed
annually for the past twenty-one years,
12, Kenmedy-Nasser Correspondence, op, elt,
13, Joseph E, Johnson, ®Arab vs, Israeli ,'3 The
United States and the Middle East (Pinal Report o f .the San
Francisco Assembly, February 2?-29, 19%), p, !$<>

CHAPTER 8
THE SECOND ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 1967
1°
Ao Sapport of Al°Fatah
A1“Fatah is ©ne of a scores or more 9 of varloms
Palestlaiaa organizatieas that have foeea established by
various Palestinian refugees in Arab countries for the task
of redeeming their homelands Palestine, through armed
straggldo A1=Fatah is by far the largest and strongest
military organization ever set up by the Palestinians since
19i|.8o
According to Yasir Arafat, the leader of Al'*Fatah,
the A1 “Fatah was organized in Syria, sometime in late 1964*
Prior to 1967, the Syrian regime did not support Al-Fatah,
but by January, 1967a the Syrians publicly committed them
selves in favor of A1-Fatah operations from Syria against
Israel*^
Prior to 1967, not a single Arab country supported
or encouraged Palestinian guerillas to operate from their
borders0 Rather, the Arab countries took severe measures
to curb their actions, and in some instances, to control
1» See Time, December 13, 1968, pp 0 29-32,

Ikk
their organizations 0 She' Arab countries feared that
Israel9 as in the past* would utilize the Palestinian
guerillas as an excuse to invade the Arab country from
which the Palestinians might operate 0
To repeats the Syrian decision to supports publiclyp
A1~Fatah guerilla activities from Syria against Israel was
without precedent in the past eighteen years» The Syrian
decision was in violation of the General Armistice Agree
ments concluded between Syria and Israel i n , 1914-9» It was
also a challenge to the Israelis, who had warned the Arab
states in the past against supporting guerilla activities
against Israel* The Israelis had threatened the Arabs with
military reprisals, and in several instances Israel had
taken severe measures against Jordan, even though Jordan
had disapproved guerilla activities from its borders
2
against Israel* .
According to Yasir Arafat, the leader of Al-Patah,
the activities of Al-Patah against Israel in 196?, and
prior to that, were geared towards studying Israel's border
defense and reprisal policy tactics* Despite the fact that
only minor incidents occurred between Al-Patah and Israel,
the Israelis must have been alarmed by Al-Patah activities*
The Israelis consider Al-Patah a potential danger to
2* See Moshe Dayan,
(Londons Sox & Byman, 1966),

Israeli border security* and if A1-Fatah eannot be
destroyed, then the host country mist be held responsible
for its operations
Bo Israeli Reaction to Syrla
g g r ttaratt a Jilfcii a gggacttMtv r^miBaaitsgsitc5*i>
lo Border Slashes with Syria
Prom January to April S, 1 9 6 7, the Israelis engaged
with the Syrians in more than a dozen clashes, ranging from
pot shots to exchanges of fire between tanks, artillery,
and aircrafto Despite Israelis warnings, the Syrian regime
con tinned to support A1-Fatah activities against Israelo^"
On April 7» 1967, one of the many continuing border
clashes developed into a serious battle between Israel and
Syria0 Israeli and Syrian planes engaged in combat over
the city of Damascus, in which Syria lost six planes 0 That
April 7, 1967, incident, according to Mr. Charles ¥. Yost,
former United States Ambassador to Syria, Mappears to have
been the curtain raiser to the six day war.
t6
2.a Israeli Threats to
©n May 11, 1967, Israeli Prime Minister, Levi
Bshkol, stated that his government regarded this wave of
3. Time, op. clt.
if,. Charles tf. Yost, :liHow it Began,-H Foreign
Affairs„ XL¥I (January, 1968), 306.
So Ibid.

lMsaB'©tages aad ^iafiltration® (meaning 11-Fatah guerilla
activities) "gravelyo11 Mr. Eshkol warned Syria that if
such activities were not smspendedg Israel "may have to
A
adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7<> ”
Just what Mr-. Eshkol meant by ’’measures no less drastic
than those of April 7sM he did not specify.
Judging from Israel's past record of military
reprisals, and according to Israeli General Dayan, an
attack on a major city or a military installation would be
7
the objective of a military reprisal. - President Easser,
however, interpreted Israel differently. On May 23» 1967,
in a speech in Gairo, President Easser referred to a public
statement made by a senior Israeli officer on May 12, 1967*
President Easser said, "on May 12 a very important state
ment was made <> f . . The statement said that the Israeli
commanders have announced they would carry out military
operations against Syria in order to occupy Damascus and
O
overthrow the Syrian government.M That Israel intended to
carry out -a - military reprisal against Syria, unless the
A1-Fatah attacks were suspended, was indicated in Mr.
Eshkol11 s statement of May 1 1, 1967° The statement of May
12, 1967, to which President Easser referred, was more
6, Ibid.« p. 3 0 7.
7. Dayan, op. cit.

3 4 7
blunt and forward than Mr 0 Eshkol8s statementso Whether it
was true or not» the Arabs believed it 9 and Mr„ Eshkol8s
next statement on May 13$ 196?» did not retraet it 0
Rather» Mr0 Eshkol stated, J,we shall choose the time, the
place, and the means to encounter the aggression, ” Mr,
Eshkol went on to say that he intended to make Israeli
defense forces powerful enough to deter aggression, to
repel it, and to strike a decisive blow within enemy terri-
4. 9
tory,
IIo Arab Reaction and Response
Ao Mobilization of Forces
The Israeli statements of May 11, 12, and 13, 1967s
were no less grave to the Arabs than were the Al-Patah
guerilla attacks to Israel, In the past, Israel's military
reprisals had come as surprises and usually several months
following an attack by the Palestinians, In the first two
weeks of May, 196?, the Israelis stated the target, the
objective, and the intent. To the Arabs, it was only a
matter of time before Israel carried out its military
reprisal against Syria to overthrow the Syrian regime,
according to the aforementioned statements.
The first Arab countries to mobilize their armed
forces were Syria and the United Arab Republic, The
9o Ibid,

mobilization came following a U <,&»!<, statement which stated
that Israel had assembled an army of over 609000 along the
Israeli-Syrian border» Later 9 Jordan,, Lebanon^ Iraq, and
the rest of the Arab countries followed suit, Arab mobil
ization began as early as May I?, 1967, five days after the
Israeli threat to invade Syria,,
Bo fhe BololoFo
On May 16, 1967, Seneral Pawzy of the Wnited Arab
Republic requested the Wnited Eations Emergency Force
(WoloEoFo) to withdraw from S h a m el Sheikh and el Sabhao
(These two cities, which were located in Sinai, were stra
tegically important, as they controlled passage to the ©ulf
of Aqabao ) The WoNoEoFo command referred the matter to
Secretary General ¥ Thant„
Secretary General U Thant, realizing that the
WoloEoFo had helped maintain peace between the Wnited Arab
Republic and Israel for the preceding eleven years, was
nonetheless aware of the fact that the presence of the
WoUoloFo along the WoAoRo-Israeli borders was subject to
the Wnited Arab Republic 8 s consent. Accordingly, Mr» W
Thant asked for an official request from the government of
the Wnited Arab Republic for withdrawal. Mr. W Thant
informed the Wnited Arab Republic that there could be no
partial withdrawal. Either the W.E.E.P. was to remain in

149
all of its specified areas, or it would have to be totally
withdrawn from the Whited Arab Republic,
On May 17, 1967, President Nasser requested the
evacuation of the 3,500 man W,N,E»P, from the WoA,!,
President Nasser considered the WolLBoFo a barrier in front
11
of his army in case Israel invaded Syria, But, perhaps
the primary factor that moved President Nasser to request
the evacuation of the W,N,1,F, was the continuing demands
made by the Arab leaders on President Nasser, The Arab
leaders accused President Nasser of supporting the W,N,E,P,
as an excuse for not entering into war with Israel, and
they used the WoN,E,F, as a pretext to attack President
Nasser,
Accordingly, on May 18, 1967, Mr, W Thant received
an official request from the United Arab Republic asking
for the withdrawal of the W,N,B,F, Mr, W Thant complied
with the request and. ordered the total withdrawal of the
W,N,E,Fo from the United Arab Republic as of May 19,
X2
1967o On the same day, Israel's representative to the
United Nations protested the order for the withdrawal of
UcNoloF, from the United Arab Republic, Similar protests
10, Salter Laqueur, The Road to Jerusalem (New
Yorks Macmillan, 1968), pp, 261-289,
11, The Ohristian Science Monitor, May 19, 1967,
P o 1 ,
12, Laqueur, op, cit.

came from the United States* Britain* and Ganada*^^ Mr 0 U
Thant* however* suggested to the Israelis the possibility
of moving the U.H<,EoF0 to the Israeli side of the border*
The Israeli representative replied that such an action
would be 11 entirely unacceptable to his government*
Following the WoN.JE.F* withdrawal from the United
Arab Republic * the United Arab Republic’s army took over
Gaza and Sinai as of May 19 * 1967«
G* The Strait of Tiran
On May 22* 1967s President Hasser* asserting* and
reacting to the state of belligerency between Israel and
the United Arab Republic* prohibited the passage of ships
carrying ’’strategic materials” to Israel* The prohibition
was enforced at the Strait of Tiran* which leads to the
port of Eilat in Israel*3*^
The most important ”strategic material” that had
been going to Eilat was oil from Iran* The United Arab
Republic* exercising its right as a belligerent state* pro
hibited the passage of ships bearing oil to Israel* Israel,
13* The Ghristian Science Monitor* May 22* 1967 9
p* 1 2*
lij.* Yost, op* c i t o fl p* 313» Eaqueur* op* c i t *
15* The Ghristian Science Monitor* May 21}., 1967,
p* 1*

howeverP did not reoognize the existence of a state of
belligerency between Israel and the United Arab Republico
lo Israeli Reaction
The prohibition in Israel6s eyes was (l) a viola
tion of the G-eneral Armistice Agreements of 1914.9 (Israel
had nullified those agreements in 1 9 5£>)j^ (2) a violation
of Article 10 of the 1958 Geneva Convention of the Terri
torial Sea and the Contiguous gone (The United Arab Repub
lic did not sign that Convention)and (3) an act of
aggressions as the prohibition purported to close an inter
national waterway (the same view that was expressed by
*i A
President Johnson on Hay 26g 1967),
2, United States Reaction
©n Hay 23, 1957? one day after President Uasser’s
May 22, 196? statements the Christian Science Monitor
reported that a United States official ^flatly said on May
22 that .*Washington considers the (Strait of Tiran) an
international waterway and would make sure it stayed that
16, United Nations Documents, S/1,?, 13k-$s> May 31?
1 9 6 7? pp, 61-65, "
170 United Nations Conference on the haw of the
Seas, ?ol, I?, 1958? U,N, 11, p, 13lj-« : —
1 8, The Christian Science Monitor, May 26, 1967?
p , 7 *

way6 oThe Christian Science Monitor also reported that
^President Johnson had privately hmt sternly warned Presi
dent Nasser that the United States would consider blockage
of Israel8 s Red Sea access as an act of aggression, on the
20
grounds that it violated an international waterway»
President Johnson was indeed intolerant of the
Strait of Tiran ‘‘blockaden imposed by President Has aero Mr*
Johnson not only considered the Gulf of Aqaba to be an t
international waterway, but also felt that 11 a blockade of
Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to
the cause of peaceo11^ - Convinced, as he was, that the
“blockade9 is “potentially disastrous to the cause of
peace,M Mr® Johnson proposed to President Nasser on May
23, 19678
(1) Removal of the Strait of Tiran restrictions#
(2) A halt to the withdrawal of the U 0N,EoBlog
(3) Demobilization of both UoAoR® and Israeli troops
along Sinai and the Negev Desert#
■J
(ij.) A ban on sending UoAoR« troops to S h a m el Sheikh#
19o The Christian Science Monitor, May 23, 196?,
P* 3°
20o The Christian Science Monitor 0 May 26, 1967,
P e 7 o
21e The Department of State Bulletin, June 12,
1967, pp» 870^871®

153
(5) Removal of t?oAoRd troops from ©aza^ and the estab
lishment of a Halted Nations Administration in
S-azao^
Mr« Johnson’s proposals made no mention of the
Syrian-1 sraeli dispate y which gradually became tense and
led the Arabs to believe that Syria was in danger from a
possible Israeli attack. In fact, following the removal of
the tLNoBUPo and the Tirah restrictions, the Syrian ques
tion became a relatively insignificant incident compared to
the dramatic events that followed, lihat appeared as a war
over Syria now became a challenge over Aqaba and the Strait
of Tiran0 Hr, Johnson’s proposals reflected the dramatic
change of events that focused on the Strait of Tiran 0
Mr, Johnson’s proposals were unacceptable to Presi
dent Nasser who considered that they encroached upon the
sovereignty of the United Arab Republic by limiting its
military movements in Gaza, S h a m el Sheikh and Aqaba, Mr,
Johnson’s proposals, demanding essentially that President
Nasser retract considerably from his former position, had
little to ask of Israel, In fact, President Johnson chose
to neglect the Syrian issue by emphasizing the grave events
in Aqaba,
22, The Christian Science Monitor, May 27» 1967s
po 1,

fhe only pmiDlioly reported requests by the United
States of Israel was "not to test the blockades at least
for mow, President Johnson is not anxious to send a single
American soldier to the Middle last in the middle of a
Vietnam Ear»
Israels according to Professor laeqmeurs would not
die if the Strait of Tiran was closed. The port of Eilat
noraally only, handles about 1 0% of Israel8s shippings and
oil from- Iran represents the- bulk of cargo that has normally
passed through the Strait of Tiran,^
The issues involved might appear to have been legal
and political. They weres but to the Arabs and Israelis it
was more of a psychological issue,^ President Basser8s
spokesman, Mr, Mohammed laykal (Editor of Cairo8s daily
Al°Ahram newspaper)s referred to Mr, Idsser 8 s decision on
Tiran as a "major psychological defeat to Israel , 11
. According So Mr, HaykalIsrael had two choicess Either to
attack Egypt or to backdown and accept defeat,^
23a The Christian Science Monitor, May 29, 1967,
P° $0
2l{.o Saqmeur, op, eit, n pp, 94-=95°
' 25, Ibid,
2 6, Ibid,
2?, Ibid, 0 p, 311,

Mr, Wri Avn©rys (an important Israeli* who is a
member of the Knesset) stated, that S!if we back down now,
every single Arab will believe that our military force is a
bluff. If this belief spreads* there is nothing to hold
28
back the Arabs, 11 Ire si dent Nasser! s action* therefore*
was a challenge to Israel's military power* upon which the
survival of the state of Israel heavily depends, What ~
began as a war over Syria* then Aqaba, developed into a war
involving the survival of the state of Israel and the
Arab8 s pride and dignity over the restoration of Pales
tine ,^ The liberation of Palestine could not succeed
unless Israel were destroyed as a state* and the survival
of Israel depended upon Israel's military power to thwart
any Arab attempt to achieve that twenty-year old goal, The
Israelis* who were challenged* indicated that they would
not back down, Israel's security was at stake* and the
other alternative* according to Mr® Haykal* was war,
III, The Six-Day Ifar
A, Israeli Preparations
Israeli General Moshe Dayan wrote in his book* The
Sinai Gamnaian, 196j>* yIf we do not succeed at the very
28, Wri Avnery* Israel .Without Zionists (New forks
Macmillan, 1968), pp, 25-26,

omfcset in siarprising the Egyptians and knocking out their
planes while they are still on the ground* our plan will
fallo"^^ The 195>6 objective was carried out in 1967s as
part of a plan prepared in I 9 6I4. by General Rabin* The 196%
blueprint was slightly adjusted by General Bar Lev* due to
last minute changes* but it was basically the 196% plan by
which Israel fought*
The decision to !Sgo to war in self-defense" or
fight a "preventive war" as the Israelis like to label
their wars* was made on June 3* 1967* and the timing was
left to Mr. Eshkol and General Dayan. The day they
selected was June 5* 1967»^ The day of attack* however*
was heavily dependent upon the rapidity of Israel9s mobili
zation. Israel* according to Israeli military and govern
ment officials* had "only a very small regular army. Its
wartime army consists mainly of reserves* a full mobiliza
tion of almost the entire population. Once the reserves
are called up* the economy grinds to a halt. The men of
Israel literally disappear from the streets* the offices*
the factories* and the coffee shops. The whole country
32
changes* visually and materially." According to Israeli
3 0. Dayan* op. clt.
31. Fred Ehoury* The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (lew
Yorks Syracuse University Fress* I960)* p. 256. Also see
The lew York Times of June 6* 8* 10* 1967.
32. Avnery* op. clt.* p. 2 5.

1B7
a m y officials, Israel cannot afford, to remain mobilized
more than seven days0 ^ Despite the several thousands of
volunteers who came to Israel for a month or so before the
June5 196% War9 in order to take ever a few urgent vacant
jobs9^ Israel had to fight or demobilize within a week*
Israel chose to fight9 and since mobilization began as
early as June 3> 1967s the Israeli attack was expected any
time .35
B0 The Arabs
The Arab world* prior to the ” Six-Day War**’ was
more disunited and disrupted by regional disputes than at
any previous time in the history of the Arab-Israeli con
flict 0
The United Arab Republic, was heavily committed to
the maintenance of the Republican regime in Yemen» At
least £0*000 U0A0R0 soldiers were in Yemen to support the
Republicans against the Saudi-backed Royalists of Imam al-
Bader® Jordan severed diplomatic relations with Syria on
May 30* 1 9 6 7* following an explosion in Amman* Jordan8 s cap
ital* by Syrian agents„ Then there was the traditional dis
pute between President .Nasser8 s "revolutionary1,8 regime and
33® See L. felie* "@eek the Hot Dine Burned*,$
Readers Digest, XGIII (August* 19681* 3 7-1 * 0
31$.o Daqueur* op. clt. * p» 22k.o
Yost* ©Po eito * p. 317o

King Bassein1 s ^reactionary^ regime<> In faet 9 President
lasser said in a speech on May 25s 1967» "They say they
want to coordinate their plans with us» We cannot coordi
nate our plans in any way with Islamic Alliance members
because it would mean giving our plans to I s r a e l
President Nasser8s attitude 9 howevers was significantly
changed when King Hussein paid him. a secret visit on May
3 1 s 1 9 6? and concluded a defense pact on the same day?
Syria had already concluded a defense pact with the TJoAoBo
The pactsa however, were not coordinated* They were sepa
rate pacts with the H*A*H* only and they were concluded
only a week before the Israeli attack on June 5# 1967«
The conclusion of these separate pacts, however,
did not necessarily mean that there was a united military
plan among the Arabs* The Arab governments had no inten
tion of officially attacking Israeli therefore, if an
invasion plan existed among the Arabs, it must have been
drawn up after June 1, and no later than June 1$.* According
to Professor hacqueur, the Arabs "stumbled into war without
a plan, hoping that somehow Israel would c r u m b l e *"37
The UoAoBo, Syria, and Jordan, therefore, had
separate plans, if such existed, but they never did
coordinate their plans before the war* According to King
3 6 0 laqueur, op* cit*, p* 3 0 0*
37- Ibid*, p* 106*

Hmssein’s memoirss Our M t h Israel (Arabie|9^® Jordan
had a defense plan, due to its long borders with Israel
(over 6 5 0 kilometers}s as invasion would have been suicidal
without outside help0 Little is known about Syriao The
WoAolo 5, therefores is the only country that could have had
a plan, and President Nasser 8 s speech of May 2£><, 1967,
verifies the existence of a !,plan 0 M The question, there
fore, (since President Nasser's Tiran prohibition had
become the Casus Belli for Israeli was, were the Arabs
readyf The answer, according to Mr 0 Haykal (President Nas
ser's spokesman) was 11 we must expect the enemy to deal us
the first blow in the battle<> But as we wait for that
first blow, we should try to minimize its effect as much as
possible,, The second blew will then follow,and "Let
Israel begin„ Let our second blow then be ready. Let it
be a knock out,
President Nasser, however, went beyond Haykal by ,
"inviting Israel to war, 11 Hhat he said, in fact was "Ahlan
wa'Sabian (meaning, "Welcome, We are' ready and waiting for
you"),^ The "invitation” to attack first, however, was
3 8° King Hussein, Harbuna Ma Israel (Beirutt
Al-Nahar Press, 1968), (Arabic)7 ' .
39» Al-Ahranio May 26, 1967$ Laqueur, op0 cit0,
p . 308o
4.0o Laqueur, ona cito, p« 3H«
41= King Hussein, op* cito

dme to the private warnings that Mr* Nasser and the Arabs
received from 1ms sia and the Uni ted States <. Both govern
ments warned the Arabs not to fire the first shoto^
6» Mondayo June g» 1967
©n Monday mornings Jmne 5S, 1967 s the second Arab-
Israeli iiars or so-called Six-Bay War, began when the
Israeli Air Force destroyed U«Ao-Eo, Syrian, and Jordanian
air power in order to achieve aerial superiority in an
area that is mostly desert*^
Despite the conflicting statements, as to which
side began the attack, and the inability of the Security
Council to determine the aggressor, Israel appears to have
fired the first shot which began the war,
(1) The Arabs, especially the B,Aol., were warned by
the United States and the Soviet Union not to fire the
first shoto^
(2) On June 2, 1967, President Nasser told Mr, Christo
pher Mayhew, a British M 0P,, $,Yes, we will leave them
alone| we have no Intention of attacking Israel,
lj.2, Laqueur, op, cit,, p, 311,
%3» King Hussein, op, eltog Laqueur,
Yost, op, cit,g Randolph Churchill, The Slx-1
(Bostons Houghton Mifflin, 1967),
41}.° Laqueur, op, cit,, p, 311,
4-S° Yost, op, cit,, p, 317°

(3) The Israeli air attack of Jmne $ 9 1 9 6 7» verifies
the faet that if the Arabs did attack* then their air power
womld have been on its way towards Israel* rather than at
home waiting to be destroyed by the Israeli jet fighters0
In a war that depended heavily on aerial snpremaey* the
presence of Arab planes on the ground makes little sense if
the Arabs, attacked first* Moreover* W*AoH0 ss Field
Marshall* the late Abdul Hakim Amer* along with Air Force
General Sidky* was in a plane on his way to inspect some
air bases when the' Israelis attacked on Monday* In fact*
the only HoA*B* plane that was in the air was the jet
transport “Ilyushin*M carrying Amer and Sidky* If the
Arabs attacked* then Amer* Sidky* and the other military
people should have been on the ground directing a war*
rather than in a plane on an inspection tour* The
“Ilyushin” had to land at Oairo International Airport as
all of the military bases were under attack*^
I4.6* On June 8* 1967* Israeli Ambassador to honden*
Mr* Aharon Bernes* stated: Mlt was Israel who had fired the
first shot*w (See Wi"l dispatches of June 8* 9* 1967* from
London| also quoted in Howard Koch* Jr* * Six Hundred Days
(Hew York* Arab Information Center* 1969)* p* 27* on
February 28* 1969* General Babin saidg ,$I do not believe
that B&sser wanted war* The two divisions he sent into
Sinai on May Ilf would not have been enough to unleash an
offensive against Israel* He knew it and we knew it * 11 (See
The Jerusalem Post* February 29* 1968* p* 2)g James Reston*
CIA* Cairo* sent two dispatches to Mr* Richard Helms *
Director of the CIA* Mr* Reston said that 1 “The United
Arab Republic did not wish war* was certainly not ready for
war* and had been making no preparations within the country

(if.) Before M s death in late FebruaryP 19699 Mro Bshkol
was interviewed by Newsweek in Israel* In the interviews
Mr* Bshkol said that Mthe Arabs were the first to attack
* * * they closed the Strait of Tiran, moved tanks and
troops into Sinai$ and were headed toward our borders*
Hhen they chased the TJ«N* troops out* we were faced with a
blatant act of war? there was no way out for us * xn
faets reliable sources report that as early as June 1967s
Israel decided to go to warfl and that the date set was
June £ 0 1967*^ Mr* Bshkol did not say that the Arabs
fired first? he did not say that the Arabs reached Israel's
borders* Mr* Bshkol said that the Arabsg in this case the
BoAoRog committed acts of wars and thus qualified them to
be labelled as “attackers*11 Therefore, in Mr* Bshkol8 s own
itself(see I*8Orient, June 13, 1967? also quoted in Koch,
op* cit*, p* 3D? David Kimehe and Ban Bawlv* The Sandstorm:
The Arab^Israell War of 1967 (New Yorks Stein & Bay,
196£f), p* 1267™reported on a meeting that took place on
May 25, 1967, between Mr* Bban, and Secretaries Bean Rusk
and Robert McNamara* At the meeting, “General Wheeler was
called in to join the meeting and he gave the official
evaluation* He had no information of any Egyptian (H*A*R*)
intention to attack, he declared? if anything, it was the
Israeli army that was pressing to begin hostilities* And
he repeated that in the Pentagon's view Israel had nothing
to fear* Her army was, in their estimation, far superior
to that of Egypt (WoA»R,)»“
47* Newsweek* February 17, 1969, p* 4.9*
48* Khoury, op* elt*, p. 258? The New York Times,
June 6, 8, 10, 1 9 6 7=

words, although sth@ Arabs were the first to attack , 51 they
were not the ones who fired the first shot which started
the war,
8„ 'go So 8. Liberty
On Thursday, June 8, 1967, at 2i03 p=m0, the U0S0 8 0
Liberty was attacked by Israeli jet fighters. Several
Americans were killed and many more were injured during the
Israeli attack, which lasted more than forty-five min
utes.^
The U,S,S, Libertyo not a heavily armed ship, was
only equipped with four machine guns. It was operating as
a spy ship, like its counterpart the g.S,S, Pueblo, which
was seized by the Berth Koreans in January, 1968,
Shen the XT, 8,8, Liberty was attacked by the
Israelis, little was known about its mission and purpose.
The Arabs believed it to be a spy ship spying for Israel,
The Israelis said that they thought it was a n,A,R,
destroyer, as it was 1 3 , 6 nautical miles off the coast of
al-Areish, Egypt, The Director of the United States Infor
mation Agency, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, officially stated
that wthe liberty was directing the evacuation of American
citizens from the Middl# Bast to Rome,11
49, The Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1967,
p, 1, ^ .
50, Ibid,

The truth, to some extent, was revealed, when a navy
officer aboard the America^ which was sent from
Srete to re seme the M b e r tv B said lsshe was there to spy for
msoAmong the varioms functions of the Wo So So Eibertv
was the task of learning about radar stations and their
signals as*a prelude to attack, or jamming, should later
situations dictate such. But what purpose was it serv
ing? Sho sent the ship and why? All these questions have
been left unanswered, The only official explanation came
when President Johnson replied to a letter sent by Senator
Mike Mansfieldo President Johnson wrote to Senator Mans
field, #These losses have included the lives of Americans
engaged in the work of peaceful communication on the high
seas e
The liberty was not the sole lsmysteryM of the June
war. To a lesser extent, the activities of the United
States Sixth Fleet have also remained rather vague» Prior
to the war, and as early as June 1, 1967s Mthe Sixth Fleet
strike carriers America and Saratoga, were conducting exer
cises near Grete 0 „ , the 33,000 ton U,8. aircraft carrier
51* Ibid,
52* Ibid. '
93. The Department of State Bulletin, June 26,
1967, p. 952,

1 6 5
Interlaid headed south early June first,11 ^ In faeta the
Sixth Fleet was in a state of readiness before the war,
IV, ffhe Hole of the United States in the United. Nations
A, On War
The position of the United States on aggression in
the Middle East was outlined in the Tri-fartite Declaration
of May* 1950o Britain, France, and the United States, in
the Trl~Fartit@ Declaration, agreed to maintain the status
quo and prohibit aggression by one party against another in
that area,^
On June 2, 1964, President Johnson assured Israel’s
Prime Minister Devi Eshkol, who was on an official visit to
Sashington, of ^United States support for territorial
integrity and national independence of all countries in the
Middle East,The principle of Middle Eastern Mterrito~
rial integrity,” from 1950, was upheld by Presidents Eisen
hower, Kennedy, and to a limited extent, Johnson, Prior to
the war. President Johnson stated that "the United States
is firmly committed to the support of the political
54* The Christian Science Monitor, June 2, 196?,
p, 1,
55, The Department of State Bulletin, June 5,
1950, p, 886. "
56, The Department of State Bulletin, June 22,
1964, pp, 958-960,

166
independence and territorial integrity of all the nations
of that area (Meaning the Middle East)o The United States
strongly opposes aggression by any one in the area 9 in any
forms overt or clandestineo18^
On Jime 5s> 1967s the Security Council met to take
action on the •Arab-Israeli '®ar0 All the members of the
Security Councils except the United States 9 were in favor
of an immediate cease fire and withdrawal behind the Armi
stice or Bemareation Mmes» established prior to the out
break of hostilities* The United Statess however 9 which
championed and supported “independence and territorial
integrity of all nations in the Middle Easts” was in favor
of a cease fire only9 and opposed withdrawals in this case
Israeli withdrawals back to the'Armistice limesIt was
the influence of the United States that prevented the
Security Council from taking any action on June Only
when the withdrawal clause was omitted did the United
States vote in favor of a cease fire only. Subseqmently 9
on June 6 9 1967s. the Security Gouncil called for an imme
diate cease fire and a cessation of all military
57o The Department of State Bulletin* June 12»
1967s p° ®71»
5@e International CenciliatiemB Septembers 1967s
p. 19 O

aotivitieso^ Jmne 7, 1967a the Security Council
demanded a cease fire as ©f 2©s@© hours
The Soviet Unions unlike the United States* pre
sented a draft resolution* calling upon Israel to withdraw
from occupied Arab territory. The soviet draft also con
demned Israeli aggression and called for withdrawal behind
the Armistice M n e s , ^
B0 ©n Jerusalem
The position of the United States on the question
of Israeli withdrawal from the areas occupied during the
June War was very clear on the question of Jerusalem.
Prior to the June 3Sar» Jerusalem was in the same
predicament as Berlin. The major part of Jerusalem was
occupied by Jordan* and Israel* which did not have fron
tiers with Jerusalem* occupied a smaller portion. Follow
ing the June War* Jerusalem* as well as the entire Western
lank of Jordan* was occupied by the Israelis.
The Israelis* who had long sought to annex Jerusa-
lem* declared Jerusalem a Jewish city* a part of the State
of Israel. In fact* when General Dayan first entered the
%9o Security Gouneli Resolution S/RES/233* June
6* 1967.
60o Security Council Resolution. B/EES/June
7» 1967*
61. Security Council Resolution, S/7951s Bev. 2*
June 13$ 1 9 6 7.

168
city as the conquerors he declared to Sadi© Israel that
“'Orshalem (Jerusalem) will remain ©rshalem forever* n
©eneral Bayan9 however9 became bolder and stated (also}
that 5,1 the #aga Strip is Israel* & e status of the West
Bank, is the same*
The Wnited Bationss however9 did not remain silent
on Jerusalem* On July 1967s the General Assembly con
sidered the Israeli move to change the status of Jerusalem
as invalid and called upon Israel to refrain from changing
the status of Jerusalem* The Wnited States abstained from
voting on the resolution* which was passed by 99 to O * ^
#m July llj.* 1967* the General Assembly formally deplored
the fact that Israel had not complied with Resolution 2253
(ES-V) of July 4$ 1967* The Wnited States also abstained
from voting on the resolution which was passed by 100 to
6k
0* The position of the Wnited States in the General
Assembly on Jerusalem has been consistent ever since Israel
changed the status of Jerusalem to the date of this paper*
In the Security Gouneil* the Wnited States* too* abstained
from voting on May 21* 1968* when the Security Council
62* "Israeli Expansionism*,§ Arab information
©enter (lew Yorks 1967)$ p* 15°
630 Wnited Eatioms Documents* A/RES/2253 (ES-Y)*
July 4i> 1967 *
64° Wnited Wations Documents* A/RES/2254 (ES-Y)*
July 14$ 1 9 6 7 °

deplored Israel8 a aetiem changing the statms of Jerusalem
and declared that action to be invalid* The vote* again*
was 13 to 0 with the United States abstaining*^
The Israeli measure which changed Jerusalem into a
Jewish city by military conquest is a clear and apparent
violation of the Tri-Bartite Declaration of 1950 and sub
sequent statements by Presidents Johnson* Kennedy* and
Sisenhower on the principle'of territorial integrity of the
Middle East in the Tri-Partite Declaration of 1950,
Be spite Israel’s clear violations* the representative of
the Suited States to the United Hattons on June 6* 1967*
Mr, Arthur Goldberg* had this to say on President Johnson’s
principle of territorial integrity in the Middle Easts ®It
has been our consistent policy* #e believe in it* We
believe in the spirit of friendship for all the countries
concerned* That is our position* That remains our posi
tion* It is not changed by anything that has been said*
because it represents the fundamental policy of our coun-
65* United Matioms Documents, S/RES/252* May 21*
1968*
66* The Department of State Bulletin* June 26*
1967* p* 9ii-0*

170
■ 0° Qa Arab Refugees
On June 11^.s 1967» the Security Council unanimously
adopted a resolution that called upon Israel to (1) aensure
the safetyg welfare and security of the Inhabitants of the
areas where military operations have taken place* and (2)
*to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have
fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.)(A
similar resolution* 22$2 (BS-?)* was also passed by the
General Assembly on July 4s 1967» by a vote of 116 to Go)
According to Secretary General ¥ Thant's report
(S/81241 ©f August 182 1967, about 200*000 Arabs had been
displaced as a result of the June War. Of those 200*000
refugees* 170*000 submitted applications through the Red
Gross to return in compliance with the United Nations reso
lutions 0 Israel* however* approved only 21*000 applications
and only 14s000 had actually returned. Israel refused to
allow any more refugees to return beyond the 1 4 S0 0 0 who did
return and also encouraged further Arab emigration from
the occupied areas.^
6 7o United Nations Security Council Official
Records. 22nd Year* 1361 Meeting* June 14* 1967* (S/RIS/
68. Rhoury* op. clt., p. l54l The Christian
Science Monitor. August 1* 1967o
6 9. Ibid.. pp. 1 2 3-1 8 1.

171
As far as gensuring the safety, welfare and. seem™
rity of the inhabitants*1 in the occupied, areas, Israel did
not apply the United nations resolutions in a faithful
7©
manner* In Gaza, for example, the Israelies adopted a
policy of intimidation to persuade the new and old Arab
refugees to leave Gaza* Hr* Michael Adams of the Man
chester Guardian reported that some of the persuasive tac
tics employed by the Israelis were permanent curfews Cwhich
resulted in shortages of food and water for days), physical
torture, and occasional firing on the refugees to scare
them, Mr, Adams concluded that “I had my ups and downs
during four years as a prisoner of war in Germany, but the
Germans never treated me as harshly as the Israelis are
treating the Arabs of the Gaza Strip, the majority of whom
71
are women and children,M Although the Israelis denied
any plan to evict the Arabs in order to colonize Gaza, the
Israeli military governor of Gaza signed an order per
mitting Jews to purchase land in the Gaza Strip,
Similar settlements were already established in Sinai,
7©, Ibid, | also see Uri Avnery, Ha8Glam Hazeh,
February 26, 1969, p* 9, in which Mr, Avnery charges the
Israeli government with evicting the Arabs in order to
annex the occupied areas to Israel,
71, The Manchester Guardian, January 25>, 1968,
72, The Eos Angeles Times, February 1}., 1968,

Golan Heights, and the West Bank of J o r d a n , g b e n
Israel8 s actions are compared with statements made by
General Moshe Dayan and Gideon Bafael (Israel8s permanent
representative to the United Eations} on June 5s 1967, in
which both stated that ^soldiers of Israel, we have no aims
of territorial conquest,15^ the conflict is indeed apparent,
Premier Devi Eshkol stated on June 5, 1967, “Me do not
demand anything except to live in our present territory,
In no way did the Israelis admit that they were expansion
ists, even when their statements are compared with state
ments like that of General Dayan who appeared on June 11,
1967, on the GBS program, wFace the IationM s SI do not
think that we should in any way give back the Gaza Strip to
Sgypt or the Western Bank of Jordan to King H u s s e i n ,117^ and
33The Gaza Strip is Israel, The status of the West Bank is
the same,^^ The Israeli attitude on Arab land is equally
as clear as on the subject of the Arab inhabitants. Gen
eral Dayan stated that "there are about a million Arabs
73° Ibid,
74° The Hew York Times, June 5» 1967$ Arab Inform
ation Center,.Israeli Expansionism, op, cit,, p, ig, ~
75° Ibid,
76, Ibid,'
77° Ibid,

■ . 173
which we don81 wan to11 Although the Security Council and
General Assembly urged the Secretary ©eneral to secure
Israeli compliances little has been doae„^ The Ihited
States supported the resolutions9 but did not urge Israel
to Implement theme At least, no public statement was made
to that effect*
D* @m Peace
The position of the Waited States on peace is
similar to its position on war* As mentioned earlier, the
Waited States opposed all Waited Nations8 draft resolutions
that called upon Israel to withdraw and supported only a
cease fire resolution without committing Israel to with
draw*®^ The fighting, however, came to a halt only after
Israel had overrun Jordan's Vest Bank, Syria's Solan
Heights, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip*
The members of the Security Council, with the
exception of the Wnited States, were reported to favor an
Israeli withdrawal as early as June 5* Due to the Wnited
States opposition, the Security Council was unable to act
7®» Ibid? The Jerusalem Post* January 27, 1969,
p * 2»
79* Ehoury, op* cit*, pp* 123=131*
@0* International Conciliation* September, 1967,
p* 19, Wnited"Nations Documents0 S/RES/233s June 6, 1967°

m
Si
until June 6? and then only eailed for a ©ease fire» In
faets Ambassador Goldberg objected to ©ailing a special
Q m
meeting of the General Assembly* but in vain*
At the General Assembly’s ,Fifth Emergency Special
Session (June 17“September 18* 1967)* the Waited States and
Israel opposed all the draft resolutions that ©ailed upon
Israel to withdraw* conditionally or unconditionally*
including these specific eases 8
(1) The representative of Yugoslavia submitted a
draft resolution (A/%0£22/Rev„3) ©n July ij.* 1967* calling
for an unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all
the areas occupied in the June Mar* It was defeated and
the Whited States was amongst those who voted against the
Yugoslav proposal*®^
(2) The Latin American members submitted a draft
resolution (A/L°£23/Hev*1) on July %* 1967* which requested
an Israeli withdrawal* reaffirmed that there should be no
recognition of the acquisition of territory through force*
and asked for an end to the state of belligerence* freedom
of transit in international waterways* and a full solution
Sia Ibid,o also see Waited Nations Documents „
S/79S1s lev, 2* June 13* 196?,
82, The Department of State Bulletin* July 3*
1967* pp, 12“13o
8 3, Khoury* op, eit,* p.

of the refugee problem» It was defeated® She Suited
States did not vote im favor of it8®^
(3) Indias Halls and Nigeria submitted a draft
resolution (S/8277Is whioh was similar to the Batin Ameri=
can proposals exeept that this draft suggested the estab
lishment of a Folio mediation to resolve the ©onflieto It
was defeated and the United States was amongst those who
opposed i t o
(ij.) The Soviet Fnion submitted a draft resolution
(A/Bo$191 on June 19s 1967/ whioh ©ailed upon Israel to
withdraw from all areas oocupied in the June War and to
compensate the Arabs for losses Incurred by Israel6s
aggression, and affirmed the right of all nations to exist
in the Middle Bast® The Soviet draft was rejected, and the
United States voted against it®
Shat then, did the United States consider as the
basis for a peaceful settlement in the Middle Bast? The
answer came in President Johnson8 s famous "Five Points11 of
June 19, 196?g
(1) ‘The recognized right of national life#
(2) justice for the refugees?
(3) innocent maritime passage?
(%) limits on the wasteful and destructive arms
race?
84= Ibid®

176
(5) national independence and territorial integrity
for all 0
The Johnson #S%ve Joints® became the basic objec
tive of the United States goal in the United Hations for
the Middle East* The Johnson !?iPive Pointss 15 like the
Johnson position on the June War, did not mention Israeli
withdrawalo The "Five PointsM are similar to the Latin
American and joint Indian-Mali-Higerian drafts with one
exceptions the exception was the condition for securing
Israeli withdrawal» It may be assumed* however * that some
where within the ,$vague but magnanimous offers expected of
a duel8 s victor and his second „ = 0 withdrawal may be
possible<, Heither Mr„ Johnson nor Mr0 Eban spelled out
just what withdrawal would mean* ^ ' It is clear from
President Johnson’s position on the war* Jerusalem* and
Israeli withdrawal that the Johnson Administration believed
that MIsrael should be allowed to keep some of the con
quered areas*Maintaining the same desired objective*
the United States submitted a draft resolution (A./La$2Q) on
June 20* 1967* of its own* This stateds 58Armed forces*’
should withdraw "from occupied territories” without
85° The Department of State Bulletin* July 10*
1967* pp, 33-%. "
86. The Christian Science Monitor. June 21* 1967*
P. Id
8 7° Khoury* on. ©it.. p. 3 1 7°

177
specifying whose forces were Involved and whether all
0Q
territories should he given up»'" '
B 0 On the Jarring Mission
The deadlock at the Waited Nations was partially
resolved when Great Britain submitted a resolution on
November 22s 19679 to the Security Council and that was
unanimously adopted. The November 22, 1967$ resolutions
lo AFPIBMS that the fulfillment of Charter prin
ciples requires the establishment of a just
and lasting peace in the Middle East which
should include the application of both the
following principless
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflicts
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of
belligerency and respect for and acknowl
edgement of the sovereignty$ territorial
integrity and political independence of
every state in the area and their right to
live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of
force;
2o AFFIRMS FWRTHSR the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the
refugee problem;
(e) For guaranteeing the territorial invio
lability and political independence of every
State in the area, through measures includ
ing the establishment of demilitarized zones;
88„ Ibid.

39 REQUESTS the Secretary"G-enerai to designate
a Special Representative to proceed to the
Middle East to establish and maintain con
tacts iid,th the States concerned in order to
promote agreement and assist efforts to
achieve a peaceful settlement in accordance
with the provisions and principles in this
re solution i
l*.o REQUESTS the Secretary-General to report to
the Security Council on the progress of the
efforts of the Special Representative as
soon as possible,
(Mr, U Thant sent Mr, Gunner Jarring» Sweden8s Ambassador
to the U,S,SoRos as Special Representative on November 23$
1967, )8 9
The Arabs’ support of the Jarring Mission was a
radical change from previous Arab statements on a peaceful
settlement in the Middle lasts■ but nevertheless the Arabs -
expressed their faith and confidence in the Jarring mission
as the most feasible solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The position of the United States and Israel was
also a contradiction of their previous position on peace,
While both parties had expressed approval of almost any
thing but withdrawalp their support of the November 22s
1 9 6 7s resolution cannot be explained in terms of their pre
vious stand. In facts the United States and Israel had
rejected the Satin American resolutions the joint India-
Mali-Nigerian resolution* and the Soviet resolution* which
89= United Nations Documents, S/RES/2^2* and
S/82479 November 22* 1967°

179
Mere almost identical to the British resolution of November
22s 1967 o The point is* therefore$, not so much whether
they can be explained in terms of past American and Israeli
behavior* but what are the United States and Israel doing
to fulfill a resolution that they have declared themselves
to be in favor off
Although the November 22 resolution called for
Israeli withdrawal* and Israel supported the resolution*
Israel did not withdraws
(1) As far as Jerusalem is concerned* the Israelis
declared it to be an integral part of Israel* contrary to
the November 22 resolution; and as late as May* 1968*
Israel refused to implement any of the previous resolutions
that deplored Israel8s ©hanging the status of Jerusalem*
Israel refused to implement any of the resolutions* The
Waited States abstained from voting on any of the resolu**
90
tions*
(2) G-emeral Dayan declared on June 11* 1967* that
^the Gaza Strip is Israel* The .status of the West,Bank is
the same*11 Foreign Minister Abba Eban declared on July 9*
1 9 6 7* that ^Israel will* under no circumstances* return to
the 1949 Armistice Agreements * * * * If the General
90, United Nations Documents* A/RES/2203 (E3-Y)*
July ij.* 19671 A/RES7l20ij. (ES~V)* July % * 1967; S/RES/202*
May 21* 1968 *

Assembly were to vote by 121 to 1 in favor of returning to
the A m i s tie© M m e s « , „ Israel will refuse to e amply,*
Israel's Minister of Informations Tisrael Qallllee*
deelared on June 10s 1967, that “Israel cannot agree to
return to the status quo before this (conflict) hap-
pened,11^
(3) The Israeli statementss howevers while they are
in contradiction to the November 22, 196? resolution, are
in harmony with Israeli actions and objectives, The hos
Angeles Times of February 1968, reported that “in seven
months the Israelis have established six definite settle
ments in the occupied areas, have indicated the plans for
more, and reflect a mood that does not look with favor on
returning much, if any, of the real estate won in the Six-
Bay War (26,000 sq, mi,) , , , in the ©aza Strip an order
was signed by the military governor permitting Jews to
purchase land , , , settlement on the Sinai Desert took
92
place as early as October (1967),
% ) While some Israelis have opposed returning any
of the lands conquered, others believe that some, not all,
of the lands conquered are negotiable, General Dayan, for
example, was asked by Mr, Mike Wallace on January 21, 1969,
91, “Israeli Exp ansi oni sm„" Arab Information
Oenter (Hew York, 1967), pi !£>,
92, The Dos Angeles Times, February ij., 1968,

X8l
on the GBS Television network6s ”60 Minutes,n whether
Israel womld return all of the land conquered to the Arabs
in exchange for peace 0 General Dayan replied^ !,Ho g but
they are negotiable.Even Israel8 s Premier Eshkol
affirmed the same position as late as February 17? 1969*^
It is clear then? that while Israel declares itself
to be in favor of the Jarring Mission? it is not willing to
return the areas conquered? in accordance with the November
22 resolution. Shat areas Israel will keep and what might
Israel return may seem not too relevant? since the November
22 resolution made no provision for partial withdrawal.
The Arab position is that if Israel wants peace? according
to the November 22 resolution? whose terms it then sup
ported? then Israel must act faithfully in accordance with
its provisions. So far? the Israelis have made no move to
do that. Yet? on occasion? they may seem to indicate that
permanent peace is so important that they are? in words
ascribed to Mr. Eshkol? ^flexible on everything11 and 41 don81
insist on anything.
The position of the United States has seemed to
remain essentially unchanged. Under President Johnson? the
93° The Jerusalem Post? January 27? 1969? pp. 1-2.
9j4.» Newsweek. February 17? 1969? pp. I 4.9-S6.
95« Ibid.? p. 50.

182
Waited States was unready to insist upon Israeli with
drawals abstained from voting on Jerusalems but supported
the November 22 resolution^ Even President Nixon, who
insisted that he was following an evenhanded poliey in the
Middle East, as his envoy, Mr. Scranton, suggested, has
declared himself to be in favor of the Jarring Mission0
Mro Nixon, however, like Mr* Johnson, does not believe that
Israel should be expected to withdraw completely from the
areas conquered, a view held by such Israeli spokesmen as
General Dayan and Mr* Eshkol* In fact, following the
Nixon-Eban meeting in March, 1989, three principles were
confirmed 2
(l) Peace and rejection of withdrawal without
peace;
<2) An integral or package settlement involving all
key elements of the Arab-lsraeli dispute;
(3) A new juridical and territorial structure
instead of restoration of the status quo ante*^
Both Israel and the United States, who have
expressed their common hope for the effectiveness of the
November 22, 196? resolution as the basis for a Middle East
settlement, refuse to effectuate (or in the ease of the
United States, to urge the effectuation) of the part of that
96» The Jerusalem Post* March 17, 1969, p» 1*

resolution eailing for withdrawal as a prelude to a final
peace settlement* A strong Arab feeling is that the very
same countries which hope for peace are those which have
made peace almost impossible. And the Arab position is
that,, if there is to be peace along the lines of the Novem
ber 22 resolution, then both Israel and the United States
should modify their present positions, which are in direct
contradiction to the basic principles upon which the Jar
ring Mission was supposed to operate*
On April 10, 1969, in a speech before the National
Press Olub in Washington, King Bussein of Jordan offered
Israel a final chance for a just and lasting peace in the
Middle Easts
Speaking for President Nasser as well as for
myself <,.»»_ We are prepared to offer the
following as a basis for a just and lasting
peace, in accordance, with the Security Council
resolution (of November 22, 1967)s
1, The end of all belligerency*
2* Respect.for and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and polit
ical independence of all states in the area,
3* Recognition of the rights of all to live
in peace within secure and recognized bound
aries free from threats or acts of war,
I}., Guarantees for all the freedom of naviga
tion through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez
Ganal»
jp. Guaranteeing the territorial inviola
bility of all states in the area through
whatever measures necessary including the
establishment of demilitarized zones.

XSij.
60 Accepting a just settlement of the refugee
problem,
o o , in return for these considerations» our
sole demand upon Israel is the withdrawal of
its armed forces from all territories occupied
In the June9 19&7 War and the implementation
of all other provisions of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution,•
The ,:!Six Point" peace plan of King Hussein (as well
as that of Mr, Nasser) was a reaffirmation of the November
2 2 j, 1967 s Security Council resolution. In his speech. King
Hussein reiterated his position, and that of President
Nasser, that peace, in the Middle East, could only be
achieved through the November 22 resolution.
The Israelis, however, rejected King Hussein8s
98
offer, Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Izthak
Rabin, referred to King Hussein8s peace proposal on April
10, 1969, as a Mpeace proposal without peace,It is
worth remembering, however, that King Hussein1s peace plan
was a reaffirmation of the November 22, 1967 resolution
which Israel and the United States had previously supported.
If there is to be a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East, along the lines of the November 22, 1 9 6 7 reso
lution, then peace rests on Israel8s willingness to
97« The New York Times, April 11, 1969, p» 2,
98, The New York Times, April 12, 1969,
99, Interview with CBS news correspondent Marvin
Kalb, CBS Evening lews, April 10, 1969,

effectuate the 196? resolution (and. the United States to
urge the effectuation of the resolution),, The positions of
President Nasser and King Hussein were made clear in King
Hussein8s April 10$, 1969$, speech. Just what Israel and the
United States will do in the future$, bears heavily on the
prospects for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

APPENDIX A*
HOrSAIN-HCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE
Sharif BasaiB11 s Letter of July 1915
Complimentary titleso
Whereas the entire Arab nation without exception is
determined to assert its right to live, gain its freedom
and administer its own affairs in name and in fact;
And whereas the Arabs believe it to be in (treat
Britain9s interest to lend them assistance and support in
the fulfillment of their steadfast and legitimate aims to
the exclusion of, all other aims 5.
• . . And whereas it is similarly to the advantage of the
Arabs, in View of their geographical position and their
economic interests, and in view of the well-known attitude
of the Government of Great Britain, to prefer British
assistance to any other;
For these reasons, the Arab nation has decided to
approach the Government of Great Britain with a request for
the approval, through one of their representatives if they
think,,fit,' pf "the following basic;provisioms which, "as time
presses, have not been made to include matters of rela
tively smaller importance, since such matters can wait
^•George Antonious, The Arab Awakening (Beirut 1
Xhayafs, 1955)» pp» 1)13=427»

until the time eomes for their considerations”"
le Great Britain recognises the independence of
the Arab countries which are bounded: on the north, by the
line Hersin-Adana to parallel 37° H0 and thence along the
line Birejik-Wrfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (ibn *Hmar)--Amadia
to the Persian frontiers on the east, by the Persian fron
tier down to the Persian Gulfs on the south, by the Indian
Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden whose status will remain
as at present)s on the west, by the Bed Sea and the Medi
terranean Sea back to Mersin,.
2o Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of
an Arab Oaliphate for Islam,
3= The Shariflan Arab Government undertakes, other
things being sepal, to grant Great Britain preference in
all economic enterprises in the Arab countriese
With a view to ensuring the stability of Arab
independence and the efficacy of the promised preference in
economic enterprises, the two contracting parties under
take, in the event of any foreign state attacking either of
them, to come to each other's assistance with all the
resources of their military and naval forces; it being
understood that peace will be concluded only when both
parties concur.
In the event of one of the two parties embarking
upon a war of offense, the other party will adopt an

attitude of neutralitys M t s if invited to join9 will agree
to confer with the other party as to the conditions of
joint action*
5= Great Britain agrees to the abolition of Capit
ulations in the Arab countries9 and undertakes to assist
the Sharifian Government in summoning an international
congress to decree their abolition*
6* Glauses 3 and ij. of the present Agreement are to
remain in force for a period of fifteen years* Should
either party desire an extension* due notice of one year
before the expiry of that period will have to be given*
Therefore* since the entire Arab nation is (God be
praised!) united in its resolve to pursue its noble aim to
the end* at whatever cost, it requests the Government of
Great Britain to return an answer* whether negatively or in
the affirmative* within thirty days of the receipt of this
message* in default of which it reserves its right to com
plete freedom of action* just as we will consider ourselves
absolved from the letter and the spirit of the declaration
which we made earlier through 8Ali Efendi*
Compliments«
Sir Henry McMahon8s Letter of
October 24* 1915
Cairo* October 24* 1915
Complimentary titles

I have, with gratification and pleasure, received
your note of the 29th Shawwal, 1333» and its tokens of sin
cere friendship have filled me with satisfaction and con
tentment*
I regret to find that you. inferred from my last
note that my attitude towards the question of frontiers and
boundaries was.one of hesitancy and lukewarmth. Such was
in no wise the intention of my note. All I meant was that
I considered that the time had not yet come in which that
question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.
But, having realized from your last note that you _
considered the question important, vital and urgent, I
hastened to communicate to the Government of Great Britain
the purport of your note. It gives me the greatest pleasure'
to convey to you, on their behalf, the following declara
tions which, I have no doubt, you will receive with satis
faction and acceptance,
The districts of Hersin and Alexandretta, and por
tions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of
Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be
purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the
proposed delimitation.
Subject to that modification, and without prejudice
to the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab
Ghiefs, .we accept that delimitation.

As for the regions lying within the proposed fron
tiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detri
ment to the interests of her ally France, I am authorized
to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Govern
ment of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your
notes -
(X) That, subject to the modifications stated above.
Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the inde
pendence of the Arabs- in all the regions lying within the
frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca?
/ •
(2) That Great Britain will guarantee the Holy
Places against all external aggression, and will recognise
the obligation of preserving them from aggression?
(3) That, when circumstances permit. Great Britain
will help the Arabs with her advice and assist them in the
establishment of governments to suit those diverse regions?
(h) That it is understood that the Arabs have
already decided to seek the counsels and advice of Great
Britain exclusively? and that such European advisers and
officials as may be needed to establish a sound system of
administration shall be British?
(5) That, as regards the two vilayets of Baghdad and
of Basra, the Arabs recognize that the fact of Great Brit
ain’s established position and interests there will call
for the setting up of special administrative arrangements

191
to protest those regions from foreign aggression, to pro~
mote the welfare of their inhabitants, and to safeguard our
mutual eoonomie.interestso
I am confident that this declaration will convince
you, beyond all doubt, of Great Britain8s sympathy with the
aspirations of her friends the Arabs? and that it will
result in a lasting and solid alliance with them, of whieh
one of the immediate eomseqnemoes will be the expulsion of
the Turks from the Arab countries and the liberation of the
Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which has weighed on
them all these long years6
1 have confined myself in this note to vital ques
tions of primary importance» If there are any other matters
in your notes, which have been overlooked, we can revert to
them at some suitable time in the future»
1 have heard with great satisfaction and pleasure
that the Sacred Klswa and the charitable gifts which had
gone with it, had arrived safely and that, thanks to your.
wise directions and arrangements, they were landed without
trouble or damage in spite of the risks and difficulties
created by the present deplorable war. Be pray Almighty
God that He may bring a lasting peace and freedom to man
kind,
I am sending this note with your faithful messenger.
Shaikh Muhammad ibn ’Aref ibn 8Wraifan, who will lay before

yom eertain imterestimg matters which? as they are of
secondary importance, I have abstained from mentioning in
this not@0
Compliments <,

APPENDIX B*
BASSET8 S ISTTER
% e Aeting British Agent9 Jedda
to King ffiasain
Jedda» February 8S 191#
Gbmplimentary titles
I am direeted by His Britannic Majesty$ s High Com
missioner to forward to Your Majesty the text of a tele
graphic message which His Excellency has had from the
Foreign Office in London for transmission as a communica
tion from His Britannic Majesty8s Government to Your Maj
esty, The text is verbatim as follows§
Begins, The loyal motives which have prompted Your
Majesty to forward to the High Commissioner the letters
addressed by the Turkish ^commander-in-chief in Syria to His
Highness the Amir Faisal and to Ja8far Pasha have caused
His Majesty’s Government the liveliest satisfaction. The
steps taken by Your Majesty in this connexion are only a
token of the friendship and mutual sincerity which have
always inspired the relations between the Government of the
Hejaz and His Majesty’s Government, It would be superflous
to point out that the object aimed at by Turkey is to sow
AntoniouSc, op, cit, „ pp» 14.3 1=4 3 2,
193

doubt and suspicion between the Allied Powers and those
Arabs who, under Your Majesty8s leadership and guidance,
are -striving, nobly to recover their ancient freedom. The-
Turkish policy is to create dissension by luring the Arabs
into believing that the Allied Powers have designs on the
Arab countries, and by representing to the Allies that the
Arabs might be made to renounce their aspirations» But
such intrigues cannot succeed in sowing dissension among
those whose minds are directed by a common purpose to a
common end.
His Majesty8 s Government and their allies stand
steadfastly by every cause aiming at the liberation of the
oppressed nations, and they are determined to stand by the
Arab peoples in their struggle for the establishment of an
Arab world in which law shall replace Ottoman injustice,
and in which unity shall prevail over the rivalries arti
ficially provoked by the policy of Turkish officials. His
Majesty8s Government reaffirm their former pledge in regard
to the liberation of the Arab peoples. His Majesty's
Government have hitherto made it their policy to ensure
that liberation, and it remains the policy they are deter
mined unflinchingly to pursue by protecting such Arabs as
are already liberated from all dangers and perils, and by

assisting tiaese who are still under the tyrants t© obtain
their freedom* Ends*
GomplimentSo
J0 Bo Bassetts
lit o r"3 0 Ol 0
Acting British Agents
J edda

AEPEHB1X Q%
DE0LAMT10K T© - fHI SEYEM
Declaration to the Seven (June X6S 1918)
His Majesty’s Government have considered the memo
rial of the Seven with great care* They fully appreciate
the reasons for the desire of its authors to retain their
anonymitys, but the fact that the memorial is anonymous has
in no way detracted from the value which His Majesty’s
Government assign to that document6
The territories mentioned in the memorial fall into
four categories:—
(i) Territories which were free and independent
before the outbreak of the Mars
(ii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the
action of the Arabs themselves?
(iii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the
action of the Allied armies?
(iv) Territories still under Turkish rule,
Ifith regard to the first two categories^ His
esty1s Government recognise the complete and sovereign
•sfeAnteniouSj, on, cit,, pp, 4,33=

197
independenee of the Arabs inhabiting those territories9 and
smpport them in their struggle for freedom,
Elth regard to the territories occupied by the
Allied amies9 His Majesty's Government invite the atten
tion of the memorialists to the proclamations issued by the
commander-in-chief on the occasions of the capture of
Baghdad (March 19$ 1917) and of the capture of Jerusalem
(Beeember 9» 1917 )<> These proclamations define the policy
of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of
those regionsp which is that the future government of those
territories should be based upon the principle of the con
sent of the governed. This policy will always be that of
His Majesty's Governmento
With regard to the territories in the fourth cate
gory 9 it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that the
oppressed peoples in those territories should obtain their
freedom and independence 0 His Majesty's Government will
continue to work for the achievement of that object. They
are fully aware of the difficulties and perils which
threaten those who are striving for the /liberation?/ of the
inhabitants of those territories.
In spite of those obstacles,, however* His Majesty's
Government believe that the difficulties can be overcome*
and they are prepared to give every support to those who
are striving to overcome them. They are ready to consider

any soheme of co-operation which does not conflict with the
military operations in hand or with the political prin
ciples proclaimed by His Majesty's Government and their
allieso

APPENDIX 2>*
ANGLO-FREMCH DECLARATION
November 7* 1918
The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in
prosecuting in the Bast.the War set in train by German
ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peo
ples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks$ and
the setting up of national governments and administrations
that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of
the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations®
In pursuit of those intentions $ France and Great
Britain agree to further and assist in the setting up of
' ' %
indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and
Mesopotamia which have already been liberated by the Alliesg
as well as in those territories which they are endeavouring
to liberate, and to recognise them as soon as they are
actually set up®
Far from wishing to impose this or that system upon
the populations of those regions, their /i.e®, France's and
Great Britain's/ only concern is to offer such support and
■ssAntonious, op® cit® s pp® h3S-^3b®
1, In official parlance, this name was still used
to denote the whole of geographical Syria, from the Taurus
range to the Egyptian frontier® f
199

efficacious help as will ensure the smooth working of the
governments and administrations which those populations
will have elected bf their own free will to have; to secure
impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the
economic development of the country by promoting and
encouraging local initiative; to foster the spread of edu
cation; and to put an end to the dissensions which Turkish
policy has for so long exploited* Such is the task which
the two Allied Powers wish to undertake in the liberated
territories*

APPENDIX m
RESOLUTIONS OF T H GENERAL SYRIAN CONGRESS
(Damaseuss July 2S 1919)
We, the undersigneds members of the General Syrian
Congress assembled in Samasoms on the 2nd of July 1919 and
composed of delegates from the three zones, namely the
southern, eastern and western, and furnished with creden
tials duly authorising us to represent the Moslem, Chris
tian and Jewish inhabitants of our respective districts 0
have resolved to submit the following as defining t;he aspir
ations of the people who have chosen us to place them
before the American Section of the Inter-Allied Commission.
With the exception of the fifth clause, which was passed by
a large majority, the Resolutions which follow were all
adopted unanimously s - -
1, We desire full and absolute political independ
ence for Syria within the following boundariess on the
north, the Taurus Ranges on the south, a line running from
Rafah to al-Jamf and following the Syria-Hejaz border below
•Aqaba5 on the east, the boundary formed by the Euphrates
and Khabur rivers and a line stretching from some distance
#Antonious, op. clt., pp.
201

202
east of A.t>U"Kama! to some distance east of al=Jamf| on the
■wrest* the Mediterranean Sea«
2o We desire the Government of Syria to he a con
stitutional monarchy based on principles of democratic and
broadly decentralised rule which shall safeguard the rights
of minorities* and we wish that the Amir Faisal who has
striven so nobly for our liberation and enjoys our full
confidence and trust be our King®
3= In view of the fact that the Arab inhabitants
of Syria are not less fitted or gifted than were certain
other nations (such as the Bulgarians* Serbs* Greeks and
Rumanians) when granted independence* we protest against
^ Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations which
relegates ms to the standing of insufficiently developed
races requiring the tutelage of a mandatory power®
Ij.® If* for whatever reason that might remain
undisclosed to us* the Peace Conference were to ignore
this legitimate protest* we shall regard the mandate men
tioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as implying
no more than the rendering of assistance in the technical
and economic fields without impairment of our absolute
independence® ie rely on President Wilson’s declarations
that his object in entering the Ear was to put an end to
acquisitive designs for imperialistic purposes® In our
desire that our country should not be made a field for

©©Ionisation;> and. in the belief that the American nation is
devoid of colonial ambitions and has no political designs
on our country@ we resolve to seek assistance in the tech
nical and economic fields from the Waited States of America
on the understanding that the duration of such assistance
shall not exceed twenty years»
So In the event of the Waited States finding her
self unable to accede to our request for assistance^ we
would seek it from Great Britain, provided always that it
will not be allowed to impair the unity and absolute inde
pendence of our country and that its duration shall not
exceed the period mentioned in the preceding clause«
6» We do not recognise to the French Government
any right to any part of Syria, and we reject all proposals
that France should give us assistance or exercise authority
in any portion of the country0
Jo We reject the claims of the Zionists for the
establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in that part of
southern Syria which is known as Palestine, and we are
opposed to Jewish immigration into any part of the countryo
@e do not acknowledge that they have a title, and we regard
their claims as a grave menace to our national, political
and economic life* Our Jewish fellow-eitisens shall con
tinue to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities
which are ours in common.

8» We desire that there should be no dismemberment
of SyriaP and no separation of Palestine or the coastal
regions in the west or the Lebanon from the mother country;
and we ask that the unity of the country be maintained
under any circumstances.
9<> We desire that Iraq should enjoy complete inde
pendence P and that no economic barriers be placed between
the two countries.,
10o #ie basic principles proel&imed by President
lElson in condemnation of secret treaties cause us to enter
an emphatic protest against any agreement providing for the
dismemberment of Syria^ and against any undertaking envis
aging the recognition of Zionism^ in southern Syria; and we
ask for the explicit annulment of all such agreements and
undertakings.
The lofty principles proclaimed by President Wilson
encourage us to believe that the determining consideration
in the settlement of our own future will be the real desires
of our people; and that we may look to President Wilson and
the liberal American nation, who are known for their sincere
and generous sympathy with the aspirations of weak nations®
for help in the fulfillment of our hope s.,
la sco the Sykes-Pieot Agreement«
2» sc o the Balfour Declaration,

2 0 5
We also fully believe that the Peace Oomferenee
will recognise that we would not have risen against Turkish
rule under which we enjoyed civic and political privileges*
as well as rights of representation* had it not been that
the Turks denied us our right to a national existence0 We
believe that the Peace Oomferenee will meet our desires in
full* if only to ensure that our political privileges may
not be less* after the sacrifices of life which we have
made in the cause of our freedom* than they were before the
liar 0
Me desire to be allowed to send a delegation to
represent us at the Peace ©omferenee* advocate our claims
and secure the fulfillment of our aspirations»
X

APPENDIX m
REGOMMENDATIGNS OF THE KING-CRANE COMMISSIONS
(August 28# 1919)
(With Regard to Palestine)
lo We recommends in the fifth places serious modi
fication of the extreme Kionist programme for Palestine of
unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making
Palestine distinctly a Jewish State*
(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism
with minds predisposed in its favour, but the actual facts
in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general prin
ciples proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians
have driven them to the recommendation here made*
(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with
literature on the Zionist programme by the Zionist Commis
sion to Palestine| heard in conferences much concerning the
Zionist colonies and their claims? and personally saw some
thing of what had been accomplished* They found much to
approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and
had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the
#Antomlous, op* clt* 9 pp* (Portions rela
ting to Palestine pp.

colonists9 and for their snaecessj by modern methods* in
overcoming great natural obstacles*
(3) The Sommission recognised also that definite
encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies
in Mr* Balfour1s often-quoted statement9 in its approval by
other representatives of the Allies* If* however* the
strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered t o -
favouring fthe establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people*8 8it being clearly understood
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine9 — it can hardly be doubted that the extreme
Zionist programme must be greatly modified*
For a national home for the Jewish people is not
equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can
the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without
the gravest trespass upon the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine* The fact
came out repeatedly in the Commission8s conferences with
Jewish representatives* that the Zionist looked forward to
a practically complete dispossession of the present non-
Jewish inhabitants of Palestine* by various forms of pur
chase 0
In his address of July 1918* President Wilson
laid down the following principle as one of the four great

9 ends £er w M o h the associated peoples of the world were
fighting’s "The settlement of every questions whether of
territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of •
political relationship upon the basis of the free accept
ance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned,
and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage
of any other nation or people which may desire a different
settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or
masteryo5 If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes
of Palestine’s population are to be decisive as to what is
to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that
the non-Jewish population of Palestine— nearly nine-tenths
of the whole— are emphatically against the entire Zionist
programmeo The tables show that there was no one thing
upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed
than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited
Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social
pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation
of the principle just quoted, and of the people’s rights,
though it kept within the forms of law.
It is to be noted also that the feeling against the
Zionist programme is not confined to Palestine, but shared
very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our con
ferences clearly showed. More than seventy-two per cent—
1,300 in all— of all the petitions in the whole of Syria

were <lireete<3. against the Zionist programme„ Only two
requests-=-those for a united Syria and for independence-—
had a larger support= This general feeling was duly voiced
by the General Syrian Gongress in the seventh* eighth and
tenth resolutions of the statement6
The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to
the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and
Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. Mo British
officer* consulted by the Commissioners* believed that the
Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of
arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not
less than £©*000 soldiers would be required even to ini
tiate the programme. That of itself is evidence of a
strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist programme* on
the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and
Syria, .Decisions requiring armies to carry out are some
times necessary* but they are surely not gratuitously to be
taken in the interests of serious Injustice, For the
initial claim* often submitted by Zionist representatives*
that they have a ’right8 to Palestine* based on an occupa
tion of 2*00© years ago* can hardly be seriously considered.
There is a further consideration that cannot justly
be ignored* if the world is to look forward to Palestine
becoming a definitely Jewish State* however gradually that
may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact

210
that Palestine is the Holy hand for Jewss Christians$, and
Moslems alike« Millions of Christians and Moslems all over
the world are qmite as much eonoerned as the Jews with con
ditions in Palestine$, especially with those conditions
which touch upon religious feeling and rightsa fhe rela
tions in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and
difficult^ ffith the best possible intentions9 it may be
doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either
Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy placesg
or custodians of the Holy hand as a wholeo
The reason is thiss The places which are most
sacred to Christians— those having to do with Jesus— and
which are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred
to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible,
under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to
feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or
under the custody of Jews. There are still other places
about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact,
from this point of view, the Moslems, just because the
sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them,
have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians
of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be
believed that the precise meaning in this respect of the
complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully
sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist programme.

211
For it would intensifys with a certainty like fate,, the
anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other por
tions of the world which look to Palestine as the Holy
hando
In view of all these considerations a and with a
deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commis
sioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly^ reduced
Zionist programme be attempted by the Peace Conference, and
even that, only very gradually initiated. Phis would have
to mean that Jewish Immigration should be definitely
limited, and that the project for making Palestine dis
tinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.
There would then be no reason why Palestine could
not be included in a united Syrian State, just as other
portions of the country, the holy places being eared for by
an international and inter-religious commission, somewhat
as at present, under the oversight and approval of the
Mandatory and of the heague of Nations» The Jews, of course,
would have representation upon this commission.

AEPEMDIX 8
MLESTINE * S POPULATION 1922-1947*
YSAR ARAB JEEESH
Pre Mandate 644sOOO ^6*000
1922 6619000 84s000
1923 6 8 1 , 0 0 0 90,000
1924 702,000 95s000
1925 717,000 122,000
1 9 2 6 7 4 0 , 0 0 0 1 5 0 , 0 0 0
1927 759,000 • 150,000
1928 775,000 152,000
1929 795,000 157,000
1 9 3 0 8 1 8 , 0 0 0 1 6 5 , 0 0 0
1 9 3 1 8 4 8 , 0 0 0 1 7 5 , 0 0 0
1932 874,000 192,000
1933 896,000 235,000
1934 917,000 283,000
1935 942,000 355,000
1936 971,000 384,000
1937 995,000 396,000
1 9 3 8 1,0 1 2 , 0 0 0 4 1 1 , 0 0 0
1939 1,044,000 446,000
1940 1,069,000 464,000
1947 . 1,222,000 508,000
•35-See Sami Hadawi, Palestineg Loss of a Heritage
(San Antonios Naylor Go,, 19631, p° 25, Bethmann^
Decisive Years in Palestine (New Yorks The American
Friends of the Middle East, Inc =, 1957), P° 20; United
Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 1947, Yolo I, p0 11,
212

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Balfour Declaration," The Middle last Journals XXIX
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XGIII (August, 1968), 37=44" •
Wright, Quincyo "The Palestine Mandate," Political Science
Quarterly* XL1 (September, 19261, 384“4120 """
Yost, Gharles ¥* "How It Began," Foreign Affairs, XLVI
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2X8
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