The Indo-Pacific Narrative.pptxdfgdgdgfffg

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1. The Indo-Pacific Narrative/ Chessboard/ Politics Irfan waheed usmani

2. Outline Introduction Understanding the Indo-Pacific Region The Geo-strategic and Geo-Economic Significance of the Region Alfred Mahan’s Thesis Understanding Indo-Pacific Chess Board: its key players/ The main Actors of the region: A brief introduction The US Policy to Contain China: Its larger context How has the US Indo-Pacific strategy unveiled?: Brief insights into the strategies of Donald Trump and Joe Biden The US Indo-Pacific Strategy: Its salient features The Significance of the Strategy in US Scheme of Things: The Strategy in the light of statements and policy initiatives of the high-ranking US officials Critique Fallouts/ Implications Summing UP

3. Introduction Indo-pacific region has become a center stage/ battlefield of the tussle of world powers particularly since 2015 The US Indo-pacific strategy is aimed at/directed towards Countering Chinese influence in the region. The US Indo-pacific policy also represents a paradigmatic shift in US strategy from Asia-Pacific conceptual map to the Indo-pacific concept. The strategy has remained cornerstone of the policies of US Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden as evident from the fact that: Suspended Judgement: Geopolitical dynamics are rapidly shaping up world powers behavior in strategically important regions of the world. Underlying motive/ purpose Both the governments have unveiled Indo-pacific strategic frameworks You may ask or raise critical questions casting doubts about the effectiveness of the policy/ strategy

4. Understanding the Indo-Pacific Region The Indo-Pacific consisting of Indian Ocean Region and Western Pacific. Beginning from eastern Africa and passes through East and South Asia all the way to South China Sea and defined by connectivity and conflicts between regional and global powers. The Indo-Pacific, that starts from ‘the west coast of US and ends at the west coast of India’…. M.Asif Baloch, DT,

5. The Geo-strategic and Geo-Economic Significance of the Region :The Growing Significance of the region global commerce and trade and politics 40 percent of world commerce and trade is takes place through Malacca Straits Today, the region captivates world’s economic Centre of gravity and maritime strategy of US and China is shaping geopolitical outcomes in 21st century. Over all terms 70 percent of world trade and commerce

6. The Geo-strategic and Geo-Economic Significance of the Region :Alfred Mahan’s Thesis Alfred Thayer Mahan was an American based historian and naval strategist argued that, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.”

7. Understanding Indo-Pacific Chess Board: its key players/ The main Actors of the region: A brief introduction China: Its growing influence in the region US and Indo-Pacific geo-political competition Japan Australia India Korea The counties located around the South China Sea

8. China: Its growing influence in the region China’s growing influence in the region: An Overview The Chinses Strategy in the South China Sea Chinses Interests in Indian Ocean

9. China’s growing influence in the region: An Overview China’s assertive role in Indo-pacific region The US Reports highlighting Threat perceptions from China The BRI Projects China as a “greater threat than Russia ( copy the image) construes China as the long-term threat to the US led world power..

10. The Chinses Strategy in the South China Sea Chinese claims in the disputed South and east China seas China is aggressively asserting its claims to the disputed territorial waters encircled by so-called Nine-Dash line

11. Chinses Interests in Indian Ocean

12. US and Indo-Pacific geo-political competition The US Perception of Threat from rising Power of China. How is US responding to the Challenge by China? How is it trying to re-shape its Indo-Pacific policies? What US has resorted to/ its priorities after de-camping from Middle East The Strategic Pivots in Indian and Pacific Oceans which are on US radar.. The Significance of the region in US scheme of things as underscored by Mark Asper in 2019

13. US and Indo-Pacific geo-political competition The US interests in the region How is it perceiving threat from increasing Chinse influence in the region? Reports of state department and pentagon The Main concerns of US: Chinse increasing control. Predatory economics Taiwan’s security (IV) Sovereignty, international law and customs. (V) China’s increasing influence in South Pacific.

14. The Strategic Pivots in Indian and Pacific Oceans which are on US radar. The Strait of Malacca Taiwan Straits Kyaukphyu Port of Myanmar Gwadar Port of Pakistan Hambantota Port of Sri Lanka

15. The Significance of the region in US scheme of things as underscored by Mark Asper in 2019 “America’s network of alliances is its greatest combat advantage, and no where is that more important than in Indo-Pacific region”, which Defence Secretary has called America’s “priority theatre”. Cited in Ankit Pand , South Chia Morning post, 17 November 2019.

16. The Concerns of states/US allies located around the South China Sea: The US Concerns(NR) US Concerns Mark Asper Randall G. Schriever, US Assistant Secretary of state for Indo-Pacific Mark Asper’s article Chinse increasing control. Predatory economics Taiwan’s security (IV) Sovereignty, international law and customs. (V) China’s increasing influence in South Pacific. 14 November 2019: he made the second Indo-Pacific visit to counter Chinese power. “The Indo-Pacific strategy has several foundations, including economic, good governance, security. There is an emphasis on sovereignty, international customs, and law. The tactic call for dispute resolution and mutual free-trade, cited in “The United States pursues stronger Defence Cooperation”, The Daily Kaler Kanton, 1 February 2020. “America’s network of alliances is its greatest combat advantage, and no where is that more important than in Indo-Pacific region”, which Defence Secretary has called America’s “priority theatre”. Cited in Ankit Pand , South Chia Morning post, 17 November 2019. Pentagon’s Statement on the visit: named China as a “greater threat threat than Russia and added he would discuss Chinese claims in the disputed South and east China seas. Mark Asper’s article:

17. (III)The Concerns of states/US allies located around the South China Sea (NR) Taiwan Vietnam Singapore Philippines Australia Vietnam and Philippines are among rival claimants on the South China Sea. Australia traditionally a major power in South Pacific: has promised up to A$3 bn($2.04 bn) in grants and cheap loans Nov.2019: it specifically maintained” New relations with Vietnam by highlighting arms sales, joint military exercises and a port visit from the aircraft US USS Carl Vinson 2018”.

18. Japan: the priority Japanese leaders have accorded to Indo-pacific since 2015 PM Abe PM Suga PM The main irritant in Sino-Japan relations Abe announced his Partnership for Quality Infrastructure in 2015, he made it clear that the programme was not at odds with China’s plans but in its alignment. In this bearing, Suga seems to be going the other extreme; he seems to be making an open advancement for the Quad. He wasted no time in asserting approval of Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative ( FOIP)

19. Vietnam and Philippines Vietnam and Philippines are among rival claimants on the South China Sea. Nov.2019: US specifically maintained” New relations with Vietnam by highlighting arms sales, joint military exercises and a port visit from the aircraft US USS Carl Vinson 2018”.

20. India: India's counter strategic policy to contain/ thwart Chinese ambitions/ intentions Augmenting/ advancing its naval power under Indian maritime doctrine India’s Look East Policy India’s strategy of building of Parts India’s third naval base INS Kohasa, on Northern Andaman Island: significance of its strategic location as it aims to guard Malacca strait on the one side and to control Bay of Bengal on the other.

21. The South China Sea is bordered by  Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam .

22. The South China Sea is a critical commercial gateway for a significant portion of the world’s merchant shipping, and hence is an important economic and strategic sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. It is also the site of several complex territorial disputes that have been the cause of conflict and tension within the region and throughout the Indo-Pacific. Geography: Geographically, the South China Sea plays a significant role in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. The South China Sea is bordered by Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and  Vietnam . Their recent economic growth has contributed to a large portion of the world’s commercial merchant shipping passing through these waters. Japan and South Korea rely heavily on the South China Sea for their supply of fuels and raw materials and as an export route, although the availability of diversionary sea lanes bypassing the South China Sea provides non-littoral states with some flexibility in this regard. The South China Sea also contains rich, though unregulated and over-exploited fishing grounds and is reported to hold significant reserves of undiscovered oil and gas, which is an aggravating factor in maritime and territorial disputes. The major island and reef formations in the South China Sea are the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas , the Natuna Islands and Scarboro

23. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES Competing claims of territorial sovereignty over islands and smaller features in the South China Sea have been a longstanding source of tension and distrust in the region. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was concluded in 1982 and came into force in 1994, established a legal framework intended to balance the economic and security interests of coastal states with those of seafaring nations. UNCLOS enshrines the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a 200 nautical mile area that extends sole exploitation rights to coastal nations over marine resources. However, the EEZ was never intended to serve as a security zone, and UNCLOS also guarantees wide-ranging passage rights for naval vessels and military aircraft.

24. While UNCLOS has been signed and ratified by nearly all the coastal countries in the South China Sea, its interpretation is still hotly disputed. Moreover, legal and territorial disputes persist, primarily over the Spratly and Paracel Islands as well as Scarborough Shoal, the scene of ongoing tensions between China and the Philippines. In terms of the Spratlys , more than 60 geographic features are reportedly occupied by claimants, which consist of Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, China and Malaysia. The Paracel Islands are the subject of overlapping claims by China, Vietnam and Taiwan. China makes the largest claim in the South China Sea, within a ‘dash-line’ map published by the Kuomintang Government in 1947. The ambiguous nine or ten ‘dash line’, which China asserts is based on evidence of historical usage, is disputed by other South China Sea territorial claimants and lacks a legal foundation under UNCLOS. A

25. AUSTRALIA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA Australia has significant interests in the South China Sea, both economically, in terms of freedom of trade and navigation, and geopolitically, as the United States is invested in upholding the rules-based order in the region. Australia has been conducting its own airborne surveillance operations in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, called Operation Gateway, since 1980. These patrols are conducted by P-3 Orion maritime aircraft and some of them have been verbally challenged by China. While Australia has not conducted a surface FONOP operation similar to those of the US Navy, it regularly conducts naval presence patrols, exercises and port calls throughout the region. As Washington’s closest ally in the region, Australia may come under growing pressure from the United States to make its presence felt in the South China Sea beyond statements of diplomatic support for freedom of navigation.

26. The US Perception of Threat from rising Power of China(NR)

27. The US Policy to Contain China: Its larger context The shift from Asia-Pacific conceptual map to the Indo-pacific concept… Under the influence of the policy/ thinking US has remained US Pacific command to Indo-pacific command Underlying reason: is the dearth of US allies in mainland Asia , save Japan, India and few other peripheral states. ( Aneela Shahzad)

28. How has the US Indo-Pacific strategy unveiled?: Brief insights into the strategies of Donald Trump and Joe Biden (I) Trump’s Administration Indo-pacific Strategic Framework 2017—2018 (II) Biden administration unveiled its Indo-pacific strategy February 2022 2017: President’s Trump national Security Strategy 2018: President Trump approved the framework for implementation across Executive Branch department and agencies. January 2021: The original document was de-classified. What was the purpose of de-classifying such a sensitive document by the Trump Administration? “ was to ensure that the incoming Biden government sticks to the Indo-pacific policy ( Mushahid Hussain Syed) Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan,” India’s place in US Indo -pacific Strategy”, 22 February 2022.

29. Trump’s Administration Indo-pacific Strategic Framework 2018 (IV) The Framework has guided the development of numerous subordinate policy frameworks and campaign plans that have steered the U.S. approach to specific issues of importance to the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, (I) such as the U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China, the U.S. Strategic Framework for Countering China’s Economic Aggression, (II) the U.S. Campaign Plan for Countering China’s Malign Influence in International Organizations, and others. (III) Together with its subordinate documents, the Framework has guided U.S. whole-of-government actions to advance regional prosperity and stability, including sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight, reciprocity in trade and investment, respect for individual rights and rule of law, and transparency.

30. (IV) To build To build the economic ,defence and military muscle of India/[ in other words] To bolster India’s economy, diplomatic influence and defence

31. Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan,” India’s place in US Indo -pacific Strategy”, 22 February 2022. Its main objectives Salient Features The Critical analysis of the strategy

32. Its main objectives(I)

33. Its main objectives(II): missing words(is to more firmly anchor…)

34. The Salient Features of the framework (I)

35. The Salient Features of the framework (II)

36. Salient features (III)

37. ( i )To deter/counter threat perception about China [ The strategy rightly placed the United States’ attention on a number of significant challenges that the Indo-Pacific region is faced with, particularly those posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC’s use of diplomatic, military, and technological prowess to establish or nurture its own sphere of influence and emerge as the “world’s most influential power” is noted. The strategy adds that while China’s aggressiveness is not limited to the Indo-Pacific region and is seen across the globe, “it is more acute in the Indo- Pacific”P . 1 the US will use “all instruments of power to deter aggression and to counter coercion” by a series of steps including “advancing integrated deterrence, deepening cooperation and enhancing interoperability with allies and partners, maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, innovating to operate in rapidly evolving threat environments, including space, cyberspace, and critical- and emerging-technology areas, strengthening extended deterrence and coordination with our ROK and Japanese allies and pursuing the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, continuing to deliver on AUKUS, expanding U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation against other transnational threats and working with Congress to fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative.” (P.2)

38. (ii) Building connectivity across the region and beyond B3W

39. (iii) Building regional resilience to deal with a range of transnational threats and challenges The strategy also prioritizes the United States’ “ network of security alliances and partnerships ” with whom the U.S. intends to “ develop and deploy advanced warfighting capabilities .” 

40. (iv) What does fact sheet on strategy emphasize /said? The administration’s vision is to “more firmly anchor the US in the Indo-Pacific and strengthen the region in the process”

41. (v) Apart from/ moving beyond China the other characteristic features of the strategy The strategy does appear to recognize this “not just China” approach by focusing regional needs, such as those of the countries in  Southeast Asia . The strategy highlights ASEAN centrality and “support[s] ASEAN in its efforts to deliver sustainable solutions to the region’s most pressing challenges,” which is a considered an improvement from the Trump administration’s efforts at “provoke[ ing ] ASEAN to confront China.”pp.3-4.

42. (vi) An effort to integrate Europe in the strategy instead of abandoning it Similarly, the strategy acknowledges the important role of France as well as “the strategic value of an increasing regional role for the European Union (EU).” Thus, instead of abandoning Europe for the Indo-Pacific, the strategy appears to be an endeavour to integrate Europe into the Indo-Pacific..

43. (vii) It assigns India pivotal/ prominent role India finds prominent space in this context. Washington “will continue to build a strategic partnership in which the United States and India work together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia” and “steadily advance our Major Defense Partnership with India and support its role as a net security provider.”  The strategy also identified India as “a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean” … “a driving force of the Quad and other regional fora, and an engine for regional growth and development.”p.2. Emphasizing the importance of India, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink and Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu, in a telephone press conference,  said  that “India is more than just a partner.

44. Salient features (IV)

45. The Critical analysis of the Strategy : the two key goals

46. The Critical analysis of the Strategy (II)

47. The Critical analysis of the strategy: How is Biden’s strategy different from Trump’s Strategy? (I)It is “not just China” approach by focusing on regional needs such as those of the countries in Southeast Asia. It highlights ASEAN’s centrality. (II) an effort to integrate Europe in the Indo-pacific instead of abandoning it. (III) In sum, the new Indo-Pacific strategy appears to be taking regional concerns more seriously,

48. The EWO: Combine the features of the Two frameworks unveiled by Trump and Biden administrations Highlight / underscore the difference between the two : How is Biden’s framework different from Trump’s U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China, the U.S. Strategic Framework for Countering China’s Economic Aggression (I)It is “not just China” approach by focusing on regional needs such as those of the countries in Southeast Asia. It highlights ASEAN’s centrality. Together with its subordinate documents, the Framework has guided U.S. whole-of-government actions to advance regional prosperity and stability, including sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight, reciprocity in trade and investment, respect for individual rights and rule of law, and transparency. (II) an effort to integrate Europe in the Indo-pacific instead of abandoning it. Building regional resilience to deal with a range of transnational threats and challenges (III) In sum, the new Indo-Pacific strategy appears to be taking regional concerns more seriously, Building connectivity across the region and beyond “more firmly anchor the US in the Indo-Pacific and strengthen the region in the process” Both the frameworks assign India pivotal/ prominent role

49. How is it trying to re-shape its Indo-Pacific policies?

50. How is US responding to the Challenge by China?

51. What US has resorted to/ priorities after de-camping from Middle East

52. The Strategic Pivots in Indian and pacific Oceans which are on US radar..

53. Japan The Irritants in Sino-- Japan relations Shinzo Abe and India-Pacific Suga’s and India-Pacific

54. The Irritants in Sino-- Japan relations

55. Shinzo Abe and India-Pacific

56. Suga’s and India-Pacific

57. Australia Australia as a …. Power Irritants in Sino Australia relations How has Australia moved closer towards US orbit?

58. India

59. The counties located around the South China Sea

60. The US Policy to Contain China: Its larger context The Perceptible Shift in the US Strategy from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific Its main reasons

61. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy: Its salient features(NR) The Indo-Pacific Framework (already covered) The US Initiatives to Implement the Policy ( discussion in the next sides) The US has assigned prominent role to India in the Strategy( discussion in the next slides)

62. The US Initiatives to Implement the Policy QUAD Build Back Better World( B3W) The US has assigned prominent role to India in the Strategy AUKUS

63. (NP) The Significance of the Strategy in US Scheme of Things: The Strategy in the light of statements and policy initiatives of the high-ranking US officials Mike Pompeo Mark Asper Statements : 2019 described Indo-pacific as a priority theater Long Term Procurement Plan? What does the plan envisage?

64. (I) QUAD: slides 67– 95; 2003—2007: Insights into informal of the alliance(I)

65. (I) QUAD: slides 67– 95; 2003—2007: Insights into informal of the alliance(II)

66. Historical Evolution/ development between 2007 and 2017

67. Historical Evolution/ development between 2007 and 2017(II)

68. Formal beginning: 2007(NR) Merely as discussion forum Largely remained dormant : 2007—2016

69. Largely remained dormant : 2007—2016( main reason)

70. 2017: efforts to revive the dialogue platform

71. 2017: efforts to revive the dialogue platform(II)

72. But still the members of QUAD were following cautious approach as they remained hesitant to openly oppose China(I) :

73. But still the members of QUAD were following cautious approach as they remained hesitant to openly oppose China(II) :

74. The Emergence of the QUAD as anti-China platform 2018--2021

75. Its meetings assume greater salience(I) :the increasing involvement of policy –makers / high-ranking officials

76. Focus on QUAD/activation of QUAD coincided the unveiling of Frameworks of Trump and Biden

77. The use of QUAD as instrument / tool to implement security framework (I)

78. The use of QUAD as instrument / tool to implement security framework (II): Mike Pompeo’s statement reinforces the contention: underling motive of institutionalization of QUAD

79. The use of QUAD as instrument / tool to implement security framework (II): Mike Pompeo’s statement reinforces the contention: underling motive of institutionalization of QUAD(II)

80. How is Biden’s administration according significance to QUAD? (I)

81. The Importance Biden’s Administration is according to QUAD(II)

82. The growing significance of QUAD in US Indo-pacific policy(I)

83. The growing significance of QUAD in US Indo-pacific policy(II): what was the outcome of the virtual summit of QUAD in March 2021?

84. More details of in-person summit

85. How is Biden’s administration according significance to QUAD?(NR)

86. The QUAD Summit (Sep 2021) (I)

87. What the leaders committed themselves or vowed to do?: The leaders then committed themselves: “to promoting the free, open, rules-based order, rooted in international law and undaunted by coercion, to bolster security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We stand for the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity of states”.[8]

88. Another significant development of the Summit: This summit went far beyond any previous assembly to set out the Quad’s agenda in areas beyond immediate security concerns. These included: Pandemic and vaccines:  the summit set up a “Quad Vaccine Experts Group” that would drive the Quad’s efforts in this area. These would include: delivery of 1.2 billion vaccines; Japan’s contribution of $ 3.3 billion to support regional partners; Australia’s contribution of $ 212 million for supply of vaccines in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and Indo-Japanese cooperation to promote healthcare in India. Climate change:  the Quad will focus on clean energy innovation and deployment, as also climate adaptation, resilience and preparedness; it will pursue clean-energy supply chains, set up a Quad Shipping Taskforce to identify a few low-emission shipping corridors by 2030, and establish a clean-hydrogen partnership. Technology:  the focus here will be on technical standards, 5G diversification and deployment, and technology supply chains. The Quad will also pursue a Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative to identify vulnerabilities and bolster supply chain security for semiconductors and their components. Infrastructure, Space and Fellowships:  The summit set up a “Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group” to identify infrastructure needs, arrange technical assistance and capacity-building efforts. Besides cooperation in space and cyberspace, the summit set up a “Quad Fellowship” for 100 graduate students in the four countries.

89. The US Strategy to implement the framework (II) : Build Back Better World( B3W)

90. (III) The US has assigned prominent role to India in the Strategy The Logistics and Secure Communication Pacts in 2016 and 2018 The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA): allows / authorizes US to share satellite and sensor data, allowing India to improve its targeting and navigation capabilities. The role of US support in increasing Indian ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region: The significance of India’s third naval base– Kohasa, on Northern Andaman Island. As it aims to guard the Malacca straits on one side and to control the Bay of Bengal on the other.

91. AUKUS (I)

92. (IV) AUKUS : the setting up of a new defence and security partnership

93. Replacing eight diesel-powered submarines that Australia had contracted with France.

94. Further insights into AUKUS: from Waseem Shabbir's article While pursuing aggressive manoeuvres , Washington on 16-Sep-2021 forged a new trilateral security agreement with UK and Australia named (AUKUS). Under the garb of “freedom of navigation”, “free and open Indo-Pacific” and “rule-based order” this new coalition entirely aim at countering Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific. According to this pact of $ 66 billion, Australia will be assisted to build 12 nuclear-powered submarines. These efforts will enhance Australia’s naval power to impede and challenge China’s preponderance in the Indo-Pacific.

95. Critique To what extent US would be able to realize or achive its objectives of isolating and containing China ? Would Biden’s Administration be able to implement the policy/ realize its ambitious visions of containing the influence of China in the region? The ambiguities regarding/ surrounding the extent of Japanese cooperation/ ambitions The French critical reaction over AUKUS: its larger implications

96. The Chinse Reaction

97. Fallouts/ Implications

98. The US Indo-pacific Strategy and its Implications for Pakistan( imaging from Kamran Yousaf's article )

99. Fall outs

100. Summing UP