The Office of Strategic Services - A Mixed Start to American Intelligence
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Nov 14, 2015
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The Office of Strategic Services: A Mixed Start to American Intelligence
When America went to war in 1941, it stood alone among the allies in having no standing
intelligence agency. The United States had no equivalent to the British Secret Intelligence
Service, the French BCRA, the Chinese Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, or the Soviet
NKVD. In an era when the reach and power of our intelligence agencies such as the CIA and
NSA are greatly debated in public, it is fascinating to learn that the history of American
intelligence agencies goes back less than 75 years. Indeed, there are many people alive today
who were born before the US any professional espionage or covert operations capability.
The American tradition of opposition to tyranny had seen any form of standing
intelligence agency as being equivalent to secret police forces such as the German Gestapo
1
. The
rudimentary intelligence apparatus that existed before the war was limited to two very limited
agencies. First was the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division (MID), which
amounted to having staff officers report when they saw information of possible importance
during their routine duties, such as new equipment on display at foreign parades, to a handful of
clerks in Washington that was more concerned about filing everything away in cabinets than
field work
2
. Second was the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), which focused on analysis of
potential threats to the United States Navy, and had no concept of undercover work or espionage.
In World War I, the United States had used the British Secret Intelligence Service for its
foreign intelligence needs. As World War II was looming the Americans again began relying on
their British allies for support. However, the strategic necessity and political will existed to
1
Editorial, Wall Street Journal, December 1, 1938
2
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979), p. 6
When America went to war in 1941, it stood alone among the allies in having no standing
intelligence agency. The United States had no equivalent to the British Secret Intelligence
Service, the French BCRA, the Chinese Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, or the Soviet
NKVD. In an era when the reach and power of our intelligence agencies such as the CIA and
NSA are greatly debated in public, it is fascinating to learn that the history of American
intelligence agencies goes back less than 75 years. Indeed, there are many people alive today
who were born before the US any professional espionage or covert operations capability.
The American tradition of opposition to tyranny had seen any form of standing
intelligence agency as being equivalent to secret police forces such as the German Gestapo
1
. The
rudimentary intelligence apparatus that existed before the war was limited to two very limited
agencies. First was the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division (MID), which
amounted to having staff officers report when they saw information of possible importance
during their routine duties, such as new equipment on display at foreign parades, to a handful of
clerks in Washington that was more concerned about filing everything away in cabinets than
field work
2
. Second was the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), which focused on analysis of
potential threats to the United States Navy, and had no concept of undercover work or espionage.
In World War I, the United States had used the British Secret Intelligence Service for its
foreign intelligence needs. As World War II was looming the Americans again began relying on
their British allies for support. However, the strategic necessity and political will existed to
1
Editorial, Wall Street Journal, December 1, 1938
2
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979), p. 6
create an actual professional intelligence agency with trained spies and large numbers of analysts
to process their reports.
To fill this role, Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Colonel William “Wild Bill”
Donovan to be the first spymaster of the United States and lead the newly formed Office of
Strategic Services (OSS). William Donovan was a World War I veteran and Medal of Honor
recipient, who earned the nickname “Wild Bill” for his daring and recklessness in battle. A
member of the upper-class, his ties to the Ivy League would shape his personnel choices and
policies in the agency he would create, drawing heavily from academia in its leadership
3
.
Combining his own Ivy League heritage with British training of his agents, William
Donovan would quickly build a world-spanning intelligence agency that was operating in both
theaters of the war, doing everything from propaganda to sabotage, to airdropping counterfeit
ration stamps on the German population to undermine the economy of the Reich, to undercover
operations in Vichy France, to infiltration and spying deep within German territory. When a
cabal of German officers plotted to kill Hitler in 1944, the OSS was aware of the attempt and
made plans for if it should succeed
4
.
Under British tutelage, the OSS would quickly learn not just the practical aspects of
intelligence analysis, but learn to train commandos and spies for a variety of missions into Nazi-
occupied Europe
5
. Against orders of his military superiors, and on dubious standing with the
3
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 46
4
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979) p. 49
5
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London,
Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 17
to process their reports.
To fill this role, Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Colonel William “Wild Bill”
Donovan to be the first spymaster of the United States and lead the newly formed Office of
Strategic Services (OSS). William Donovan was a World War I veteran and Medal of Honor
recipient, who earned the nickname “Wild Bill” for his daring and recklessness in battle. A
member of the upper-class, his ties to the Ivy League would shape his personnel choices and
policies in the agency he would create, drawing heavily from academia in its leadership
3
.
Combining his own Ivy League heritage with British training of his agents, William
Donovan would quickly build a world-spanning intelligence agency that was operating in both
theaters of the war, doing everything from propaganda to sabotage, to airdropping counterfeit
ration stamps on the German population to undermine the economy of the Reich, to undercover
operations in Vichy France, to infiltration and spying deep within German territory. When a
cabal of German officers plotted to kill Hitler in 1944, the OSS was aware of the attempt and
made plans for if it should succeed
4
.
Under British tutelage, the OSS would quickly learn not just the practical aspects of
intelligence analysis, but learn to train commandos and spies for a variety of missions into Nazi-
occupied Europe
5
. Against orders of his military superiors, and on dubious standing with the
3
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 46
4
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979) p. 49
5
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London,
Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 17
Geneva Conventions, Donovan recruited captured German POW’s to spy on their own nation for
the US
6
. Analysts within the OSS would even piece together the facts of the holocaust, although
their reports and alarms on this issue would not be heeded by their superiors
7
.
The OSS was an amazing work of organization that built an entire intelligence
infrastructure from scratch in remarkably short time, but it used highly questionable techniques
at points, contradicting both the Geneva Convention and its own manuals and regulations.
Furthermore, the OSS suffered from substantial organizational weaknesses due to the cultural
biases of both the era it emerged in, as well as the military heritage it grew out of.
Existing scholarship has largely been limited to official works of the US government
such as the compilation The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
produced by George Chalou for the National Archives, or works of members of the Central
Intelligence Agency in their internal journal Studies in Intelligence.
Until recently, the shroud of official secrecy over the organization has limited detailed
study of the agency, which meant that unclassified studies were based off the few official
summary reports released to the public and censored interviews and accounts of veterans.
Joseph Persico, more widely known as Vice President Rockefeller’s speechwriter, has written
two books related to the OSS. Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage
focused on the politics of FDR and how that affected the OSS, while Piercing the Reich
discussed the OSS infiltration of Germany. Interestingly, the most notable historian to be a
6
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979), p. 253
7
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and
the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 12
the US
6
. Analysts within the OSS would even piece together the facts of the holocaust, although
their reports and alarms on this issue would not be heeded by their superiors
7
.
The OSS was an amazing work of organization that built an entire intelligence
infrastructure from scratch in remarkably short time, but it used highly questionable techniques
at points, contradicting both the Geneva Convention and its own manuals and regulations.
Furthermore, the OSS suffered from substantial organizational weaknesses due to the cultural
biases of both the era it emerged in, as well as the military heritage it grew out of.
Existing scholarship has largely been limited to official works of the US government
such as the compilation The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
produced by George Chalou for the National Archives, or works of members of the Central
Intelligence Agency in their internal journal Studies in Intelligence.
Until recently, the shroud of official secrecy over the organization has limited detailed
study of the agency, which meant that unclassified studies were based off the few official
summary reports released to the public and censored interviews and accounts of veterans.
Joseph Persico, more widely known as Vice President Rockefeller’s speechwriter, has written
two books related to the OSS. Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage
focused on the politics of FDR and how that affected the OSS, while Piercing the Reich
discussed the OSS infiltration of Germany. Interestingly, the most notable historian to be a
6
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979), p. 253
7
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and
the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 12
veteran of the OSS, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., wrote virtually nothing about the agency and only
spoke in vague terms about his work for the OSS, only saying that he worked on a classified
publication called “European Political Report”
8
.
In recent years, a small number of mass-market books have been written on the OSS such
as Douglas C. Waller, who has written popular books about other military-related subjects.
Waller's book Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern American
espionage was successful enough to be ranked on the New York Times Bestseller List.
Scholarship into the OSS has long been impeded by the cloak of secrecy which covers its
history and actions. Most prior research into the history of the OSS has been conducted by its
successor, the Central Intelligence Agency, which has had an unabashedly favorable view of the
history of the OSS
9
. However, with the declassification of a number of OSS manuals and reports
in December 2013
10
, it is now possible to take a more detailed and critical look at America’s first
spy agency.
The United States did not have a tradition of espionage agencies before the Second World
War. There had been limited ad-hoc intelligence gathering during previous wars, and a
partnership agreement in the First World War to let the US gain access to information from the
British intelligence agencies, but no standing intelligence apparatus had been established by the
United States. With the looming war, and it being apparent that the United States would play a
8
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 64.
9
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992) p. 32
10
Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944), p. 1
spoke in vague terms about his work for the OSS, only saying that he worked on a classified
publication called “European Political Report”
8
.
In recent years, a small number of mass-market books have been written on the OSS such
as Douglas C. Waller, who has written popular books about other military-related subjects.
Waller's book Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern American
espionage was successful enough to be ranked on the New York Times Bestseller List.
Scholarship into the OSS has long been impeded by the cloak of secrecy which covers its
history and actions. Most prior research into the history of the OSS has been conducted by its
successor, the Central Intelligence Agency, which has had an unabashedly favorable view of the
history of the OSS
9
. However, with the declassification of a number of OSS manuals and reports
in December 2013
10
, it is now possible to take a more detailed and critical look at America’s first
spy agency.
The United States did not have a tradition of espionage agencies before the Second World
War. There had been limited ad-hoc intelligence gathering during previous wars, and a
partnership agreement in the First World War to let the US gain access to information from the
British intelligence agencies, but no standing intelligence apparatus had been established by the
United States. With the looming war, and it being apparent that the United States would play a
8
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 64.
9
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992) p. 32
10
Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944), p. 1
more key role than it did in the prior World War, it was clear that some kind of professional
intelligence agency would be needed. The British government had been pressuring the United
States to develop its own standing foreign intelligence before the American entry to the war
11
.
The appraisal of American intelligence capabilities by Rear Admiral John Godfrey of the Royal
Navy was that the United States had only a “small and uncoordinated” intelligence capability,
which he described as “amateurs without special qualification and without training.”
12
Into this void, first J. Edgar Hoover tried to step. Hoover politically lobbied President
Roosevelt to expand the FBI from domestic law enforcement into being a full-fledged
intelligence agency with responsibility for foreign intelligence as in addition to domestic
investigations. President Roosevelt disapproved of the idea of giving Hoover and the FBI that
much authority and flatly refused Hoover’s request
13
.
To that end, on June 18, 1941, President Roosevelt appointed Colonel William “Wild Bill”
Donovan to be the “Coordinator of Information”. His title was carefully chosen, as the term
“Intelligence” was nowhere in the name. The existing Army and Navy intelligence functions
objected to a new intelligence apparatus that they feared might replace them, and felt that any
civilian intelligence agency would be interference with their role in waging war
14
. At first,
Donovan was given a specific and limited mandate: to coordinate the intelligence efforts of the
FBI, War Department and Department of the Navy to prevent overlap or conflicting assignments.
11
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 48
12
Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York:
Random House, 2001), p. 81
13
Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York:
Random House, 2001), p. 36
14
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 50
intelligence agency would be needed. The British government had been pressuring the United
States to develop its own standing foreign intelligence before the American entry to the war
11
.
The appraisal of American intelligence capabilities by Rear Admiral John Godfrey of the Royal
Navy was that the United States had only a “small and uncoordinated” intelligence capability,
which he described as “amateurs without special qualification and without training.”
12
Into this void, first J. Edgar Hoover tried to step. Hoover politically lobbied President
Roosevelt to expand the FBI from domestic law enforcement into being a full-fledged
intelligence agency with responsibility for foreign intelligence as in addition to domestic
investigations. President Roosevelt disapproved of the idea of giving Hoover and the FBI that
much authority and flatly refused Hoover’s request
13
.
To that end, on June 18, 1941, President Roosevelt appointed Colonel William “Wild Bill”
Donovan to be the “Coordinator of Information”. His title was carefully chosen, as the term
“Intelligence” was nowhere in the name. The existing Army and Navy intelligence functions
objected to a new intelligence apparatus that they feared might replace them, and felt that any
civilian intelligence agency would be interference with their role in waging war
14
. At first,
Donovan was given a specific and limited mandate: to coordinate the intelligence efforts of the
FBI, War Department and Department of the Navy to prevent overlap or conflicting assignments.
11
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 48
12
Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York:
Random House, 2001), p. 81
13
Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York:
Random House, 2001), p. 36
14
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 50
Colonel Donovan was a respected military officer who was a World War I veteran and
Columbia University alumni. He had earned the nickname “Wild Bill” for his brave and reckless
actions on the battlefield, which had culminated in receiving the Medal of Honor for his actions
on October 14, 1918 in leading an infantry charge in France
15
. His credentials as a leader were
impeccable, and he had an Ivy League education and had served as the Deputy Attorney General
of the United States in the 1920’s. President Roosevelt gave Colonel Donovan an initial charge
to coordinate intelligence gathering and analysis functions of the FBI, ONI, and MID to prevent
overlap and allow for interchange of information. The British responded to this modest increase
in American intelligence capability by having Commander Ian Fleming of the Royal Navy (who
would find fame after the war as the author of the James Bond novels) speak with Colonel
Donovan about coordinating US and UK intelligence efforts and helping the US develop a more
robust intelligence service than the modest Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI)
16
.
The OCI did not change immediately after the US entered World War II in December
1941. However, their scope of operations began to move from simply coordinating the efforts of
the existing agencies to undertaking their own operations. In January 1942, the OCI began a
program of covert burglaries into the Spanish Embassy in Washington D.C., with the intent of
files from the records of the Axis-affiliated Franco government. However, the rivalry of
Donovan and Hoover undermined the effort, as in April 1942 the FBI used their knowledge of
these operations to interrupt a OCI burglary by having marked FBI squad cars arrive at the
Spanish Embassy during one of the burglaries and had FBI agents warn the Spanish that burglars
15
United States Army, Medal of Honor Citation of Lieutenant Colonel William Donovan, 1922
16
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 47
Columbia University alumni. He had earned the nickname “Wild Bill” for his brave and reckless
actions on the battlefield, which had culminated in receiving the Medal of Honor for his actions
on October 14, 1918 in leading an infantry charge in France
15
. His credentials as a leader were
impeccable, and he had an Ivy League education and had served as the Deputy Attorney General
of the United States in the 1920’s. President Roosevelt gave Colonel Donovan an initial charge
to coordinate intelligence gathering and analysis functions of the FBI, ONI, and MID to prevent
overlap and allow for interchange of information. The British responded to this modest increase
in American intelligence capability by having Commander Ian Fleming of the Royal Navy (who
would find fame after the war as the author of the James Bond novels) speak with Colonel
Donovan about coordinating US and UK intelligence efforts and helping the US develop a more
robust intelligence service than the modest Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI)
16
.
The OCI did not change immediately after the US entered World War II in December
1941. However, their scope of operations began to move from simply coordinating the efforts of
the existing agencies to undertaking their own operations. In January 1942, the OCI began a
program of covert burglaries into the Spanish Embassy in Washington D.C., with the intent of
files from the records of the Axis-affiliated Franco government. However, the rivalry of
Donovan and Hoover undermined the effort, as in April 1942 the FBI used their knowledge of
these operations to interrupt a OCI burglary by having marked FBI squad cars arrive at the
Spanish Embassy during one of the burglaries and had FBI agents warn the Spanish that burglars
15
United States Army, Medal of Honor Citation of Lieutenant Colonel William Donovan, 1922
16
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 47
were trying to break in to the Embassy. The OCI agents barely escaped from both the Spanish
Embassy personnel and FBI agents attempting to arrest them
17
.
In the aftermath of this incident, it became clear that the OCI needed expansion and a
clear mandate from the President to conduct covert operations. With the rapid expansion of
military capabilities from the mobilization to wartime, the reorganization of the OCI into the
OSS was undertaken. President Roosevelt issued the formal order on June 13, 1942
18
. President
Roosevelt followed that order in December with Executive Order 9241, which gave the OSS the
same wartime powers to purchase goods and services without a formal bidding process or
executive oversight that had been granted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September
19
.
Colonel Donovan was promptly promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, and given
command of the Office of Strategic Services, established as a special joint military agency,
outside the normal chain of command, that would report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Directive gave General Donovan the responsibility to rapidly build an agency that would be
tasked with intelligence analysis, special operations behind Axis lines, and morale operations
(often called propaganda, but distinct from the propaganda of the Office of War Information).
17
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p.18
18
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 1942. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: F.D.
Roosevelt, “Military Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services. June 13, 1942”
19
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Order 9241, Federal Register 7, no. 7185 “Extension of
the Provisions of Executive Order 9001 of December 27, 1941 to the Office of Strategic Services,
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff”, (September 1, 1942)
Embassy personnel and FBI agents attempting to arrest them
17
.
In the aftermath of this incident, it became clear that the OCI needed expansion and a
clear mandate from the President to conduct covert operations. With the rapid expansion of
military capabilities from the mobilization to wartime, the reorganization of the OCI into the
OSS was undertaken. President Roosevelt issued the formal order on June 13, 1942
18
. President
Roosevelt followed that order in December with Executive Order 9241, which gave the OSS the
same wartime powers to purchase goods and services without a formal bidding process or
executive oversight that had been granted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September
19
.
Colonel Donovan was promptly promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, and given
command of the Office of Strategic Services, established as a special joint military agency,
outside the normal chain of command, that would report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Directive gave General Donovan the responsibility to rapidly build an agency that would be
tasked with intelligence analysis, special operations behind Axis lines, and morale operations
(often called propaganda, but distinct from the propaganda of the Office of War Information).
17
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p.18
18
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 1942. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: F.D.
Roosevelt, “Military Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services. June 13, 1942”
19
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Order 9241, Federal Register 7, no. 7185 “Extension of
the Provisions of Executive Order 9001 of December 27, 1941 to the Office of Strategic Services,
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff”, (September 1, 1942)
Its status as a joint agency would give the OSS the ability to recruit from all the armed services
as well as directly recruit specially qualified civilians
20
.
General Donovan was given a particularly broad mandate. While his agency was to be
based on the British model, the British had divided the functions he was to accomplish into four
separate agencies. Donovan was expected to create an American equivalent to the British MI6,
Special Operations Executive, Political Warfare Executive, and Political Office of Research
21
.
Hoover, however, would not quietly accept the creation of a new intelligence agency.
The MID, a modest organization, growing rapidly after Pearl Harbor, was lead by General
George Strong, a close friend of Hoover. Hoover and Strong feared Donovan’s new agency
would pose a threat to the power and influence of the FBI and the MID. Hoover and Strong
lobbied to have Donovan relieved of his position and have the OSS placed under General
Strong’s command as a subordinate branch of the MID. President Roosevelt denied the request
22
.
General Donovan began to staff his agency largely with his colleagues from the Ivy
League. Donovan expressed great admiration for an Ivy League education, believing that their
tradition of secret societies prepared a student for intelligence work. He also believed that their
academic rigor was superior and produced a more refined mind. General Donovan also
appreciated the athletic tradition of the Ivy League schools and felt that Ivy League students
20
Office of Strategic Services, Maritime Unit Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944), p. 6
21
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 26
22
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p. 313
as well as directly recruit specially qualified civilians
20
.
General Donovan was given a particularly broad mandate. While his agency was to be
based on the British model, the British had divided the functions he was to accomplish into four
separate agencies. Donovan was expected to create an American equivalent to the British MI6,
Special Operations Executive, Political Warfare Executive, and Political Office of Research
21
.
Hoover, however, would not quietly accept the creation of a new intelligence agency.
The MID, a modest organization, growing rapidly after Pearl Harbor, was lead by General
George Strong, a close friend of Hoover. Hoover and Strong feared Donovan’s new agency
would pose a threat to the power and influence of the FBI and the MID. Hoover and Strong
lobbied to have Donovan relieved of his position and have the OSS placed under General
Strong’s command as a subordinate branch of the MID. President Roosevelt denied the request
22
.
General Donovan began to staff his agency largely with his colleagues from the Ivy
League. Donovan expressed great admiration for an Ivy League education, believing that their
tradition of secret societies prepared a student for intelligence work. He also believed that their
academic rigor was superior and produced a more refined mind. General Donovan also
appreciated the athletic tradition of the Ivy League schools and felt that Ivy League students
20
Office of Strategic Services, Maritime Unit Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944), p. 6
21
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 26
22
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p. 313
were more physically fit, which made them ideal for military or paramilitary duties
23
. The
overall recruitment for the OSS was heavily biased towards white male Protestants, with women,
non-white, and non-Protestant personnel being rare exceptions
24
. Donovan recruited heavily
from academia in staffing the OSS. Most of the supervisors and civilian analysts were drawn
from the faculty and alumni of the Ivy League and transitioned their academic research skills
into intelligence analysis skills.
The OSS initially experimented with recruiting criminal figures, under the concept that it
would take a remorseless killer to perform the deeds of a guerilla or spy. However, after a
disastrous operation in Italy early in the war where members of organized crime that were
recruited by the OSS had failed their mission, the idea of using criminal figures was discarded.
The selection process for civilian recruits then turned to elaborate psychometric testing and
evaluations to find those who were suitable for undercover work and guerilla warfare
25
.
The OSS found success in recruiting agents from refugees from occupied Europe. These
people were strongly motivated to fight the Nazis, and knew the language and culture of the
areas they were being sent to infiltrate
26
.
All OSS personnel were put through a condensed 4-week basic military training course.
Even those that were already in the military had to repeat the course of basic training, and those
that were assigned to be analysts in the Special Intelligence branch and thus not field personnel
23
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 23.
24
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 24
25
Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 21
26
Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 23
23
. The
overall recruitment for the OSS was heavily biased towards white male Protestants, with women,
non-white, and non-Protestant personnel being rare exceptions
24
. Donovan recruited heavily
from academia in staffing the OSS. Most of the supervisors and civilian analysts were drawn
from the faculty and alumni of the Ivy League and transitioned their academic research skills
into intelligence analysis skills.
The OSS initially experimented with recruiting criminal figures, under the concept that it
would take a remorseless killer to perform the deeds of a guerilla or spy. However, after a
disastrous operation in Italy early in the war where members of organized crime that were
recruited by the OSS had failed their mission, the idea of using criminal figures was discarded.
The selection process for civilian recruits then turned to elaborate psychometric testing and
evaluations to find those who were suitable for undercover work and guerilla warfare
25
.
The OSS found success in recruiting agents from refugees from occupied Europe. These
people were strongly motivated to fight the Nazis, and knew the language and culture of the
areas they were being sent to infiltrate
26
.
All OSS personnel were put through a condensed 4-week basic military training course.
Even those that were already in the military had to repeat the course of basic training, and those
that were assigned to be analysts in the Special Intelligence branch and thus not field personnel
23
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 23.
24
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 24
25
Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 21
26
Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 23
were also sent to this training. The school largely taught the same curriculum as the US Army
did in its normal basic training, but at an accelerated rate, with changes to the curriculum to
emphasize guerilla warfare instead of conventional infantry tactics
27
, as well as adding subjects
that would be unique to intelligence work such as conducting body searches
28
. OSS agents were
also trained in various methods of committing sabotage
29
.
All OSS personnel would also be given training in the culture of their adversaries,
particularly Germany
30
. Those OSS agents to be assigned to undercover work would receive
additional weeks of training in how to maintain a cover identity, culminating in an examination
where they would be interrogated while in their cover identity to see if they could maintain their
cover while being questioned
31
. Personnel assigned to Special Operations groups would be
given extensive training in sabotage. OSS doctrine considered the assassination of an individual
to be regarded as “Sabotage applied to individuals”
32
.
27
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Basic Military Training, Office of Strategic
Services.
28
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Body Search, Office of Strategic Services.
29
Office of Strategic Services, Simple Sabotage Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944) p. 10
30
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Meet the Enemy (German), Office of Strategic
Services.
31
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Undercover Training, Office of Strategic
Services.
32
Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944)
did in its normal basic training, but at an accelerated rate, with changes to the curriculum to
emphasize guerilla warfare instead of conventional infantry tactics
27
, as well as adding subjects
that would be unique to intelligence work such as conducting body searches
28
. OSS agents were
also trained in various methods of committing sabotage
29
.
All OSS personnel would also be given training in the culture of their adversaries,
particularly Germany
30
. Those OSS agents to be assigned to undercover work would receive
additional weeks of training in how to maintain a cover identity, culminating in an examination
where they would be interrogated while in their cover identity to see if they could maintain their
cover while being questioned
31
. Personnel assigned to Special Operations groups would be
given extensive training in sabotage. OSS doctrine considered the assassination of an individual
to be regarded as “Sabotage applied to individuals”
32
.
27
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Basic Military Training, Office of Strategic
Services.
28
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Body Search, Office of Strategic Services.
29
Office of Strategic Services, Simple Sabotage Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944) p. 10
30
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Meet the Enemy (German), Office of Strategic
Services.
31
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Undercover Training, Office of Strategic
Services.
32
Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944)
Although it was highly unconventional in America for the time, the OSS training was
gender-integrated with the few female agents that had been recruited receiving training at the
same sites
33
. This mimicked the British practice of gender-integrated intelligence training
34
.
The eight OSS training camps were established in remote parts of US Park Service lands
in Virginia and Maryland, chosen for being isolated but accessible within a day’s drive of
Washington D. C
35
. The camps included hastily erected barracks where classes of approximately
30 recruits would conduct conventional military training, combined with instruction in
intelligence tradecraft. They were based on similar British MI6 and SOE training camps which
was conducted at country estates of the aristocracy, within a day’s drive of London
36
.
In London, the OSS established its support facilities for operations in Europe. The
centerpiece of this operation was the Research and Analysis branch. R&A was an office
complex in London that was staffed with a mixture of Donovan’s Ivy League academics and
soldiers trained in intelligence analysis. The Central Information Division of the Research and
Analysis Branch was tasked with keeping track of the massive amounts of information that the
OSS was gathering. They were required to index the information, cross-reference it, and keep it
readily accessible for analysts. This was a substantial achievement for an era predating modern
33
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 123
34
Juliette Pattinson, Behind Enemy Lines: Gender, Passing and the Special Operation Executive
in the Second World War (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 64
35
John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training during World War II”,
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010) p. 3
36
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) p. 17
gender-integrated with the few female agents that had been recruited receiving training at the
same sites
33
. This mimicked the British practice of gender-integrated intelligence training
34
.
The eight OSS training camps were established in remote parts of US Park Service lands
in Virginia and Maryland, chosen for being isolated but accessible within a day’s drive of
Washington D. C
35
. The camps included hastily erected barracks where classes of approximately
30 recruits would conduct conventional military training, combined with instruction in
intelligence tradecraft. They were based on similar British MI6 and SOE training camps which
was conducted at country estates of the aristocracy, within a day’s drive of London
36
.
In London, the OSS established its support facilities for operations in Europe. The
centerpiece of this operation was the Research and Analysis branch. R&A was an office
complex in London that was staffed with a mixture of Donovan’s Ivy League academics and
soldiers trained in intelligence analysis. The Central Information Division of the Research and
Analysis Branch was tasked with keeping track of the massive amounts of information that the
OSS was gathering. They were required to index the information, cross-reference it, and keep it
readily accessible for analysts. This was a substantial achievement for an era predating modern
33
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 123
34
Juliette Pattinson, Behind Enemy Lines: Gender, Passing and the Special Operation Executive
in the Second World War (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 64
35
John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training during World War II”,
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010) p. 3
36
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) p. 17
information technology. The elaborate card index system they developed was so efficient that it
is still studied by archivists as an example of highly efficient indexing and archival storage
37
.
The analysts of the OSS combed through all available information to deduce everything
they could about their adversaries. This included detailed review and analysis of German
newsreels
38
, and detailed economic study of the Reich
39
. The OSS also studied how the
Germans used propaganda to control public and military morale
40
. OSS analysts also developed
an elaborate system of sorting all intelligence information by the reliability of the source and
estimated accuracy of the information
41
.
Another key activity of the OSS was their production of forged German identification
papers for undercover agents. Undercover agents would need flawless replica papers to survive
Gestapo scrutiny. In recruiting forgers, the OSS drew from the best workers at the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing and in commercial printing firms. The suggestion was made to use the
best criminal forgers in prison, but Donovan flatly refused that request, noting that if they were
the best forgers, they wouldn’t have been caught
42
. At the same time, the OSS was attempting to
37
Jennifer Davis Heaps, “Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic Services”,
The American Archivist Vol 61, No 2 (Fall 1998) pp 287
38
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – German Newsreel Analysis #240, Office of
Strategic Services
39
Mark Guglielmo, “The Contribution of Economists to Military Intelligence during World War
II”, The Journal of Economic History Vol 68, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 109
40
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – A Report on German Morale, Office of
Strategic Services.
41
Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944), p. 4
42
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979) p. 25
is still studied by archivists as an example of highly efficient indexing and archival storage
37
.
The analysts of the OSS combed through all available information to deduce everything
they could about their adversaries. This included detailed review and analysis of German
newsreels
38
, and detailed economic study of the Reich
39
. The OSS also studied how the
Germans used propaganda to control public and military morale
40
. OSS analysts also developed
an elaborate system of sorting all intelligence information by the reliability of the source and
estimated accuracy of the information
41
.
Another key activity of the OSS was their production of forged German identification
papers for undercover agents. Undercover agents would need flawless replica papers to survive
Gestapo scrutiny. In recruiting forgers, the OSS drew from the best workers at the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing and in commercial printing firms. The suggestion was made to use the
best criminal forgers in prison, but Donovan flatly refused that request, noting that if they were
the best forgers, they wouldn’t have been caught
42
. At the same time, the OSS was attempting to
37
Jennifer Davis Heaps, “Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic Services”,
The American Archivist Vol 61, No 2 (Fall 1998) pp 287
38
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – German Newsreel Analysis #240, Office of
Strategic Services
39
Mark Guglielmo, “The Contribution of Economists to Military Intelligence during World War
II”, The Journal of Economic History Vol 68, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 109
40
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – A Report on German Morale, Office of
Strategic Services.
41
Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944), p. 4
42
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979) p. 25
undermine German efforts to counterfeit American identity documents and currency that their
own spies were using
43
.
A key problem with forging German identity documents was that the Reich had
developed a special high-security ink to thwart counterfeiting, that had unique properties under
different types of light. The OSS could not find a way to replicate the ink. Thus, they proceeded
to obtain the ink directly from the Germans. The OSS forged requisition forms for the ink, and
had an OSS agent that was undercover in a Vichy French government office submit the forms.
The secure ink was promptly delivered, where it was picked up by OSS agents and escorted to
London to allow the OSS regular production of German secure documents
44
.
One of the innovations of the Research and Analysis branch was the concept of strategic
bombardment. Previously in warfare, bombers attacked enemy formations on the battlefield, or
indiscriminately targeted cities rather than targeting specific war-related industries or resources.
At their London field office, the R&A branch of the OSS refined the doctrine of specifically
targeting industrial capability to cripple the German ability to sustain the war
45
.
Albert Speer would later credit the strategic bombardment concept invented by the OSS
with crippling the German war machine and turning the tide of war. Specifically, he noted that
43
Kevin C. Ruffner, “On the Trail of Nazi Counterfeiters”, Studies in Intelligence Vol 46, No 2.
(2002) pp 41-53 p. 44
44
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979) p. 36
45
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 46
own spies were using
43
.
A key problem with forging German identity documents was that the Reich had
developed a special high-security ink to thwart counterfeiting, that had unique properties under
different types of light. The OSS could not find a way to replicate the ink. Thus, they proceeded
to obtain the ink directly from the Germans. The OSS forged requisition forms for the ink, and
had an OSS agent that was undercover in a Vichy French government office submit the forms.
The secure ink was promptly delivered, where it was picked up by OSS agents and escorted to
London to allow the OSS regular production of German secure documents
44
.
One of the innovations of the Research and Analysis branch was the concept of strategic
bombardment. Previously in warfare, bombers attacked enemy formations on the battlefield, or
indiscriminately targeted cities rather than targeting specific war-related industries or resources.
At their London field office, the R&A branch of the OSS refined the doctrine of specifically
targeting industrial capability to cripple the German ability to sustain the war
45
.
Albert Speer would later credit the strategic bombardment concept invented by the OSS
with crippling the German war machine and turning the tide of war. Specifically, he noted that
43
Kevin C. Ruffner, “On the Trail of Nazi Counterfeiters”, Studies in Intelligence Vol 46, No 2.
(2002) pp 41-53 p. 44
44
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979) p. 36
45
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 46
American bombing targeting Luftwaffe fuel refineries and the mines that produced a handful of
strategic metals used in aircraft construction had effectively disabled the Luftwaffe
46
.
The Research and Analysis Branch was a combination of academics and soldiers, and this
division did not go unnoticed. The military members of R&A were usually junior-ranking
soldiers, and they complained that the senior officers that comprised OSS leadership frequently
ignored their findings due to their low rank. Some intelligence analysts complained that they
spent more time performing janitorial duties, such as mowing lawns and picking up trash than
they did performing intelligence duties
47
.
OSS operations in France focused heavily on providing aid to the Maquis resistance
movement against the Nazi occupation
48
. Many OSS agents worked undercover, posing as
French civilians. These operatives helped to arm and equip the Maquis, sabotage German forces,
as well as help prepare the French coast for the invasion that was to come.
Elizabeth Pack was one OSS operative in France who provided a vast amount of
intelligence for the OSS. Her specialty was to seduce Vichy French officials to gain access to
encryption codes and other government secrets
49
. After the war, General Donovan actively
denied that anyone in the OSS ever used such tactics, claiming “We did not rely on the seductive
46
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich – The Memoirs of Albert Speer (London, Orion Books,
1970), p. 547
47
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 102
48
Leonard C. Courier, “OSS Mission to the Burgundian Maquis”, Studies in Intelligence (Spring
1985) pp 60-65
49
Mary S. Lovell, Cast No Shadow: The life of the American spy who changed the course of
World War II (New York, Pantheon Books, 1992), p. 230
strategic metals used in aircraft construction had effectively disabled the Luftwaffe
46
.
The Research and Analysis Branch was a combination of academics and soldiers, and this
division did not go unnoticed. The military members of R&A were usually junior-ranking
soldiers, and they complained that the senior officers that comprised OSS leadership frequently
ignored their findings due to their low rank. Some intelligence analysts complained that they
spent more time performing janitorial duties, such as mowing lawns and picking up trash than
they did performing intelligence duties
47
.
OSS operations in France focused heavily on providing aid to the Maquis resistance
movement against the Nazi occupation
48
. Many OSS agents worked undercover, posing as
French civilians. These operatives helped to arm and equip the Maquis, sabotage German forces,
as well as help prepare the French coast for the invasion that was to come.
Elizabeth Pack was one OSS operative in France who provided a vast amount of
intelligence for the OSS. Her specialty was to seduce Vichy French officials to gain access to
encryption codes and other government secrets
49
. After the war, General Donovan actively
denied that anyone in the OSS ever used such tactics, claiming “We did not rely on the seductive
46
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich – The Memoirs of Albert Speer (London, Orion Books,
1970), p. 547
47
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 102
48
Leonard C. Courier, “OSS Mission to the Burgundian Maquis”, Studies in Intelligence (Spring
1985) pp 60-65
49
Mary S. Lovell, Cast No Shadow: The life of the American spy who changed the course of
World War II (New York, Pantheon Books, 1992), p. 230
blonde or phony mustache” when discussing OSS methods
50
. Female OSS agents operating in
France regularly complained of highly sexist behavior and treatment from French resistance
members they dealt with
51
.
One highly unconventional operation of the OSS was known as Operation Iron Cross.
The goal of this was to have teams of double agents act as saboteurs to do as much damage as
possible to the German war effort, and ideally to capture any senior German officers or
government officials they may encounter
52
. This was accomplished by taking those German
prisoners of war that they felt could be turned into double agents, equipping them with new
uniforms and equipment, and forged identifications giving them new identities, and then
releasing them into German-held Europe as a wandering military unit. While the exact scale of
Iron Cross is unknown because full records did not appear to have been preserved after the war
53
,
the few surviving records noted that the plan had been declared an overall success
54
.
In Italy, the OSS found most of its work being helping anti-Fascist partisans. Mussolini’s
rise to power left many who strongly dissented with fascism, but could not safely express that
dissent. The OSS found it advantageous to supply them with weapons, organize them, and let
them act as reinforcements in the fight to retake Italy. By March 1944, over 20,000 Italian
50
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p.42
51
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p.156
52
Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York:
Random House, 2001) p. 253
53
Mark Murphy, “The OSS-German POW Controversy”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp
57
54
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) p. 162
50
. Female OSS agents operating in
France regularly complained of highly sexist behavior and treatment from French resistance
members they dealt with
51
.
One highly unconventional operation of the OSS was known as Operation Iron Cross.
The goal of this was to have teams of double agents act as saboteurs to do as much damage as
possible to the German war effort, and ideally to capture any senior German officers or
government officials they may encounter
52
. This was accomplished by taking those German
prisoners of war that they felt could be turned into double agents, equipping them with new
uniforms and equipment, and forged identifications giving them new identities, and then
releasing them into German-held Europe as a wandering military unit. While the exact scale of
Iron Cross is unknown because full records did not appear to have been preserved after the war
53
,
the few surviving records noted that the plan had been declared an overall success
54
.
In Italy, the OSS found most of its work being helping anti-Fascist partisans. Mussolini’s
rise to power left many who strongly dissented with fascism, but could not safely express that
dissent. The OSS found it advantageous to supply them with weapons, organize them, and let
them act as reinforcements in the fight to retake Italy. By March 1944, over 20,000 Italian
50
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p.42
51
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p.156
52
Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York:
Random House, 2001) p. 253
53
Mark Murphy, “The OSS-German POW Controversy”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp
57
54
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS
(London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) p. 162
Partisans had been organized and equipped by the OSS, who sabotaged the German retreat from
Italy by destroying key rail lines, and bolstered advancing Allied forces
55
.
Lt. William Colby, USNR, who would later become the director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, spent most of his service with the OSS undercover in Germany as a
member of Project Jedburgh. Jedburgh teams, including Lt. Colby, engaged in both intelligence
gathering and sabotage operations throughout occupied Europe. Colby was awarded the Bronze
Star Medal for infiltrating several German cities, including Berlin itself
56
.
One of the more daring projects of the OSS within German borders was Project
Cornflakes. This was the effort to forge propaganda letters which would demoralize German
citizens, complete with forged postage stamps that mocked Hitler but superficially resembled
legitimate postage, and insert mailbags full of these letters into the German postal system to be
delivered. This allowed the OSS to deliver demoralizing messages directly to the mailboxes of
German households with the postal service as an accomplice
57
. The use of agent provocateurs to
spread “poison pen” letters with forged stamps was an ideal case of the use of most of the
doctrinal standard methods of morale operations that the OSS’s own manuals approved of
58
.
The OSS office in Bern was based out of the United States Embassy, and was headed by
John Allen Dulles, who carried the title “Special Assistant to the Minister” to justify his presence.
Dulles had to walk a fine line, as the Swiss guarded their neutrality carefully, and being caught in
55
Peter Tompkins, “The OSS and Italian Partisans in World War II.” Studies in Intelligence
(Spring 1998), p. 100
56
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of William J Casey, p. 36
57
Office of Strategic Services, “CORNFLAKES” Project Report.
58
Office of Strategic Services, Morale Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1943), p. 2
Italy by destroying key rail lines, and bolstered advancing Allied forces
55
.
Lt. William Colby, USNR, who would later become the director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, spent most of his service with the OSS undercover in Germany as a
member of Project Jedburgh. Jedburgh teams, including Lt. Colby, engaged in both intelligence
gathering and sabotage operations throughout occupied Europe. Colby was awarded the Bronze
Star Medal for infiltrating several German cities, including Berlin itself
56
.
One of the more daring projects of the OSS within German borders was Project
Cornflakes. This was the effort to forge propaganda letters which would demoralize German
citizens, complete with forged postage stamps that mocked Hitler but superficially resembled
legitimate postage, and insert mailbags full of these letters into the German postal system to be
delivered. This allowed the OSS to deliver demoralizing messages directly to the mailboxes of
German households with the postal service as an accomplice
57
. The use of agent provocateurs to
spread “poison pen” letters with forged stamps was an ideal case of the use of most of the
doctrinal standard methods of morale operations that the OSS’s own manuals approved of
58
.
The OSS office in Bern was based out of the United States Embassy, and was headed by
John Allen Dulles, who carried the title “Special Assistant to the Minister” to justify his presence.
Dulles had to walk a fine line, as the Swiss guarded their neutrality carefully, and being caught in
55
Peter Tompkins, “The OSS and Italian Partisans in World War II.” Studies in Intelligence
(Spring 1998), p. 100
56
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of William J Casey, p. 36
57
Office of Strategic Services, “CORNFLAKES” Project Report.
58
Office of Strategic Services, Morale Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1943), p. 2
espionage activities in Switzerland would likely get the US embassy closed. As Switzerland was
neutral territory, agents of virtually every power in the war, including Japan, had a presence in
Bern, all trying to avoid the Swiss “foreign police” who enforced the neutrality of Switzerland
59
.
When senior German officers engaged in their famous plot to assassinate Hitler, the OSS
had received advance warning. Hans Gisevius, a German intelligence officer who the Americans
had given the codename “Breaker” had travelled to Switzerland and at great risk to himself and
the plot, communicated the intent of the group to the OSS, hoping for American support. When
the plot failed, he escaped to Switzerland and, using forged documents provided by the OSS, was
evacuated. This made him one of the few conspirators to survive the War
60
.
In Scandinavia, the OSS operations focused mainly on assisting local resistance units and
sabotage against Nazi occupation. Lt. Colby was also present in Norway in April 1945,
sabotaging railroads to prevent Wehrmacht forces in Norway from travelling to Germany to
reinforce defenses there during the final push to Berlin
61
. Colby also helped to establish OSS
safehouses in Sweden and Norway
62
.
The OSS had a very limited role in South America. Early in the war, J. Edgar Hoover
objected to any presence or action by the OSS in South America, stating that he already had
undercover FBI agents in multiple South American countries as part of ongoing investigations.
Hoover used this claim to argue that an OSS presence would interfere with FBI investigations
that predated the war. Donovan felt that this was just another attempt by Hoover to fight with
59
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of Allen Dulles, p. 20
60
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 282
61
William E. Colby. "OSS Operations in Norway: Skis and Daggers." Studies in
Intelligence (Winter 1999-2000), 54
62
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of William J Casey, p. 28
neutral territory, agents of virtually every power in the war, including Japan, had a presence in
Bern, all trying to avoid the Swiss “foreign police” who enforced the neutrality of Switzerland
59
.
When senior German officers engaged in their famous plot to assassinate Hitler, the OSS
had received advance warning. Hans Gisevius, a German intelligence officer who the Americans
had given the codename “Breaker” had travelled to Switzerland and at great risk to himself and
the plot, communicated the intent of the group to the OSS, hoping for American support. When
the plot failed, he escaped to Switzerland and, using forged documents provided by the OSS, was
evacuated. This made him one of the few conspirators to survive the War
60
.
In Scandinavia, the OSS operations focused mainly on assisting local resistance units and
sabotage against Nazi occupation. Lt. Colby was also present in Norway in April 1945,
sabotaging railroads to prevent Wehrmacht forces in Norway from travelling to Germany to
reinforce defenses there during the final push to Berlin
61
. Colby also helped to establish OSS
safehouses in Sweden and Norway
62
.
The OSS had a very limited role in South America. Early in the war, J. Edgar Hoover
objected to any presence or action by the OSS in South America, stating that he already had
undercover FBI agents in multiple South American countries as part of ongoing investigations.
Hoover used this claim to argue that an OSS presence would interfere with FBI investigations
that predated the war. Donovan felt that this was just another attempt by Hoover to fight with
59
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of Allen Dulles, p. 20
60
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 282
61
William E. Colby. "OSS Operations in Norway: Skis and Daggers." Studies in
Intelligence (Winter 1999-2000), 54
62
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of William J Casey, p. 28
the OSS over power and his ongoing campaign to undermine the OSS.
63
Meanwhile, Hoover felt
that this was part of a plot by Donovan to have the OSS replace the FBI, or for Donovan to be
appointed as the Director of the FBI and replace Hoover
64
.
The situation was eventually resolved when President Roosevelt issued a direct order to
the OSS that they could not engage in any undercover operations or covert activities south of the
American border. Any OSS agents would have to not operate under cover, and the FBI was
given territorial jurisdiction for covert US operations in Central and South America
65
. This
ultimately meant that the role of the OSS in South America was very limited. Officially, no
covert OSS activities were taken in South America, pursuant to the Presidential directive.
Much as in South America, the OSS had a reduced role in the Pacific Theater of
Operations. Both General Douglas MacArthur
66
, and Admiral Chester Nimitz
67
, as the senior
military commanders in the Pacific would not tolerate OSS tactical operations in their area. Both
felt that the OSS was in competition with their own intelligence activities and did not want an
independent paramilitary force operating in their area of operations outside their jurisdiction.
Due to these restrictions, the special operations branch of the OSS was restricted from
operating in the Pacific Theater of Operations. OSS activity related to the Pacific theater was
63
Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency
(New York, Rowman & Littlefield 2005), p. 17
64
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001). P. 295
65
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p.17
66
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 79
67
Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency
(New York, Rowman & Littlefield 2005), p. 294
63
Meanwhile, Hoover felt
that this was part of a plot by Donovan to have the OSS replace the FBI, or for Donovan to be
appointed as the Director of the FBI and replace Hoover
64
.
The situation was eventually resolved when President Roosevelt issued a direct order to
the OSS that they could not engage in any undercover operations or covert activities south of the
American border. Any OSS agents would have to not operate under cover, and the FBI was
given territorial jurisdiction for covert US operations in Central and South America
65
. This
ultimately meant that the role of the OSS in South America was very limited. Officially, no
covert OSS activities were taken in South America, pursuant to the Presidential directive.
Much as in South America, the OSS had a reduced role in the Pacific Theater of
Operations. Both General Douglas MacArthur
66
, and Admiral Chester Nimitz
67
, as the senior
military commanders in the Pacific would not tolerate OSS tactical operations in their area. Both
felt that the OSS was in competition with their own intelligence activities and did not want an
independent paramilitary force operating in their area of operations outside their jurisdiction.
Due to these restrictions, the special operations branch of the OSS was restricted from
operating in the Pacific Theater of Operations. OSS activity related to the Pacific theater was
63
Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency
(New York, Rowman & Littlefield 2005), p. 17
64
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001). P. 295
65
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p.17
66
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 79
67
Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency
(New York, Rowman & Littlefield 2005), p. 294
restricted to intelligence analysis at stations outside the Pacific theater. However, technically the
China-Burma-India theater was a separate military theater than the Pacific, one largely
dominated by the British that the OSS had a good relationship with, and had not been prohibited
under the orders that Nimitz and MacArthur gave restricting them from the Pacific theater
68
.
Without prohibition against operating in mainland Asia, the OSS established Detachment 101,
lead by Colonel Carl Eifer to conduct operations in that theater.
Operational groups like Detachment 101 were the most military-like element of the OSS,
which often avoided military trappings whenever possible
69
. The small unit, only a few hundred
members, created a network of saboteurs to undermine Japanese occupation, supported the
Republic of China army, and established safe houses and a network for recovering downed allied
aircrews and returning them to friendly territory. Detachment 101 also organized 3,000 Kachin
people of northern Burma into the paramilitary resistance force known as the Kachin Rangers
70
.
The US Army had such little interest in unconventional warfare such as this in World
War II that they refused to undertake their own special operations or commando activities, that
was left to the Army elements assigned to the OSS. The modern US Army Special Operations
Command traces its history to the OSS Special Operations groups such as Detachment 101
71
.
68
CIA Historical Review Program, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101”, Studies
in Intelligence (September 1993)
69
Office of Strategic Services, Operational Groups Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944)
70
Troy J. Sacquety, “Behind Japanese Lines in Burma”, Studies in Intelligence, Fall/Winter
2001
71
United States Department of Defense. Department of the Army. Center for Military History,
U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II by David W. Hogan Jr. 1992, p. 7
China-Burma-India theater was a separate military theater than the Pacific, one largely
dominated by the British that the OSS had a good relationship with, and had not been prohibited
under the orders that Nimitz and MacArthur gave restricting them from the Pacific theater
68
.
Without prohibition against operating in mainland Asia, the OSS established Detachment 101,
lead by Colonel Carl Eifer to conduct operations in that theater.
Operational groups like Detachment 101 were the most military-like element of the OSS,
which often avoided military trappings whenever possible
69
. The small unit, only a few hundred
members, created a network of saboteurs to undermine Japanese occupation, supported the
Republic of China army, and established safe houses and a network for recovering downed allied
aircrews and returning them to friendly territory. Detachment 101 also organized 3,000 Kachin
people of northern Burma into the paramilitary resistance force known as the Kachin Rangers
70
.
The US Army had such little interest in unconventional warfare such as this in World
War II that they refused to undertake their own special operations or commando activities, that
was left to the Army elements assigned to the OSS. The modern US Army Special Operations
Command traces its history to the OSS Special Operations groups such as Detachment 101
71
.
68
CIA Historical Review Program, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101”, Studies
in Intelligence (September 1993)
69
Office of Strategic Services, Operational Groups Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS
Reproduction Branch, 1944)
70
Troy J. Sacquety, “Behind Japanese Lines in Burma”, Studies in Intelligence, Fall/Winter
2001
71
United States Department of Defense. Department of the Army. Center for Military History,
U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II by David W. Hogan Jr. 1992, p. 7
Much like the OSS in Europe used German POW’s for intelligence purposes,
Detachment 101 found a way to use Japanese prisoners of war for their own ends in translating
and adapting propaganda to be distributed in the theater to demoralize Japanese forces. Japanese
POW’s were used as translators and for cultural reference in ensuring that the morale operations
of Detachment 101 had optimum effect in demoralizing Japanese troops. Flyers and leaflets that
were distributed mocking the Japanese were found throughout the entire theater, in many cases
hundreds of miles from where they were originally distributed
72
.
By the end of the war Detachment 101 had been responsible for the rescue of 541 allied
airmen, killed 5,428 Japanese soldiers, and only suffered 22 American casualties
73
. Despite
General MacArthur’s distaste for the OSS, he was impressed enough by their performance in the
China-Burma-India theater to award Detachment 101 the Distinguished Unit Citation after the
war for their collective achievements in the war effort
74
.
The OSS maintained professional relations and communications with the Soviet
intelligence and security service, the NKVD, despite J. Edgar Hoover’s anticommunist paranoia
casting a shadow over the relations. In early 1944, the OSS and NKVD had brokered a deal to
actively coordinate efforts in the field and exchange espionage technologies, but Hoover, along
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued against the deal in a letter to Roosevelt on February 22,
72
Jack B. Pfeifer, “OSS Propaganda in Europe and the Far East”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall
1984) pp 43
73
William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America’s Most
Successful Guerrilla Force (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 217-220
74
United States Army, Distinguished Unit Citation of OSS Detachment 101, January 27, 1946
Detachment 101 found a way to use Japanese prisoners of war for their own ends in translating
and adapting propaganda to be distributed in the theater to demoralize Japanese forces. Japanese
POW’s were used as translators and for cultural reference in ensuring that the morale operations
of Detachment 101 had optimum effect in demoralizing Japanese troops. Flyers and leaflets that
were distributed mocking the Japanese were found throughout the entire theater, in many cases
hundreds of miles from where they were originally distributed
72
.
By the end of the war Detachment 101 had been responsible for the rescue of 541 allied
airmen, killed 5,428 Japanese soldiers, and only suffered 22 American casualties
73
. Despite
General MacArthur’s distaste for the OSS, he was impressed enough by their performance in the
China-Burma-India theater to award Detachment 101 the Distinguished Unit Citation after the
war for their collective achievements in the war effort
74
.
The OSS maintained professional relations and communications with the Soviet
intelligence and security service, the NKVD, despite J. Edgar Hoover’s anticommunist paranoia
casting a shadow over the relations. In early 1944, the OSS and NKVD had brokered a deal to
actively coordinate efforts in the field and exchange espionage technologies, but Hoover, along
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued against the deal in a letter to Roosevelt on February 22,
72
Jack B. Pfeifer, “OSS Propaganda in Europe and the Far East”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall
1984) pp 43
73
William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America’s Most
Successful Guerrilla Force (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 217-220
74
United States Army, Distinguished Unit Citation of OSS Detachment 101, January 27, 1946
1944, saying it was an attempt at Communist infiltration of the OSS. Shortly after Hoover’s
letter was received, President Roosevelt cancelled the deal
75
.
Even though President Roosevelt had cancelled the pending deal, General Donovan had
already gone through with much of the terms of the arrangement. Although he never reported it
to Washington, and the records revealing were only found after his death years later, Donovan
had transferred a large quantity of microdot manufacturing systems, miniature cameras and other
espionage gear to the NKVD in anticipation that the arrangement would be approved
76
.
Shortly after the deal was cancelled, in May 1944, OSS and NKVD relations collapsed
when Soviet forces reached Romania and Bulgaria. The Soviets occupied those territories
immediately, and the territories had OSS agents already in them. On September 25, 1944, the
Soviet Union officially demanded that all OSS personnel leave these countries, stating that they
were now the sovereign territory of the Soviet Union, and not axis territory
77
. The OSS
negotiated a deal to remain in Bulgaria and Romania after that ultimatum, but they proved to be
of little intelligence value in the war. The main role of the agents that remained in those
territories was to observe the actions of the USSR in the areas they were occupying.
The OSS agents in Bulgaria and Romania reported as the USSR immediately moved to
suppress all non-Communist political parties, nationalize all industries, and suppress all dissent
or public statements against the USSR or Soviet occupiers. OSS intelligence analysts concluded
75
Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York,
Basic Books, 1983), p. 340
76
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p. 312
77
Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York,
Basic Books, 1983), p 350.
letter was received, President Roosevelt cancelled the deal
75
.
Even though President Roosevelt had cancelled the pending deal, General Donovan had
already gone through with much of the terms of the arrangement. Although he never reported it
to Washington, and the records revealing were only found after his death years later, Donovan
had transferred a large quantity of microdot manufacturing systems, miniature cameras and other
espionage gear to the NKVD in anticipation that the arrangement would be approved
76
.
Shortly after the deal was cancelled, in May 1944, OSS and NKVD relations collapsed
when Soviet forces reached Romania and Bulgaria. The Soviets occupied those territories
immediately, and the territories had OSS agents already in them. On September 25, 1944, the
Soviet Union officially demanded that all OSS personnel leave these countries, stating that they
were now the sovereign territory of the Soviet Union, and not axis territory
77
. The OSS
negotiated a deal to remain in Bulgaria and Romania after that ultimatum, but they proved to be
of little intelligence value in the war. The main role of the agents that remained in those
territories was to observe the actions of the USSR in the areas they were occupying.
The OSS agents in Bulgaria and Romania reported as the USSR immediately moved to
suppress all non-Communist political parties, nationalize all industries, and suppress all dissent
or public statements against the USSR or Soviet occupiers. OSS intelligence analysts concluded
75
Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York,
Basic Books, 1983), p. 340
76
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p. 312
77
Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York,
Basic Books, 1983), p 350.
that it was the intent of the Soviet Union to annex all territories in Eastern European that they
were taking from Nazi control, and were already actively converting those countries to
communism
78
.
The OSS had a strained relationship with the Free French Forces. After the war, the head
of intelligence operations for the French, Major Andre Dewavrin (also known by his nom de
guerre “Colonel Passy”) actively considered the idea of any study of the OSS in France to be
useless, saying “The OSS did virtually nothing in France”
79
. During the war, female OSS agents
working in France reported that they were not taken seriously by French resistance fighters
because they were women, and that the Free French forces would refuse to work with them
80
.
The OSS had a very good working relationship with the British intelligence services.
The British had encouraged the creation of the OSS, and had fostered and guided its initial
organization and training. Once established, the OSS developed agreements with MI6 and the
British Special Operations Executive that all infiltration of Europe should be done jointly
between the British and Americans
81
. The British had even developed a method for secretly
78
Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York,
Basic Books, 1983), p. 352
79
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 248
80
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 156
81
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 298
were taking from Nazi control, and were already actively converting those countries to
communism
78
.
The OSS had a strained relationship with the Free French Forces. After the war, the head
of intelligence operations for the French, Major Andre Dewavrin (also known by his nom de
guerre “Colonel Passy”) actively considered the idea of any study of the OSS in France to be
useless, saying “The OSS did virtually nothing in France”
79
. During the war, female OSS agents
working in France reported that they were not taken seriously by French resistance fighters
because they were women, and that the Free French forces would refuse to work with them
80
.
The OSS had a very good working relationship with the British intelligence services.
The British had encouraged the creation of the OSS, and had fostered and guided its initial
organization and training. Once established, the OSS developed agreements with MI6 and the
British Special Operations Executive that all infiltration of Europe should be done jointly
between the British and Americans
81
. The British had even developed a method for secretly
78
Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York,
Basic Books, 1983), p. 352
79
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 248
80
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 156
81
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 298
accessing the contents of sealed diplomatic pouches, and shared this technology with the
Americans, letting them access the diplomatic messages of other countries
82
.
However, due to Hoover’s political interference, the OSS was prohibited from having
professional ties or liaison connections to MI5, whom Hoover argued should communicate with
the FBI as their U.S. counterpart. Hoover argued that since the OSS did not handle domestic
security, they should not interact with MI5
83
. President Roosevelt agreed with Hoover on that
point, and prohibited the OSS from maintaining a liaison with the British MI5.
With the end of the war in Europe, the OSS found a role in the closing affairs of the
theater and the prosecution of Nazis for the war crimes that were committed. With the surrender
of the German military on May 7, 1945, the OSS found that they now had a role in piecing
together what had happened that they were not aware of, and helping with the orderly closing of
the loose ends of the war.
A looming question that arose when Allied forces liberated the concentration camps was
to wonder why there hadn’t been alarms or notice of this made by the OSS or other intelligence
agencies during the war itself. When asked about why the OSS had not discovered the
Holocaust during the war, General Donovan replied that official policy was to focus on the
defeat of Germany above all else and that anything not explicitly related to achieving victory was
82
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and
the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 14
83
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p. 150
Americans, letting them access the diplomatic messages of other countries
82
.
However, due to Hoover’s political interference, the OSS was prohibited from having
professional ties or liaison connections to MI5, whom Hoover argued should communicate with
the FBI as their U.S. counterpart. Hoover argued that since the OSS did not handle domestic
security, they should not interact with MI5
83
. President Roosevelt agreed with Hoover on that
point, and prohibited the OSS from maintaining a liaison with the British MI5.
With the end of the war in Europe, the OSS found a role in the closing affairs of the
theater and the prosecution of Nazis for the war crimes that were committed. With the surrender
of the German military on May 7, 1945, the OSS found that they now had a role in piecing
together what had happened that they were not aware of, and helping with the orderly closing of
the loose ends of the war.
A looming question that arose when Allied forces liberated the concentration camps was
to wonder why there hadn’t been alarms or notice of this made by the OSS or other intelligence
agencies during the war itself. When asked about why the OSS had not discovered the
Holocaust during the war, General Donovan replied that official policy was to focus on the
defeat of Germany above all else and that anything not explicitly related to achieving victory was
82
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and
the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 14
83
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p. 150
not the focus of the OSS
84
. Schlesinger had also insisted that the Research and Analysis branch
of the OSS had absolutely no knowledge of the Holocaust
85
.
The fact that all intercepted German communications that referred to the Holocaust used
coded phrases and euphemisms gives some small degree of plausible deniability to these claims
86
.
However, the fact that the OSS had been receiving reports from the Polish resistance fighters
regarding what they had seen at the concentration camps and reports of ongoing extermination
operations as early as November 1942 indicates either willful ignorance, or actively distrusting
the reports they were receiving from the Poles
87
.
While General Donovan repeatedly denied that the OSS had any knowledge of the
Holocaust, two intelligence analysts at the OSS did file reports concluding that Germany was
engaged in a systematic program of genocide of the European Jewish population, including
specifying the various camps at which the action were taking place. Abraham Duker and Charles
Dwork were low-ranking intelligence analysts in the OSS Research and Analysis office in
London who had repeatedly filed reports on the ongoing genocide, and had their work repeatedly
84
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and
the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005)
85
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 66
86
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and
the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 31
87
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 108
84
. Schlesinger had also insisted that the Research and Analysis branch
of the OSS had absolutely no knowledge of the Holocaust
85
.
The fact that all intercepted German communications that referred to the Holocaust used
coded phrases and euphemisms gives some small degree of plausible deniability to these claims
86
.
However, the fact that the OSS had been receiving reports from the Polish resistance fighters
regarding what they had seen at the concentration camps and reports of ongoing extermination
operations as early as November 1942 indicates either willful ignorance, or actively distrusting
the reports they were receiving from the Poles
87
.
While General Donovan repeatedly denied that the OSS had any knowledge of the
Holocaust, two intelligence analysts at the OSS did file reports concluding that Germany was
engaged in a systematic program of genocide of the European Jewish population, including
specifying the various camps at which the action were taking place. Abraham Duker and Charles
Dwork were low-ranking intelligence analysts in the OSS Research and Analysis office in
London who had repeatedly filed reports on the ongoing genocide, and had their work repeatedly
84
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and
the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005)
85
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 66
86
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and
the Nazis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 31
87
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II
(Washington D.C., National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), p. 108
ignored
88
. The fact that both Duker & Dwork were Jewish cannot be overlooked in the
ramifications of this ongoing pattern of neglect.
With the war over, the OSS had found itself subject to both post-war cutbacks and the
changing political landscape. President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9621 on
September 20, 1945 that disbanded the OSS, transferring their tactical functions to the War
Department, and their research and analysis functions to the US State Department
89
. On that day,
President Truman wrote a polite letter thanking General Donovan for his service, and explicitly
stated that his intent as President was to create a permanent post-war intelligence agency as a
regular government agency and not an ad hoc wartime organization
90
.
When Truman signed the order to close the Office of Strategic Services, he had received
a report compiled by President Roosevelt’s military attaché, Colonel Richard Park Jr, a longtime
friend of Hoover's ally General Strong
91
. This report accused the OSS of incompetence,
nepotism, and numerous botched operations
92
. President Truman had developed such a low
88
David Bankier, Ed. Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust (New York, Enigma Books, 1996), p.
21
89
Harry Truman, Executive Order 9621, Federal Register 10, no. 12033 “Termination of the
Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions”, (September 20, 1945)
90
Truman, Harry S., 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S.
Truman, “Letter to General William J. Donovan on the Termination of the Office of Strategic
Services”
91
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p. 314
92
Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern
American espionage (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011), 4
88
. The fact that both Duker & Dwork were Jewish cannot be overlooked in the
ramifications of this ongoing pattern of neglect.
With the war over, the OSS had found itself subject to both post-war cutbacks and the
changing political landscape. President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9621 on
September 20, 1945 that disbanded the OSS, transferring their tactical functions to the War
Department, and their research and analysis functions to the US State Department
89
. On that day,
President Truman wrote a polite letter thanking General Donovan for his service, and explicitly
stated that his intent as President was to create a permanent post-war intelligence agency as a
regular government agency and not an ad hoc wartime organization
90
.
When Truman signed the order to close the Office of Strategic Services, he had received
a report compiled by President Roosevelt’s military attaché, Colonel Richard Park Jr, a longtime
friend of Hoover's ally General Strong
91
. This report accused the OSS of incompetence,
nepotism, and numerous botched operations
92
. President Truman had developed such a low
88
David Bankier, Ed. Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust (New York, Enigma Books, 1996), p.
21
89
Harry Truman, Executive Order 9621, Federal Register 10, no. 12033 “Termination of the
Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions”, (September 20, 1945)
90
Truman, Harry S., 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S.
Truman, “Letter to General William J. Donovan on the Termination of the Office of Strategic
Services”
91
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001), p. 314
92
Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern
American espionage (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011), 4
opinion of General Donovan that he actively avoided complementing Donovan in speeches after
the war, to the point of even crossing him off prepared lists of people to thank or compliment
93
.
At the war crimes trials that closed the European Theater of the war, the OSS found a role.
General Anton Dostler was placed on trial for following Hitler’s “commando order” that any
infiltrators or saboteurs must be shot. On March 26, 1944, General Dostler had ordered the
execution of 15 captured OSS agents. The agents were wearing US Army uniforms, thus were to
be considered prisoners of war under the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. For his
role in ordering the execution of 15 OSS agents, General Dostler was the first member of the
Nazi regime to be convicted of war crimes, and was executed on December 1, 1945
94
.
Even though the OSS did not officially acknowledge the events of the holocaust during
the war, and that they were officially disbanded in late 1945, former OSS analysts who were
reassigned to the War Department continued to produce reports on the events of the holocaust for
review, using the OSS name to identify for whom they were working. They produced long,
elaborate reports summarizing the events that occurred at the various concentration camps, with
interviews of survivors and elaborate accounting of what happened
95
.
After the war, there was also the question of what should be done with the records of the
OSS. There was substantial debate to whether or not what the OSS did should even be recorded
or preserved, or if the acts of the OSS should be allowed to be forgotten as a wartime secret.
93
Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern
American espionage (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011), 5
94
United States v. Anton Dostler, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals Vol I, 22, (U.S.
Military Commission at Rome, 1945)
95
Seventh Army Office of Strategic Services Section. Dachau, by Major Alfred L. Howes,
Technical Sergeant John S. Denney and Technician 3rd Class Chas W. Denney, 1946.
the war, to the point of even crossing him off prepared lists of people to thank or compliment
93
.
At the war crimes trials that closed the European Theater of the war, the OSS found a role.
General Anton Dostler was placed on trial for following Hitler’s “commando order” that any
infiltrators or saboteurs must be shot. On March 26, 1944, General Dostler had ordered the
execution of 15 captured OSS agents. The agents were wearing US Army uniforms, thus were to
be considered prisoners of war under the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. For his
role in ordering the execution of 15 OSS agents, General Dostler was the first member of the
Nazi regime to be convicted of war crimes, and was executed on December 1, 1945
94
.
Even though the OSS did not officially acknowledge the events of the holocaust during
the war, and that they were officially disbanded in late 1945, former OSS analysts who were
reassigned to the War Department continued to produce reports on the events of the holocaust for
review, using the OSS name to identify for whom they were working. They produced long,
elaborate reports summarizing the events that occurred at the various concentration camps, with
interviews of survivors and elaborate accounting of what happened
95
.
After the war, there was also the question of what should be done with the records of the
OSS. There was substantial debate to whether or not what the OSS did should even be recorded
or preserved, or if the acts of the OSS should be allowed to be forgotten as a wartime secret.
93
Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern
American espionage (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011), 5
94
United States v. Anton Dostler, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals Vol I, 22, (U.S.
Military Commission at Rome, 1945)
95
Seventh Army Office of Strategic Services Section. Dachau, by Major Alfred L. Howes,
Technical Sergeant John S. Denney and Technician 3rd Class Chas W. Denney, 1946.
After the transfer of OSS tactical capabilities to military jurisdiction, Fleet Admiral William D.
Leahy ended the debate by commissioning a report on the history of the OSS on July 26, 1946.
This “War Report of the OSS” was a broad, general history of the OSS that remained Top Secret
until 1976. It provided just a summary of its actions
96
. It was careful to omit information that
did not cast the OSS in a positive light. What little was revealed immediately after the war was
heavily censored.
Ultimately the OSS was a triumph of organization and planning. General Donovan built
an organization of around 13,000 individuals on short notice, organizing them into a worldwide
intelligence agency, with an archival system that is still notable many decades later
97
. This
agency combined the roles of what the UK used four agencies with separate missions to
accomplish, drawing from both the very best in academia and the military.
However, the shortcomings of the Office of Strategic Services must also be noted. The
OSS inherited the hierarchical structure of the military, meaning that lower-ranking members
found their input ignored or overlooked easily, such as analysts Duker & Dwork having their
reports on the holocaust repeatedly ignored due to their low military rank. This hierarchical
structure was clearly reinforced by the tendency of the OSS to recruit from the Ivy League
colleges, as the leaders of the OSS were recruited from the protestant members of upper social
classes. The internal political strife in American government at the time also greatly hindered
the ability of the OSS to perform intelligence work in the entire Pacific Theater and South
America were closed to OSS activity due to Donovan’s rivalries with Hoover and MacArthur.
96
United States Department of War, Strategic Services Unit. War Report, Office of Strategic
Services by Kermit Roosevelt, 1947.
97
Dawidoff, Nicholas. The Catcher was a Spy: The Mysterious Life of Moe Berg ( New York:
Vintage Books, 1994) p. 240
Leahy ended the debate by commissioning a report on the history of the OSS on July 26, 1946.
This “War Report of the OSS” was a broad, general history of the OSS that remained Top Secret
until 1976. It provided just a summary of its actions
96
. It was careful to omit information that
did not cast the OSS in a positive light. What little was revealed immediately after the war was
heavily censored.
Ultimately the OSS was a triumph of organization and planning. General Donovan built
an organization of around 13,000 individuals on short notice, organizing them into a worldwide
intelligence agency, with an archival system that is still notable many decades later
97
. This
agency combined the roles of what the UK used four agencies with separate missions to
accomplish, drawing from both the very best in academia and the military.
However, the shortcomings of the Office of Strategic Services must also be noted. The
OSS inherited the hierarchical structure of the military, meaning that lower-ranking members
found their input ignored or overlooked easily, such as analysts Duker & Dwork having their
reports on the holocaust repeatedly ignored due to their low military rank. This hierarchical
structure was clearly reinforced by the tendency of the OSS to recruit from the Ivy League
colleges, as the leaders of the OSS were recruited from the protestant members of upper social
classes. The internal political strife in American government at the time also greatly hindered
the ability of the OSS to perform intelligence work in the entire Pacific Theater and South
America were closed to OSS activity due to Donovan’s rivalries with Hoover and MacArthur.
96
United States Department of War, Strategic Services Unit. War Report, Office of Strategic
Services by Kermit Roosevelt, 1947.
97
Dawidoff, Nicholas. The Catcher was a Spy: The Mysterious Life of Moe Berg ( New York:
Vintage Books, 1994) p. 240
The OSS also inherited the problems of racism and sexism that were inherent to
American society in the 1940’s. The racial and sexual prejudices of the era worked to limit the
effectiveness of the OSS by reducing the available talent they had to draw from.
Furthermore, the OSS clearly had to engage in numerous espionage activities that were
well outside the normal scope of espionage and crossed into violations of international law as
well as their own policies. The breaching of diplomatic pouches was a violation of standards of
diplomatic relations, even if it would not be formal international law until after the War
98
. That
the OSS violated not only international law against the use of prisoners of war as double-agents,
but violated its own classified internal regulations regarding the issue casts light on the reasons
of why there was talk of destroying OSS records and why the records of operations such as Iron
Cross were fragmentary at best. It also puts more context on the actions of President Truman to
disband the OSS and his ostracism of General Donovan after the war. The OSS turning over
espionage equipment to the NKVD as part of an exchange program that had been prohibited by
Presidential order is another example of an extremely questionable espionage activity.
The Office of Strategic Services achieved great things during World War II, albeit at
ethical costs. The OSS violated international law, domestic regulations and policies, and ancient
diplomatic traditions. The history of the OSS, both successes and failures in espionage, is further
besmirched by the taint of the prejudices of the time, which caused the leaders of the Office of
Strategic services to discount the achievements or information gained by some of the agents due
to their gender, religion, or socio-economic status.
98
United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1962, p. 2
American society in the 1940’s. The racial and sexual prejudices of the era worked to limit the
effectiveness of the OSS by reducing the available talent they had to draw from.
Furthermore, the OSS clearly had to engage in numerous espionage activities that were
well outside the normal scope of espionage and crossed into violations of international law as
well as their own policies. The breaching of diplomatic pouches was a violation of standards of
diplomatic relations, even if it would not be formal international law until after the War
98
. That
the OSS violated not only international law against the use of prisoners of war as double-agents,
but violated its own classified internal regulations regarding the issue casts light on the reasons
of why there was talk of destroying OSS records and why the records of operations such as Iron
Cross were fragmentary at best. It also puts more context on the actions of President Truman to
disband the OSS and his ostracism of General Donovan after the war. The OSS turning over
espionage equipment to the NKVD as part of an exchange program that had been prohibited by
Presidential order is another example of an extremely questionable espionage activity.
The Office of Strategic Services achieved great things during World War II, albeit at
ethical costs. The OSS violated international law, domestic regulations and policies, and ancient
diplomatic traditions. The history of the OSS, both successes and failures in espionage, is further
besmirched by the taint of the prejudices of the time, which caused the leaders of the Office of
Strategic services to discount the achievements or information gained by some of the agents due
to their gender, religion, or socio-economic status.
98
United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1962, p. 2
Bibliography
Government Manuals:
Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction
Branch, 1944)
Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction
Branch, 1944)
Office of Strategic Services, Operational Groups Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction
Branch, 1944)
Office of Strategic Services, Simple Sabotage Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch,
1944)
Office of Strategic Services, Morale Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction
Branch, 1943)
Office of Strategic Services, Maritime Unit Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch,
1944)
Intelligence Reports:
Seventh Army Office of Strategic Services Section. Dachau, by Major Alfred L. Howes, Technical Sergeant
John S. Denney and Technician 3rd Class Chas W. Denney, 1946. Accessed February 14, 2015
http://www.paperlessarchives.com/FreeTitles/DachauOSSSection7thArmyReport.pdf
United States Department of War, Strategic Services Unit. War Report, Office of Strategic Services by
Kermit Roosevelt, 1947. Accessed February 14, 2015
http://www.ossreborn.com/files/War%20Report%20of%20the%20OSS%20Volume%201.pdf
Office of Strategic Services, “CORNFLAKES” Project Report. Accessed February 14, 2015
http://research.archives.gov/description/595125
Personnel Files:
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of Allen Dulles, Accessed February 14, 2015
http://media.nara.gov/oss/Dulles_Allen.pdf
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of William J Casey, Accessed February 14, 2015
http://media.nara.gov/oss/Casey_William_J.pdf
Court Cases:
United States v. Anton Dostler, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals Vol I, 22, (U.S. Military
Commission at Rome, 1945)
Treaties
United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1962
Government Manuals:
Office of Strategic Services, Special Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction
Branch, 1944)
Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction
Branch, 1944)
Office of Strategic Services, Operational Groups Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction
Branch, 1944)
Office of Strategic Services, Simple Sabotage Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch,
1944)
Office of Strategic Services, Morale Operations Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction
Branch, 1943)
Office of Strategic Services, Maritime Unit Field Manual (Washington D.C., OSS Reproduction Branch,
1944)
Intelligence Reports:
Seventh Army Office of Strategic Services Section. Dachau, by Major Alfred L. Howes, Technical Sergeant
John S. Denney and Technician 3rd Class Chas W. Denney, 1946. Accessed February 14, 2015
http://www.paperlessarchives.com/FreeTitles/DachauOSSSection7thArmyReport.pdf
United States Department of War, Strategic Services Unit. War Report, Office of Strategic Services by
Kermit Roosevelt, 1947. Accessed February 14, 2015
http://www.ossreborn.com/files/War%20Report%20of%20the%20OSS%20Volume%201.pdf
Office of Strategic Services, “CORNFLAKES” Project Report. Accessed February 14, 2015
http://research.archives.gov/description/595125
Personnel Files:
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of Allen Dulles, Accessed February 14, 2015
http://media.nara.gov/oss/Dulles_Allen.pdf
Office of Strategic Services, 1946, Personnel File of William J Casey, Accessed February 14, 2015
http://media.nara.gov/oss/Casey_William_J.pdf
Court Cases:
United States v. Anton Dostler, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals Vol I, 22, (U.S. Military
Commission at Rome, 1945)
Treaties
United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1962
Executive Orders and Presidential Letters
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 1942. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: F.D. Roosevelt,
“Military Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services. June 13, 1942”
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Order 9241, Federal Register 7, no. 7185 “Extension of the
Provisions of Executive Order 9001 of December 27, 1941 to the Office of Strategic Services, United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff”, (September 1, 1942)
Harry Truman, Executive Order 9621, Federal Register 10, no. 12033 “Termination of the Office of
Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions”, (September 20, 1945)
Truman, Harry S., 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, “Letter to
General William J. Donovan on the Termination of the Office of Strategic Services”
Award Citations:
United States Army, Medal of Honor Citation of Lieutenant Colonel William Donovan, 1922
United States Army, Distinguished Unit Citation of OSS Detachment 101, January 27, 1946
Government Training Films:
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Basic Military Training, Office of Strategic Services.
Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=veMVDEodFCY
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Undercover Training, Office of Strategic Services. Accessed
February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbuF_QwRP-E
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Body Search, Office of Strategic Services. Accessed February
14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ezxtb2zcfhU
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Meet the Enemy (German), Office of Strategic Services.
Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdQSYXBHBJY
Government Briefing and Intelligence Report Films
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – A Report on German Morale, Office of Strategic Services.
Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJlXUdayHxQ
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – German Newsreel Analysis #240, Office of Strategic
Services. Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6Lg8WDozHI
Books:
United States Department of Defense. Department of the Army. Center for Military History, U.S. Army
Special Operations in World War II by David W. Hogan Jr. 1992
Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern American espionage
(New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011)
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass
Publishers, 2003)
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 1942. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: F.D. Roosevelt,
“Military Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services. June 13, 1942”
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Order 9241, Federal Register 7, no. 7185 “Extension of the
Provisions of Executive Order 9001 of December 27, 1941 to the Office of Strategic Services, United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff”, (September 1, 1942)
Harry Truman, Executive Order 9621, Federal Register 10, no. 12033 “Termination of the Office of
Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions”, (September 20, 1945)
Truman, Harry S., 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, “Letter to
General William J. Donovan on the Termination of the Office of Strategic Services”
Award Citations:
United States Army, Medal of Honor Citation of Lieutenant Colonel William Donovan, 1922
United States Army, Distinguished Unit Citation of OSS Detachment 101, January 27, 1946
Government Training Films:
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Basic Military Training, Office of Strategic Services.
Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=veMVDEodFCY
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. Undercover Training, Office of Strategic Services. Accessed
February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbuF_QwRP-E
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Body Search, Office of Strategic Services. Accessed February
14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ezxtb2zcfhU
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1943. O.S.S. Meet the Enemy (German), Office of Strategic Services.
Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xdQSYXBHBJY
Government Briefing and Intelligence Report Films
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – A Report on German Morale, Office of Strategic Services.
Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJlXUdayHxQ
Field Photographic Branch, dir. 1944. O.S.S. – German Newsreel Analysis #240, Office of Strategic
Services. Accessed February 14, 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6Lg8WDozHI
Books:
United States Department of Defense. Department of the Army. Center for Military History, U.S. Army
Special Operations in World War II by David W. Hogan Jr. 1992
Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and modern American espionage
(New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011)
Nelson MacPherson, American Intelligence in war-time London: The Story of the OSS (London, Frank Cass
Publishers, 2003)
Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (New York,
Rowman & Littlefield 2005)
Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House,
2001)
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001)
Juliette Pattinson, Behind Enemy Lines: Gender, Passing and the Special Operation Executive in the
Second World War (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007)
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005)
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during
World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979)
David Bankier, Ed. Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust (New York, Enigma Books, 1996)
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C.,
National Archives and Records Administration, 1992)
William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America’s Most Successful
Guerrilla Force (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 217-220
Mary S. Lovell, Cast No Shadow: The life of the American spy who changed the course of World War II
(New York, Pantheon Books, 1992)
Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York, Basic Books, 1983)
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich – The Memoirs of Albert Speer (London, Orion Books, 1970)
Newspaper Articles:
Editorial, Wall Street Journal, December 1, 1938
Journal Articles:
CIA Historical Review Program, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101”, Studies in Intelligence
(September 1993) https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol4no3/html/v04i3a11p_0001.htm Accessed 04/15/2015
Troy J. Sacquety, “Behind Japanese Lines in Burma”, Studies in Intelligence, Fall/Winter 2001
John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training during World War II”, Studies in
Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010) pp 1-28
Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 21-34
Mark Murphy, “The OSS-German POW Controversy”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 57-66
Leonard C. Courier, “OSS Mission to the Burgundian Maquis”, Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1985) pp 60-
65
Rowman & Littlefield 2005)
Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House,
2001)
Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001)
Juliette Pattinson, Behind Enemy Lines: Gender, Passing and the Special Operation Executive in the
Second World War (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007)
Richard Breitman, Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005)
Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during
World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979)
David Bankier, Ed. Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust (New York, Enigma Books, 1996)
George C. Chalou, Ed, The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II (Washington D.C.,
National Archives and Records Administration, 1992)
William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America’s Most Successful
Guerrilla Force (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1963), pp. 217-220
Mary S. Lovell, Cast No Shadow: The life of the American spy who changed the course of World War II
(New York, Pantheon Books, 1992)
Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the origins of the C.I.A. (New York, Basic Books, 1983)
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich – The Memoirs of Albert Speer (London, Orion Books, 1970)
Newspaper Articles:
Editorial, Wall Street Journal, December 1, 1938
Journal Articles:
CIA Historical Review Program, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101”, Studies in Intelligence
(September 1993) https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol4no3/html/v04i3a11p_0001.htm Accessed 04/15/2015
Troy J. Sacquety, “Behind Japanese Lines in Burma”, Studies in Intelligence, Fall/Winter 2001
John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training during World War II”, Studies in
Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010) pp 1-28
Donald W. MacKinnon, “OSS Assessment Program”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 21-34
Mark Murphy, “The OSS-German POW Controversy”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1979) pp 57-66
Leonard C. Courier, “OSS Mission to the Burgundian Maquis”, Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1985) pp 60-
65
Jack B. Pfeifer, “OSS Propaganda in Europe and the Far East”, Studies in Intelligence (Fall 1984) pp 41-46
Kevin C. Ruffner, “On the Trail of Nazi Counterfeiters”, Studies in Intelligence Vol 46, No 2. (2002) pp 41-
53
William E. Colby, "OSS Operations in Norway: Skis and Daggers." Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1999-
2000): 53-60;
Peter Tompkins, “The OSS and Italian Partisans in World War II.” Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1998): 95-
103
Jennifer Davis Heaps, “Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic Services”, The American
Archivist Vol 61, No 2 (Fall 1998) pp 287-308
Mark Guglielmo, “The Contribution of Economists to Military Intelligence during World War II”, The
Journal of Economic History Vol 68, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 109-150
Kevin C. Ruffner, “On the Trail of Nazi Counterfeiters”, Studies in Intelligence Vol 46, No 2. (2002) pp 41-
53
William E. Colby, "OSS Operations in Norway: Skis and Daggers." Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1999-
2000): 53-60;
Peter Tompkins, “The OSS and Italian Partisans in World War II.” Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1998): 95-
103
Jennifer Davis Heaps, “Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic Services”, The American
Archivist Vol 61, No 2 (Fall 1998) pp 287-308
Mark Guglielmo, “The Contribution of Economists to Military Intelligence during World War II”, The
Journal of Economic History Vol 68, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 109-150
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