the problem of Evil: Free will (philosophy of Nature)
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Sep 12, 2024
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About This Presentation
Evil, according to St. Augustine is a privation of the good
Slide Content
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
A DEPARTMENTAL PRESENTATION
BY
2007/2008 YR IV PHILOSOPHY CLASS
A DEPARTMENTAL PRESENTATION
BY
2007/2008 YR IV PHILOSOPHY CLASS
WHAT IS EVIL?
Taken in itself, evil imports the absence of a good or
perfection due to a nature or a being.
Not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can
be taken in the privative and in a negative sense. Absence of
good taken in the negative sense is not evil; otherwise,
otherwise it would follow that not having the good belonging
to something else would be evil.
The absence of a good taken in a privative sense is evil
Evil exist only in a subject or in a being which by its nature is
good
Taken in itself, evil imports the absence of a good or
perfection due to a nature or a being.
Not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can
be taken in the privative and in a negative sense. Absence of
good taken in the negative sense is not evil; otherwise,
otherwise it would follow that not having the good belonging
to something else would be evil.
The absence of a good taken in a privative sense is evil
Evil exist only in a subject or in a being which by its nature is
good
THE CAUSE OF EVIL
Evil has a cause by way of an agent, not directly,
but accidentally.
According to Aquinas, God causes in things the
good of the order of the universe, and that there
should be things that can, and do sometimes fail.
Consequently and as it were, by accident, God
causes corruption in natural and voluntary things.
However, God does not will evil for its own sake.
Evil has a cause by way of an agent, not directly,
but accidentally.
According to Aquinas, God causes in things the
good of the order of the universe, and that there
should be things that can, and do sometimes fail.
Consequently and as it were, by accident, God
causes corruption in natural and voluntary things.
However, God does not will evil for its own sake.
Evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect. In the
action, evil is caused by reason of the defect in some
principle of action, either of the principal or instrumental
agent. In man, as a principal agent, one may attribute this
principle of action responsible for evil (and good) to be the
power of the soul called the Will, while an instrumental agent
responsible for evil would be the ineptitude of an organ or
part of the body.
Aquinas maintains that in so far as evil is caused by the
defect or fault of the agent, evil cannot be reduced to God,
since there is no defect in God, but the highest perfection.
Aquinas points out that the order of justice belongs to the
universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to
sinners. And so Aquinas posits that God is the author of evil
by way of penalty, and not of evil which is fault or defect of
the agent.
action, evil is caused by reason of the defect in some
principle of action, either of the principal or instrumental
agent. In man, as a principal agent, one may attribute this
principle of action responsible for evil (and good) to be the
power of the soul called the Will, while an instrumental agent
responsible for evil would be the ineptitude of an organ or
part of the body.
Aquinas maintains that in so far as evil is caused by the
defect or fault of the agent, evil cannot be reduced to God,
since there is no defect in God, but the highest perfection.
Aquinas points out that the order of justice belongs to the
universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to
sinners. And so Aquinas posits that God is the author of evil
by way of penalty, and not of evil which is fault or defect of
the agent.
KINDS OF EVIL
Moral evil: Moral evil results from the actions of free
creatures. It consist essentially in the disorder of the will, it is
also called fault or sin. Murder, rape, lying, theft, torturing,
character defects like greed, deceit, cruelty, wantonness, and
cowardice are examples.
Natural evil: Natural evil includes the terrible pain and
suffering, and untimely death caused by natural processes or
cataclysms such as earthquakes, fire, floods, typhoons,
epidemic, landslide, and famine. These occurrences are not
determined by the human will.
Moral evil: Moral evil results from the actions of free
creatures. It consist essentially in the disorder of the will, it is
also called fault or sin. Murder, rape, lying, theft, torturing,
character defects like greed, deceit, cruelty, wantonness, and
cowardice are examples.
Natural evil: Natural evil includes the terrible pain and
suffering, and untimely death caused by natural processes or
cataclysms such as earthquakes, fire, floods, typhoons,
epidemic, landslide, and famine. These occurrences are not
determined by the human will.
INTRODUCING THE LOGICAL
PROBLEM OF EVIL
(1) God is omnipotent (i.e, All-powerful).
(2) God is omniscient (i.e., All-knowing).
(3) God is perfectly good.
(4) Evil exists.
PROBLEM OF EVIL
(1) God is omnipotent (i.e, All-powerful).
(2) God is omniscient (i.e., All-knowing).
(3) God is perfectly good.
(4) Evil exists.
A set of propositions is logically inconsistent if
and only if:
(a) that set includes a direct contradiction of the
form “A & NOT-A”;
or
(b) if a direct contradiction can be deduced from
that set.
and only if:
(a) that set includes a direct contradiction of the
form “A & NOT-A”;
or
(b) if a direct contradiction can be deduced from
that set.
Atheologians reason as follows:
(6) If God is omnipotent, He would be able to
prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world.
(7) If God is omniscient, He would know about all
of the evil and suffering in the world and how to
eliminate or prevent it.
(8) If God is perfectly good, he would want to
prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world.
(6) If God is omnipotent, He would be able to
prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world.
(7) If God is omniscient, He would know about all
of the evil and suffering in the world and how to
eliminate or prevent it.
(8) If God is perfectly good, he would want to
prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world.
Reflecting upon statements (6) through (8) in the light of
the fact of evil and suffering in reality, Atheologians are led
to the following conclusions:
(9) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the
world, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, is
powerful enough to prevent it, and yet does not prevent it,
he must not be perfectly good.
(10) If God knows about all of the evil and suffering, know
how to eliminate or prevent it, wants to prevent it, and
yet does not do so, he must not be all-powerful.
(11) If God is powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and
suffering, wants to do so, and yet does not, he must
not know about all of the suffering or know how to eliminate
or prevent it - that is, he must not be all-knowing.
the fact of evil and suffering in reality, Atheologians are led
to the following conclusions:
(9) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the
world, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, is
powerful enough to prevent it, and yet does not prevent it,
he must not be perfectly good.
(10) If God knows about all of the evil and suffering, know
how to eliminate or prevent it, wants to prevent it, and
yet does not do so, he must not be all-powerful.
(11) If God is powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and
suffering, wants to do so, and yet does not, he must
not know about all of the suffering or know how to eliminate
or prevent it - that is, he must not be all-knowing.
From statements (9) through (11), the Atheologian infers
that:
(12) If evil and suffering exist, then God is either not
omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good.
But evil and suffering obviously do exist, we thus get:
(13) God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not
perfectly good.
It is obvious that statement (13) conflicts with (1), (2) and
(3) above. This is made even clearer if we combine (1), (2)
and (3) into the following single statement:
(14) God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good.
Statement (14) expresses the central belief of classical
theism.
that:
(12) If evil and suffering exist, then God is either not
omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good.
But evil and suffering obviously do exist, we thus get:
(13) God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not
perfectly good.
It is obvious that statement (13) conflicts with (1), (2) and
(3) above. This is made even clearer if we combine (1), (2)
and (3) into the following single statement:
(14) God is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good.
Statement (14) expresses the central belief of classical
theism.
Therefore, analyzing statement (13) & (14):
(13) God is either not omnipotent, not
omniscient, or not perfectly good;
and
(14) God is omnipotent, omniscient and
perfectly good;
The atheologian conclude that both (13) &
(14) can not be true at the same time, and so
these statements are logically inconsistent or
contradictory.
(13) God is either not omnipotent, not
omniscient, or not perfectly good;
and
(14) God is omnipotent, omniscient and
perfectly good;
The atheologian conclude that both (13) &
(14) can not be true at the same time, and so
these statements are logically inconsistent or
contradictory.
LOGICAL CONSISTENCY AND THE LOGICAL
PROBLEM OF EVIL
(15) A set of statements is logically consistent if and only if it is
possible for all of them to be true at the same time.
(15) does not stipulate that consistent statements must actually
be true at the same time. They may all be false or some may
be true and others false. Consistency only requires that it be
possible for all of the statements to be true (even if that
possibility is never actualized).
Also, (15) does not say anything about plausibility. It does not
demand that the joint of a consistent set of statements be
plausible. In other words, it does not require that the
conjunction of statements (1) through (4) be plausible.
PROBLEM OF EVIL
(15) A set of statements is logically consistent if and only if it is
possible for all of them to be true at the same time.
(15) does not stipulate that consistent statements must actually
be true at the same time. They may all be false or some may
be true and others false. Consistency only requires that it be
possible for all of the statements to be true (even if that
possibility is never actualized).
Also, (15) does not say anything about plausibility. It does not
demand that the joint of a consistent set of statements be
plausible. In other words, it does not require that the
conjunction of statements (1) through (4) be plausible.
But the Atheologian maintains that statements
(1) through (4) couldn’t possibly all be true at
the same time, i.e.,
(16) It is not possible for God and evil to co-
exist.
Now, the Theist goal must be to demonstrate
that (16) is false, i.e., that it is possible for God
and evil to co-exist.
(1) through (4) couldn’t possibly all be true at
the same time, i.e.,
(16) It is not possible for God and evil to co-
exist.
Now, the Theist goal must be to demonstrate
that (16) is false, i.e., that it is possible for God
and evil to co-exist.
Thus, the theists suggest that perhaps God has
a good reason for allowing the evil and suffering
that we do suffer.
We consider such reason that could morally
justify God’s allowing evil and suffering to be the
kind of reason philosophers of religion call
“morally sufficient reason.” In other words, this
is a moral reason by which a thing, whether
caused or uncaused, exist.
a good reason for allowing the evil and suffering
that we do suffer.
We consider such reason that could morally
justify God’s allowing evil and suffering to be the
kind of reason philosophers of religion call
“morally sufficient reason.” In other words, this
is a moral reason by which a thing, whether
caused or uncaused, exist.
Now, assuming God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing
suffering and evil to occur, let us then consider the following
statement:
(17)It is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for
allowing evil.
If God were to have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil,
would it be possible for God to be omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly good, and yet for there to be evil and suffering?
Expectedly, the theist would answer “Yes.”
suffering and evil to occur, let us then consider the following
statement:
(17)It is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for
allowing evil.
If God were to have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil,
would it be possible for God to be omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly good, and yet for there to be evil and suffering?
Expectedly, the theist would answer “Yes.”
If (17) were true, then (9) through (12) would have to be modified. to
read:
(9' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good – unless he
has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(10' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not be all-powerful – unless he has a
morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(11' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not know about all of the suffering or
know how to eliminate or prevent it (i.e., he must not be all knowing)
– unless he has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(12' ) If evil and suffering exist, then either: a) God is not omnipotent,
not omniscient, or not perfectly good;
or b) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
read:
(9' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good – unless he
has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(10' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not be all-powerful – unless he has a
morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(11' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not know about all of the suffering or
know how to eliminate or prevent it (i.e., he must not be all knowing)
– unless he has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(12' ) If evil and suffering exist, then either: a) God is not omnipotent,
not omniscient, or not perfectly good;
or b) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
Thus, (9) through (12) would now read:
(9' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good – unless he
has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(10' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not be all-powerful – unless he has a
morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(11' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not know about all of the suffering or
know how to eliminate or prevent it (i.e., he must not be all knowing)
– unless he has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(12' ) If evil and suffering exist, then either:
(a) God is not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good;
or
(b) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(9' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good – unless he
has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(10' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not be all-powerful – unless he has a
morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(11' ) If God knows about all the evil and suffering in the world, knows
how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and
yet does not prevent it, he must not know about all of the suffering or
know how to eliminate or prevent it (i.e., he must not be all knowing)
– unless he has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
(12' ) If evil and suffering exist, then either:
(a) God is not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good;
or
(b) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.
Now, the upshot behind this logical problem of evil,
as some theist would suggest is the question
whether (17 ) is true. i.e.,
(17) It is possible that God has a morally sufficient
reason for allowing evil.
If (17) is true, then the logical problem of evil fails to
prove the non-existence of God. However, if (17)
is false, then it seems that (13) would be true:
(13) God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or
not perfectly good.
as some theist would suggest is the question
whether (17 ) is true. i.e.,
(17) It is possible that God has a morally sufficient
reason for allowing evil.
If (17) is true, then the logical problem of evil fails to
prove the non-existence of God. However, if (17)
is false, then it seems that (13) would be true:
(13) God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or
not perfectly good.
Now, an implicit assumption here is that:
(18) It is not morally permissible for God to allow evil and suffering to
occur unless he has a morally sufficient reason for doing so.
But assuming God does not have a morally sufficient reason for allowing
evil, (18) would imply that
(19) God is doing something morally inappropriate or blameworthy in
allowing evil to occur;
and
(20) If God is doing something morally inappropriate or blameworthy,
then God is not perfectly good.
If (19) and (20) are true, then God, as portrayed by orthodox theism,
does not exist.
Is (18) true?
(18) It is not morally permissible for God to allow evil and suffering to
occur unless he has a morally sufficient reason for doing so.
But assuming God does not have a morally sufficient reason for allowing
evil, (18) would imply that
(19) God is doing something morally inappropriate or blameworthy in
allowing evil to occur;
and
(20) If God is doing something morally inappropriate or blameworthy,
then God is not perfectly good.
If (19) and (20) are true, then God, as portrayed by orthodox theism,
does not exist.
Is (18) true?
ALVIN PLANTINGA’S FREEWILL DEFENSE AND
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Plantinga posits that people in the actual world are free
in the most robust sense of the term. They are fully free
and responsible for their actions and decisions. Hence,
they can do what is right and be praised, or can do
wrong and be blamed or punished for their actions.
Consequently, Plantinga, considers the following as a
possible Morally Sufficient Reason (MSR) why God
allows suffering and evil to occur:
MSR1: God has created persons with morally significant
free will and which is of immense value. God could not
eliminate much of the evil and suffering in the world
without also eliminating the greater good of having
created persons with free will, persons with whom He
could have relationships and who are able to love one
another and do good deeds.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Plantinga posits that people in the actual world are free
in the most robust sense of the term. They are fully free
and responsible for their actions and decisions. Hence,
they can do what is right and be praised, or can do
wrong and be blamed or punished for their actions.
Consequently, Plantinga, considers the following as a
possible Morally Sufficient Reason (MSR) why God
allows suffering and evil to occur:
MSR1: God has created persons with morally significant
free will and which is of immense value. God could not
eliminate much of the evil and suffering in the world
without also eliminating the greater good of having
created persons with free will, persons with whom He
could have relationships and who are able to love one
another and do good deeds.
World 1
(a) God creates persons with morally significant free will:
(b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to
choose
what is right and avoid what is wrong; and
© There is evil and suffering in world 1.
World 1 is clearly possible.
(a) God creates persons with morally significant free will:
(b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to
choose
what is right and avoid what is wrong; and
© There is evil and suffering in world 1.
World 1 is clearly possible.
World 2
(a) God does not create persons with morally significant free will:
(b) God causally determine people in every situation to choose
what is right and avoid what is wrong; and
© There is no evil or suffering in world 2.
Considering the assumption that human beings are genuinely
free creatures, you and I would not exist in this type of world
since we are creatures with morally significant free will. Again it
is not impossible for God to causally determine people in every
situation to choose what is right and to avoid what is wrong.
Hence it seems clearly possible that whatever creatures God
creates in such a world would not have morally significant free
will and that there would be no evil or suffering . World 2 is also
possible.
(a) God does not create persons with morally significant free will:
(b) God causally determine people in every situation to choose
what is right and avoid what is wrong; and
© There is no evil or suffering in world 2.
Considering the assumption that human beings are genuinely
free creatures, you and I would not exist in this type of world
since we are creatures with morally significant free will. Again it
is not impossible for God to causally determine people in every
situation to choose what is right and to avoid what is wrong.
Hence it seems clearly possible that whatever creatures God
creates in such a world would not have morally significant free
will and that there would be no evil or suffering . World 2 is also
possible.
World 3:
(a) God creates persons with morally significant free will:
(b) God causally determine people in every situation to choose
what is right and avoid what is wrong; and
© There is no evil or suffering in world 3.
World 3 is not possible because if persons have morally
significant free will and yet God still causally determines them
to choose right and avoid wrong, then their free will is not free
in the real sense. This scenario raises a logical inconsistency
and impossibility. We would be physically incapable of doing
what we otherwise want to do. This world fits into the claim of
the atheologians for a world free from evil and suffering while
assuming that human free will remain untouched. But this
would be expecting God to do the logically impossible.
According to Plantinga, divine omnipotence involves an ability
to do anything that is logically possible, but precludes the
logically impossible.
(a) God creates persons with morally significant free will:
(b) God causally determine people in every situation to choose
what is right and avoid what is wrong; and
© There is no evil or suffering in world 3.
World 3 is not possible because if persons have morally
significant free will and yet God still causally determines them
to choose right and avoid wrong, then their free will is not free
in the real sense. This scenario raises a logical inconsistency
and impossibility. We would be physically incapable of doing
what we otherwise want to do. This world fits into the claim of
the atheologians for a world free from evil and suffering while
assuming that human free will remain untouched. But this
would be expecting God to do the logically impossible.
According to Plantinga, divine omnipotence involves an ability
to do anything that is logically possible, but precludes the
logically impossible.
World 4
(a) God creates persons with morally significant free will:
(b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is
right and avoid what is wrong; and
© There is no evil and suffering in world 4.
Prima facie, World 4 would be seen by most people as impossible. But it is
not impossible. That there is no evil or suffering in world 4 is not because
God Causally determines people always to choose right and to avoid wrong.
If there nothing bad in this world it is because the free creatures have used
their morally significant free will well by always choosing the right thing.
Something is logically possible just when it can be conceived without
contradiction. There is nothing contradictory about supposing that there is a
possible world where free creatures always make the right choices and
never go wrong. Of course, its highly improbable given our understanding of
human nature. But improbability and impossibility are two different things. In
fact this world is depicted in the Genesis story of Adam and Eve, here it was
God’s will that significant free human beings live in the Garden of Eden and
always obey God’s commandment. If Adam and Eve had followed God’s
plan, then world 4, according to the theist belief, would have been our actual
world.
(a) God creates persons with morally significant free will:
(b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is
right and avoid what is wrong; and
© There is no evil and suffering in world 4.
Prima facie, World 4 would be seen by most people as impossible. But it is
not impossible. That there is no evil or suffering in world 4 is not because
God Causally determines people always to choose right and to avoid wrong.
If there nothing bad in this world it is because the free creatures have used
their morally significant free will well by always choosing the right thing.
Something is logically possible just when it can be conceived without
contradiction. There is nothing contradictory about supposing that there is a
possible world where free creatures always make the right choices and
never go wrong. Of course, its highly improbable given our understanding of
human nature. But improbability and impossibility are two different things. In
fact this world is depicted in the Genesis story of Adam and Eve, here it was
God’s will that significant free human beings live in the Garden of Eden and
always obey God’s commandment. If Adam and Eve had followed God’s
plan, then world 4, according to the theist belief, would have been our actual
world.
FREE WILL AND NATURAL EVIL
For natural evil are not contingent on our morally significant free will.
Plantinga, however, thinks the contrary. For him free will defense can
be used to solve the logical problem of evil as it pertains to natural
evil. Consider the following possible Morally Sufficient Reason God
might have for allowing natural evil:
MSR 2 :God allowed natural evil to enter the world as part of Adam
and Eve’s punishment for their sin in the Garden of Eden. Thus Adam
and Eve’s wrong use of their free will led to a moral evil. MSR2 claims
that all natural evil followed as the result of the worlds first moral evil.
For the scientist, however, the so called ‘natural evils’ occur
because of the nature of the elements, i.e., the nature of nature
itself. Nature is strictly harmonious at its core and through all its parts, and
all its movements are towards a restoration of harmony -- which is
equilibrium It is the way the world works. Cataclysmic events
have continued from the universe's inception through to the
arrival of living beings, and continues into the future.
For natural evil are not contingent on our morally significant free will.
Plantinga, however, thinks the contrary. For him free will defense can
be used to solve the logical problem of evil as it pertains to natural
evil. Consider the following possible Morally Sufficient Reason God
might have for allowing natural evil:
MSR 2 :God allowed natural evil to enter the world as part of Adam
and Eve’s punishment for their sin in the Garden of Eden. Thus Adam
and Eve’s wrong use of their free will led to a moral evil. MSR2 claims
that all natural evil followed as the result of the worlds first moral evil.
For the scientist, however, the so called ‘natural evils’ occur
because of the nature of the elements, i.e., the nature of nature
itself. Nature is strictly harmonious at its core and through all its parts, and
all its movements are towards a restoration of harmony -- which is
equilibrium It is the way the world works. Cataclysmic events
have continued from the universe's inception through to the
arrival of living beings, and continues into the future.
CONCLUSION
END
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
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