The Road to the Great War IBDP Japan Part 2
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Oct 29, 2025
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About This Presentation
IB DP Japan, Road to the Great War Part 2 Paper 1
Slide Content
New beginnings? 1936
• post-coup (“February 26
th
”) Japan was a confused and volatile place
• at the execution of the coup plotters, those about to die shouted “Long live the
emperor” (Kita Ikki notably refused)
• many in Japanese society, including Prince Chichibu (Hirohito’s brother), were
sympathetic to the coup men despite their failure
• at the time Japan was full of ultra-nationalist organizations that had appeared in recent
years, for instance the Amur (or Black Dragon) Society, which wanted that river to be
Japan’s northern border (following a showdown with the Soviets)
• after the coup many of those involved lost places of high command but reappeared all
the same
• ‘Imperial Way’ man Araki Sadao, for instance, who was to be appointed PM had the
coup succeeded, found himself Minister of Education
• as such he pushed for all citizens to embrace the consciousness, “I am a Japanese”
• Fukuzawa may have called for “departure from Asia and entry into the West,” the coup
men and others of their ilk wanted to reverse this
• the militaristic revival based on ancient lore (begun long
ago by Meiji Japan) sought no further embrace of the West
• it rejected the false gods of capitalism, calling instead for
the virtues of Japan’s rural past
• post-coup (“February 26
th
”) Japan was a confused and volatile place
• at the execution of the coup plotters, those about to die shouted “Long live the
emperor” (Kita Ikki notably refused)
• many in Japanese society, including Prince Chichibu (Hirohito’s brother), were
sympathetic to the coup men despite their failure
• at the time Japan was full of ultra-nationalist organizations that had appeared in recent
years, for instance the Amur (or Black Dragon) Society, which wanted that river to be
Japan’s northern border (following a showdown with the Soviets)
• after the coup many of those involved lost places of high command but reappeared all
the same
• ‘Imperial Way’ man Araki Sadao, for instance, who was to be appointed PM had the
coup succeeded, found himself Minister of Education
• as such he pushed for all citizens to embrace the consciousness, “I am a Japanese”
• Fukuzawa may have called for “departure from Asia and entry into the West,” the coup
men and others of their ilk wanted to reverse this
• the militaristic revival based on ancient lore (begun long
ago by Meiji Japan) sought no further embrace of the West
• it rejected the false gods of capitalism, calling instead for
the virtues of Japan’s rural past
The strange incident of the man at the bridge in the night time 1937
“At long last we take the
plunge”
• military control meant Manchurian expansion was to be fully supported and
the way to a Chinese invasion quickly paved
• it also meant the Anti-Comintern Pact: the new PM being forced to sign an
anti-communist alliance with Germany
• still the governing Diet sought ways to prevent a slide into military rule, the
introduction to the government of Prince Konoe being a prime example
• yet fundamentalist right wing forces were just awaiting the excuse needed to
invade China proper, indeed they did much to manufacture it
• at the Marco Polo Bridge a search for a missing Japanese soldier is soon
transformed into a fight with Chinese forces
• although not prearranged, Japan had done much to prepare the fertile ground
for both an this incident and an invasion
• once the fighting started it
quickly escalated
PM Konoe could do little to contain it
and soon he too was calling for the
‘annihilation’ of China
“At long last we take the
plunge”
• military control meant Manchurian expansion was to be fully supported and
the way to a Chinese invasion quickly paved
• it also meant the Anti-Comintern Pact: the new PM being forced to sign an
anti-communist alliance with Germany
• still the governing Diet sought ways to prevent a slide into military rule, the
introduction to the government of Prince Konoe being a prime example
• yet fundamentalist right wing forces were just awaiting the excuse needed to
invade China proper, indeed they did much to manufacture it
• at the Marco Polo Bridge a search for a missing Japanese soldier is soon
transformed into a fight with Chinese forces
• although not prearranged, Japan had done much to prepare the fertile ground
for both an this incident and an invasion
• once the fighting started it
quickly escalated
PM Konoe could do little to contain it
and soon he too was calling for the
‘annihilation’ of China
Total war and the Rape of Nanking 1937
• it was now “total war”, and atrocities soon followed (with not only Japan to blame)
• at Tungchow Chinese troops massacred Japanese civilians, igniting Japanese fury
• within a month a fierce battle had begun at Shanghai and Japan’s propaganda
machine and government ministers now spoke of “holy war”
• after overcoming resolute Chinese resistance, Japanese forces advanced on
Nanking, the capital, bent on vengeance
• there one of the century’s great atrocities, a six-week long orgy of violence occurs
that, while not government sanctioned, will taint Japan’s image for decades
• the Japanese began their mopping up operations, killing anyone suspected
of being a soldier (they looked for callused hands as a sign)
• the conquering Japanese humiliate, dehumanize, rape and kill
• some 200,000 are killed and over 20,000 women raped (some luckily were
saved in an International Safety Zone established by Western missionaries)
• Chiang shifts his capital inland, the brutal war continues
“I know I’m
early but things
look great”
Matsui
• it was now “total war”, and atrocities soon followed (with not only Japan to blame)
• at Tungchow Chinese troops massacred Japanese civilians, igniting Japanese fury
• within a month a fierce battle had begun at Shanghai and Japan’s propaganda
machine and government ministers now spoke of “holy war”
• after overcoming resolute Chinese resistance, Japanese forces advanced on
Nanking, the capital, bent on vengeance
• there one of the century’s great atrocities, a six-week long orgy of violence occurs
that, while not government sanctioned, will taint Japan’s image for decades
• the Japanese began their mopping up operations, killing anyone suspected
of being a soldier (they looked for callused hands as a sign)
• the conquering Japanese humiliate, dehumanize, rape and kill
• some 200,000 are killed and over 20,000 women raped (some luckily were
saved in an International Safety Zone established by Western missionaries)
• Chiang shifts his capital inland, the brutal war continues
“I know I’m
early but things
look great”
Matsui
Turning point: Marco Polo Bridge 1937
• the situation was much changed by the time of the “China Incident”
• by then the forces unleashed in 1931 were even stronger, and Japan was more
politically isolated
• the government would allow this incident to evolve into a war due to the
now substantial populist clamour and the army’s militarist expansionism
• Japan would not (could not, said some) let China go until the ‘problem’ had been
brought to a glorious resolution
• leaving China a major stumbling block to any attempts at accommodation with the
USA (the atrocities that ensued only backed Japan further into a corner)
• ever more desperate to escape this quagmire, the Japanese behavior became that
much more erratic… the idea of a ‘holy war’ against China grew in popularity,
beyond even the military circles from whence it came
• as with the Mukden Incident, the government here had a choice (albeit a more
difficult one at this moment) but opted to approve of China’s destruction
“[We must]
eradicate the
Chinese threat,
[and I] will not
meet with the
Chinese”
Konoe
• the situation was much changed by the time of the “China Incident”
• by then the forces unleashed in 1931 were even stronger, and Japan was more
politically isolated
• the government would allow this incident to evolve into a war due to the
now substantial populist clamour and the army’s militarist expansionism
• Japan would not (could not, said some) let China go until the ‘problem’ had been
brought to a glorious resolution
• leaving China a major stumbling block to any attempts at accommodation with the
USA (the atrocities that ensued only backed Japan further into a corner)
• ever more desperate to escape this quagmire, the Japanese behavior became that
much more erratic… the idea of a ‘holy war’ against China grew in popularity,
beyond even the military circles from whence it came
• as with the Mukden Incident, the government here had a choice (albeit a more
difficult one at this moment) but opted to approve of China’s destruction
“[We must]
eradicate the
Chinese threat,
[and I] will not
meet with the
Chinese”
Konoe
• Japan’s presence in and aggression toward China in the 1930s amounted to an attack on
the Open Door policy, yet one that met with no US retaliation
• relations between Japan and America had soured over the decade, witness the US share
of Japan’s exports falling from 37% in 1929 to 14% in 1939
• that said, the US still provided Japan with 44% of its imports (cars, oil, iron, steel)
• when the Sino-Japanese War started in 1937 the US simply wanted to stay out, but this
proved difficult to do entirely
• the invasion and the Nanking massacre helped contribute to a slow revision in America’s
approach to China
• events in that country attracted considerable attention stateside, prompting some
Americans to express dismay at FDR’s refusal to impose serious sanctions
• so too did the sinking of the American gunboat Panay
• escorting three small oil tankers (and standing by to evacuate
embassy staff) the gunboat was sunk on Dec 12
th
• this ‘crime’ (and that of Nanking) caused a momentary rise in
tensions and elicited apologies from the Japanese
• but ultimately there was no bellicose response from Washington
• indeed, there was relief in Washington
when Tokyo apologized and offered
reparations
Of massacres and gunboats 1937
Panay
the Open Door policy, yet one that met with no US retaliation
• relations between Japan and America had soured over the decade, witness the US share
of Japan’s exports falling from 37% in 1929 to 14% in 1939
• that said, the US still provided Japan with 44% of its imports (cars, oil, iron, steel)
• when the Sino-Japanese War started in 1937 the US simply wanted to stay out, but this
proved difficult to do entirely
• the invasion and the Nanking massacre helped contribute to a slow revision in America’s
approach to China
• events in that country attracted considerable attention stateside, prompting some
Americans to express dismay at FDR’s refusal to impose serious sanctions
• so too did the sinking of the American gunboat Panay
• escorting three small oil tankers (and standing by to evacuate
embassy staff) the gunboat was sunk on Dec 12
th
• this ‘crime’ (and that of Nanking) caused a momentary rise in
tensions and elicited apologies from the Japanese
• but ultimately there was no bellicose response from Washington
• indeed, there was relief in Washington
when Tokyo apologized and offered
reparations
Of massacres and gunboats 1937
Panay
America’s response 1937
• the prospect of America being dragged into the hostilities, elicited a variety of
reactions: pacifist Congressman Louis Ludlow, for one, called for any declaration of war
to be contingent on a successful referendum (his proposal was narrowly voted down)
• be that as it may, the Panay attack and the atrocity in the capital did, however, signal a
rising anti-Japanese, pro-Chinese sentiment in the US that would persist (with some
calling for a ban on the sale of Japanese goods)
• the presence of Sinophiles attempting to influence Washington was nothing new
• the “China Lobby” of Jiang Jieshi supporters pushed Washington throughout the
period to fully support the helpless Asian giant
• some, like wealthy publisher Henry Luce, had considerable pull, author Pearl S. Buck
painted a literary portrait of the noble Chinese faced with many a hardship
• the lobby was influential, but America refused to assume a leadership role at the time:
something the British duly made note of
“Chiang’s Nationalists
must be supported”
“[Britain can] “count on the
Americans for nothing but
words”
“Madame Chiang and I would like to
thank all our friends in America”
Chamberlain
• the prospect of America being dragged into the hostilities, elicited a variety of
reactions: pacifist Congressman Louis Ludlow, for one, called for any declaration of war
to be contingent on a successful referendum (his proposal was narrowly voted down)
• be that as it may, the Panay attack and the atrocity in the capital did, however, signal a
rising anti-Japanese, pro-Chinese sentiment in the US that would persist (with some
calling for a ban on the sale of Japanese goods)
• the presence of Sinophiles attempting to influence Washington was nothing new
• the “China Lobby” of Jiang Jieshi supporters pushed Washington throughout the
period to fully support the helpless Asian giant
• some, like wealthy publisher Henry Luce, had considerable pull, author Pearl S. Buck
painted a literary portrait of the noble Chinese faced with many a hardship
• the lobby was influential, but America refused to assume a leadership role at the time:
something the British duly made note of
“Chiang’s Nationalists
must be supported”
“[Britain can] “count on the
Americans for nothing but
words”
“Madame Chiang and I would like to
thank all our friends in America”
Chamberlain
One Co-Prosperity Sphere to rule them all 1938
• as America imported less, Japan grew desperate to salvage its economic survival
• the solution: to create an autonomous Japanese bloc to secure markets and resources
• perhaps it might win over the Chinese (or at least some of them)
• Tokyo sought to make something of the admiration many Asians had for Japan’s
achievements: establishing constitutional government and providing encouragement to
those chafing at colonial rule by besting all comers (ie Europeans)
• indeed Japan’s early modernisation had inspired nationalists from Mao to Nehru
• so as hostilities intensified, PM Konoe proposed the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, to unite Japanese, Manchurians, Koreans and Chinese in a political and economic
cooperation zone… to challenge the new international order
• if the American market dried up, a new one must be found (created)
• Jiang not surprisingly rejected the idea but three years later the Japanese expanded the
union to include the peoples of South-East Asia newly under their control
• many would buy in to the concept of Japanese-led Asian rule
• in the global war to come, many in Japanese-ruled Formosa,
for instance, would fight for Japan not against it
“Asians, unite in a ‘New
Order’ and throw off
your European-made
chains”
“Asia for the Asians”
• as America imported less, Japan grew desperate to salvage its economic survival
• the solution: to create an autonomous Japanese bloc to secure markets and resources
• perhaps it might win over the Chinese (or at least some of them)
• Tokyo sought to make something of the admiration many Asians had for Japan’s
achievements: establishing constitutional government and providing encouragement to
those chafing at colonial rule by besting all comers (ie Europeans)
• indeed Japan’s early modernisation had inspired nationalists from Mao to Nehru
• so as hostilities intensified, PM Konoe proposed the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, to unite Japanese, Manchurians, Koreans and Chinese in a political and economic
cooperation zone… to challenge the new international order
• if the American market dried up, a new one must be found (created)
• Jiang not surprisingly rejected the idea but three years later the Japanese expanded the
union to include the peoples of South-East Asia newly under their control
• many would buy in to the concept of Japanese-led Asian rule
• in the global war to come, many in Japanese-ruled Formosa,
for instance, would fight for Japan not against it
“Asians, unite in a ‘New
Order’ and throw off
your European-made
chains”
“Asia for the Asians”
America’s response 1937-38
• despite the previous foot dragging, a sympathetic FDR saw to it that China received aid
after the invasion (even as America sent oil and scrap iron to Japan)
• Neutrality Acts, reflecting Congress’s isolationist stance and the desires of the public,
however, prevented the president from pursuing a harsher course had he so wished
• FDR for his part hastened to add the Europeans wanted America “to come forward with
a hat and a rabbit in it” to magically solve Asia’s problems: he didn’t have one
• when FDR occasionally ventured forth with comments about America not being safe in
a ‘world of disorder’, his moves consistently met isolationist push back
• in his famous “Quarantine” speech FDR spoke out, decrying the fact that America was
facing an ‘epidemic of world lawlessness’ by aggressive states
• the speech has divided historians: to some it was a “confused and unsuccessful
attempt” to stop aggression without fighting
• others felt FDR had realistically assessed the situation and knew he lacked both the
means and public support needed to do anything
• indeed over 50% of Americans in 1937 felt US citizens
in China should leave to avoid a confrontation
“I do this on
behalf of my
fellow Asians”
“We are determined to keep out of war,
yet we cannot insure ourselves against
the disastrous effects of war and the
dangers of involvement”
• despite the previous foot dragging, a sympathetic FDR saw to it that China received aid
after the invasion (even as America sent oil and scrap iron to Japan)
• Neutrality Acts, reflecting Congress’s isolationist stance and the desires of the public,
however, prevented the president from pursuing a harsher course had he so wished
• FDR for his part hastened to add the Europeans wanted America “to come forward with
a hat and a rabbit in it” to magically solve Asia’s problems: he didn’t have one
• when FDR occasionally ventured forth with comments about America not being safe in
a ‘world of disorder’, his moves consistently met isolationist push back
• in his famous “Quarantine” speech FDR spoke out, decrying the fact that America was
facing an ‘epidemic of world lawlessness’ by aggressive states
• the speech has divided historians: to some it was a “confused and unsuccessful
attempt” to stop aggression without fighting
• others felt FDR had realistically assessed the situation and knew he lacked both the
means and public support needed to do anything
• indeed over 50% of Americans in 1937 felt US citizens
in China should leave to avoid a confrontation
“I do this on
behalf of my
fellow Asians”
“We are determined to keep out of war,
yet we cannot insure ourselves against
the disastrous effects of war and the
dangers of involvement”
• FDR was not alone in his inaction, an international conference held in Brussels in 1937
had castigated Japan for its aggression, but undertook no action to reverse it
• FDR’s policy, one historian, was “two steps forward and one back before he took the
giant step ahead,” without ever getting ahead of public opinion
• indeed some of his advisors, Ambassador Joseph Grew among them, advised a
conciliatory policy, not sanctions that boxed Japan into a corner
• hardliners like Stanley Hornbeck argued for sanctions to force Japan into submission,
necessary since the Japanese people were “enthusiastic over the policy of expansion”
• but by 1938 China’s importance in American eyes was revised upwards, and a primitive
domino theory dictated that it must be protected or other states would also be lost
• this policy shift came as the Kwantung army was making some (slow) headway, and was
further accelerated when Japan proposed its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
• the moves elicited from FDR a loan to China that included oil, a concrete measure of
support that required the use of presidential discretion to skirt the nation’s neutrality
laws
• the possibility a war-weary Jiang might be tempted to join the new entity could not be
ignored… hardliners Hornbeck (and Hull) would carry the day
• American aid to China would begin to grow, and the economic screws gradually turned
Sinophiles, Sinophobes, skirting laws1937-38
“Japan’s announcement of a
‘New Order in East Asia’ is a
contradiction of the Open Door
Policy, and a euphemism for
Japanese dominance in Asia”
“[Tokyo] was ‘endeavouring
courageously’ to battle the army and US
actions ‘furnish the army with powerful
arguments to be used in its own support’
”
had castigated Japan for its aggression, but undertook no action to reverse it
• FDR’s policy, one historian, was “two steps forward and one back before he took the
giant step ahead,” without ever getting ahead of public opinion
• indeed some of his advisors, Ambassador Joseph Grew among them, advised a
conciliatory policy, not sanctions that boxed Japan into a corner
• hardliners like Stanley Hornbeck argued for sanctions to force Japan into submission,
necessary since the Japanese people were “enthusiastic over the policy of expansion”
• but by 1938 China’s importance in American eyes was revised upwards, and a primitive
domino theory dictated that it must be protected or other states would also be lost
• this policy shift came as the Kwantung army was making some (slow) headway, and was
further accelerated when Japan proposed its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
• the moves elicited from FDR a loan to China that included oil, a concrete measure of
support that required the use of presidential discretion to skirt the nation’s neutrality
laws
• the possibility a war-weary Jiang might be tempted to join the new entity could not be
ignored… hardliners Hornbeck (and Hull) would carry the day
• American aid to China would begin to grow, and the economic screws gradually turned
Sinophiles, Sinophobes, skirting laws1937-38
“Japan’s announcement of a
‘New Order in East Asia’ is a
contradiction of the Open Door
Policy, and a euphemism for
Japanese dominance in Asia”
“[Tokyo] was ‘endeavouring
courageously’ to battle the army and US
actions ‘furnish the army with powerful
arguments to be used in its own support’
”
A troublesome “incident” on the frontier 1939
• Japan meanwhile had a score that needed settling on its northern
frontier
• in 1938 the Kwantung army turns its attention to the Soviets
• the Imperial Way group, a part of the “Strike North” faction, was
interested in attacking the Soviets
• the clash, starting in the summer, would be brief but telling
• an anxious Hirohito told the generals to stop the assault but General
Tsuji goes forward anyways with an undeclared war
• the battle is a costly defeat for the Japanese
• learning this harsh lesson in the north, the Japanese agree the
direction will now most certainly be south
“They call it the
‘Nomonhan Incident’, is
that Japanese for
defeat?”
“A little ‘loyal
insubordination’ is a good
thing”
Zhukov
Tsuji
• Japan meanwhile had a score that needed settling on its northern
frontier
• in 1938 the Kwantung army turns its attention to the Soviets
• the Imperial Way group, a part of the “Strike North” faction, was
interested in attacking the Soviets
• the clash, starting in the summer, would be brief but telling
• an anxious Hirohito told the generals to stop the assault but General
Tsuji goes forward anyways with an undeclared war
• the battle is a costly defeat for the Japanese
• learning this harsh lesson in the north, the Japanese agree the
direction will now most certainly be south
“They call it the
‘Nomonhan Incident’, is
that Japanese for
defeat?”
“A little ‘loyal
insubordination’ is a good
thing”
Zhukov
Tsuji
America’s response 1939-40
• the 2
nd
Sino-Japanese conflict began to warrant serious attention as appeasement
efforts in Europe started to unravel precipitously
• public opinion turns against the continued export of military goods and Congress in 1939
wanted trade restrictions on nations violating the Nine Power Treaty
• America commenced a ‘moral embargo’ on the sale of planes and aviation parts,
stopped credit to Japan, and suspended a trade agreement in the months preceding
Poland’s invasion (Japan received one third of its imports from America)
• a year later with Western Europe under the Nazi boot heel, Washington instituted a
partial trade embargo that withheld aviation and motor fuel from Tokyo
• aid to an embattled China now increased, as German successes unfolded and Japan
decided to hitch itself to Hitler’s rising star
• Tokyo makes a bold move into north Indochina, capitalizing on France’s misfortunes,
following this up by signing the Tripartite Pact with Europe’s Axis powers (primarily
to send a message to Washington not to interfere in the Pacific)
• FDR then calmly informed the nation that faced with such aggression America must step
out of its shell and be the ‘arsenal of democracy’
“Enjoy your hotdog,
Your Majesty, don’t
worry we’ll back you
up should war ensue ”
King George VI
“Damn meddling Yanks,
they’ll never have any
real interest in Indochina”
• the 2
nd
Sino-Japanese conflict began to warrant serious attention as appeasement
efforts in Europe started to unravel precipitously
• public opinion turns against the continued export of military goods and Congress in 1939
wanted trade restrictions on nations violating the Nine Power Treaty
• America commenced a ‘moral embargo’ on the sale of planes and aviation parts,
stopped credit to Japan, and suspended a trade agreement in the months preceding
Poland’s invasion (Japan received one third of its imports from America)
• a year later with Western Europe under the Nazi boot heel, Washington instituted a
partial trade embargo that withheld aviation and motor fuel from Tokyo
• aid to an embattled China now increased, as German successes unfolded and Japan
decided to hitch itself to Hitler’s rising star
• Tokyo makes a bold move into north Indochina, capitalizing on France’s misfortunes,
following this up by signing the Tripartite Pact with Europe’s Axis powers (primarily
to send a message to Washington not to interfere in the Pacific)
• FDR then calmly informed the nation that faced with such aggression America must step
out of its shell and be the ‘arsenal of democracy’
“Enjoy your hotdog,
Your Majesty, don’t
worry we’ll back you
up should war ensue ”
King George VI
“Damn meddling Yanks,
they’ll never have any
real interest in Indochina”
The four pillars of the faith 1940
• as Europe falls under Hitler’s sway, a new Cabinet forms in Japan, one determined to
reflect new geo-political realities
• this Konoe Cabinet (including Navy and war ministers) meets to iron out a new policy,
an expansionist plan driven by economic imperatives
• Japan will expand co-operation with the Axis powers, moving beyond the
anti-Comintern agreement already in place, and form a non-aggression pact with the
Soviet Union
• the objective being wrapping up the China problem (cutting it off from Indochina, Hong
Kong and Burma through which aid was flowing)
• prepare for a southern advance (which would involve shifting the military allocation of
resources from the Army to the Navy)
“The people of
Japan look to us,
the Four Pillars, to
provide direction,
and that direction
will be south”
“Cut their supplies and
we’ll finish them off”
• as Europe falls under Hitler’s sway, a new Cabinet forms in Japan, one determined to
reflect new geo-political realities
• this Konoe Cabinet (including Navy and war ministers) meets to iron out a new policy,
an expansionist plan driven by economic imperatives
• Japan will expand co-operation with the Axis powers, moving beyond the
anti-Comintern agreement already in place, and form a non-aggression pact with the
Soviet Union
• the objective being wrapping up the China problem (cutting it off from Indochina, Hong
Kong and Burma through which aid was flowing)
• prepare for a southern advance (which would involve shifting the military allocation of
resources from the Army to the Navy)
“The people of
Japan look to us,
the Four Pillars, to
provide direction,
and that direction
will be south”
“Cut their supplies and
we’ll finish them off”
The road south that summer 1940
• all of this unfolds in conjunction with developments in Europe
• Hitler’s success (the Phony War was under way) empowered the Japanese to act now
against the ABCD powers, even moderate Japanese leaders had their interest piqued
• Japan’s leaders started to consider a Southern Advance and the possibility of a non-
aggression pact with the Soviets, combined with an alliance with Germany
• the summer brought Japanese pressure on the Dutch in the East Indies to provide oil
and other supplies, similarly the French in Indo-China and the British in Hong Kong were
pressured to stop supplying Chiang
• an Outline for war in the Pacific with the ABCD powers was made in accordance with
the belief that, with Britain certain to fall soon, here was a golden opportunity
• the trick would be acting without starting a war with America (while preparing for such
an eventuality all the while)… and to act quickly: Japanese naval war games indicated
that defeat would inevitably result from a prolonged fight
• everyone was on board: even the stubborn army generals had shifted their traditional
northern focus to an interest in a southern advance
“The road to glory
leads south”
Sugiyama
Troops fighting and making sacrifices in
China were immortalized as “human bullets”
“[Regarding conquest,]
‘missing the bus’ is not
an option”
T g
ō ō
• all of this unfolds in conjunction with developments in Europe
• Hitler’s success (the Phony War was under way) empowered the Japanese to act now
against the ABCD powers, even moderate Japanese leaders had their interest piqued
• Japan’s leaders started to consider a Southern Advance and the possibility of a non-
aggression pact with the Soviets, combined with an alliance with Germany
• the summer brought Japanese pressure on the Dutch in the East Indies to provide oil
and other supplies, similarly the French in Indo-China and the British in Hong Kong were
pressured to stop supplying Chiang
• an Outline for war in the Pacific with the ABCD powers was made in accordance with
the belief that, with Britain certain to fall soon, here was a golden opportunity
• the trick would be acting without starting a war with America (while preparing for such
an eventuality all the while)… and to act quickly: Japanese naval war games indicated
that defeat would inevitably result from a prolonged fight
• everyone was on board: even the stubborn army generals had shifted their traditional
northern focus to an interest in a southern advance
“The road to glory
leads south”
Sugiyama
Troops fighting and making sacrifices in
China were immortalized as “human bullets”
“[Regarding conquest,]
‘missing the bus’ is not
an option”
T g
ō ō
Indochina 1940
• the first step in the “southern advance” would be the French colony of Indochina
• by now the colonies of a defeated France were administered by the neutral Vichy regime
• for Japan’s victory in China to become a reality, arms and supplies destined for Chiang
must be cut off: Indochina was a major conduit for such materiel
• emboldened by the collapse of two of the four ABCD powers, Japan decided to act on the
matter (amassing troops for an invasion)
• under pressure the Vichy colonial authorities agreed to the presence of a small
contingent of Imperial Japanese troops in Indochina
• within days northern Indochina had been inundated with Japanese forces
• America’s response: an embargo on iron and scrap metal, more aid for Chiang
• a collision with America seemed inevitable, despite the hopes
of the Roosevelt administration
• whether or not a clash occurred hinged on China: the longer the
“problem” lasted there, the less retreat (and a possible peace)
seemed an acceptable option
“No iron or
scrap metal
for you”
“We bring tidings
of peace and
great joy”
“It is our hope
Japan will not
‘gallop off on a
wild horse’ to war”
• the first step in the “southern advance” would be the French colony of Indochina
• by now the colonies of a defeated France were administered by the neutral Vichy regime
• for Japan’s victory in China to become a reality, arms and supplies destined for Chiang
must be cut off: Indochina was a major conduit for such materiel
• emboldened by the collapse of two of the four ABCD powers, Japan decided to act on the
matter (amassing troops for an invasion)
• under pressure the Vichy colonial authorities agreed to the presence of a small
contingent of Imperial Japanese troops in Indochina
• within days northern Indochina had been inundated with Japanese forces
• America’s response: an embargo on iron and scrap metal, more aid for Chiang
• a collision with America seemed inevitable, despite the hopes
of the Roosevelt administration
• whether or not a clash occurred hinged on China: the longer the
“problem” lasted there, the less retreat (and a possible peace)
seemed an acceptable option
“No iron or
scrap metal
for you”
“We bring tidings
of peace and
great joy”
“It is our hope
Japan will not
‘gallop off on a
wild horse’ to war”
(Fascist) friends in far off places 1940
• with France about to fall, Konoe seeks to expand co-operation with the Axis
powers and create a formal Tripartite Pact
• at first the Germans were not receptive, and show little interest
• this changes when the USA agrees to sell 50 (albeit old) destroyers to Britain
• strategists in Tokyo and Berlin feel a united front will keep the Americans neutral
• for the Japanese in particular, the goal is to resist Anglo-American dominance of
the Pacific, and in that matter a powerful European ally might help
• Japan signs the Tripartite Pact, with Germany seeking a firm commitment, Japan
insists on a degree of autonomy
• the bottom line: neither need automatically declare war if the other was attacked
• the fallout: the Axis allies misjudged the Americans, who regarded the move as
confirming Japan as a dangerous Asian Nazi regime
• relations between Washington and Tokyo began to deteriorate
By 1940 rice rationing
had begun in Japan
“I can’t broker a peace
for you this time
around”
• with France about to fall, Konoe seeks to expand co-operation with the Axis
powers and create a formal Tripartite Pact
• at first the Germans were not receptive, and show little interest
• this changes when the USA agrees to sell 50 (albeit old) destroyers to Britain
• strategists in Tokyo and Berlin feel a united front will keep the Americans neutral
• for the Japanese in particular, the goal is to resist Anglo-American dominance of
the Pacific, and in that matter a powerful European ally might help
• Japan signs the Tripartite Pact, with Germany seeking a firm commitment, Japan
insists on a degree of autonomy
• the bottom line: neither need automatically declare war if the other was attacked
• the fallout: the Axis allies misjudged the Americans, who regarded the move as
confirming Japan as a dangerous Asian Nazi regime
• relations between Washington and Tokyo began to deteriorate
By 1940 rice rationing
had begun in Japan
“I can’t broker a peace
for you this time
around”
Quisling friends closer to home 1940
• Japan also sought allies in its struggle in mainland China
• it found one in Wang JingWei, a former colleague and rival of Chiang in the GMD
• having become convinced China could not defeat Japan, Wang Ching-Wei decided
to break ranks with the Nationalists and join the Japanese occupiers
• finding itself in a quagmire, Tokyo hoped to undermine Chiang and break the
stalemate by supporting his erstwhile colleague
• the Japanese would situate him in Nanking as a leader of a puppet Chinese state
• according to Tokyo’s wishful thinking, Wang was to be maintained in Nanking until
his administration was eventually merged with Chiang’s government on its defeat
• he signed a "Sino-Japanese Treaty" with his new overlords, a document with
many broad concessions reminiscent of Japan's Twenty-one Demands
• ultimately Wang’s traitorous regime provided Japan with limited military
assistance
“I’m glad to hear you
survived the
assassination attempt
and look forward to
working with you”
“For the greater glory
of the motherland”
• Japan also sought allies in its struggle in mainland China
• it found one in Wang JingWei, a former colleague and rival of Chiang in the GMD
• having become convinced China could not defeat Japan, Wang Ching-Wei decided
to break ranks with the Nationalists and join the Japanese occupiers
• finding itself in a quagmire, Tokyo hoped to undermine Chiang and break the
stalemate by supporting his erstwhile colleague
• the Japanese would situate him in Nanking as a leader of a puppet Chinese state
• according to Tokyo’s wishful thinking, Wang was to be maintained in Nanking until
his administration was eventually merged with Chiang’s government on its defeat
• he signed a "Sino-Japanese Treaty" with his new overlords, a document with
many broad concessions reminiscent of Japan's Twenty-one Demands
• ultimately Wang’s traitorous regime provided Japan with limited military
assistance
“I’m glad to hear you
survived the
assassination attempt
and look forward to
working with you”
“For the greater glory
of the motherland”
Why the anger? 1941
• Japan saw itself as a have-not nation (as did Germany and Italy)
• it also felt it had been on the receiving end of a number of unfair judgments
• these dated back to the ‘Triple Intervention’ that still raised hackles in Tokyo
• similarly, a soft treaty for Russia at the conclusion of its drubbing in the Russo-Japanese
conflict, rubbed the victors the wrong way
• the aggrieved nation likewise saw the post-World War One settlement as designed to
serve the West not Japan
• later, the Washington Treaty only locked in that advantage: a harsh arrangement that
raised the ire of an ambitious, rising Asian power
• the Europeans had their empires, was not resource-deficient Japan to be afforded the
same luxury?
• the imperialistic mercantilism of the time dictated that an empire must be required and
yet European was denying Japan membership in the club
• furthermore, Japan had an axe to grind with Washington, a discriminatory immigration
policy toward Japanese that betrayed America’s prejudices
• efforts by the west to contain Japan, condemn its mainland ventures, and thus deny it a
colonial future, only deepened the Japanese image of itself as a victim
• be that as it may, Ambassador Nomura is sent to Washington to commence
talks aimed at improving relations
• Hirohito himself was genuinely reluctant to resort to war
and wanted to explore diplomatic avenues
“nothing will keep
us from our
destiny”
Tojo
• Japan saw itself as a have-not nation (as did Germany and Italy)
• it also felt it had been on the receiving end of a number of unfair judgments
• these dated back to the ‘Triple Intervention’ that still raised hackles in Tokyo
• similarly, a soft treaty for Russia at the conclusion of its drubbing in the Russo-Japanese
conflict, rubbed the victors the wrong way
• the aggrieved nation likewise saw the post-World War One settlement as designed to
serve the West not Japan
• later, the Washington Treaty only locked in that advantage: a harsh arrangement that
raised the ire of an ambitious, rising Asian power
• the Europeans had their empires, was not resource-deficient Japan to be afforded the
same luxury?
• the imperialistic mercantilism of the time dictated that an empire must be required and
yet European was denying Japan membership in the club
• furthermore, Japan had an axe to grind with Washington, a discriminatory immigration
policy toward Japanese that betrayed America’s prejudices
• efforts by the west to contain Japan, condemn its mainland ventures, and thus deny it a
colonial future, only deepened the Japanese image of itself as a victim
• be that as it may, Ambassador Nomura is sent to Washington to commence
talks aimed at improving relations
• Hirohito himself was genuinely reluctant to resort to war
and wanted to explore diplomatic avenues
“nothing will keep
us from our
destiny”
Tojo
What’s good for the goose… 1941
• having been administered a bloody nose by the Soviets in both a border skirmish
and a more sizable clash (1939), the Japanese realized they were not ready for a re-
match with the Russia
• Japanese anxiety over its northern frontier was again heightened, when shortly
thereafter Moscow signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
• strategists in Tokyo viewed the development with dismay
• fast forward two years and Hitler, now the undisputed ruler of Europe, was causing
Stalin some worry
• the Soviets, just as they had done earlier with Berlin, this time agreed to a
Neutrality Pact with Japan, much to the relief of Japan’s military men
• Soviet-Japanese agreement suited both parties very well: it allowed Stalin on the
one hand to focus on Hitler (whose invasion of Russia was now just months away)
• Japan for its part could now look south and worry less about the northern frontier
“All quiet now
on this front,
time to move
on Saigon”
“Both
Contracting
Parties
undertake to
maintain
peaceful and
friendly relations
between them”
• having been administered a bloody nose by the Soviets in both a border skirmish
and a more sizable clash (1939), the Japanese realized they were not ready for a re-
match with the Russia
• Japanese anxiety over its northern frontier was again heightened, when shortly
thereafter Moscow signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
• strategists in Tokyo viewed the development with dismay
• fast forward two years and Hitler, now the undisputed ruler of Europe, was causing
Stalin some worry
• the Soviets, just as they had done earlier with Berlin, this time agreed to a
Neutrality Pact with Japan, much to the relief of Japan’s military men
• Soviet-Japanese agreement suited both parties very well: it allowed Stalin on the
one hand to focus on Hitler (whose invasion of Russia was now just months away)
• Japan for its part could now look south and worry less about the northern frontier
“All quiet now
on this front,
time to move
on Saigon”
“Both
Contracting
Parties
undertake to
maintain
peaceful and
friendly relations
between them”
Digging the hole that much deeper July
• the way was now truly clear to move south, and the next target was the rest of French
Indochina (indeed an Imperial Conference decides to proceed whatever the risks)
• once Indochina’s south was occupied, Japan was now in a position to threaten Siam,
Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies
• when this occurred the Americans proceeded to freeze all Japanese assets in USA
(Canada, Holland and Britain followed suit)
• now Japan cannot buy oil (now there was a de facto total embargo, in
reality – de jure- the embargo was only on high grade aviation fuel)
• foreign trade with Japan was brought to a halt and the Western powers moved to
strengthen their defences in the region (including bringing Canadians to Hong Kong)
• Washington increased its aid to Jiang
• as the noose tightened, some said back out of Indo-China, others said widen the conflict
to pillage the resources of Europe’s colonies
• Japan had two years’ worth of fuel remaining (of this the Japanese high command was
very much aware)
• with oil now included, this helps create a siege mentality in Japan
“We come to liberate
you from French
colonial oppression”
• the way was now truly clear to move south, and the next target was the rest of French
Indochina (indeed an Imperial Conference decides to proceed whatever the risks)
• once Indochina’s south was occupied, Japan was now in a position to threaten Siam,
Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies
• when this occurred the Americans proceeded to freeze all Japanese assets in USA
(Canada, Holland and Britain followed suit)
• now Japan cannot buy oil (now there was a de facto total embargo, in
reality – de jure- the embargo was only on high grade aviation fuel)
• foreign trade with Japan was brought to a halt and the Western powers moved to
strengthen their defences in the region (including bringing Canadians to Hong Kong)
• Washington increased its aid to Jiang
• as the noose tightened, some said back out of Indo-China, others said widen the conflict
to pillage the resources of Europe’s colonies
• Japan had two years’ worth of fuel remaining (of this the Japanese high command was
very much aware)
• with oil now included, this helps create a siege mentality in Japan
“We come to liberate
you from French
colonial oppression”
Hoping to mend fences August
• with only fuel reserves sufficient to last two years, and concerns about a possible
conflict, some in the upper echelons of Japan’s power structure sought a way out
• Konoe and Toyoda (with the blessing of Hirohito) hoped to extricate the nation from this
predicament… seeking peace they proposed a summit with FDR
• they offered, again with the emperor’s approval, a pledge to not advance farther
than Vietnam and to leave the Philippines alone
• while Konoe was willing to discuss these matters, others were non-negotiable and not
open for compromise: the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japanese troops in
China, and membership in the Axis alliance
• in return, America must end the embargo
• provided Konoe toe the line, and expecting little to come of the pacific overture, even
the army and navy were on board
• the question: how receptive would the Americans be?
• as for Japan’s sincerity, some historians side with Hornbeck: many Japanese wanted war
• most, however, feel Japan preferred to avoid war but prepared to face it lest it prove
unavoidable
“Talk if you
must Konoe, but
don’t
compromise”
“The navy says start
the fight now and
have done with it”
Nagano
Tojo
• during the latter half of the year relations deteriorate
• with only fuel reserves sufficient to last two years, and concerns about a possible
conflict, some in the upper echelons of Japan’s power structure sought a way out
• Konoe and Toyoda (with the blessing of Hirohito) hoped to extricate the nation from this
predicament… seeking peace they proposed a summit with FDR
• they offered, again with the emperor’s approval, a pledge to not advance farther
than Vietnam and to leave the Philippines alone
• while Konoe was willing to discuss these matters, others were non-negotiable and not
open for compromise: the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japanese troops in
China, and membership in the Axis alliance
• in return, America must end the embargo
• provided Konoe toe the line, and expecting little to come of the pacific overture, even
the army and navy were on board
• the question: how receptive would the Americans be?
• as for Japan’s sincerity, some historians side with Hornbeck: many Japanese wanted war
• most, however, feel Japan preferred to avoid war but prepared to face it lest it prove
unavoidable
“Talk if you
must Konoe, but
don’t
compromise”
“The navy says start
the fight now and
have done with it”
Nagano
Tojo
• during the latter half of the year relations deteriorate
Cautions, distrust, and MAGIC August
• the answer became abundantly clear that summer
• the Americans, in possession of the MAGIC intercepts and faced with
bald Japanese aggression, were not interested in talks
• as long as Japanese aggression continued in China, Washington (Secretary of State
Cordell Hull in particular) had no interest in a summit
• indeed, to the contrary, FDR was abroad signing the Atlantic Charter with Churchill,
enunciating the ‘principles’ to govern a post-war world
• for Japan it broke down as follows: the Pacific status quo must be preserved,
commercial opportunities worldwide must remain open, no interference in the inviolable
sovereign affairs of other nations would be tolerated (read, China)
• Hull’s “Four Principles” were additional proof in Japanese eyes, if any was needed, that
further scheming for Anglo-American “world domination” was afoot
• on his return, FDR cautioned Tokyo against further aggression, but dangled hope of an
October summit before his Pacific foes… but the prospects of a negotiated agreement
were thin, the ghosts of Munich loomed large, haunting the West, for any agreement with
Japan must surely mean sacrificing China
“Don’t worry
Winston, I’ve
broken their code
and will continue to
baby them along”
“Mr. President,
nothing will stop
them except force.
Remember Munich”
Hull
• the answer became abundantly clear that summer
• the Americans, in possession of the MAGIC intercepts and faced with
bald Japanese aggression, were not interested in talks
• as long as Japanese aggression continued in China, Washington (Secretary of State
Cordell Hull in particular) had no interest in a summit
• indeed, to the contrary, FDR was abroad signing the Atlantic Charter with Churchill,
enunciating the ‘principles’ to govern a post-war world
• for Japan it broke down as follows: the Pacific status quo must be preserved,
commercial opportunities worldwide must remain open, no interference in the inviolable
sovereign affairs of other nations would be tolerated (read, China)
• Hull’s “Four Principles” were additional proof in Japanese eyes, if any was needed, that
further scheming for Anglo-American “world domination” was afoot
• on his return, FDR cautioned Tokyo against further aggression, but dangled hope of an
October summit before his Pacific foes… but the prospects of a negotiated agreement
were thin, the ghosts of Munich loomed large, haunting the West, for any agreement with
Japan must surely mean sacrificing China
“Don’t worry
Winston, I’ve
broken their code
and will continue to
baby them along”
“Mr. President,
nothing will stop
them except force.
Remember Munich”
Hull
Hopes of the hardliners September
• strong opposition existed to Konoe’s initiatives, as a result he was kept on a short leash
• military leaders were fixated on expansionist aims and the need to ensure the sacrifices
made in the “China Incident” were not in vain
• since time was of the essence, the military decided for war in 6 weeks, should the peace
talks prove unsuccessful in easing of the economic embargo (talks until war in October)
• indeed both the army and navy felt the war plan should proceed while the diplomacy
was being conducted (with Konoe not compromising the essentials)
• both branches of the military, meeting at the Liaison Conference, felt war was inevitable,
and a long war surely lost, so decisive battles were needed
• all policy roads led through Hirohito, and at the preliminary gathering preceding the next
Imperial Conference the emperor, on hearing of the generals’ plans, became angry at
their giving to war mobilization precedence over diplomacy
• furthermore, he scoffed at the suggestion that America would be defeated quickly
• yet the generals managed to convince him that only a limited window of opportunity
existed to win a war, so Japan must make haste
• in Washington meanwhile, it was believed Japan would not risk war and therefore no
compromise was necessary (a serious misjudgement)
“Easy you say? You told
me the same would be
true in China”
Sugiyama
“Have faith your
eminence, it’s a
question of
national honour”
• strong opposition existed to Konoe’s initiatives, as a result he was kept on a short leash
• military leaders were fixated on expansionist aims and the need to ensure the sacrifices
made in the “China Incident” were not in vain
• since time was of the essence, the military decided for war in 6 weeks, should the peace
talks prove unsuccessful in easing of the economic embargo (talks until war in October)
• indeed both the army and navy felt the war plan should proceed while the diplomacy
was being conducted (with Konoe not compromising the essentials)
• both branches of the military, meeting at the Liaison Conference, felt war was inevitable,
and a long war surely lost, so decisive battles were needed
• all policy roads led through Hirohito, and at the preliminary gathering preceding the next
Imperial Conference the emperor, on hearing of the generals’ plans, became angry at
their giving to war mobilization precedence over diplomacy
• furthermore, he scoffed at the suggestion that America would be defeated quickly
• yet the generals managed to convince him that only a limited window of opportunity
existed to win a war, so Japan must make haste
• in Washington meanwhile, it was believed Japan would not risk war and therefore no
compromise was necessary (a serious misjudgement)
“Easy you say? You told
me the same would be
true in China”
Sugiyama
“Have faith your
eminence, it’s a
question of
national honour”
Imperial conference, imperial culpability? September
• did Hirohito have no other choice? Could he have pushed harder for the
diplomacy he no doubt preferred?
• the constitution gave him executive power, but in reality it was limited
• the military held real power and opposed any concessions (either in China or
breaking from the Axis), and all the while the oil clock was ticking
• it was also largely unthinkable for him to truly oppose the military adventurism
that meant so much to national honour (adventurism that he and other emperors
had previously condoned)
• at the Imperial Conference Konoe argued for peace talks, while Admiral Nagano
said the best bet was to act now (decisive battles were needed as were Dutch
resources)
• the admiral’s flawed argument (surely Japan would lose against America) was not
scrutinized in any way, on the contrary, the army brass concurred
• General Sugiyama said fortune would favour the brave, win the South
Nagano
“Your majesty, oil
resources are
dwindling fast, the
Allies strength
growing”
• the emperor nodded, the die was cast, the
Conference’s decision was now national policy
• with war now an option, the battle plans had to
be approved…
• did Hirohito have no other choice? Could he have pushed harder for the
diplomacy he no doubt preferred?
• the constitution gave him executive power, but in reality it was limited
• the military held real power and opposed any concessions (either in China or
breaking from the Axis), and all the while the oil clock was ticking
• it was also largely unthinkable for him to truly oppose the military adventurism
that meant so much to national honour (adventurism that he and other emperors
had previously condoned)
• at the Imperial Conference Konoe argued for peace talks, while Admiral Nagano
said the best bet was to act now (decisive battles were needed as were Dutch
resources)
• the admiral’s flawed argument (surely Japan would lose against America) was not
scrutinized in any way, on the contrary, the army brass concurred
• General Sugiyama said fortune would favour the brave, win the South
Nagano
“Your majesty, oil
resources are
dwindling fast, the
Allies strength
growing”
• the emperor nodded, the die was cast, the
Conference’s decision was now national policy
• with war now an option, the battle plans had to
be approved…
The master plan September
• the bold stroke to militarily achieve Japan’s aims, was first proposed in May
• the target would be Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, to which America had transferred its
naval fleet a year earlier
• the mastermind was Isoroku Yamamoto; his plan would be tested in September
and adopted in October
• the Hawaii naval base was but one part of a broader plan to secure both control of
the western Pacific and a position of strength, for either a lengthy conflict (if one
should follow) or leveraging a negotiated peace
• the move was also intended to cut China off completely from its supplies (and thus
bring about Chiang’s hasty fall)
• on a similarly optimistic note, it was hoped the Germans would prove successful
against either the British or the Russians, or both: developments that would force
the USA into the European conflict (not a Pacific one)
“this is the only way,
but I implore you not
to launch a surprise
attack while peace
talks are in progress”
Yamamoto
• the bold stroke to militarily achieve Japan’s aims, was first proposed in May
• the target would be Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, to which America had transferred its
naval fleet a year earlier
• the mastermind was Isoroku Yamamoto; his plan would be tested in September
and adopted in October
• the Hawaii naval base was but one part of a broader plan to secure both control of
the western Pacific and a position of strength, for either a lengthy conflict (if one
should follow) or leveraging a negotiated peace
• the move was also intended to cut China off completely from its supplies (and thus
bring about Chiang’s hasty fall)
• on a similarly optimistic note, it was hoped the Germans would prove successful
against either the British or the Russians, or both: developments that would force
the USA into the European conflict (not a Pacific one)
“this is the only way,
but I implore you not
to launch a surprise
attack while peace
talks are in progress”
Yamamoto
Beware the Ides of October October
• Konoe set out on his peace mission, but the Americans would not budge
• four days later nationalist fanatics almost assassinate the Japanese leader
• still hopeful, Konoe asked the military for concessions but got none, only a mid-
October deadline for the talks
• China was the sticking point, without the withdrawal of troops there could be no
peace talks (for those of Tojo’s ilk withdrawal meant a return to a “little Japan”)
• Tojo accordingly rejected Hull’s “4 Principles”, declaring acceptance of same
tantamount to returning Japan to its position of weakness pre-1931
• in early October the positions of Konoe and Tojo were diverging
• the one suggesting Japan must close the “China Incident”, accept a blow to
national honour, and accede to US demands in order to secure a peace
• the other unreceptive to any such thought, considering Konoe’s manoeuvring to be
going back on the recent imperial decision (which was now national policy)
• yet even Tojo now saw the October 15 deadline as being problematic
• the matter would fall to him to resolve, as Konoe’s embattled administration could
no longer govern and the prince resigned
• army man, Hideki Tojo, would head the
next government
“Accepting the American
diktat would take us back
to the servitude of the Nine
Power Treaty of the
1920s”
• Konoe set out on his peace mission, but the Americans would not budge
• four days later nationalist fanatics almost assassinate the Japanese leader
• still hopeful, Konoe asked the military for concessions but got none, only a mid-
October deadline for the talks
• China was the sticking point, without the withdrawal of troops there could be no
peace talks (for those of Tojo’s ilk withdrawal meant a return to a “little Japan”)
• Tojo accordingly rejected Hull’s “4 Principles”, declaring acceptance of same
tantamount to returning Japan to its position of weakness pre-1931
• in early October the positions of Konoe and Tojo were diverging
• the one suggesting Japan must close the “China Incident”, accept a blow to
national honour, and accede to US demands in order to secure a peace
• the other unreceptive to any such thought, considering Konoe’s manoeuvring to be
going back on the recent imperial decision (which was now national policy)
• yet even Tojo now saw the October 15 deadline as being problematic
• the matter would fall to him to resolve, as Konoe’s embattled administration could
no longer govern and the prince resigned
• army man, Hideki Tojo, would head the
next government
“Accepting the American
diktat would take us back
to the servitude of the Nine
Power Treaty of the
1920s”
New man at the helm November
• when it became clear Konoe’s Cabinet could not govern, and the PM resigned, the
emperor asked Tojo (a totally loyal army careerist) to serve as prime minister
• Hirohito wanted a Tojo Cabinet to re-examine the national policy (as set on September
6
th
), and secure army-navy cooperation in support of a push for a negotiated settlement
• Tojo faced from the outset an immovable military High Command
• he lets the peace talks continue but they do so now amidst a flurry of war preparations
• for the generals and admirals (Nagano in particular) the ‘China Incident’ must be seen
through to its conclusion and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere allowed to
develop
• of this two-faced approach the Americans have more than a vague awareness
• thanks to the ‘Magic’ code-breaking device, US officials are able to read Japanese
diplomatic cables, making Japan’s peace suggestions seem insincere
• as for Japan, in keeping with the dire situation, the Liaison Conference of November
1941 opted for war
“At the divine
emperor’s
request, I will take
control”
“We will not pull out of
China and leave Japan a
third-rate country”
Tojo
Nagano
• when it became clear Konoe’s Cabinet could not govern, and the PM resigned, the
emperor asked Tojo (a totally loyal army careerist) to serve as prime minister
• Hirohito wanted a Tojo Cabinet to re-examine the national policy (as set on September
6
th
), and secure army-navy cooperation in support of a push for a negotiated settlement
• Tojo faced from the outset an immovable military High Command
• he lets the peace talks continue but they do so now amidst a flurry of war preparations
• for the generals and admirals (Nagano in particular) the ‘China Incident’ must be seen
through to its conclusion and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere allowed to
develop
• of this two-faced approach the Americans have more than a vague awareness
• thanks to the ‘Magic’ code-breaking device, US officials are able to read Japanese
diplomatic cables, making Japan’s peace suggestions seem insincere
• as for Japan, in keeping with the dire situation, the Liaison Conference of November
1941 opted for war
“At the divine
emperor’s
request, I will take
control”
“We will not pull out of
China and leave Japan a
third-rate country”
Tojo
Nagano
The president, plans and progress November
• still diplomacy proceeded under ambassador Nomura and diplomat Kurusu
• it did so with Hull knowing fully well Japan was preparing for war, thanks to
the continued interception of Japan’s messages by U.S. Intelligence
• as a result Hull and the State Department opposed any deal with Japan
• FDR, however, was open to peace talks (largely because America was not ready for a
war in the Pacific)
• the president met with the Japanese diplomats, suggesting America was not interested
in the Sino-Japanese dispute and might be open to an accord
• open that is if Japan could behave itself (stop its expansionist plans), only then might
economic relations be resumed
• the Japanese had formulated two plans: Plan A was almost guaranteed to be
rejected by America (calling as it did for troops to stay in China and Indochina until
the job was done, and for Japan to stay in the Axis pact and reject Four Principles)
• Plan B offered held more promise: China would be ignored by America, and
Indochina vacated by the Japanese who would also cease further expansion… in
return the Dutch would make available their oil
“I propose a
modus vivendi”
• these final Japanese proposals, in particular ‘B’ with its
withdrawal from Indochina, it was hoped would convince
Washington to restore normal relations
• still diplomacy proceeded under ambassador Nomura and diplomat Kurusu
• it did so with Hull knowing fully well Japan was preparing for war, thanks to
the continued interception of Japan’s messages by U.S. Intelligence
• as a result Hull and the State Department opposed any deal with Japan
• FDR, however, was open to peace talks (largely because America was not ready for a
war in the Pacific)
• the president met with the Japanese diplomats, suggesting America was not interested
in the Sino-Japanese dispute and might be open to an accord
• open that is if Japan could behave itself (stop its expansionist plans), only then might
economic relations be resumed
• the Japanese had formulated two plans: Plan A was almost guaranteed to be
rejected by America (calling as it did for troops to stay in China and Indochina until
the job was done, and for Japan to stay in the Axis pact and reject Four Principles)
• Plan B offered held more promise: China would be ignored by America, and
Indochina vacated by the Japanese who would also cease further expansion… in
return the Dutch would make available their oil
“I propose a
modus vivendi”
• these final Japanese proposals, in particular ‘B’ with its
withdrawal from Indochina, it was hoped would convince
Washington to restore normal relations
Appeasement Asian-style November
• the two Japanese diplomats presented Plan B to Hull, who said no but not outright,
since FDR was still floating his ‘modus vivendi’
• hopes of finding common ground were soon dashed
• for starters, Hull received expressions of dismay from the Chinese, British and Dutch,
who saw the Plan as thinly veiled appeasement
• then, the coup de grace, another Japanese message was intercepted, indicating the
diplomats could extend the deadline for talks but beyond that no further, because “after
that things are automatically going to happen”
• that was enough for Hull; for FDR too
• any remaining enthusiasm he has for a deal is quickly dissipated on learning a Japanese
convoy was sighted bringing a further 50,000 troops to Vietnam
• the time for pleasantries was over, the two men would stand firm, with Hull firing off a
proposal
“They say it
smacks of
appeasement”
“Gentlemen it’s
not good enough”
Hull
• the two Japanese diplomats presented Plan B to Hull, who said no but not outright,
since FDR was still floating his ‘modus vivendi’
• hopes of finding common ground were soon dashed
• for starters, Hull received expressions of dismay from the Chinese, British and Dutch,
who saw the Plan as thinly veiled appeasement
• then, the coup de grace, another Japanese message was intercepted, indicating the
diplomats could extend the deadline for talks but beyond that no further, because “after
that things are automatically going to happen”
• that was enough for Hull; for FDR too
• any remaining enthusiasm he has for a deal is quickly dissipated on learning a Japanese
convoy was sighted bringing a further 50,000 troops to Vietnam
• the time for pleasantries was over, the two men would stand firm, with Hull firing off a
proposal
“They say it
smacks of
appeasement”
“Gentlemen it’s
not good enough”
Hull
The Hull note (or ultimatum) November
• Hull’s response stated that Japan must leave China, abrogate the Tripartite Pact, and
accept the Chiang government
• in return the proposal said the sanctions would end
• as the month closes, Japan receives what it considered an insulting “ultimatum”
• the matter was further complicated by Japan’s interpretation of ‘China’ to include
Manchuria, which was not the case
• but Hull’s note, read this way, was too much for Tokyo, undermining as it would Japan’s
economy and returning the nation to a pre-1931 position of weakness
• the army and navy General Staff were delighted with the “Hull Note”, which would make
going to war that much easier to justify
• while some, like the emperor’s brother, still dreamt of peace, others with power thought
otherwise… Tojo for one now fully supported military action
• Nagano at a meeting expressed his confidence in the war plans: the carriers were already
at sea, and negotiations must continue as a cloak to conceal the attack
• diplomacy, at least with any earnestness, was at an end
“count me in, the
emperor must
not be so
humiliated”
“Ikimasho, we
are ready”“Please take note:
Japan must leave
China”
• Hull’s response stated that Japan must leave China, abrogate the Tripartite Pact, and
accept the Chiang government
• in return the proposal said the sanctions would end
• as the month closes, Japan receives what it considered an insulting “ultimatum”
• the matter was further complicated by Japan’s interpretation of ‘China’ to include
Manchuria, which was not the case
• but Hull’s note, read this way, was too much for Tokyo, undermining as it would Japan’s
economy and returning the nation to a pre-1931 position of weakness
• the army and navy General Staff were delighted with the “Hull Note”, which would make
going to war that much easier to justify
• while some, like the emperor’s brother, still dreamt of peace, others with power thought
otherwise… Tojo for one now fully supported military action
• Nagano at a meeting expressed his confidence in the war plans: the carriers were already
at sea, and negotiations must continue as a cloak to conceal the attack
• diplomacy, at least with any earnestness, was at an end
“count me in, the
emperor must
not be so
humiliated”
“Ikimasho, we
are ready”“Please take note:
Japan must leave
China”
Amidst duplicity things fall apart December
• at an Imperial Conference the emperor was told of the breakdown in negotiations
and the completed preparations for war
• advised that Hull’s demands were humiliating, and that retreat now would mean
losing everything achieved since the Meiji dawn, Hirohito granted his imperial
sanction
• negotiations, however, had to continue, and Japan’s foreign office prepared a
document informing the Yanks that hopes for peace were no longer possible
• the message was to arrive just as the attack started (it arrived late!)
• this of course would fuel American outrage but the Americans in fact knew
something was afoot when they intercepted yet another diplomatic cable
• on the day before the Japanese launched their surprise attack, FDR knew
hostilities were imminent and so too Hull and Stimson
• the pair agreed to meet the next morning and issued no special warning
• others key figures were also aware of war’s approach, but all felt the target would
be Malaya or Siam not America’s Pacific possessions
“this means
war”
“The divine
emperor wishes
us every
success”
• at an Imperial Conference the emperor was told of the breakdown in negotiations
and the completed preparations for war
• advised that Hull’s demands were humiliating, and that retreat now would mean
losing everything achieved since the Meiji dawn, Hirohito granted his imperial
sanction
• negotiations, however, had to continue, and Japan’s foreign office prepared a
document informing the Yanks that hopes for peace were no longer possible
• the message was to arrive just as the attack started (it arrived late!)
• this of course would fuel American outrage but the Americans in fact knew
something was afoot when they intercepted yet another diplomatic cable
• on the day before the Japanese launched their surprise attack, FDR knew
hostilities were imminent and so too Hull and Stimson
• the pair agreed to meet the next morning and issued no special warning
• others key figures were also aware of war’s approach, but all felt the target would
be Malaya or Siam not America’s Pacific possessions
“this means
war”
“The divine
emperor wishes
us every
success”
Jubilation December
• Japanese were jubilant at the December 7 attack, finally
vengeance had been wreaked on the arrogant whites
• the war against fellow Asians in China had generated little joy,
taking the fight towards the Caucasians was viewed much differently
• this would be a war on liberalism: the West’s individualism,
materialism, capitalism, democracy, but also the English language
and the “Anglo-American beasts” in general
• thankfully for America its carriers were at sea,, and
most of the damaged ships could be repaired
• the strike therefore was a mighty one but not a killer
blow
“where are
the carriers?”
During the war, school children wrote letters to
troops at the front, telling them to “die gloriously”
• Japanese were jubilant at the December 7 attack, finally
vengeance had been wreaked on the arrogant whites
• the war against fellow Asians in China had generated little joy,
taking the fight towards the Caucasians was viewed much differently
• this would be a war on liberalism: the West’s individualism,
materialism, capitalism, democracy, but also the English language
and the “Anglo-American beasts” in general
• thankfully for America its carriers were at sea,, and
most of the damaged ships could be repaired
• the strike therefore was a mighty one but not a killer
blow
“where are
the carriers?”
During the war, school children wrote letters to
troops at the front, telling them to “die gloriously”
America’s responses 1937-1941
• FDR “quarantine speech”
+ loan to China
1941
1938
1937
1937
• FDR - ‘moral
embargo’ (no planes)
• embargo on scrap metal and iron• apology accepted + export of
strategic material continues
• Hull Note: leave China, quit Axis pact
Continued fighting
Indochina (north)
Co-prosperity Sphere
Plans A + B, troops to Indochina
Nanking + Panay
Indochina (south)
1941
1941
• embargo on oil + asset freeze
+ ABCD agreement
1939
• old trade
deal suspended
1940
Axis Pact
• partial embargo
(plane fuel)
• Hull and FDR: Four Principles
1941
• FDR “quarantine speech”
+ loan to China
1941
1938
1937
1937
• FDR - ‘moral
embargo’ (no planes)
• embargo on scrap metal and iron• apology accepted + export of
strategic material continues
• Hull Note: leave China, quit Axis pact
Continued fighting
Indochina (north)
Co-prosperity Sphere
Plans A + B, troops to Indochina
Nanking + Panay
Indochina (south)
1941
1941
• embargo on oil + asset freeze
+ ABCD agreement
1939
• old trade
deal suspended
1940
Axis Pact
• partial embargo
(plane fuel)
• Hull and FDR: Four Principles
1941
Apportioning blame: Japan 1941
• by the end of this fateful year, Japanese elites, in particular the military, universally
accepted expansionism as a necessity
• the decision had been made to advance South and join the Axis powers, steps
that made a diplomatic solution even more difficult to achieve
• when a collision with America looked imminent, Tokyo decided not to back down
• the autumn before Pearl saw a genuine fear of war with America and its
consequences grip the emperor and so too Konoe (so desperate to meet with FDR)
• even Tojo advocated for negotiated accommodation with America
• but it was too little too late when confronted with a Washington not for turning
• the fault lay with Japan, its seekers of peace late in the year did so out of fear of
war, not because they opposed the aggression that brought Japan to this impasse
• they had all backed the decisions made between 1931 and 1937
• the elites all sought victory in China and a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
that promised Japan’s dominance of the Far East
• to those scrambling for peace that fall these goals amounted to an economic
imperative, a matter of national honour and pride, the prestige of great
power standing… failure would mean subordination to America
• that is why their efforts failed
T g
ō ō
“I tried my level best
to salvage peace”
• by the end of this fateful year, Japanese elites, in particular the military, universally
accepted expansionism as a necessity
• the decision had been made to advance South and join the Axis powers, steps
that made a diplomatic solution even more difficult to achieve
• when a collision with America looked imminent, Tokyo decided not to back down
• the autumn before Pearl saw a genuine fear of war with America and its
consequences grip the emperor and so too Konoe (so desperate to meet with FDR)
• even Tojo advocated for negotiated accommodation with America
• but it was too little too late when confronted with a Washington not for turning
• the fault lay with Japan, its seekers of peace late in the year did so out of fear of
war, not because they opposed the aggression that brought Japan to this impasse
• they had all backed the decisions made between 1931 and 1937
• the elites all sought victory in China and a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
that promised Japan’s dominance of the Far East
• to those scrambling for peace that fall these goals amounted to an economic
imperative, a matter of national honour and pride, the prestige of great
power standing… failure would mean subordination to America
• that is why their efforts failed
T g
ō ō
“I tried my level best
to salvage peace”
Apportioning blame: America 1941
• and why the intransigence on America’s part?
• could it not have compromised somewhat on its commitment to China (which
meant little to it – America being a Pacific power not a continental Asian power)
• could FDR have met with Konoe or Hull’s points be clarified regarding Manchuria?
• but such queries are mere speculation because what exactly could come from such
gestures? America was not more accommodating precisely because of Japan’s actions
• over time China became a moral cause in America, one that it could not abandon
because of Japanese aggression and, more to the point, atrocities perpetrated
• also, intelligence intercepts revealed Japan’s true expansionist intentions
• China additionally could not be sacrificed out of fear of jeopardizing America’s
relations with the other members of the ABCD coalition
• finally, accommodating Japan and undermining Chiang for short-term gain could,
based on Japan’s recent track record, only amount to postponing and not avoiding a
conflict
Hull
“Seriously, Nomura, after
what you’ve done, what
more could you expect?”
• and why the intransigence on America’s part?
• could it not have compromised somewhat on its commitment to China (which
meant little to it – America being a Pacific power not a continental Asian power)
• could FDR have met with Konoe or Hull’s points be clarified regarding Manchuria?
• but such queries are mere speculation because what exactly could come from such
gestures? America was not more accommodating precisely because of Japan’s actions
• over time China became a moral cause in America, one that it could not abandon
because of Japanese aggression and, more to the point, atrocities perpetrated
• also, intelligence intercepts revealed Japan’s true expansionist intentions
• China additionally could not be sacrificed out of fear of jeopardizing America’s
relations with the other members of the ABCD coalition
• finally, accommodating Japan and undermining Chiang for short-term gain could,
based on Japan’s recent track record, only amount to postponing and not avoiding a
conflict
Hull
“Seriously, Nomura, after
what you’ve done, what
more could you expect?”
At the 11
th
hour 1945
• closing in on Japan’s home islands, America called for surrender without
conditions and the replacement of the military regime
• in Japan reports circulated that the people were getting restless
• a nervous Hirohito sought to end the war, with overtures soon made to the
Soviets to broker a peace (yet there was little interest)
• but as envoys scurried back and forth, Japan still prepared for a final Armageddon
• Truman’s Potsdam proclamation spoke of unconditional surrender but also a new
government “in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people”
• still the High Command would not budge, ignored the proclamation, and the
manufacture of suicide planes continued apace (powerful military men refused to
accept what defeat would surely entail, resulting in a stalemate at the top)
• indeed the impasse among the ruling elite continued after Hiroshima, the Soviet
invasion of Manchuria two days later, and even Nagasaki
• finally Hirohito broke the deadlock and decided on surrender
“I fear a
communist
revolution is
possible”
“Unconditional I
said”
“there must be no
occupation, no war
crimes tribunal,
and no attack on
the emperor”
th
hour 1945
• closing in on Japan’s home islands, America called for surrender without
conditions and the replacement of the military regime
• in Japan reports circulated that the people were getting restless
• a nervous Hirohito sought to end the war, with overtures soon made to the
Soviets to broker a peace (yet there was little interest)
• but as envoys scurried back and forth, Japan still prepared for a final Armageddon
• Truman’s Potsdam proclamation spoke of unconditional surrender but also a new
government “in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people”
• still the High Command would not budge, ignored the proclamation, and the
manufacture of suicide planes continued apace (powerful military men refused to
accept what defeat would surely entail, resulting in a stalemate at the top)
• indeed the impasse among the ruling elite continued after Hiroshima, the Soviet
invasion of Manchuria two days later, and even Nagasaki
• finally Hirohito broke the deadlock and decided on surrender
“I fear a
communist
revolution is
possible”
“Unconditional I
said”
“there must be no
occupation, no war
crimes tribunal,
and no attack on
the emperor”
“Machinists welcomed the munitions boom. We’d been
waiting anxiously for a breakthrough. From that time on,
we got really busy. China news was everywhere. Even
my father subscribed to Asahi Graph since every issue
carried lots of pictures of soldiers in China. By the end of
1937, everybody in the country was working. For the first
time, I was able to take care of my father. War’s not bad
at all, I thought. As a skilled worker I was eagerly sought
after and earned my highest wages in 1938, ’39, and ’40.
There were so many hours of overtime! I changed jobs
often, each new job better than the one before. In 1940, a
draft system for skilled workers was introduced to keep
us from moving around.”
1940
waiting anxiously for a breakthrough. From that time on,
we got really busy. China news was everywhere. Even
my father subscribed to Asahi Graph since every issue
carried lots of pictures of soldiers in China. By the end of
1937, everybody in the country was working. For the first
time, I was able to take care of my father. War’s not bad
at all, I thought. As a skilled worker I was eagerly sought
after and earned my highest wages in 1938, ’39, and ’40.
There were so many hours of overtime! I changed jobs
often, each new job better than the one before. In 1940, a
draft system for skilled workers was introduced to keep
us from moving around.”
1940
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