Zinkina et al A big history of globalization, ch 8, 9, 12.pdf

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JuliaZinkina•DavidChristian•
LeonidGrinin•IlyaIlyin•AlexeyAndreev•
IvanAleshkovski•SergeyShulgin•
AndreyKorotayevABigHistory
ofGlobalization
TheEmergenceofaGlobal
WorldSystem
JuliaZinkina
RussianPresidentialAcademyofNational
EconomyandPublicAdministration
Moscow,Russia
DavidChristian
MacquarieUniversity
Sydney,NSW,Australia
LeonidGrinin
HigherSchoolofEconomics
NationalResearchUniversity
Moscow,Russia
IlyaIlyin
MoscowStateUniversity
Moscow,Russia
AlexeyAndreev
MoscowStateUniversity
Moscow,Russia
IvanAleshkovski
FacultyofGlobalStudies
MoscowStateUniversity
Moscow,Russia
SergeyShulgin
RussianPresidentialAcademyofNational
EconomyandPublicAdministration
Moscow,Russia
AndreyKorotayev
HigherSchoolofEconomics
NationalResearchUniversity
Moscow,Russia
ISSN2522-0985 ISSN2522-0993(electronic)
World-SystemsEvolutionandGlobalFutures
ISBN978-3-030-05706-0 ISBN978-3-030-05707-7(eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05707-7
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2018966551
#SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2019
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ModernGlobalization:Global
TechnologicalandEconomic
TransformationsintheLateEighteenth
andNineteenthCenturies
8
ThenineteenthcenturypresentsamajorwatershedinthecontextofBigHistoryin
generalandhistoryofglobalizationinparticular.Thiswatershedisrelatedtothe
moderntechnologicalrevolutionwhichbroughtprofoundchangestonearlyall
spheresofhumanlife.Inthischapterwetouchuponsomeofthesechangeswhich
werethemostrelevanttoglobalizationand/oremergedintotrulyglobalprocesses
changingthelifeofthehumanity.
WewillstartbyexaminingthemanifestationsofthemodernTechnological
Revolutioninagriculture,whichfirstbecamevisibleinBritain,wheretheintroduc-
tionofborrowedtechnologiesalongwithBritishinventionsledtoasignificant
growthinagriculturalproductivity.Thisgrowthwasremarkableforthefactthatit
allowedBritishsocietytoescapefromtheMalthusiantrapbysustainingpopulation
growthandsupplyingapooloflaborforindustrialproduction(duetotheintroduc-
tionoflabor-savingagriculturaltechnologies).Asmodernizationdevelopedinother
countriesandregions,firstintheWorld-Systemcore,andthengraduallyspilling
overintotheperiphery,moreandmoresocietiesescapedfromtheMalthusiantrap,
andexperiencedaphasetransition,reachinganewtypeofequilibrium.
Next,wewillfocusontheIndustrialRevolutioninBritain,whichhasattracted
hugeattentionfromscholarsofverydifferentfieldsofresearch.Wewillarguethat
thoughtheIndustrialRevolutionisacruciallyimportantpartofthemodernTech-
nologicalRevolution,itisstillonlyoneelementofthecomprehensivemoderniza-
tionprocess,anddoesnotreflectthisprocessasawhole.Inthecontextofthehistory
ofglobalization,theIndustrialRevolutionengenderednewtypesofbothnetworks
andcontentthatmovedthroughthesenetworks.
Whentalkingaboutnewtypesofconnectivityandnetworks,oneshouldpay
specialattentiontothetechnologicalbreakthroughsoftheIndustrialRevolution
relatedtonewsourcesofenergy.Steamenergylaidthefoundationfornewmeansof
transportation,suchassteamtrainsandsteamships,whichwerecloselyfollowedby
advancesintelecommunications(thespreadofthetelegraph).Thesetechnologies
#SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2019
J.Zinkinaetal.,ABigHistoryofGlobalization,World-SystemsEvolution
andGlobalFutures,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05707-7_8
123
formednewmaterialnetworks,whichgraduallyspannedthewholeworld,leading
globalconnectivitytoanewlevel.
124 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Thesenewlyemergednetworkswerefilledwithnewtypesofcontent,thespread
ofwhichwasalsorelatedtotheIndustrialRevolution.Thus,althoughlong-distance
tradeinbulkgoodshadalreadyexistedbeforethenineteenthcentury,itwasthe
IndustrialRevolutionthatdramaticallychangeditsscaleandimportance,turning
long-distancetradeintoatrulyglobalphenomenon.Thefirst“mass”bulkfinished
goodwastextilesproducedbyBritishmanufacturers.Massfactoryproduction
reducedthepriceoftextilestosuchalowlevelthatevenwiththeaddedcostof
long-distancetransportation(whichitselffellrapidlyduetotechnological
advancementsintransportation),pricesremainedlowandcouldcompetewith
localproductioninvariousregionsoftheworld.Othermass-producedgoods,
includingagriculturalones,soonfollowedthesamepattern.
However,newcontentfillingtheglobalnetworkswasnotlimitedtomaterial
items.Probablythemostimportantnon-materialcontenttransmittedthroughthe
networkswasEuropeanmodernityitself.
Asthepopulations,theeconomies,andthemilitarypowersofEuropeanandAtlantic
societiesgrew,governmentsinotherregionsrealizedthattheywouldhavetotrytoimitate
Europe’seconomic,political,andmilitarysuccess.Asaresultoftheireffortsandofthe
increasingeconomicandculturalintegrationoftheworld,Europeanpatternsofmodernity
wereimposedontherestoftheworld.Thespeedandscaleofthesechangesclosedoffthe
possibilityofseparateregionalindustrialrevolutions,analogoustotheseparateregional
transformationsoftheNeolithicera.Instead,Europeanpatternsofmodernityprovided
globaltemplatesofindustrialization,justasthetechnologiesofthepioneeringagricultural
regionsprovidedtemplatesthatwerecopiedwithintheregionalexchangenetworksofthe
earlyagrarianera.(Christian2004:409–410)
Someoftheimportantnon-materialcontentrunningthroughthenetworks
includedtheknowledgeofeffectivemethodsoffightingvariousdiseases(suchas
introducingquarantines),aswellasparticularmedical-andhygiene-based
technologies(suchasvaccinations,orpasteurization).Atthesametime,increasing
physicalconnectivityandrapidlydevelopingglobaltradenetworkstransferred
importantagriculturalgoods(firstofall,cereals)toregionssufferingfrompoor
harvests.Allofthisallowedforasignificantdecreaseinmortality(firstand
foremost,catastrophicmortalityfromfaminesandpandemics),contributingtothe
startoftheglobaldemographictransition.Thistransitionencompassedthewholeof
theWorld-Systemcoreandsomeofthesemi-peripheryinthenineteenthcentury,
leadingfirsttoademographicexplosionandeventuallytoanewtypeofdemo-
graphicequilibrium.
OneimportantcharacteristicofthemodernTechnologicalRevolutionisthatit
hascomeinwaves.TheIndustrialRevolutionwasthefirstwave,followedbyothers
thatcanbeidentifiedasKondratieffwaves.Takentogether,therearesixwaves
(includingthefourpreviouswaves,thefifthwavethatiscurrentlyending,andthe
upcomingsixth)whichcanbeviewedasthedifferentphasesofthemodern
TechnologicalRevolution.EachKondratieffwaveisbasedonanewfundamental

technologicalparadigm.Atfirstitdrivesrapidgrowth,whichgraduallyslowsdown
(asthepotentialoftheparadigmbecomesexhausted)untilthenextbreakthrough
technologyisintroducedandspreads,startinganewparadigm.Thescaleofthese
wavesisincreasinglyglobal.LongKondratieffwaves(lastingaround50yearseach)
startedinthelateeighteenthcentury.Intheearlynineteenthcentury,theybecame
superimposedwithshorterJuglarcycles(lastingabout7–11yearseach)whichalso
becameincreasinglyglobal.Theemergenceofanewcyclicalpatternofeconomic
developmentinthenineteenthcenturyiscloselyrelatedtotheglobalizationpro-
cessesofthetime,asrapidlyincreasingglobalconnectivitysecuredfasterandmore
efficientspreadoftheupswingsanddownswingsacrossvariousregionsofthe
world,encompassingmoreandmoreterritoriesuntilthewholeworldbeganto
feelalmostsimultaneouseconomiccycles.
8.1TheAgriculturalRevolutionandEscapefromtheMalthusianTrap 125
8.1TheAgriculturalRevolutionandEscapefrom
theMalthusianTrap
Aremarkableincreaseinagriculturalproductivitytookplaceinsomeofthe
advancedEuropeancountriesbetween1700and1850,precedingthestartofthe
IndustrialRevolutionandthengoingparallelwithit.Forexample,inBritain,grain
yieldincreasedby100%,whilelivestockproductivity(meat,milk,wool)increased
byatleast50%.Thevolumeofagriculturalproductiongrewby200%,anda
significantproportionofthisincreasewasduetoagrowthincropyieldsand
livestockproductivity(Broadberryetal.2015:128).
Thegrowthinagriculturalproductivityinthisperiodwascausedbyalotof
factorssuchasdiversifiedandlengthenedcroprotations,asteadyincreaseinthe
shareofarablelandinproductiveuse,anexpandedcultivationoffoddercrops,land
manuring,cropandlivestockselection,animprovedplow(borrowedfromChina)
thatwaswellsuitedforheavysoils,canalconstruction,drainageofwetlands,and
otherfactors(Broadberryetal.2015:128;Overtonetal.2004;Overton1996;de
VriesandvanderWoude1997).
ThesuccessesinEuropeanagriculturehadtwomajorconsequences.First,they
enabledsignificantdemographicgrowth;forexample,thepopulationoftheUK
increasedfromaboutfourmillioninthemiddleofthesixteenthcenturytoabout
5.2–5.4millionin1700andmorethanninemillionin1800.Second,thesesuccesses
contributedtolabor-saving—employmentinagricultureinadvancedEuropean
countrieswasalreadyrelativelylowin1700(ontheeveoftheIndustrialRevolution)
(Crafts1985:62–63),whichmadeasignificantnumberofpeopleavailabletowork
intheindustrialsector.Theseagriculturalachievementsareimportantinthehistory
ofglobalizationbecausetheydisseminatedouttomuchoftherestoftheworld
duringthelatenineteenthandespeciallythetwentiethcentury(Grininand
Korotayev2015).
Thesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturysawtwomorefactorsthatcontributed
toincreasedagriculturalproductivity:theintroductionofartificialfertilizers;andthe
beginningofmechanization.Thevalueofthesefactorsbecamefullyvisibleinthe
twentiethcentury,whentheyacquiredatrulyglobalscale.However,theirorigins
canbetracedbacktothelaterdecadesofthenineteenthcentury—notonlyinBritain,
butalsoinotherWorld-Systemcorecountries.Indeed,theuseofmineralfertilizers
derivedfromphosphates,potassium,andnitratesgoesbacktotheGermanchemist
JustusvonLiebig’sstudypublishedin1840.Complexagriculturalmachinery
benefittedfrommanynewinventionsthatusedsteampower(forexample,threshing
machines)(Tortella2010:59):
126 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Inthetransitiontothetwentiethcenturyawaveofimprovementsonceagainrevolutionized
agriculture:theapplicationoftheinternalcombustionenginetoagriculturalmachinery
(tractors,harvesters,etc.),theappearanceofpetroleum-basedchemistry,withnewartificial
fertilizers,andtheHaber-Boschprocessforfixingnitrogenfromtheair,whichconsiderably
cheapenednitrogen-basedfertilizers,necessaryforgrowingcereals.(ibid.:60)
AlltheseinnovationshelpedtheWorld-Systemcorecountriestoescapefromthe
Malthusiantrapbytheendofthenineteenthcentury.Inotherwords,thesecountries
experiencedaphasetransitionfromMalthusiandynamicstoaprincipallynewtype
ofdynamics.ItisnotacoincidencethatMalthus’smasterpieceAnEssayonthe
PrincipleofPopulation(1798)waspublishedattheveryendoftheeighteenth
century.Indeed,inEuropethiswasstilla“Malthusian”century.Intheeighteenth
century,Europeansociopoliticalstabilitywasmuchmoresecurethanintheturbu-
lentseventeenthcentury.MostEuropeaneconomiesexperiencedspectacularexpan-
sion(seeSect.6.3).However,thegrowthofEuropeanpopulationsinthiscentury
generallyoutpacedthatoftheEuropeaneconomies(Goldstone1991).Atthesame
time,theEuropeanelitesappropriatedanincreasinglylargershareoftheeconomyat
theexpenseofthegeneralpopulation,whichsawtheirlivingstandardsdecline
substantially(althoughthesestandardswerealreadyfarfrombeinghighintheearly
eighteenthcentury),asisevidenced,forexample,bythelong-termdataonthe
statureofEuropeanmilitaryrecruits(seeFig.8.1).
Scientistshaveshownthatmeanhumanstaturereflectsratheraccuratelythe
averagewellbeingandlivingstandardsofthepopulation,asone’sstaturedepends
toasignificantextentonthequalityofnutritioninchildhoodanddiseasesborneasa
child(Komlos1985,1994,2009;Mironov1999;KomlosandBaur2004;Komlos
andCarlson2014).Adeclineinaveragewellbeingandlivingstandardsgenerally
leadstoadecreaseinmeanstature.Againstthisbackground,adeclineinthemean
statureofmilitaryrecruitsintheeighteenthcenturyinalltheEuropeancountries(for
whichwehaverelevantdata)pointstoasubstantialdropinthewellbeingandliving
standardsofthegeneralpopulationofthesecountries.
Inthenineteenthcentury,thesituationchangeddramatically.Themeanstatureof
recruitsintheeighteenthcenturystagnatedorexperiencedasharpdeclineinallthe
Europeancountriesforwhichwehavedata.Conversely,inthenineteenthcenturyall
these(andmanymore)Europeancountrieswitnessedaremarkableincreaseinthe
statureofrecruits(upto5cmduringtheperiodfrom1800to1900).Thissuggestsan
importantandwide-scaleimprovementinthewellbeingandlivingstandardsofthe
generalpopulationofthesecountries.Indeed,atthattime,alltheEuropeancountries
startedtheirescapefromtheMalthusiantrap,andalmosteverywhereinEuropethis

8.1TheAgriculturalRevolutionandEscapefromtheMalthusianTrap 127
160
165
170
175
180
185
1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
Stature, cm
Sweden Netherlands Germany Great Britain
Russia France Italy Spain
Fig.8.1Theaveragestatureofrecruitsbornbetween1700and1980invariousEuropean
countries,incentimeters.Datasource:Mironov(2009:193)
escapeproceededrathersuccessfully.Twogroupsoffactorscontributedtothis
process.Theendogenousfactors,whichrelatetonewagriculturalmethods,
techniques,ormachinerythatcontributedtothegrowthofagriculturalproductivity,
havebeendescribedabove.Asfortheexogenousfactors,toagreatextentthey
shouldbeattributedtotheTechnologicalRevolution(asdescribedbelow)andthe
relatedincreaseinglobalizationandglobalconnectivityofthenineteenthcentury
(especiallyitslaterdecades).TheirinfluenceontheescapeoftheWorld-Systemcore
countriesfromtheMalthusiantrapmightnotbeself-evidentatthefirstsight,butin
realityitwassignificantandmanifold.Thus,tostartwith,theglobalizationpro-
cessesofthenineteenthcenturyincludedtheformationofglobaltradenetworksin
bulkagriculturalgoods,firstofall,cerealcrops:
Therapidgrowthofthelong-distancetradeinwheat —andotherbulkyprimary
commodities—whichwasaleadingcharacteristicofthelate19thcentury,resultedfroma
dramaticdeclineinthecostofdistance.Lowertransportationcostsencouragedgreater
internationalspecializationandagrowthoftrade.Intheprocessfallingtransportation
coststransformeduneconomic“desert”intoareaswherewheatcouldprofitablybegrown
asanexportstaple.Theriseoftheopportunityforstapleproductioninturngeneratedlarge
intra-andinternationalmigrationsandflowsofcapital.(Harley1980:218)
128 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Indeed,asnewtechnologicaladvancesmadeestablishingsustainableconnections
possibleamongalmostalltheregionsoftheworld,themajorityoftheblacksoil
zones(includingthoseinArgentina,Canada,theRussianEmpire,andtheUSA)
becameintegratedintoglobaltradenetworksandcouldprovidelargeamountsof
grainnotonlyforthemselvesbutforthelessfertileregionsaswell.Thisfactor
greatlyincreasedfoodsecurityworldwide(but,firstofall,intheWorld-System
core).Forexample,JohnKomloshasfoundthatthesevereharvestfailuresof1816
inEuropedidnotresultinademographiccatastropheanddidnotinterruptpopula-
tiongrowthlargelyduetogainsinagriculturalproductivityandanexpansionof
globalagriculturaltrade.Indeed,“[f]oodexportsfromtheUnitedStatesalone
providedEuropeanswithcloseto1000millionkcalperday,enoughtokeepalive
theinhabitantsofParis,forinstance”(Komlos1998:72).
Moreover,increasedinformationalandfinancialconnectivity(Borodkinand
Konovalova2010)alongwiththeincreasedactivityofglobaltradenetworksled
toaconvergenceofgoodsprices,especiallyforprimaryagriculturalproducts.
Increasedglobalsuppliesofcereals(or,moreexactly,theincreasedavailabilityof
theirsuppliesforvariousregions)ledtoasharpdeclineincerealpricesinthemost
connectedcountries,i.e.theWorld-Systemcore(seeFig.8.2foranexampleof
wheatpricedynamicsinBritain).
This,inturn,madebread(andothercereal-basedfoods)moreaffordabletothe
masspopulationsoftheWorld-Systemcorecountries.Forexample,althoughthe
realwagesofBritishworkersdidnotexperiencemuchofnominalgrowthduringthe
lastdecadesofthenineteenthcentury,workerscouldbuymorefoodperunitof
moneyasfoodgotcheaper.Asaresult,thewellbeingandlivingstandardsofthe
0
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4
6
8
10
12
14
16
180018201840186018801900
Fig.8.2DynamicsofwheatpricesinBritain,pence/bushel,1800–1895.Datasource:Clark(2004)

generalpopulationofBritainandothercorecountriesthatexperiencedasimilar
wage/pricepatternimprovedsubstantially.Theseimprovementspavedthewayout
oftheMalthusiantrapforthesecountriesandweretoalargeextentrelatedtothe
accelerationoftechnologicaldevelopmentandincreasesinglobalconnectivity
duringthefirstand,especially,thesecondmoderntechnologicalparadigm(see
below).
8.2TheIndustrialRevolution:TheFirstModernTechnologicalParadigm 129
8.2TheIndustrialRevolution:TheFirstModernTechnological
Paradigm
ThesignificanceoftheIndustrialRevolutioncanhardlybeoverestimated.Beingone
ofthecrucialcomponentsoftheglobalmodernizationprocess(knownalsoasBig
HistoryThreshold8,ortheModernRevolution),thisphenomenonisrelatedtothe
escapeofthehumanityfromtheMalthusiantrap,theemergenceofmodernsustain-
ableeconomicgrowth,thebirthofmodernsocialandpoliticalsystems,aswellasa
radicalchangeintheroleofWesternEuropeintheglobalizedworldandits
emergenceastheworldleaderinthenineteenthcentury.Intermsofdramatic
changesinthewayoflife,theIndustrialRevolutioniscomparabletothetransition
fromhuntingandgatheringtosettledagriculture(BigHistoryThreshold7)(McNeill
andMcNeill2003:213;seealsoChristian2004:Chaps.8and13,Christian2008).
OneimportantcharacteristicsofthemodernTechnologicalRevolutionisthatit
hascomeinwaves.TheIndustrialRevolutionwasthefirstwave,followedbyother
waves,whichcanbeidentifiedasKondratieffwaves(orcycles).Takentogether,
thesesixwaves(includingthefourpreviouswaves,thefifthwavethatiscurrently
ending,andtheupcomingsixth)canbeviewedasthephasesofamodernTechno-
logicalRevolutionasawhole.EachKondratieffwaveisbasedonanewfundamen-
taltechnologicalparadigm.
Sixtechnologicalparadigmsarecurrentlyidentified(thesixthoneisforecastfor
theperiodofthe2020stothe2060s).ThegeneralsystemofKondratieffwavesand
theirrespectivetechnologicalparadigmsareasfollows:
–thefirstwave(1780s–late1840s):textileindustry,steamengine,coal;
–thesecondwave(late1840s–1890s):railways,steel;
–thethirdwave(1890s–late1940s):electricity,chemicals,heavyengineering;
–thefourthwave(late1940s–early1980s):cars,artificialmaterialsand
petrochemicals,electronics;
–thefifthwave(early1980–~2020s):microelectronics,personalcomputers,infor-
mationandbiotechnologies;
–thesixthwaveisbelievedtobeassociatedwiththeso-calledMANBRICtechno-
logicalparadigm(medical,additive,nano,bio,robotics,informationandcogni-
tivetechnologies)(Grininetal.2017).
130 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Inthissub-chapterwewillviewthefirsttechnologicalparadigm,whilethenext
sub-chapterwillfocusonthemainbreakthroughsofthesecondparadigm.The
generalnatureofthesewaves(cycles)willbebrieflyoutlinedinSect.8.4.
8.2.1TheIndustrialRevolutionandUrbanizationTransition
ThereisconsiderabledebateamongstscholarsastothecausesoftheIndustrial
Revolution.Manyfactorshavebeendiscussed,suchasmercantilistpolicy[setting
extremelyhightariffsonimportsoffinishedtextilesgoodsandlowtariffsonimports
ofrawmaterials,whichstimulateddomestictextileproduction(Ormrod2003)],
patentlaw(whichguaranteedinventorsprotectionoftheirideasandmadeitpossible
forthemtoearnmoney),theachievementsofthescientificrevolution[inparticular,
thediscoverythattheatmospherehasaweight,aswellasthefactthatavacuumcan
becreatedbycondensingsteam(Landes1997:104;Cohen2004)],andmanyothers.
Thegrowthofliteracy,theemergenceofmodernstates(withmodernadministrative
apparatuses,fiscalsystems,etc.—seeChap.7),thebeginningofthedemographic
transition,andaspecificEuropeanpatternofnuptiality,thatis,postponedmarriage
(Lesthaeghe1980)undoubtedlyplayedsomeroleintheIndustrialRevolution.Some
researchershavereferredtothe“industriousrevolution,”whichimpliesareduction
inthenumberofpublicholidaysandlongerworkinghoursduetothegrowing
necessityofmoneyincome(deVries2008).Othershavehighlightedtheimportance
oftheexportofcapitalfromforeigncolonies,anindependentjudiciary,theavail-
abilityofparliamentaryrepresentationandlimitedmonarchy,intenseruraltourban
migration,andprotectionism(Hicks1969:145–166;Landes1997;Wallerstein
1980;Allen2009;Clark2007).
AllthesefactorscertainlycontributedtotheemergenceoftheIndustrialRevolu-
tion.However,outofthewiderangeoffactors—institutional,financial,economic,
andsoon—oneshouldtrytoidentifyasetofconditionsthatwerenecessaryand
sufficienttostarttheRevolution.Inthis,wefollowRobertAllen’s(2009)approach,
whichspecifiesthreemainconditions:
•anincreaseinagriculturalproductivity(seeabove);
•highworkerwagesthatcontinuedtoremainhighduringthecompressionphaseof
thesociodemographiccycle;
1
1
Notethatthecompressionphase(describedinChap.4)maybeconsideredasaperiodof
bifurcationbecausesomeofitstypicalfeaturesarealsoinherenttoso-calledprimitiveaccumula-
tion,which,accordingtoMarx,preparesthetransitionofsocietytocapitalism.Thetwoessential
componentsofsuchatransitionarelaborandcapital.Duringthecompressionphase,landshortage,
bankruptcyoflandowningpeasants,andamassexodusofimpoverishedpeasantstocities(where
theytrytomakealivingfrompettytradeorcraft)createsalargepooloflabor.Atthesametime,a
strongincomestratificationofthepopulationalongwiththegrowthoflargeestatesformthe
concentrationofcapital,which,whenproperlyinvested,createsasecondnecessarycomponent
forapotentialtransitiontocapitalism.

8.2TheIndustrialRevolution:TheFirstModernTechnologicalParadigm 131
•cheapfossilfuelenergy.KennethPomeranzarguesthatinthenineteenthcentury
EuropemanagedtoovertakeAsialargelyduetotheexogenousfactorofcoal
(Pomeranz2000).However,itwasnotonlyWesternEurope(andparticularly
Britain)thatheldsignificantcoalreserves.Othercountriesandregionsofthe
world(forexample,EasternEurope,China,andIndia)alsopossessedthis
resource.Still,onlyBritainusedcoalintensivelyandsystematically,somuch
sothatitbecametheworld’sbiggestcoalproducerbeforetheIndustrialRevolu-
tion.Consequently,coalshouldbeconsideredasanendogenousratherthanan
exogenousfactor,theactivepresenceofwhichwastosomeextentduetointernal
economicprocesses.(PradosdelaEscosura2004:8)
ThesethreeconditionswereallnecessaryfortheIndustrialRevolutiontostart,but
theywerenotsufficient,asallthefactorslistedaboveseemtohavemadeacontribu-
tiontoo.Moreover,aratheradvancedleveloftechnologicaldevelopmentwasneces-
saryasabackgroundfactoroftheRevolution;agreatnumberofvariousinventions,
tools,andapplianceshelpedtocreatethemaintechnologicalpillarsoftheRevolution.8.2.2TheFirstTechnologicalParadigm
TheIndustrialRevolutionandthefirstmoderntechnologicalparadigmwerebased
onbreakthroughinnovationsinthetextileindustry.In1730,JohnKayinventedthe
flyingshuttle,whichmadeweavingmuchfasterthanspinning.Thenextdecades
(fromthe1730stotheearly1760s)sawthecreationofthefirstspinningmachines,
althoughinitialattemptsatusingthemwerenotverysuccessful.
Rapidmechanizationofspinningbeganinthe1760s–1770s.Thetwomost
widelyknowninventionsofthisperiodwereJamesHargreaves’spinningjenny
andRichardArkwright’swaterframe.Thesetwosuccessstoriesoccurredagainstthe
backgroundofnumerouslesserknowninventionsofthepreviousdecades.
Thespinningjennywasadomesticmachinethatcouldspin“withouthuman
hands”.Initially,itcouldserveupto8spindles;lateron,thisnumbergrewto80and
more.Butthespinningjennydidnotdestroythehomesystemofspinning.Onthe
contrary,duetothelackofamechanicalengineitspreadmainlywithinsmall-scale
homeproduction.In1788,therewereabout20,000jenniesinEngland,scatteredin
smallspinningworkshopsandhousesofvillagespinners(Tseitlin1940).Jennies
existedforaratherlongtime,stillflourishinginthe1810sandevenlater.
Almostsimultaneouslywiththedevelopmentofthispartlymechanizedhouse-
holdproductionanewproductionprincipleemerged,whichwasbasedonthe
establishmentoffactorieswithacompletelymechanizedcycleofproduction.
ThefirstspinningfactorycreatedbyArkwrightusedhiswaterframe.Hewasable
tocombinetheenergysource(water)withnewmachines,hiredlabor,andaspecial
kindofrawmaterial(cotton)tobringaboutanewsystemofmassproduction.Inthe
1770s,hemanagedtoimplementasystemofproductionforcottonfabricsinwhich
thewholemanufacturingprocess(exceptforweaving)wasperformedbymachines
(Mantou1937[1906]:184).Lateron,machineweavingwasinventedaswell,along
withmachinebleaching,printingandsoforth.Asaresult,from1780to1820,cotton
industryincreasedbymorethan16times(Shemyakin1978:51).In1801,thefirst
mechanicalfactorywasalreadyworkinginBritain,equippedwithnearly
200machines(Rounge2006:83).
132 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Thus,forthefirsttimenotjustaparticularsectorwasmechanized[thedegreeof
mechanizationwasfairlyhigh,say,inminingandwoodprocessing(Lucas2005;
Nef1987;Hall1980)],butmechanizationbecameasourceofcontinuousand
systematicexpansionofthescopeofmachineapplicationfromoneindustryto
another.
Thesteamengine,animportantsymbolofindustrialization,hadbeencreatedand
perfectedforapproximately150yearsuntilitbecamewidelyadopted.Interestinthe
steamenginewasboostedbythepracticaldemandforpumpingwaterfromdeep
mines.Inthe1770s,Watt’ssteamenginestartedtobeusedforindustrialpurposes;it
wascontinuouslyimprovedduringitsusage.Gradually,steamenginessupplanted
waterengines.In1810,Britaincountedapproximately5000steamengines;by1826,
thisnumbergrewto15,000engines,eachof25horsepoweronaverage(Shemyakin
1978:51;Rounge2006:84).Mechanicalengineeringemergedasapowerfulnew
branchofindustry.
DuringthefinalphaseoftheRevolution,bothmachineryitselfanditsfunctions
becamemorecomplex.Attheendoftheeighteenthcentury,machinessubstituted
forphysicallabor.Thenextgenerationoftechnologicalmachinesreplacednotonly
muscularenergy,butalsocertainhumanskillsandabilities.Inthenineteenthandthe
twentiethcenturies,manymoremachinesweredevelopedtocarryouthardphysical
workpreviouslydonebyhumans(excavators,oragriculturalmachines,forexam-
ple).However,technologicalmachinesweretheonesthatplayedacrucialrolein
worldhistoryinthesensethattheycouldreplacetheskilledlaborofcraftsmen,
includingweavers,blacksmiths,mechanics,locksmiths,etc.
TheIndustrialRevolutionlargelyfinishedinBritaininthe1830s.Thisdoesnot
meanthatalltheinnovationshadalreadybeeninventedbythattime.Onthe
contrary,theinventionsthatwerecreatedduringtheIndustrialRevolutionwere
mostlyintroducedandputintopracticeaftertheRevolution.However,theendofthe
IndustrialRevolutionmarkedanewstageintheproductionprocess.Newbranches
ofproductionemergedanddeveloped,creatingamodelforindustrialproduction
thataffectedotherproductionsectors.
8.2.3UrbanizationTransition
TheAgriculturalandIndustrialRevolutionsintheeighteenthandnineteenth
centuriesproduceddeepintersectoralshiftsintheWorld-Systemcore;theseshifts

8.2TheIndustrialRevolution:TheFirstModernTechnologicalParadigm 133
10
100
1000
10000
10001100120013001400150016001700180019002000
Fig.8.3Dynamicsofthe
World-Systemurban
populationinthelogarithmic
scale,1000–2000,inmillions.
Datasource:Modelski(2003),
Chandler(1987),UN
PopulationDivision(2016)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
180018251850187519001925
London
New
York
Paris
Berlin
Tokyo
Chicago
Vienna
Fig.8.4Populationgrowth
inthesevenlargestcitiesof
theworldin1800–1914,in
thousands.Datasource:
Chandler(1987)
becameglobalinthetwentiethcentury.Thegrowthoftheproductivityoflaborin
theagriculturalindustryengenderedarapidlygrowingsurplusofavailableworking
handsinruralareas.The“excessive”rurallaborforcewaspushedtopursue
non-agriculturaloccupationsthatwereconcentratedincities.Thus,theAgricultural
Revolutionpushedmassesofpopulationoutofruralareas,whereastheIndustrial
Revolution(aswellassomeothercomponentsoftheModernRevolution,suchas
thefundamentaltransformationsineducationorhealthcare)pulledthemintocities.
Asaresult,thegrowthoftheworldurbanpopulationaccelerateddramatically(see
Fig.8.3).Theaccelerationofthegrowthratesofthepopulationlivinginthelargest
citiesinthenineteenthcenturywasevenmoredramatic(seeFig.8.4).
134 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
8.3TheSecondModernTechnologicalParadigm
8.3.1TheMainCharacteristicsoftheSecondTechnological
Paradigm
Thesecondtechnologicalparadigm(whichcorrespondstothesecondlongeco-
nomiccycle)emergedinthe1840sandpersisteduntiltheearly1890s.Duringthis
period(andcontinuingintothethirdtechnologicalparadigmaswell)machine
productionspreadthroughouttheworld,graduallyreplacingmanualwork.Itis
noteworthythatby1850,18millionBritishpeopleconsumed1.5timesmoreenergy
thanthe400millionpeoplelivinginChina(Smil1994:186–187).Between1830
and1890,steamenginesinBritainweredoingtheworkof600millionpeople,while
theactualnumberofworkerswasonlyfourmillion(Lechman2018).
Themaingrowthdriversincludedrailroadconstruction,whichincreasedthe
demandforcastironandsteel,theintroductionofnewmethodsofferrousmetals
smelting(theBessemerprocessandopen-hearthfurnaces,forexample),andincreas-
ingdemandforcoal.Thissetoftechnologiescontributedtoprogressinothersectors
aswell—forexample,thedevelopmentofthetelegraph(vitalfortheeffective
functioningofrailroads),theproductionofelectricity,theexpansionofmechanical
engineering,andthegradualtransferfromtextilemachineryproductiontoheavy
industry.Notably,manyfinancialinnovationsdirectlycorrelatedwithtechnological
ones.Thus,theregularuseofthetelegraphandtelephonedramaticallychangedthe
operationofstockexchanges,increasingtheirimportance,thespeedofoperations,
andthenumberofpeopleinvolved.
Rapideconomicdevelopmentandunevenpaceofmodernizationinvarious
countriesandregionsresultedinaradicalchangeinthebalanceofpowerinthe
World-System.First,theeraofunrivalledBritishdominancewascomingtoanend.
Second,tensionsbetweenBritainandGermanywereontherise,whicheventually
becameoneofthecausesoftheFirstWorldWar.
Duetothevastarrayoftechnologiesthatsprungfromthesecondtechnological
paradigm,wewillonlyconcentrateontransportationandcommunications
technologies,astheymostlycontributedtoincreaseglobalconnectivityand,thus,
hadaremarkableimpactonthehistoryofglobalization.
8.3.2Railways
Thenetworkofwaterwaysandlandroutesthatexistedinthefirstdecadesofthe
nineteenthcenturycouldnotmeettheneedsofthetransformingeconomiesand
growingpopulationsofEurope(Berend2013:136;Bogart1942:146).Duringthe
nineteenthcentury,aninnovativetransporttechnology—therailroad—gradually

spreadallovertheworldandmarkedanentirelynewerainthehistoryofglobal
transportation.
8.3TheSecondModernTechnologicalParadigm 135
Railroadswerecreatedfromacombinationoftwobasictechnologies:rail
transportation,andsteampower.Railtransportationinitselfwasnotafundamental
innovation.Trolleysmovingonrailshadoftenbeenusedincoalmines(forexample,
inNewcastle,England)andmetallurgicalplants(Bogart1942:146).In1803,
RichardTrevithickwasthefirsttocomeupwiththeideaofusingasteamengine
onameansoftransport(Wolmar2011:6;Bogart1942:147).Lateron,George
Stephenson,oneofthe“foundingfathers”oftherailways,furtherdevelopedthe
idea.Havingsolvedanumberofengineeringproblems,heinventedthesteam
locomotive.In1825,therailwaybetweenStocktonandDarlingtonbecameopera-
tional,whilethefirstmajorpassengerrailwaybetweenLiverpoolandManchester
waslaunchedin1830(Bogart1942:147;Berend2013:137).
Thismarkedthebeginningofatrueboomintheconstructionofnewrailwaysin
theUK.In1838theirtotallengthwasonly500miles,butby1855theygrewmore
thantenfoldto6635miles,andby1870tomorethan15,000miles(Bogart1942:
149).Moreover,thenewtechnologycrossedBritishbordersandbegantoactively
spreadinContinentalEuropeandAmericaasearlyasthe1830s.Forexample,a
fundamentalbreakthroughwasachievedintheUSAwiththeconstructionofthe
Baltimore–Ohiorailway,thefirstUSpassengerandfreightrailwaythatused
locomotives(Wolmar2011:12).InContinentalEurope,theconstructionofrailways
startedinFrance,Belgium,partsofGermany(forexample,BavariaandSaxony),the
AustrianEmpire,Italy,andtheNetherlands(ibid.:17–18).Fortunately,almostall
EuropeancountriesstucktothegaugeproposedbyStephenson,whichfacilitatedthe
constructionofcross-borderrailwaysandthegradualintegrationofnationalrail
linesintoasingleEuropeannetwork(ibid.:33).Almostsimultaneously,therailways
startedtopenetrateRussia.In1837,therailwayconnectingStPetersburgto
TsarskoyeSelobecameoperational,andin1850theStPetersburg–Moscowcon-
nectionwaslaunched(note,however,thatthegaugeinRussiawasdifferentfromthe
gaugeinEurope)(ibid.:40).
Aroundthemid-nineteenthcentury,railwaysbegantheirtriumphalmarcharound
theworld.AprojectofrailwayconstructioninIndiawasproposedin1844withthe
primaryaimoffacilitatingthedeliveryofrawcottonrequiredforBritishindustryto
Indianports.Thefirstsectionoftherailwaystartedfunctioningin1853(ibid.:
49–53).In1855,thefirstrailwayopenedinAustralia(althoughthedevelopment
oftherailwaynetworkinthatcountrywasstalledduetothelackofasinglestandard
gauge)(ibid.:64).InEgypt,arailroadconnectedAlexandriatoCairoin1856(ibid.:
184).
Thesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturysawanumberofambitioustransconti-
nentalrailwayprojectscometolife.Inthe1850s,thefirsttranscontinentalrailroad
projectemergedintheUSA;itopenedin1869(ibid.:134–144).Bytheendofthe
nineteenthcentury,atleastfivetranscontinentalrailwaylinesfunctionedintheUSA,
andthreemorewerebuiltinCanadaby1915(ibid.:144–154).Inthemid-nineteenth
century,aplanforconstructingtheTransandineRailwaytolinkChileandArgentina
emerged.However,becauseofthecomplexityoftheproject,thisrailroadonly
becameoperationalin1910(ibid.:154).Finally,in1891–1916,Russiacompleted
theeasternpartoftheTrans-SiberianRailway(thelongestrailwayintheworldwith
alengthofabout7000km),fromMiasstoVladivostok(ibid.:159–171).
136 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Theimportanceofthedevelopmentofrailwaynetworksinthenineteenthcentury
canhardlybeoverestimated.In1870,theworld’srailwaystransported336million
passengersand235milliontonsofcargo.By1912,thesefigureshadrisento1.3
billionpeopleand520milliontonsofcargo.Thecostoflandtransportationhad
fallenfivefoldby1910comparedtoitsvaluejustacenturybefore(Berend2013:
137).Railwayschangedthefinancialstructureofthecontemporaryworld.Astheir
constructionwascapital-intensive,itrequirednewformsofjoint-stockcompanies.
Formillionsofformerruralworkersemployedintheconstructionofrailwaysandits
associatedindustries(primarilysteelproduction),suchjobsimpliedatransitionfrom
anagrariantoanindustrialworld.Previouslylandlockedcountriesnowenjoyed
accesstotheseaandovercamenaturalbarriers(forexample,therailwaytunnel
throughtheAlpswascrucialinraisingEuropeanconnectivity)(ibid.:138–139).The
expansionoftherailwaynetworkaroundtheworldcontributedtotheformationof
globalmarketsforminerals,manufacturedgoods,aswellasnumeroustypesof
agriculturalproducts(Berend2013:139;Wolmar2011:191–217).
8.3.3Steamships
Theintroductionofsteampowertowatertransportationalsoledtorevolutionary
changes.Theattemptsatinstallationofsteamenginesonshipsfinallyledtothe
creationofsteamships,whichtransformedseaandoceanictransportationdramati-
cally.Theperiodfromthe1770stothe1820ssawabreakoutinthenumberof
technologicalinnovationsthatwerenecessaryforthegoodoperationofsteamships.
Adecisivebreakthroughwasachievedin1807,whenthefirststeamshipdesignedby
RobertFultonsetoutonitsfirstvoyageintheUSA.Subsequentdecadeswitnessed
moreinventionsthatwereoffundamentalimportancetothedevelopmentof
steamships,suchasbladedpropellersthatreplacedwheels(Berend2013:131).
In1819,awoodensteamercrossedtheAtlanticforthefirsttimeandaniron
steamshipbegantooperateontheThamesin1821.ThelaunchofGreatWestern
steamshipmarkedanewepochinthehistoryofshipping:theepochofsteelocean
linersofcolossalsize.Thefirststeamshipsconsumedanenormousamountofcoal
andincludedonlyasmallcompartmentforthetransportationofgoods.However,the
costeffectivenessoftheseshipsgraduallyimproved.Inthesecondhalfofthe
nineteenthcentury,theaveragefuelconsumptionofasteamshiphalved.The
carryingcapacityoftheworldsteamshipsfleetexperiencedevenmorepronounced
progressduetoboththeincreasingnumberofshipsandalargercompartment
capacitypership.Duringthe“longnineteenthcentury”,thetotaltonnageofthe
world’sshipsrocketedbyalmostanorderofmagnitude,fromfourmilliontonsin
1800to33milliontonsin1914(notably,one-thirdofthiscapacitybelongedtothe
Britishships)(ibid.:133).

8.3TheSecondModernTechnologicalParadigm 137
Improvementsinsteamshipsgreatlyreducedthecostoftransoceanictransporta-
tion.Especiallyremarkablewasthereductioninthetransportationcostofbulkcargo
anddifferentkindsofrawmaterials.Forexample,thecostoftransportingcotton
fromIndiatoBritaindroppedbyone-third.Thecostofpassengertrafficalso
decreasedsharply.In1825,thecheapestticketfromEuropetotheUSAcost$100
perpassenger,whileinthe1880sthepricedroppedtojust$8(ibid.:132).Thus,the
developmentofnew,significantlycheapertypesofwatertransport(coupledwiththe
developmentofrailwaynetworksonland)ledtofundamentalchangesinthe
structureoftheworldeconomyasawhole.Inparticular,itcontributedtothe
emergenceofglobalmarketsnotonlyforexpensivegoods,butalsoinexpensive
bulkgoods,suchasagriculturalproducts(primarilystaplecarbohydrates,suchas
wheat,corn,etc.,butwiththeadventofrefrigeratorsalsomeat,poultry,andfish),as
wellasindustrialrawmaterials(coalandcotton,forexample).
8.3.4TheTelegraph
Somuchresearchandsomanyexperimentscarriedoutinvariouscountriespreceded
theactualinventionofthetelegraphthatitisdifficulttodateexactlywhenthe
electrictelegraphcameintoexistence.Thepioneeringattemptatcreatingelectrome-
chanicaltelegraphwassuccessfullymadebyRussianscientistPavel(Paul)Schilling
in1832.Hemanagedtotransmitsignalsusingtwotelegraphsandhisownbinary
systemofsignaltransmission(Huurdeman2003:54).In1837,thefirstcommercial
electricneedletelegraphwasinventedandpatentedinBritain.OneoftheBritish
railroadsinstalledwhatbecametheworld’sfirst13-mile-longtelegraphlinein1839.
Otherrailwaycompaniessoonjoinedin;by1850,3600kmoutoftotalof12,000km
ofBritishrailroadswereparalleledbytelegraphlines(ibid.:67–70).Meanwhile,in
1838,SamuelMorseclaimedapatentonhisnewdevicethatusedtheeffectsof
electromagnetismtoproducesoundsandsymbols.Morse’ssystemofsignalcoding
provedtobeefficientanduserfriendlyandspreadthroughouttheworld.In1843,
Morsetookanactivepartintheconstructionofanexperimentaltelegraphline
betweenWashington,DCandBaltimore(ibid.:58–60).Inthesameyear,Germany
startedconstructingthefirstEuropeancontinentaltelegraphline(ibid.:74).Follow-
ingagovernmentinitiative,Franceconstructeditsfirsttelegraphlinein1845
(Solymar1999:54).
Thefirstunderseatelegraphcablewaslaidin1851,connectingGreatBritainand
France(Huurdeman2003:88).The1850salsosawthefirst(ratherunsuccessful)
attemptsatlayingatransatlanticcable.Thefirstcable(laidin1857)failedseveral
daysafterbeingputintouse.Thesecond,laidin1858,failedafter3months(Oslin
1992:169–172;Solymar1999:70–71).Finally,in1866,apermanentcablewaslaid
betweenLondonandNewYork,andsincethentheconnectionbetweenthetwo
citieshasremainedstable(Oslin1992:174).In1868–1869,Francealsolaida
transatlanticcable(ibid.:178).
In1848,Louis-NapoleonBonaparte(laterknownasNapoleonIII)orderedfora
nationalnetworkofelectrictelegraphlinestobeconstructedinFrance.By1855,
ParisestablishedtelegraphiccommunicationswithallthecapitalsoftheFrench
prefectures(Huurdeman2003:107).InRussia,telegraphlinesconnectedthethen
capitalcityofStPetersburgtoMoscowin1851andtoWarsawin1854.In1855,
telegraphlinkedMoscowwithKiev,andOdessawithSevastopol.Atelegraphline
betweenMoscowandTbilisiwaslaidthroughtheCaucasusin1863(ibid.:109).In
1861,8yearsbeforethefirsttranscontinentalrailroadwasestablished,thefirst
transcontinentaltelegraphlinewasconstructedintheUSA(ibid.:99–100).The
significanceofthetelegraphbecameapparentduringtheAmericanCivilWar,asit
helpedcoordinatemilitaryoperations.
138 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Nationaltelegraphsystemscametoexistandactivelyexpandedinmany
countries,firstintheWorld-Systemcore,andtheninmanyperipheralcountriesas
well.GreatBritainremainedtheleaderintransatlanticunderseacables.Having
accesstoallthetransmittedinformation,theBritishtookadvantageofsucha
position,especiallyduringtimesofconflicts.Whenothercountriesaspiredtolay
underseacables,theyoftenhiredBritishcompanies(Solymar1999:81–83).In
1887,GreatBritainowned70%oftheworld’stelegraphlines;intheearlytwentieth
century,thisfiguresomewhatdeclinedthoughitwasstillashighas63%asof1901
(Headrick1991:28).
By1870,LondonandCalcuttawerelinkedbyan11,000km-longtelegraphline.
Beforethelinewaslaunched,itwascommonforamessagesentfromIndiatoarrive
inLondonamonthafter.Bycomparison,aresponsetothefirstmessagesentviathe
telegraphlinecamewithin1hour(Huurdeman2003:87,124).In1869,theJapanese
governmenthiredBritishengineerstolayatelegraphlinebetweenYokohamaand
Tokyoandin1871atelegraphconnectionwasestablishedbetweenJapanandChina
(Huurdeman2003:113–115;Headrick1991:43–44).In1870–1872,Australialaida
2900km-longtelegraphlineandinthe1870stwocoastalcableswereconstructedin
LatinAmerica.AtelegraphlinelinkedtheCapeofGoodHopetoZanzibarandAden
in1879,whichinturnwereconnectedwithIndiaandGreatBritain.In1885,
telegraphiccommunicationswereestablishedbetweenthebiggestcitiesofWest
Africa(Huurdeman2003:137).
By1876,whenAlexanderGrahamBellinventedthetelephone,morethan20,000
citiesintheworldwerelinkedviatelegraphlines(withtheuseofmainlyMorse
technology).Theirtotallengthexceededonemillionkmonlandand50,000km
underwater(ibid.:88–90).Transatlanticlineswerethefastest;ittookabout2or
3minutestotransmitamessagebetweentheLondonandNewYorkStock
Exchanges.Otherlinesoperatedmoreslowly,largelyduetoretransmissions.In
thelatenineteenthcentury,theaveragetimeoftelegramtransmissionreached
35minutes.Clearly,thiswasatruebreakthroughinthehistoryofcommunications,
asbeforetheadventofthetelegraphamessagecouldtakeseveralmonthstobe
deliveredfromoneplacetoanother(Headrick1991:32–34).
Thetelegraphhadatremendousimpactonpeople’slives.Inmanyplaces,the
“informationlag”declinedfromdays(orevenmonths)tohours,whichfacilitated
theformationofglobalcapitalmarkets.StockexchangesinLondonandNewYork
couldnowtrackfinancialfluctuationsinnearrealtime(Hoag2006).Accordingto
someeconomichistorians,thetelegraphaccountedforbetweenone-sixthto

one-quarterofpriceconvergenceinthenineteenthcenturyandthefirstdecadesof
thetwentiethcentury(ChilosiandFederico2015).
8.4EconomicCyclesandCrisesoftheNineteenthCentury 139
Thetelegraphalsocontributedtotheformationandstrengtheningofnation-
states.Thus,inLatinAmerica,mainlyinChileandArgentina,centralauthorities
gainedfullcontroloverregionalgovernmentexecutivesandmilitarycommanders
evenoverlongdistances(Martland2014;Hodge1984).Thetelegraphalsohelpedto
spreadinformationvialocalnewspapers.Thus,asingleinformationsystemwas
formed,whichencompassedevenremoteterritories(Hodge1984).Allthesefactors
contributedtoariseofinternalconnectivity,increasingthestrengthofstates.
8.4EconomicCyclesandCrisesoftheNineteenthCentury
8.4.1EconomicCyclesoftheNineteenthCentury
Letusdwellonthephenomenonofeconomiccyclesinmoredetail.Inthe1920s,a
prominentRussianeconomist,NikolaiKondratieff,showedthatacertaincyclical
regularityisobservedinlong-term(50–60years)economicandtechnological
dynamics.Startingfromtheendoftheeighteenthcentury,onecanidentifyanumber
ofrecurrentlong(lastingbetween40and60years)economiccycles,whichare
referredtoasKondratieffwaves.Ineachlongcycle,twophasesofapproximately
thesamedurationcanbedistinguished:theupswingandthedownswing(each
lastingbetween20and30years).Theupswingphasebringsaboutariseinimportant
economicindicators(includingprices,soinflationisobserved),whilethedownward
phaseseestheirabsoluteorrelativedecline.Duringtheupswingphaseofa
Kondratieffwave,rapideconomicexpansioninevitablyleadssocietytoimplement
changes,which,however,lagbehindthenecessitiesoftheeconomy.Therefore,after
acertaintime,thedevelopmentshiftstothedownswingphase,duringwhichcrises,
depressions,andotherproblemsinducesocietytorearrangeitseconomicstructure
andotheraspectsoflife(Kondratieff1926,1935,1998).
Currentlyresearchersidentifyfivelongcycles(Kondratieffwaves)startingfrom
the1780s,andforecasttheadventofthesixthlongcycleinthe2020s.Thefirstlong
cyclewaspresumablyengenderedbythefinalphaseoftheIndustrialRevolution.
Indeed,bythattime,economicproductionexperiencedaprofoundchange:aspira-
tiontoasteady,continuousexpansionnowbecameitsinherentfeature.This
aspirationengenderedacyclicnatureofeconomicdevelopmentduetotheinterplay
oftwoforces:variousconstraintsstandinginthewayofexpansion,andthecapacity
toovercomethem.Acommoncharacteristicofthesecycleswasthechangefrom
economicaccelerationtodecelerationcausedbytheexhaustionoftheresources
availableforgrowth,aswellasbymarketsaturation,creditdeterioration,reduced
profitmargins,andotherlimitationsoneconomicexpansion.Thus,theappearance
oflongKondratieffcycles(40–60years),aswellasmedium-termcycles(7–11
years),wasgenerallycausedbythetransitiontomodernSolow-styleeconomic
growth(Schumpeter1939;Rostow1975;Mandel1980).
140 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Thehistoryoflongcyclesiscloselylinkedtotheemergence,development,and
changeofso-calledtechnologicalparadigms,whichrepresentasystemofleading
technologiesandmethodsoftheirapplicationduringacertainperiodoftime.The
emergenceofeachnewKondratieffwaveistriggeredbyasetoffundamental
technologicalinnovationsthathavebeendiscovered/inventedinthedownswing
phaseoftheprecedingwave.Breakthroughinnovationsopenupavastnichefor
theexpansionofproduction,andcauseaninflowofinvestments.Theeconomy
experiencesanupswingphase;neweconomicsectorsdevelop,forminganew
technologicalparadigm.However,thespreadofinnovationsdoesnottakeplace
momentarily,soeconomicrestructuringtakes20–30yearstoproceed.Atfirst,the
returnsonnewtechnologiesarehigh,butwhentheybecomewidespread,returns
fall,andthelongcycleturnsintoitsdownwardphase.Thisphaseischaracterizedby
slowanddifficulteconomicdevelopment,butitisintheprocessofovercoming
thesedifficultiesthattheinventionsandinnovationsofthenexttechnological
paradigmaregenerated.
Againstthebackgroundoflongcycles,shorter-termcyclesappeared.These
cycles,usually7–11yearslong,
2
initiallyencompassedthemostdeveloped
countriesoftheWorld-Systemcore,butgraduallyexpandedtotheperiphery,
acquiringaglobalscale.Theyareessentiallyformedbyeconomicfluctuationsand
generallyconsistoffourphases:
1.Recovery:economicgrowthresumesafteradepressionandadeclineinproduc-
tion.Bythistime,economyhasacquiredthenecessaryvolumeofcapital.
Equilibriumismoreorlessestablishedbetweensupplyanddemand,aswellas
betweenpricesandproductioncosts.Againstthebackdropoftechnological
innovationsmadeduringthedepressionphaseofthepreviouscycle,acertain
push(whichmaywellbeexternal)drivestheeconomyoutofdepression.
2.Expansion:expandingcreditcreatesfavorableconditionsforaneconomicboom.
However,thecostofcreditgraduallyrises,asdothepricesforotheressential
resources(suchasrawmaterials,fuel,orrealestate),evenmoresobecauseof
speculators.Laborcanbecomescarcer,resultinginrisingwages.Strainedwith
greatdisproportionsanddebts,theeconomyishighlypronetocollapseduring
thisphase.
3.Recession:prosperitycanbeinterruptedbyvariousfactors,beitanunexpected
dropindemandorprices,alargebankruptcy,aforeignstatedefault,oranewlaw.
Majorbankruptciesoccur;demandforcashrockets,exacerbatingthecollapseof
thebankingsystem;creditvirtuallydisappears.Euphoriagiveswaytopanicas
theeconomycollapsesintoaseverecrisis.
2
Thelengthofmedium-termbusinesscyclesgraduallyshortenedfromapproximately11years
between1825and1847to8–10yearsinthelatenineteenthcenturyand7yearsinthetwentieth
century.

8.4EconomicCyclesandCrisesoftheNineteenthCentury 141
4.Depression/stagnation:equilibriumisreachedduringthisphaseasthedown-
swingcomestoanend,butthereisnogrowthyet.
3
8.4.2EconomicCrisesoftheNineteenthCentury
Thefirsteconomiccrisesoccurredratherfarbackinhistory(GrininandKorotayev
2010).Someoftheearliestcrisesweretriggeredbyattemptstoreplaceexpensive
metalswithcheaperones(forexample,goldwithcopper),orbyadeclineintrade.
EarlymodernhistorywitnessedanumberofcreditcrisesinEurope.Thefirst
exampleofacrisiscausedbyacommodityexchangebubble(andoneofthemost
famouscrisesrelatedtoexchanges)wastheso-called“tulipmania”inAmsterdamin
the1620sand1630s.
4
Speculationinvaluabletulipvarietiesledtoskyrocketing
pricesandmanyspeculatorsbecamebankrupt.Lateron,intheearlyeighteenth
century,twomajorspeculationsinsecuritiesresultedinseverecrises.TheBanque
GénéraleandtheMississippiCompanyofJohnLawinFranceandtheSouthSea
CompanyinBritainissuedlargeamountsofunsecuredbonds,becomingclassic
examplesoffinancialpyramids(Carswell1960;Cowles1960;SheeranandSpain
2004).
Inthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcentury,thenatureofeconomiccriseschanged.
Incontrastto“traditional”tradecrisesand/orfinancialcrises,thenewcrisesofthe
nineteenthcentury:(1)becamemorewidespread;(2)affectedwholenational
economiesratherthanparticulareconomicsectors;(3)affectedvariousindustries;
and(4)occurredonanincreasinglyregularbasis,becomingastandardphaseof
medium-termbusinesscycles.
Thesenewcriseshavesomerathertypicalfeatures:speculatorsandlarge
corporationsgobankrupt;securitypricesfall;creditbecomesvirtuallyunavailable;
creditorsdemandearlyrepaymentofdebts,whilelotsofdebtorsfailtorepay;money
ismassivelywithdrawnfrombankaccounts;bankingsystemsbecomeparalyzed;
goldisnolongerchangedforpapermoney(ingoldstandardsystems);demandfor
cashrisesdramatically;defaultsandnewwavesofbankruptciestakeoverthe
economy.Thisisfollowedbyindustrialdeclineandaslowdownintradeand
construction;firmseithershutdownorsuspendtheiroperations;unemployment
rises(Grininetal.2016).
Thefirstcyclicalcrisisisbelievedtohavestartedin1825inBritainandwas
relatedtotheboomincapitalexportstoLatinAmerica.Alargeamountofbonds
issuedbyLatinAmericangovernmentsprovedtobeunsecured,andtheirprices
3
Medium-termbusinesscyclesarecalledJuglarcyclesaftertheFrencheconomistClémentJuglar
(1819–1905).Hewasthefirsttoidentifytheperiodiccharacterofcrises(Juglar1862,1889).In
contemporaryeconomics,twomainphasesofsuchcyclesaresingledout,thephaseofexpansion
andthephaseofrecession.Thepeakpointofoverheatingandthelowestpointofrecessionare
consideredtobeinflectionpoints(SamuelsonandNordhaus2005).
4
TheAmsterdamStockExchangeestablishedin1611isthe firstclassicexampleofastock
exchange.
slumped,triggeringawaveofpanicamonginvestors.ApartfromLatinAmerica,the
1825crisisalsoaffectedtradeintheUSA,Germany,theItalianstates,the
NetherlandsandRussia,andcausedalongrecessioninFrance.Thecrisisof
1836–1837involvedfirstandforemostBritainandtheUSA,aslandspeculation
inthelatterwasabruptlyendedbyPresidentJackson’sdecreeof1836whichforbade
thesaleoflandforanythingbutgold.Thecrisisof1847wasmoreseverethanthe
twoprecedingones.ItwascloselyrelatedtopoorpotatoharvestsinEurope
(particularlyIreland)in1845and1846followedbyfamine,massbankruptciesof
farmers,andmassmigrationoverseas.Itisnoteworthythatallthecrisesdescribed
aboveeruptedduringatimeofpeace.
142 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
TheupswingphaseofthesecondKondratieffwave(roughly1850–1875)sawthe
continuationofcyclicdynamicsand,accordingly,anumberofcrises.InAugust
1857,fallingbreadpricesstartedafinancialcrisisintheUSA.Thecrisisspread
acrosstheAmericas,Britain,andtheentireContinentalEurope.Itwasseverein
FranceandGermany;forexample,cottontextileproductioninthelattershrunkby
30%in1857.TheeffectsofthecrisiswerealsofeltstronglyinRussiaduetothe
aftermathoftheCrimeanWar,aweakenedruble,andfallingpricesforRussian
securities.ThecrisishadadverseconsequencesinScandinavia,asthisregionwas
closelyconnectedtoLondonandHamburgviatrade.Thecrisisof1866was
essentiallyfinancialand,tosomeextent,economic.Iteruptedintheaftermathof
theAmericanCivilWarwhenabanoncottonimportswaslifted.Thecrisisof1873
wasmuchmoreseverethanthepreviousoneandreachedatrulyglobalscale.
HavingeruptedinViennafirst,itspreadthroughAustria,Hungary,Germany,and
Italy.TheUS,English,French,Scandinavian,andRussianfinancialmarketsalso
sufferedasignificantdownturn.Financialproblemswerefollowedbyanindustrial
crisis,whichstruckheavyindustryfirst.ThecrisisresonatedeveninEgyptandsome
SouthAmericancountries(Virt1877:366).Overall,thecrisesofthe1850s–1870s
graduallyturnedglobal.
8.5DemographicTransitionandDemographicExplosion
intheWorld-SystemCore
Thedemographictransitionfromthetraditionalregimeofpopulationreproduction
(highfertilityandhighmortality)tothemodernregime(lowmortalityandlow
fertility)startedintheearlymodernworld;itfirstencompassedthewholeofthe
World-Systemcore,thentouchedthesemi-peripheryinthenineteenthcentury,and
becametrulyglobalandcriticallyimportanttohumanityinthetwentiethcentury.
Thistransitionwasconnectedtotheprocessesofglobalizationinanumberofways.
Thus,increasedinformationalconnectivityhelpedtotransmitideasaboutwaysto
effectivelyfightvariousdiseases(quarantines),oruseparticularmedical-and
hygiene-basedtechnologies(suchasvaccinationsandpasteurization).Atthesame
time,increasedphysicalconnectivityandrapidlydevelopingglobaltradenetworks
madeitpossibletotransfervitalagriculturalgoods(firstofall,cereals)toregions

sufferingfrompoorharvests,thuspreventingor,atleast,mitigatingepisodesof
acuteundernourishmentandfamines.
8.5DemographicTransitionandDemographicExplosionintheWorld-SystemCore 143
8.5.1EarlyMortalityTransition.DeclineofCatastrophicMortality
Thetraditionalregimeofdemographicreproductionwithitshighratesof
bothmortalityandfertilitylastedoveralongperiodofpre-industrialhistory(Durand
1977;McKeown 1976;Biraben1979;Chesnais1992;Livi-Bacci2012).
Thisregimewascharacterizedbyextremelyhighratesofinfantandchildmortality;
upto400babiesoutof1000diedinthefirstyearoftheirlives(Chesnais1992:73).
Mortalityrates,ofcourse,differedinvarioussocietiesatvariousstagesofdevelop-
mentandsocio-demographiccycles.Nevertheless,35deathsper1000population
canbeassumedtobeatypicalvalue;thecrudedeathrateinCentralEuropeinthe
1800swasaroundthislevel(ibid.:55).Lifeexpectancyinpre-industrialsocieties
couldvaryfrom20to40years(Livi-Bacci2012:10).Weshouldemphasizethat
suchlowvaluesshouldbeattributedfirstandforemosttotheextremeratesofinfant
andchildmortality.Forthosewhosurvivedintotheirteenageyears,lifeexpectancy
wasmuchhigher—forexample,55–60yearsinearlyeighteenth-centuryChina
(Heijdra1998:437).Thecrudebirthratevariedfrom30toslightlymorethan
60birthsper1000populationinpre-industrialsocieties(Chesnais1992:102).
Thefirststageofdemographictransitionimpliesarapidmortalitydeclinedueto
dramaticchangesinthestructureofthecausesofmortality.Deathratesintraditional
societieshadadualstructureof“normal”(“regular”)mortalityobservedinyearsof
relativestability,andcatastrophicmortalityinyearsofcrisesresultingfromfamines,
epidemics,andwars(Vishnevskiy2005:45).
Intheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies,thecatastrophicmortalityrateina
numberofEuropeancountrieswaseffectivelyundercontrolthanksnotablyto
improvementsinnutrition,andthedevelopmentofwatersupplyandsewagesystems
(ibid.:57).WilliamMcNeillsuggeststhatthespreadofcannons,whichradically
changedwarfaretechniquesandstrategiesandledtoaconsolidationofstate
violenceinthehandsof“gunpowderempires,”resultedinlessciviliancasualties
andthuscontributedtoadeclineinmortalityinthisperiodaswell.Whenthese
empiresceasedconqueringterritories,lifeinthemajorpartoftheAfro-Eurasian
world-systembecamemuchmorepeaceful(McNeill1976:205–206).
Notonlywarsbutalsopandemicswereresponsibleforcatastrophicmortality.By
inventingcreativesolutionstothechallengesoftheGlobalCrisis,andbyborrowing
andspreadingthemostsuccessfultechniques,Europe,Russia,andEastAsia
managedtosignificantlylowerpandemic-relatedmortality,whichstimulatedpopu-
lationgrowthandmarkedthefirstserioussteptakentowardstheonsetofdemo-
graphictransition.Morepeoplecouldsurviveandreachadulthoodthaneverbefore
(ibid.:205).
Quarantineswereamongthemosteffectiveadministrativemeasures.Thefirst
quarantinewasintroducedinDubrovnik,Croatia,in1377.Later,intheearly
fifteenthcentury,VeniceandGenoaintroducedcompulsoryquarantines
5
intheir
portsforpassengersandcrewsofshipsthatcouldpotentiallybetransferringbubonic
plague.Goodsfromsuchshipswereunloadedtospecialwarehouses,andsubjected
tolonghoursofventilationand/orrinsing.However,theextensivespreadof
quarantinesonlytookplaceintheseventeenthcentury.Duringanoutbreakof
plague,thecitycouncilofMilanorderedallcitygatestobeclosedandeven
prohibitedmonasteriesfromhostingpilgrims.Draconianlimitationsonthemove-
mentofpeople,goods,andcorrespondencewereintroducedinalmostallmajor
Italiancities.Forexample,asanitarycordoninFlorenceinterceptedalmostall
incomingmailandparcels.Thesemeasureshelpedtostoptheoutbreakofplague
fromspreadingbeyondtheTuscanborderinnorthernItaly(Parker2013:629–630).
144 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Thankstotheirvisibleeffectiveness,quarantinesquicklyspreadtoother
Europeanstatesandregions.Thus,aSpanishsanitarycordonstoppedtheplague
of1631inthePyreneesandpreventedalateroutbreakfromgettingintoCastilein
1647–1651.Theyear1663sawthefirstquarantinesintroducedinEngland,where
shipssuspectedofcarryingtheplaguewereorderedtostayinthemouthofthe
Thames.In1683,inMarseille,alawcameintoforceorderinganyonesuspectedof
plagueinfectiontobeimmediatelyquarantined.Inthesamedecade,quarantinelaws
crossedtheAtlanticandwereintroducedintheportsofNorthAmerica,firstand
foremostinNewYorkandBoston,whereoutbreaksofyellowfeverweregradually
broughtundercontrol(Parker2013:629–630;Tognotti2013).
InanumberofEastAsiancountries,firstofallinJapan,Korea,andChina,arole
analogoustothequarantinesinEuropewasplayedbyisolationpoliciesintroduced
intheseventeenthcentury.Thus,forexample,inJapan,theTokugawarestrictedall
contactwiththeWesternworldtoaDutchtradingpostbasedonthesmall,artificial
islandofDejimaintheBayofNagasaki.JapanesetradewithChinaandKoreawas
alsolimitedtoasmallnumberofports.Asharplimitationofcontactswithforeigners
(includingtraders)alongwithaprohibitionofimmigrationsignificantlyloweredthe
chancesofthesecountriesbeingaffectedbythepandemicsbreakingoutinother
states.
8.5.2OngoingMortalityTransition.TheDeclineof“Regular”
Mortality
Inthelateeighteenthcentury,mortalitystartedtodecreaseinsomeEuropean
countries:thepioneersincludedtheScandinaviancountries,aswellasthemost
developedindustrialcountries,suchasGreatBritainandFrance.InFrance,for
example,themortalityofchildrenunderfivedeclinedfrom474per1000(nearlyone
half)in1740–1749to306per1000in1820–1830.InSweden,itfellfrom344per
1000inthemid-eighteenthcenturyto250per1000inthefirsthalfofthenineteenth
5
Theyfrequentlylastedfortydays,andthetermitselfisderivedfromtheItalianwordquaranta
meaning“forty.”

8.5DemographicTransitionandDemographicExplosionintheWorld-SystemCore 145
Table8.1DeathratesinParisbyselectedcausesofmortality,per100,000population,1876–1905
Causeofmortality1876–18801881–18851886–18901891–18951896–19001901–1905
Typhoidfever 69 88 41 22 19 12
Smallpox 35 21 9 4 5 –
Diphtheria 94 88 70 44 13 17
Meningitis 115 110 77 58 45 36
Source:Biraben(1991:231)
century(Vallin1991:56–57).However,inmanycountriesinnorthwesternand
CentralEurope,mortalitystoppeddeclininginthe1820s–1830sandremainedstable
untilaboutthe1870s,largelyduetointenseurbanizationandtheIndustrialRevolu-
tion(apoorqualityoflifeandworkingconditions,aswellashighpopulation
density,contributedtothepreservationofahighlevelofmortalityfrominfectious
diseasesandexternalcauses).
Thelastthirdofthenineteenthcenturycanbecalledthetimeofthefirst“medical
revolution”thattookplacefollowingtheworksbyPasteur,Koch,andother
scientistswhoidentifiedvariouspathogens,discoveredthemicrobialnatureof
infectiousdiseases,andeffectivelyusedthisdiscoveryinpreventivemedicineand
thetreatmentofinfectiousdiseases(seeTable8.1).
Bythemid-nineteenthcentury,modernideasonhowtopreventcholerafrom
spreadingbegantoappear.Effectivemedicaltreatmentforthisdiseasewouldnotbe
founduntilmuchlater.However,theincidenceofcholerainsomeareasshoweda
sharpdecreasewhenaccesstoinfectedwatersourceswasblocked.Improvedurban
watersupplysystemsandtheuseofsand-basedwaterfiltrationprovidedhigher-
qualitydrinkingwaterandreducedepisodesofcholeraandtyphusoutbreaks.
Modernsystemsofsewageandwastemanagementappeared.In1883,Robert
Kochdiscoveredthecholerabacterium,Vibriocholerae,whichsignaledthestart
ofbacteriologicaltestsonwaterasapreventionagainstcholera.Drinkingboiled
water,eatingwashedfruitandvegetables,frequenthandwashing,andotherhealthy
practicesbecameincreasinglypopular(Bourdelais1991:125–128).
Since1864,LouisPasteurhadworkedonadisinfectiontechnology,whichwas
basedonheatingupproductstoagiventemperatureforagiventime.Theprocess,
knownaspasteurization,doesnotsterilizetheproduct,butitcontributestothe
destructionofvegetativeformsofpathogenswithoutchangingtheproductstructure.
Pasteurizationwas(andstillis)mainlyusedforrawmilk(Biraben1991).Pasteur’s
discoverywasrapidlyadoptedafterthe1890s.Ithadaparticularlystrongeffecton
reducinginfantmortality,ascowmilkwaswidelyusedforfeedingyoungchildren
(McKeown1976:162).
Moreover,theideasofPasteurandtheBritishsurgeonLister,aswellasother
practitionersfromEuropeancountries,helpedtodevelopacomplexdisinfection
technologyinoperatingrooms,includingthoroughhandwashingbysurgeonsand
staff,sterilizationofallsurgicalinstrumentswithboilingwater,introductionof
sterilerubbermedicalgloves,whitecoats,andsoon,whichsignificantlyreduced
mortalityinpatients(Biraben1991:227–228).
146 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Inthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury,butespeciallyfromthe1880stothe
1890s,manyEuropeancountries(includingGreatBritain,Belgium,Switzerland,
andFrance)approvedhousingstandards,suchasthesizeofrooms,ceilingheights,
andwindowsizes,theminimaldistancebetweenhouses,andstreetwidth.Slums
weregraduallyrebuiltordemolished(Burnett1991:174).
Ingeneral,the“longnineteenthcentury”(lastingfromtheendoftheeighteenth
centuryto1913)broughttremendouschangestothedemographicsituationin
Europebynotonlyreducingcatastrophicmortality,butalsobybringingdown
regularmortalityandincreasinglifeexpectancy.WecantakeFranceasanexample
torevealthescaleofthesechanges.Increasesinlifeexpectancyandmortality
reductionwereobservedinallagegroupsoftheFrenchpopulation,especially
amongchildren.Theriskofdeathintheagegroup5–10yearshaddecreasedby
85%asof1913comparedtothe1740 –1749level.Mortalitydeclinedby75%
amongthoseaged10–15,66%forages0–5,andabout50%forages20–55(Vallin
1991:54).LifeexpectancyatbirthinFranceincreasedfrom24.7yearsin
1740–1745to50.4yearsin1909–1913(ibid.:47).
8.5.3TheSecondPhaseofDemographicTransition.Fertility
Transition
Fertilitytransitioniscommonlyacceptedtohavestartedwhenfertilityratesdecrease
by10%(Livi-Bacci2012:128).Thefirstsignsofsustainedfertilitydeclinewere
recordedinFranceinthemid-eighteenthcentury.Acenturylater,in1875–1880,
birthratesbegantodeclineinotherEuropeancountries,includingfirstSweden,
Norway,GreatBritain,theNetherlands,Belgium,Finland,thenlateroninGermany,
Austria,CzechRepublic,Switzerland,aswellasamongtheEnglish-speaking
populationofAustraliaandNewZealand.Fertilityratesstartedtogodownin
PolandandthewesternprovincesofRussiaaround1900,andinsoutheasternand
southwesternEuropearound1920(Chesnais1992:112–113).Inthenineteenth
century,asocialconstraintonfertilityinWesternEuropewassetbyaspecific
nuptialitypatternwhichimpliedmarriagepostponementtoanolderage,andahigh
proportionofpeoplenevermarrying(Lesthaeghe1980;Watkins1981;Coaleand
Watkins1986).Asforthedevelopingworld,thefirstsignsofsustainabledeclinesin
fertilitywereobservedinsomecountriesasearlyasthelatenineteenthandearly
twentiethcenturies,especiallyinLatinAmericancountrieswithsubstantial
Europeanpopulations,suchasArgentina,Uruguay,andChile.However,massive
fertilitytransitioninthedevelopingworldbeganmuchlater,inthe1960s–1970s
(Livi-Bacci2012:174).

8.5DemographicTransitionandDemographicExplosionintheWorld-SystemCore 147
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1500155016001650170017501800185019001950
Millions
Fig.8.5Population
dynamicsofGreaterEurope,
inmillionsofpeople,
1500–1913.Datasources:
Maddison(2010).Thedata
pointfor1650iscalculatedby
takingintoaccountthe
estimatesofseventeenth-
centurydepopulation
presentedbyGeoffreyParker
(2013)
8.5.4ExplosivePopulationGrowthintheFirstWorld
Inthenineteenthcentury,theEuropeanpopulationmorethandoubled,growing
from180millionto390millionpeople(McEvedyandJones1978:18).Thiswasa
historicallyunprecedentedincrease—bycomparison,duringtheeighteenthcentury,
arelativelyfavorableperiodinthedemographichistoryofhumanity,thepopulation
ofEuropegrewby“only”50%,from120millionto180million.However,even
theseveryimpressivefiguresdonotfullyreflectthedemographicrealitybecause
theydonotaccountforthecolossalmigrationfromEuropetovarioussettler
colonies.Forexample,theUSpopulationincreasedmorethantenfold—fromsix
millionin1800to76millionin1900,largelythroughimmigration(ibid.287).
HundredsofthousandsorevenmillionsofEuropeansemigratedtoAustralia(ibid.:
328),Argentina,andChile(ibid.:313–314),andCanada(ibid.:284).Thus,thereal
growthoftheEuropeanpopulationfarexceededa“mere”doubling.
AccordingtotheestimatesofAngusMaddison,thepopulationofGreaterEurope
(includingthepopulationofEurope,Russia,andsettlementcoloniesintheAmericas
andOceania)increasedfrom257millionin1820to689millionin1913(see
Fig.8.5).
Steeppopulationgrowthduringthedemographictransitionoccursduetothefact
thatfertilitydeclineusuallylagsbehindmortalitydecline(seeFig.8.6).
148 8ModernGlobalization:GlobalTechnologicalandEconomicTransformationsin ...
Fig.8.6Dynamicsof
demographictransition.
Source:Kapitsa(1999).
Dottedline—fertilityrate,
dashedline—mortalityrate,
solidline—relativepopulation
growthrate
Tosumup,demographictransitionalmostalwayscomeswithapopulation
explosion.Thiswasthecaseinnineteenth-centuryEurope,andthisiswhathap-
penedinthetwentieth-centuryglobalworld.
8.6Conclusion
TheconsequencesoftheModernRevolutionbothonthefateofhumankindandon
thehistoryofglobalizationweremultipleinnatureandmomentousinscale.Forthe
firsttimeinhistory—thankstoincreasedmaterial(transport)andnon-material
(information)connectivity—wecanseeatrulyholisticglobaleconomicspace
formingsurprisinglyquickly(especiallyfromaBigHistoryperspective).New
technologiestightlyinterconnectednationaleconomiesandtheirinstitutionsto
suchanextentthatanewLeviathanwasborn—theglobaleconomy.Thisnewentity
encompassedallregionsoftheplanet(althoughthedepthofthepenetrationofthe
globalprocessesintoregionalandnationaleconomiesvaried),andexperienced
commondynamics,withupswingsanddownswingsbeinggloballysynchronized
toasurprisingdegree.
Moreover,theaccelerationoftechnologicaldevelopmentandincreasesinglobal
connectivitystronglyhelpedtheWorld-Systemcorecountriestosuccessfullyescape
fromtheMalthusiantrap.Inthetwentiethcentury,thisprocessexpanded,asthe
wholeoftheWorld-Systemsemi-peripheryandimportantpartsoftheperipheryalso
escapedfromtheMalthusiantrap(eventhoughforsomeperipheralcountries,
especiallyinsub-SaharanAfrica,thisprocessseemstobestillongoing).
Technologicaladvancesandongoingglobalizationalso“tookpart”inthestart
andprogressofdemographictransition,whichledtheworld(firsttheWorld-System
corecountries,thenthesemi-peripheryandlaterontheperiphery)toawholenew
demographicequilibrium,providingaphasetransitionfromthetraditionalregimeof
populationreproduction(highfertilityandhighmortality)toitsmodernregime(low

mortalityandlowfertility).Thisphasetransitionbroughtdramaticsocialand
economicchangestotheoutlookofhumanmodernity.
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GlobalSociopoliticalTransformations
oftheNineteenthCentury
9
Thenineteenthcenturywitnessedthebeginningofmanyimportanttransformationsin
thespheresofstatehood,stategovernance,andpoliticsingeneral.Multidimensional,
profound,andveryfast(intheBigHistoryperspective),modernizationprocesses
developedunevenlyandfrequentlyexposedtheWorld-Systemcorecountriestonew
typesoftraps,whichcouldresultinrevolutionsandperiodsofpoliticalturbulence.
Paradoxicallyatfirstsight,theseepisodesofturbulencefrequentlyoccurredagainst
thebackgroundofeconomicimprovementsandrisinglivingstandards.Inthischapter,
wediscoversomemechanismsunderlyingthisseemingcontroversy.Asglobalization
forcedmodernizationprocessestoincreasinglypenetratethesemi-peripheraland
peripheralpartsoftheWorld-System,thesemechanismsbecameglobalandgenerated
episodesofsociopoliticalinstabilityinvariousmodernizingcountriesthroughoutthe
twentiethandearlytwenty-firstcenturies.
Inthepreviouschapterwenotedthatglobalizationinthenineteenthcentury
contributedheavilytotheglobalspreadofEuropeanmodernity.Inthischapter,we
willfocusonsomeofthemostprominentpoliticalaspectsofthismodernity,which
cametoacquireaglobalcharacterlateron,inthetwentiethcentury.Inthesphereof
politicspersesomeofthemostnotabledevelopmentsincludedthreewavesof
constitutionalism,whichencompassednotonlytheWorld-Systemcore(Europeand
theUSA),butalsosomeofthesemi-periphery(LatinAmerica).Anothernovelty
wastheemergenceofmodernpoliticalparties,whichdifferedsignificantlyfromthe
previouslyexistingpoliticalclubs(liketheJacobinsandGirondinsduringthe
FrenchRevolution)oraristocraticgroups.
Oneofthemostprominentchangesinthesphereofstategovernancewasrelatedto
enfranchisement.Indeed,variousaspectsofmodernizationwerebecomingincreas-
inglyincompatiblewiththetraditionalsystem,whereonlyasmallminoritypossessed
therighttovoteand,thus,toparticipateinthegovernanceofthestate.Asaresult,the
entirenineteenthcentury,especiallyfromthe1830s,wasatimeofintensestrugglefor
theexpansionofenfranchisementintheWorld-Systemcore,eventuallyresultingin
theworldwidespreadofuniversalvotingrightsduringthetwentiethcentury.
#SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2019
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andGlobalFutures,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05707-7_9
153
154 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
Anothercriticallyimportantsocialtransformationofthenineteenthcenturywas
relatedtotheglobal“liberationofslaves.”Almostall“hard”formsofpersonal
dependence(includingnotonlyslavery,butalsoserfdom)startedtobeabolishedall
overtheworld.Slaverywasnotcompletelyeradicatedworldwideby1900(espe-
ciallyintheeast),butitwasinthenineteenthcenturythatattitudestowardsit
dramaticallychanged,overturningthepracticesofthepreviouscenturiesoreven
millennia.
TheprototypeofthemodernsocialstatebegantoappearinEuropeinthelate
nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies(andlateronspreadworldwide),asstates
implementedsocialsecuritysystemsfortheirpopulations.Itwasatimemarkedbya
radicaltransitiontoanewtypeofstate,oneprovidingsocialsupportatthenational
levelnotonlytoparticularindividualsinneed,buttowholesocialgroupsand
categories.Thisisthetimewhenthewelfarestatewasborn.Inthetwentiethcentury,
globalizationbroughtthemaininstitutionsofsuchastatetothesemi-peripheryand
(partially)totheperiphery.9.1StatehoodDevelopment
Somepoliticalanthropologistsidentifythreeevolutionarytypesofstate:theearly
state;thedevelopedstate;andthematurestate(ClaessenandSkalník1978,1981;
Claessenetal.2008;Grinin2008).Theincreasingroleofindustrialproduction,the
developmentofbureaucracyandstateadministrativeapparatus,aswellasthespread
ofliteracyandurbanizationmadeEuropeanstatesbecomerelativelymatureasearly
astheeighteenthcentury.Furtherprogressinthesespheres,aswellasthedevelop-
mentofcommunications,graduallyeliminatedthearchaicfeaturesofthestate,and
ledtotheemergenceoffullymodernmaturestates.
Thethreetenetsofthestate—systemofgovernance,taxation,andterritorial
organization—experiencedprofoundchangeswhenthestatestransitionedfrom
developedtomature.Bureaucracybecameprogressivelymoreprofessionaland
specialized;thestateincreasinglyreliedonprofessionalcivilservantsratherthan
onestatesandaristocracy(Weber1978).Almostallmaturestatesimplemented
territorialreformstoeradicatefeudalautonomyandeliminateinternalcustoms
duties.Attitudestowardstaxesgraduallychangedbetweenthenineteenthandthe
twentiethcenturies.Governmentsbegantopaymoreattentiontoeconomicdevel-
opmentandsawtaxesnotonlyasasourceofgovernmentincomebutalsoasameans
ofregulatingandstimulatingtheeconomy.Thiswasoneofthereasonsforstatesto
graduallyturnawayfromfreetradetowardsprotectionismbetweenthelatenine-
teenthandearlytwentiethcenturies.
Themostimportantchangesinthewayacountrywasrunweremostlyrelatedto
theestablishmentofaconstitutionalorder,thelegitimizationofsupremepowerand
itstransfer,and,insomecases,democratization(seeSect.9.3formoredetail).
Alreadyinthenineteenthcenturytheheadsofconstitutionalregimesinmature
statescouldnolongerfullyidentifythemselveswiththeirstates;statehoodwas
nolongerpersonifiedbytheruler.Statebureaucracyandarmiesgainedacertain

levelofautonomy,becomingincreasinglyabstractmechanismsthatexecutedthe
willofthestate.Theseparationofpowersintothreebranchesbecameincreasingly
widespread.Localauthoritiesstartedtoformacoherentsystem.Onecouldalso
observetherisingimportanceofthelaw,especiallythecivillaw.Societiesmoved
towardstheequalityofrights.Manynationscodifiedtheirlaw,reformedthe
judiciary,anddevelopedasystemoflegaleducation.
1
Changesalsoaffectedsocial
ideologyandpsychology.Peoplebecameincreasinglyconvincedthatlifemustbe
controlledbylaw.Evenmaturestatesorganizedasmonarchiesandtotalitarianor
socialistpolitiesfollowedlawsandstucktotheprinciplesofsocialjustice(atleast
nominally).
9.2RevolutionsandSocialMovements 155
Theabove-mentionedfactorslaidthefoundationfortheformationofacivil
society.Thegovernmentbecameincreasinglyresponsibletoitscitizens,whereasthe
latterreceivedanopportunitytolegallycriticizethegovernment.Thisopportunity
increasedtheroleofthemassmediaandideologists,includingscholars,writers,and
publicists.Theycouldexerttheirgrowinginfluenceuponthegovernmentandpublic
opinion,thusevolvingintothefourthbranchofgovernance.
Thedevelopmentoftransport(railroads,steamships)andcommunications(tele-
graph,telephone)contributedgreatlytotheemergenceofatypicalmaturestate.The
speedofinteractionchangedthepolitical,economic,military,cultural,andsocial
characteristicsofstates.
9.2RevolutionsandSocialMovements
Amongmanyothernames,thenineteenthcenturyisknownastheAgeof
Revolutions.Thefactthatthemassspreadofrevolutionsandrebellionsacrossthe
World-Systemcorecountriestookplacenamelyinthenineteenthcenturymayseem
tobeapuzzleatfirst.Indeed,theeighteenthcenturywasa“Malthusian”century,
andlivingstandardsofEuropeanpopulationsdeclinedthroughoutthisperiod—a
developmentwhichmighthavesparkledpopularresentment.Thenineteenthcentury
broughtageneralimprovementinthestandardsoflivingforlargepartsofEuropean
populationsandevensawanumberofEuropeancountriesstarttheirsuccessful
escapefromtheMalthusiantrap(seeSect.8.1).Againstthisbackground,onewould
expecttoseemuchlesssociopoliticalstabilityintheeighteenththaninthenine-
teenthcentury;however,therealitywasquitetheopposite.Inthenextsection,we
willtrytouncoversomeofthemechanismsthroughwhichmodernizationprocesses
generatedsociopoliticalinstability.Inthetwentiethcentury,globalizationbrought
modernizationtothesemi-peripheralandperipheralcountries,andthese
mechanismsgraduallyacquiredaglobalscale.
1
ProbablythemostfamousexampleistheNapoleonicCodeinFrance.Anotherclassicexample
relatestoGermancivillegislation.
156 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
9.2.1RevolutionaryWavesintheNineteenthCentury
Inthenineteenthcentury,thefirstrevolutionarywaveroseinthe1820s.Itwas
inspiredbytheideasoftheFrenchRevolutionandanti-monarchymovements
formedmostlybythenobility.ArelevantexamplehereistheDecembristmovement
inRussiabetween1816and1825.Theserevolutionsandrebellionswere
characterizedbyverylowlevelsofmobilization,encompassingmostlysmallnum-
bersofplottersandmilitaryofficers.However,socialupheavalsgraduallygrew
larger,suchastheanti-TurkishmovementsinGreecebetween1821and1829.The
revolutionarywaveofthe1820salsoincludedtherevolutionsinSpainandPortugal,
revoltsagainstAustrianruleinItaly,unsuccessfulrebellionsinFrance,andwarsof
independenceinLatinAmerica.OnlythelatterandtheGreekrevoltturnedouttobe
successful;otheruprisingsweresuppressed.
Thesecondrevolutionarywaverosein1830–1831.Thesewererevolutionsofa
differentsort,especiallytheoneinFrance,whichgaveimpetustouprisingsinother
countries.Thisrevolutioninvolvedlargernumbersofintellectualsandlaborerswho
demandedforsocialandpoliticalchanges.TheJulyRevolution(Pinkney1973)
overthrewtheBourbondynastyandbroughtLouisPhilippeItopower.This
revolutionhadseveralrepercussions.ItstrengthenedtheEnglishmovementfor
parliamentaryreform(whichtookplacein1832).ItalsoaffectedItaly,where
rebellionsbrokeoutinsomecentralstatesin1831,althoughtheyweresuppressed
bytheAustrianarmy.Inothercountries,suchasBelgiumandPoland,
revolutionariesstoodfornationalliberation.ArevolutioninBelgiumallowedthe
countrytogainindependencefromtheDutch;however,thePolishuprisingwas
suppressedbyRussiantroops.TheJulyRevolutioninFrancealsotriggeredsocio-
politicalrevoltinSwitzerland,wherecantonsdividedintomoremodernandradical
ones,ontheonehand,andconservativeandclericalones,ontheother,andthese
contradictionslaterledtothecivilwarof1847.Progressivebourgeoiscantons
vanquishedtheiropponentsandadoptedtheprogressiveconstitutionof1848.
TheseeventsmightbeconsideredtobepartofamajorrevolutionarywaveinEurope
in1848knownastheSpringofNations.
Themostimportanteventoftherevolutionarywaveof1848wastheoverthrowof
LouisPhilippeandthefoundationoftheFrenchRepubliconFebruary24,1848,
accompaniedbytheintroductionofuniversalmalesuffrage,atrueinnovationatthat
time(seeSect.9.4).TheFrenchRepublicalsodeclaredfreedomsofspeech,press,
association,andthought.TheFebruaryrevolutionintensifiedrevolutionary
sentimentsalloverEurope.ByMarch2,revolutionhadspreadtosouthwestern
Germany.OnMarch6,itflaredinBavariaandonMarch,11grippedBerlin,the
capitalofPrussia.OnMarch13,itreachedtheAustriancapitalofViennaandseized
almostimmediatelyallofHungary.ByMarch18,therevolutionhadengulfedMilan
andsubsequentlythewholeofItaly(Hobsbawm1987).Thus,therevolutionspread
acrossEuropefromEnglandtoHungary,fromSicilytoBucharest,andresonatedin
NorthernEuropeandSwitzerland.Themainrevolutionaryareaencompassed
France,Prussia,theGermanstates,theAustrianEmpire,andtheItalianstates(ibid.).

9.2RevolutionsandSocialMovements 157
Atfirst,theserevolutionsweresuccessfulandwerecalledtheSpringofNations.
Emperorsandothermonarchsfledtheircapitalsand/oradoptedconstitutionsthat
limitedtheirpower;electionsofstatesmentonewconstitutionalbodiestookplace.
However,asrevolutionaryclaimsanduprisingsgrewmoreradical,andmonarchs
andconservativesrecoveredfromtheshock,thesituationstartedtochange.First,the
threatofrevolutionsconsolidatedconservativepowers.Second,alotof
representativesofhigherandmiddleclasses,liberalintellectualsandotherstrata
ceasedsupportingtherevolutions.Third,theexpansionofvotingrightsopenedthe
wayforconservativestobeelectedtoparliament.Fourth,anumberofrevolutions,in
ItalyandHungaryinparticular,weresuppressedbyforeigntroops(Austrianand
Russianrespectively).
Whywouldsuchintensewavesofsociopoliticaldestabilizationriseagainstthe
backgroundofeconomicgrowthandimprovinglivingstandards?Anumberof
explanationsispossible.Thus,risingstandardsoflivingduringmodernization
wereoftenaccompaniedbysoaringsocialinequality(Piketty2014),whichstrained
socialrelationsandfueledtheideaofwealthredistributioninamorefairway.
Intellectuals(includingstudents)soughthigherstandardsoflivingthatwouldmatch
theirlevelofeducation.Risingexpectationsoutpacedtherealgrowthratesofliving
standards,exacerbatingsocialdiscontent.Thesituationwasatitsmostdangerous
whenaperiodofsustainablegrowthwasinterruptedbysomeexternalshock(crop
failure,risingpricesoffood,orafallinthepricesofexportedgoods).Underthese
circumstances,theexpectationsofboththemassesandeliteskeptincreasing,while
theactualleveloftheirsatisfactiondecreased,causingfrustratedexpectationsand
relativedeprivation,whichisreflectedbytheso-called“J-curvetheory”developed
byDavies(Davies1962,1969;seealsoGurr1970).Allthiscouldresultinasocial
upheaval.
MancurOlson(1963)andSamuelHuntington(1968)suggestintheirclassic
worksthatthereisaninvertedU-shapedrelationshipratherthananegativecorrela-
tionbetweenpercapitaincomelevelsandrisksofsociopoliticaldestabilization.As
OlsonandHuntingtonargue,thehighestriskofdestabilizationisobservedneither
forhigh-incomenorforlow-incomecountries,butratherformiddle-incomestates.
Olson(1963)suggestsacomprehensivelistoffactorsthatcontributetoapositive
correlationbetweenaveragepercapitaincomeandlevelsofsociopoliticaldestabili-
zationamongthemodernizingpolities.Huntington(1968)providesthefollowing
usefulsummaryofOlson’ssuggestions:
Rapideconomicgrowth,ithasbeensaid:
1.disruptstraditionalsocialgroupings(family,class,caste),andthusincreases“thenumber
ofindividualswhoaredéclassé...andwhoarethusincircumstancesconduciveto
revolutionaryprotests”(Olson1963:532);
2.producesnouveauxricheswhoareimperfectlyadjustedtoandassimilatedbytheexisting
orderandwhowantpoliticalpowerandsocialstatuscommensuratewiththeirnew
economicposition;
3.increasesgeographicalmobilitywhichagainunderminessocialties,and,inparticular,
encouragesrapidmigrationfromruralareastocities,whichproducesalienationand
politicalextremism;
4.increasesthenumberofpeoplewhosestandardoflivingisfalling,andthusmaywiden
thegapbetweenrichandpoor;
5.increasestheincomesofsomepeopleabsolutelybutnotrelativelyandhenceincreases
theirdissatisfactionwiththeexistingorder;
6.requiresageneralrestrictionofconsumptioninordertopromoteinvestmentandthus
producespopulardiscontent;
7.increasesliteracy,education,andexposuretomassmedia,whichincreaseaspirations
beyondlevelswheretheycanbesatisfied;
8.aggravatesregionalandethnicconflictsoverthedistributionofinvestmentand
consumption;
9.increasescapacitiesforgrouporganizationandconsequentlythestrengthofgroup
demandsongovernment,whichthegovernmentisunabletosatisfy.(Huntington1968:
49–50)
Wehaveuncoveredseveralfurtherfactorswhichpositthatapositivecorrelation
existsbetweenpercapitaincomeandsociopoliticaldestabilizationinmodernizing
low-andmiddle-incomeeconomies.Someofthesefactorsarecharacterizedinour
“trapatescapefromMalthusiantrap”model(Korotayevetal.2011;Korotayevand
Zinkina2011;Grininetal.2016)whichcanbedescribedasfollows(seealso
Fig.9.1foracognitiveschemeofthemodel):
1.ThestartoftheescapefromtheMalthusiantrap
2
tendstobringaboutaprecipi-
tousdeclineinthedeathrateand,consequently,anexplosiveaccelerationin
populationgrowthrates(whichinitselfcanleadtoanincreaseinsociopolitical
tensions).
2.Thestartoftheescapeisaccompaniedbyparticularlysharpdecreasesin
infantandunder-fivemortality,whichraisestheproportionoftheyouthinthe
population,theso-called“youthbulge.”
3.Thismeansapronouncedincreaseintheproportionofthepopulationthatare
moreinclinedtoradicalism.
4.Theimpetuousgrowthoftheyoungpopulationrequiresenormousnumbers
ofnewjobs,whichisaseriouseconomicchallenge;meanwhile,growthin
youthunemploymentcanhaveaparticularlystrongdestabilizingeffect,creating
an“army”ofpotentialparticipantsinvariouspoliticalupheavals,includingcivil
warsandrevolutions.
5.EscapefromtheMalthusiantrapstimulatesvigorousgrowthoftheurbanpopu-
lation.Also,“excessive”populationisforcedoutofthecountrysidebygrowthin
theproductivityofagriculturallabor.Massiverural–urbanmigrationalmost
inevitablycreatesasignificantnumberofthosedissatisfiedwiththeircurrent
position,asmostrural–urbanmigrantsareinitiallylimitedtounskilledlow-paid
jobsandlow-qualityaccommodation.
158 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
2
Onthenotionofthe“Malthusiantrap,”seeChap.4;fordetailsonthestartoftheglobalescape
fromtheMalthusiantrap,seeSect.8.1.

Fig.9.1“AtrapattheescapefromtheMalthusiantrap.”Acognitivemodel
6.EscapefromtheMalthusiantrapisachievedthroughthedevelopmentofnew
economicsectorsanddeclineoftheoldones.Suchstructuralchangescannot
proceedpainlessly,asworkers’qualificationslosetheirvalue.Lackingthe
necessaryskillsforworkingwithnewtechnologies,theseworkersareobliged
totakeuplow-qualifiedjobs,whichmakesthemsociallydiscontent.
7.Youngpeoplemakeupthemajorityofrural–urbanmigrants,sothe“youth
bulge”andurbanizationfactorsacttogether,producingaparticularlystrong
destabilizingeffect.Notonlydoesthemostradicallyinclinedpartofthepopula-
tionincreaseinnumbers,butitalsobecomesconcentratedinmajorcities/political
centers.
9.2RevolutionsandSocialMovements 159 160 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
8.Thiscanresultinseriouspoliticaldestabilizationevenagainstthebackgroundof
stableeconomicgrowth(seeFig.9.1).Theprobabilityofpoliticaldestabilization
increasesdramaticallyifaneconomiccrisisoccurs,orifthegovernmentlegiti-
macyiscompromisedduetoothercauses(suchasmilitarydefeats).
Rapid,unregulatedchangeshavefrequentlyledsocietiesintoanewmoderniza-
tiontrap(GrininandKorotayev2012;Grinin2012),whichhasresultedin
revolutionsandperiodsofpoliticalturbulence.
3
9.3ConstitutionalismandPoliticalParties
9.3.1Constitutionalism
SamuelHuntingtonintroducestheconceptofwavesofdemocratization.Hedefines
themastransitionsfromnon-democratictodemocraticregimes,whichtakeplaceat
acertainperiodoftimeandexceedthenumberoftransitionsoftheoppositetype
happeningatthesametime(Huntington1991:16).Huntingtonspecifiesthreewaves
ofdemocratization,theearliestsignsofwhichcanbetracedbacktotheFrench
Revolutionof1789–1799andfurtherbacktotheAmericanRevolutionof
1765–1783.However,theestablishmentofdemocraticinstitutionsperseinthese
countriestookplaceinthenineteenthcentury,alongwithothercountriesthat
participatedinthefirstwaveofdemocratization,includingGreatBritainanda
numberofitscolonies,Switzerland,Italy,anumberofothersmallEuropeannations,
andArgentina(ibid.:16–17).GeorgeBilliassuggestsamoredetailedchronological
divisionofthespreadofconstitutionalism,whichisconsideredtobeoneofthemost
crucialaspectsofdemocratization.Hesinglesoutthreewavesofconstitutionalism
throughoutthenineteenthcentury:1776–1800inEurope(firstappearinginFrance);
1811–1900inLatinAmerica;and1848inEurope(Billias2009).
AccordingtoBillias,thetimespanfrom1776to1800isoneofthemost
revolutionaryperiodsofconstitutionalchangeinglobalhistory.Whenthethree
traditions—British,American,andFrench—cametogether,theyformedWestern
constitutionalism,ledbytheUnitedStatesanditsVirginiaDeclarationofRightsof
1776,whichestablishedthebasisofmodernconstitutionalism(Billias2009:56).
Duringthisperiod(in1787,tobemoreexact)theAmericanauthoritiesadopted
theConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,thefirstconstitutioninthemodernsenseofthe
term.Forthefirsttimeinglobalhistory,aconstitutionwasbasedontheprincipleof
theseparationoflegislature,executive,andjudiciarypowers,whichwasproposed
3
Nevertheless,insomecases,rapidmodernizationcanbeaccompaniedbyfastpopulation
growth,whichdoesnotcauseanylarge-scalesocio-politicalturbulencethankstosuccessful
domesticandforeignpolicy.ThemostsalientexamplesofthisareprovidedbytheScandinavian
countries.

byJohnLockeandCharlesMontesquieu.In1789,thegovernmentoftheUSA
adoptedtheBillofRights,whichcameintoforcein1791.Itcontainedthefirstten
amendmentstotheUnitedStatesConstitutionthatproclaimedfreedomofspeech,
religion,press,andtherightofthepeopletopeacefullyassemble.Theamendments
alsoprohibitedcruelpunishment,andguaranteedprivateproperty.
Between1787and1800severalconstitutionsweredevelopedinEurope—onein
Poland(1791),oneintheNetherlands(1798),andseveralconstitutionsandconsti-
9.3ConstitutionalismandPoliticalParties 161
tutionalprojectsinFrance.TheConstitutionofPolandof1791isconsideredtobe
thefirstEuropeanconstitution.TheFrenchDeclarationoftheRightsofManandof
theCitizenalsoplayedacrucialroleinthespreadofconstitutionalism,asitlaidthe
foundationsforbothFrenchconstitutionallawandtheUniversalDeclarationof
HumanRightsadoptedbytheUNGeneralAssemblyin1948.
Duringthenineteenthcentury,thenewlyindependentLatinAmericannations
developedanumberofconstitutionalprojectsthattookintoaccounttheexperience
oftheUnitedStatesandFrance.TheearliestconstitutionalprojectsofArgentina
(1819,1826,1853),Venezuela(1811),Mexico(1824and1857)andChile(1833)
containedtheideasoffederalgovernment,separationbetweenlegislature,executive,
andjudiciarypowers,aswellasseparationbetweencentralandregionalauthorities,
bicameral(two-chamber)legislatures,freedomofspeech,andothercivilfreedoms
(Billias2009:125–136).
ThethirdwaveofconstitutionalismaffectedmainlyEuropeannationsandwas
closelyconnectedwiththerevolutionsof1848alsoknownastheSpringofNations.
TheconstitutionsofFranceandSwitzerlandareamongthemostwidelyknown
constitutionsdevelopedduringthisperiod.Theformerlaidthelegalgroundforthe
FrenchSecondRepublic.ThelatterproclaimedSwitzerlandafederalrepublic
(Carstairs1980:135).Atthesametime,theso-calledPillersdorfConstitutionofthe
AustrianEmpirewaspublished.Itproclaimedequalitybetweenallnationsofthe
empire.Thisconstitutionwaslaterfollowedbyanumberofotherconstitutional
projects(ibid.:123).InJune1849,thekingofDenmarksignedthefirstmodern
constitutionofthatcountry,whichmarkedatransitiontoconstitutionalmonarchyas
opposedtothepreviousconstitutionof1665,whichproclaimedanabsolutemonar-
chy.AconstitutionwasdrawnupbyPiedmontandanumberofotherItalianstatesin
1848.TheconstitutionofPiedmontwaslaterexpandedtoItalyasawhole(ibid.:149).
9.3.2PoliticalParties
Thenineteenthcenturywitnessedtheemergenceofyetanothercrucialphenomenon
ofEuropean—andlaterglobal—politicalmodernity,namelymodernpolitical
parties,whichdifferedsignificantlyfromthepreviouslyexistingpoliticalclubs
(liketheJacobinsandGirondinsduringtheFrenchRevolution),oraristocratic
groups.Distinctivefeaturesofmodernpoliticalpartiesinclude:succession,sothat
theexistenceofapartydoesnotdependonthelengthoflifeofitscurrentleader;a
manifesto;apresenceatlocallevelsandregularcommunicationbetweenlocal
officesandtheheadoffice;aspirationtopoweratlocalandnationallevels;anda
continuoussearchforsupportersincludingvarioustypesofactionaimedatgaining
massbacking(LaPalombaraandWeiner1966:5–6).
Itisgenerallyassumedthatmodernpoliticalpartiesemergedasaresultofthe
expansionofsuffrageinthenineteenthcentury.Indeed,whileonlyalimitedgroup
162 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
ofpeoplehadvotingrights,therewasnoneedforlocalelectoralcommittees.Onthe
contrary,whenamoresignificantshareofthepopulationstartedplayingarolein
politicallife(atleastduringelections),itbecamenecessarytoinstitutionalizelegal
meanstostruggleforpowerandgainvoters’support(LaPalombaraandWeiner
1966:9;Self2000:23).
Scholarssingleoutfourmainprerequisitesforthedevelopmentofmodern
politicalparties.Theseinclude:
•thedevelopmentofasinglenationalpoliticalarena;
•growingdifferentiationandcomplexityofapoliticalsystemwhichsuggests
increasingcomplexityofgovernmentstructureandfunctions,aswellasagrow-
ingdivergenceandrisingconflictofinterestsbetweenvarioussocialgroups;
•theintroductionofnewsocialstructuresandideologiescapableofgainingthe
electorate’ssupport;and
•thenecessityfordevelopingpoliticalstructuresthatareabletoprovideaconnec-
tionbetweenpoliticalleadersandtheirfollowers(Chambers1966:82).
VonBeymesinglesoutfourmainfunctionsofpoliticalparties:(1)settinggoals
andelaboratinganideologyandaprogram;(2)expressingandaggregatingsocial
interests;(3)mobilizingsocietywithintheframeworkofapoliticalsystem,espe-
ciallyduringelections;and(4)recruitingelitesandformingcabinets(vonBeyme
1985:13).
Mostscholarsagreethattheearliestsystemofmodernpoliticalpartieswas
formedintheUSA.Indeed,by1800,twogroupsemergedinAmericanpolitical
lifethatresembledmodernpartiesintheirstructureandfunctions.Federalistsledby
AlexanderHamiltoncalledforpowerfulcentralgovernment,astrongcentralbank,
andhighimporttaxes,whiletheDemocratic-RepublicanPartyheadedbyThomas
Jeffersondemandedtherestrictionofpoweratthenationallevelandtheempower-
mentofindividualstates(Chambers1966:81).Bothgroupsestablishedsystemsof
committeesthroughoutthecountryinordertomobilizevoters.By1808,bothparties
hadaformalmanagementstructure.In1828,theDemocratic-RepublicanPartysplit
intotheDemocraticPartyandtheWhigParty(Dwyre2010:27–33;Chhibberand
Kollman2009:81).Asaresultofthissplit,arelativelystabletwo-partysystemhad
formedintheUSAbythe1840s.
4
Anewtypeofpartyorganization,especiallyinbig
cities,emergedasaresponsetothechallengeofcompetingforvotersupport.This
neworganizationincludedapartyapparatusthat,forexample,offeredimmigrants
4
TheWhigPartydeclinedandceasedtoexistinthemid-nineteenthcentury.In1854,aparty
demandingtheabolitionofslaveryservedasthebasisfortheformationoftheRepublicanParty
(Dwyre2010:33).

(whowereenteringtheUSAinlargenumbersatthattime)totakecareoftheirneeds
inexchangefortheirvotes(Hershey2015:16–19).
BasedonSteinRokkan’stypologyofEuropeanconflicts,vonBeymeelaboratesa
systemofcategoriesofpartiesapplicabletothehistoryofWesternEuropeinthe
nineteenthcentury(vonBeyme1985:23).Wecitethisclassificationbelow,
supplementingitwithexamplestakenfromThePoliticalPartiesofEurope,edited
byMcHaleandSkowronski,aswellasfromtheworksofsomeotherscholars:
9.3ConstitutionalismandPoliticalParties 163
1.Liberalpartiesagainsttheoldsocialandpoliticalorderandconservativeparties.
LiberalandconservativepartieswerefoundedthroughoutEurope,evolvingfrom
politicalmovementsandclubsandpresentingthefirstexamplesofmodern-type
parties.Thus,theLiberalPartyfoundedin1846inBelgiumbecamethefirst
formallyorganizedpoliticalparty.Theaimsofliberalpartiesfrequentlyincluded
suffrageexpansionandsecularization(Belgium,Norway)(McHaleand
Skowronski1983a:65,688),aswellasincreasinggovernmentcentralization,
implementationofthelaissez-faireprinciple,andexpansionofparliamentary
rights(Germany,theNetherlands,Switzerland)(McHaleandSkowronski1983a:
424,429,1983b:909;Carstairs1980:61).Conservativesstoodformonarchyand
preservationofitspower,representingtheinterestsoflandlordsandoftenthe
church(McHaleandSkowronski1983a:418).
2.Workers’partiesagainstthebourgeoissystem.TheSecondInternational,the
organizationofsocialistandlaborpartiesfoundedin1889,greatlyinfluencedthe
labormovementandcontributedtothefoundationofformallyorganizedlabor
parties.OneofthelaborpartiesstillpresentandinfluentialtodayistheLabor
PartyintheUK,foundedin1900astheLaborRepresentationCommitteeand
closelyconnectedwiththeBritishlaborunionmovement(Thorpe2008:8–
3.Agrarianpartiesagainsttheindustrialsystem(spreadmostlyacrossScandinavia
andEasternEurope).AtypicalexampleistheBulgarianAgrarianNationalUnion
foundedin1879,whichaimedtoimprovepeasants’livingconditionsviareforms
(McHaleandSkowronski1983a:89).AnotherexampleistheCentrePartyof
Swedenseekingtoreducegovernmentexpenditureandlowerthetaxburdenon
peasants(McHaleandSkowronski1983b:891–892).
4.Regionalpartiesagainstcentrismasaformofstateorganization.Forexample,
intheGermanEmpirethereexistedtheDanishParty,theAlsace-LorraineParty,
theGerman-HanoverianParty,andthePolishParty(McHaleandSkowronski
1983a:415).
35).
5.Christianpartiesagainstthesecularsystem.AtypicalexampleistheCatholic
PartyofBelgiumfoundedin1884,whennumerousschoolcommittees
establishedduring“theschoolwars”of1879–1884(adisputebetweenthose
supportingchurchinvolvementineducationandthoseseekingsecularization)
weretransformedintolocalofficesoftheparty.TheChristianPartypolledthe
vastmajorityofvotesinparliamentaryelectionsbetween1884and1919and
playedacrucialroleinBelgianpoliticsthroughoutmuchofthetwentiethcentury
(ibid.:56–61).AmongotherexamplesthereistheGermanCentrePartyof
164 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
theGermanEmpire,whichrepresentedtheinterestsoftheCatholicminority
(ibid.:412).
6.Communistpartiesagainstsocialdemocrats(after1916–1917).
9.4StruggleforEnfranchisement
Duringmuchofhumanhistory,therighttoparticipateinstategovernancewas
restrictedtoonlyasmallminorityofthepopulation.However,rapidmodernization
processesongoingintheWorld-Systemcoreinthenineteenthcentury,including
increasedliteracy,intenserural–urbanmigration,thedecreasingroleofestates,and
thegrowingbourgeoisie,aswellasasurgeinnationalism,wereincreasinglyatodds
withthissituation.Theentirenineteenthcentury,especiallyafterthe1830s,wasa
timeofstruggleforexpandedparticipationinstategovernance,whichtooktheform
of,firstandforemost,campaignstoincreaseenfranchisement:
OfallthepoliticalandsocialreformsintroducedinEuropeduringthenineteenthcentury,
nonerepresentedasharperbreakwiththepastthanmanhoodsuffrage.Neverbeforehadany
sizablecommunitybeenabletosustainaformofgovernmentinwhichcivicequalitywas
grantedtoeveryadultmaleregardlessofclass,property,oreducation....Theexclusionof
thelowerclassesfromparticipationinthepoliticalprocesswaseverywhereregardedas
essentialforstablegovernment.Thepurposeofthestatewaspreciselytomaintaineconomic
andsocialdistinctions,whichwerebelievedtobetimelessandineradicable....Yetafter
1815theenfranchisementofthelowerclassesgraduallybecameareality.(Hamerow1989:
285)
Indeed,asaresultofthegradualexpansionofsuffrageinmostEuropean
countries,bytheFirstWorldWartherighttovotewasavailabletotheoverwhelm-
ingmajorityofadultmalesoreventotheentiremalepopulationoveracertainage.
Thisphenomenonwasatruenon-violentrevolutioninthepoliticalsphere:elitist
politics,wheredecision-makingwasinthehandsofasmallgroupofwealthy
propertyowners,gavewaytomasspolitics.Table9.1presentssomedataonthe
electorallawreformswhichledtothemostsignificantincreasesinenfranchisement
inanumberofEuropeancountries(aswellasArgentinaandUruguay).
ItisimportanttounderstandthatthefiguresinTable9.1donotrepresentthe
percentageofeligiblevotersinthegeneralpopulation,butrathertheirshareinthe
populationmeetingtherequirementsofageandsex—inotherwords,theproportion
ofmenoveracertainagecoveredbytherighttovote.Letusconsidersomecasesof
theintroductionofuniversalmalesuffrageinthenineteenthcentury.
IntheUSA,therighttovote,firstcoveringonlyadultwhitemaleproperty
owners,wassignificantlyexpandedunderPresidentJackson(electedin1828).
Jacksonpersuadedalmostallstatestoabolishtherequirementofpropertyowner-
ship.Thisstepgreatlyincreasedthenumberofthemiddleclassandthepooramong
thevoters(notethatthepoorweremostlyinclinedtovotefortheDemocraticParty
representedbyJackson).Inthe1830s,almostallwhitemalesintheUSAhadthe
righttovote,includingnotonlycitizensbutalsoinmanystatesnewlyarrived

Table9.1Theimpactofelectorallawreformsontheproportionoftheenfranchisedpopulation
(meetingtherequirementsforageandsex)
Yearof Proportionofenfranchised Proportionofenfranchised
Country
2010:33;Testi1998
9.4StruggleforEnfranchisement 165
reform beforethereform,% afterthereform,%
Argentina 1912 ? Allmales
Denmark 1849 3 73
Finland 1906 9 87
France 1848 3 91
Greece 1864 ? Allmales
GreatBritain 1884 36 64
1918 64 89
Italy 1912 32 90
Netherlands 1917 69 95
Norway 1898 43 90
Spain 1868 11 Allmales
Sweden 1907/1909 34 78
1918/1920 78 96
Switzerland 1848 Dependingonthecanton Allmales
Uruguay 1918 63 Allmales
Source:Collier(1999:28)
immigrantswhowereundergoingtheprocessofnaturalization.AftertheCivilWar,
theConstitutionwasamendedtoguaranteetherighttovotefortheblackmale
populationaswell.Finally,atthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury15statesgave
womentherighttovote,andin1920thisrightwasenshrinedatthenationallevel
(Dwyre :387 –388).
AmongtheEuropeancountries,Francewasthepioneerintheintroductionof
universalmalesuffrage.In1792,theentireadultmalepopulationreceivedtheright
tovoteintheelectionoftheNationalConvention.
5
NapoleonBonapartekeptthe
simulacrumofuniversalmalesuffrage;however,duringtherestorationofthe
Bourbonsanincomethresholdwasintroducedforvoters.Therighttovotewas
keptonlyforthosemenwhopaidatleast300francsayearindirecttaxes(around
0.3%ofthetotalpopulation).Universalmalesuffragewasonlyfullyrestoredin
1848withtheproclamationoftheFrenchSecondRepublic.Withthisrestoration,the
electorategrewbymorethanthirtytimes,from300,000to9.3millionpeople
(Hamerow1989:305).
6
InBelgium,accordingtotheConstitutionof1831,therighttoelect
representativestothelowerhouseofparliamentwasextendedonlytocitizens
whopaidannualtaxofnotlessthanacertainamount.
7
WhentheConstitutionwas
5
TheNationalConventionwasthehighestlegislativeandexecutivebodyoftheFrenchFirst
RepublicduringtheFrenchRevolution.
6
Paradoxically,however,NapoleonIIIsoontookadvantageofthisuniversalsuffragetoestablish
theSecondFrenchEmpirethroughnationalreferendums.
7
Indifferentprovincesthisamountrangedfrom20to100florins.
beingadopted,amovementforuniversalsuffragehadnotyetemerged,andsuch
financialrestrictionsofenfranchisementweretakenforgranted.Around1860,a
campaignforuniversalmalesuffragebegantodevelop.In1893,amendmentstothe
Constitutionmadeallmenover25yearseligibletovote.Asaresultofthisreform,
theelectorate,accordingtosomeestimates,increasedbymorethantenfold
(Carstairs1980:49–51).
Inmid-19thcenturyNetherlands,onlyabout2.5%ofthepopulationwere
166 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
enfranchised:menover23-years-oldwithanincomeaboveacertainthreshold
(varyingfromprovincetoprovince).Aseriesofsuccessivereformstoexpand
suffrageincreasedtheelectorateto6.5%ofthepopulation(1887),thento12%
(1896),and,finally,universalmalesuffragewasapprovedin1917;afteronlytwo
moreyears,in1919,universalwomen’ssuffragewasalsoapproved(ibid.:61).
IntheUK,reformofelectorallawcontinuedfornearlyacentury.Thankstothe
1832reformtheelectorategrewbymorethanonehalf;voterregistrationwas
introducedthatyearaswell.In1867,theelectoratenearlydoubled,mainlydueto
theurban-dwellingrepresentativesoftheworkingclass.Furtherexpansionofthe
electoratetookplacethankstothereformsof1884(whensuffragegreatlyexpanded
amongtheruralpopulation)andin1918(Hamerow1989:302–304;Carstairs1980:
189–190;Self2000:6–9,13–18).
TheNorthGermanConfederationintroduceddirect,equal,andsecretelectionsto
parliamentin1867,thesameyearwhenuniversalmalesuffragewasgranted.Inthe
GermanEmpirethisrightwasinforcefrom1871andin1918itwasextendedto
women.Someresearcherstaketheviewthatwhenintroducinguniversalmale
suffrage,Bismarckwasnotsomuchintentonprovidingthepopulationwithgreater
democraticfreedomsbutratherwantedtogathersupportforthecrownamongthe
massesoftheruralpopulation(Hamerow1989:306–307;Carstairs1980:162).
ThehistoryofmodernItalianelectorallaworiginatedinPiedmont,whose
constitutionandelectoralsystemwereextendedtothewholeKingdomofItalyin
1861.Underthissystem,therighttovotewasgiventolessthan2%ofthe
population,namelytoeducatedmenover25yearsofagewithsomeproperty.In
1882,theminimumagewasloweredfrom25to21,andtherequirementsfor
propertypossessionwereloosened.Finally,in1912,allmenover30receivedthe
righttovote,regardlessofpropertyownershipandlevelofeducation.Menaged
21to30couldvoteiftheymettherequirementsforpropertyownershiporpast
militaryservice.Malesuffragebecamenearlyuniversal,andthenumberofvoters
increasedfromlessthanthreemilliontonearly8.5million(Carstairs1980:
149–150;Hamerow1989:307;Romanelli1998:12–13).
Thus,thenineteenthcenturywasatimeoftheintroductionofuniversalmale
suffrage,whichlatergraduallyspreadtootherpartsoftheworld.NotonlyEurope
butalsotheUSA,Australia,NewZealand,Argentina,Uruguay,andChiletook
decisivestepsinthisdirection.Majorreformsincludedtheabolitionoftheincome
thresholdandpropertyownershiprequirementsforvoters.Somecountriesalso
abolishedtheliteracythreshold,discriminationbasedonrace,and,finally,reduced
thevoteragethreshold.

9.5TheAbolitionofSlaveryandOtherHardFormsofPersonalDependence 167
However,thisdoesnotimplythattheexpansionofsuffrageandtheemergenceof
masspoliticsculminatedinthenineteenthcentury.Anolessimportantphenome-
non,namelytheintroductionofuniversalsuffrageofwomen,tookplaceinthemost
advancedcountriesattheveryendofthe“longnineteenthcentury”,butmost
countriesfollowedonlyinthetwentiethcentury.Amongthepioneercountriesin
thisareaonecanpointtoNewZealand(1893),Australia(1894),Finland(1906),
Norway(1913),Denmark(1915),Germany,SwedenandtheNetherlands(allin
1919),andsomeothers.
9.5TheAbolitionofSlaveryandOtherHardFormsofPersonal
Dependence
Onemorecriticallyimportantsocialtransformationofthenineteenthcenturywas
relatedtotheglobal“liberationofslaves.”Inotherwords,almostalllegalformsof
hardpersonaldependence(includingnotonlyslaveryinthenarrowsenseofthe
word,butalsoserfdom)wereendedinthenineteenthcenturyacrosstheglobe.
8
Indeed,withinjustafewdecades,thelegalformsofslaveryandserfdom(whichhad
existedformillenniainvariousregionsoftheecumene)disappearedinmostofthe
zoneswheretheyhadpreviouslyexisted.Thenumberoflegalslavesandserfsinthe
worlddecreasedbyordersofmagnitude.Allinall,duringthe“longnineteenth
century”(1780–1914)thetotalnumberofliberatedpeopleincluded30million
Russianpeasants,sevenmillionslavesinAfrica,fourmillionintheUSA,one
millioninBrazil,onemillionintheCaribbean,500,000inSantoDomingo,and
250,000intheSpanishcolonies(Drescher2009).
Francewasthefirstmetropolistoannouncetheabolitionofslaveryinallits
territoriesin1794;however,afteronlyafewyears(in1802)bothslaveryandthe
slavetraderesumed(Drescher1980:44).So,itseemsmorereasonabletotracethe
startofabolitionasaglobalprocessbacktoadifferenteventinadifferentcountry,
namelytheAbolitionoftheSlaveTradeActpassedin1807inGreatBritain.
TheabolitionistmovementemergedinGreatBritainin1787undertheheavy
influenceoftheEnlightenmentideasofMontesquieu,Rousseau,Condorcetand
otherprominentthinkersofthatepoch,andlateronalsotheslogansoftheFrench
Revolutionof1789regardinghumanrights,freedom,andequality.Mostmembers
ofthefirstBritishabolitionistgroupwereQuakers;in1783,theypresentedthefirst
publicpetitionagainsttheslavetradetoparliament.TheSocietyfortheAbolitionof
theSlaveTradewasformedinLondonin1783.Letusemphasizethatthissociety
decidedtofocusontheabolitionofslavetraderatherthanslaveryingeneral,as
attemptstosettlethelatterissueatthattimeinevitablycameintoconflictwith
establishedideasabouttheinviolabilityofprivateproperty(Walvin2003:71–73;
Quirk2011:31–34).
8
Withtheexceptionofaveryfewperipheral/hinterlandzonesoftheWorld-System.
168 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
TheBritishAbolitionoftheSlaveTradeActof1807becamethefirstmajorstep
tochangingthesituationwithrespecttotheslavetradeatagloballevel.Formerly
thegloballeaderintheslavetrade,
9
Britaincompletelywithdrewfromitafterthe
lawcameintoforce.Granted,someBritishshipsmighthavecontinuedtheir
involvementintheslavetradeundertheflagsofotherstates.Eitherway,thevolume
oftheBritishslavetradedecreaseddramatically,asmostcaptainswouldnotrisk
losingtheirshipstoconfiscationandpayingafineof100poundsperslavefoundon
board(Burroughs2015:3;Quirk2011:30).
ThevacuumcreatedintheslavetradebyBritain’swithdrawalwasswiftlyfilled
byotherEuropeanstates,firstofallFrance,Spain,andPortugal.However,having
introducedaninternalbanontheslavetrade,Britainbegantoactivelypromotethis
agendaattheinternationallevel,aimingtofullyeradicatetheactivity(Quirk2011:
30).UnderBritishpressure,moreandmoreEuropeanstatesenteredintobilateral
andmultilateralagreementsaimedatlimiting(andlateronfullyprohibiting)the
slavetrade.ManyLatinAmericancountriestookstepsfurtherandcompletely
abolishednotonlytheslavetrade,butalsoslaveryperse(seebelow).Inthe
1850s,Brazil,thelastmajorrecipientofAfricanslaves,alsointroducedlaws
limitingthetrade.Bythelate1860s,thetransatlanticslavetradehadpractically
ended(ibid.:62).
Oneshouldbeawarethatinmostcountriestheprohibitionoftheslavetradeand
theabolitionofslaverydidnotoccursimultaneously,butthelatterfollowedthe
former,notinfrequentlywithaconsiderablelag.Thus,theUSAstoppedreceiving
newslavesintheearlynineteenthcentury,butslaveryflourishedinthesouthern
statesuntilthe1860s(Curtin1990:174).
Whenbanningtheslavetrade,Britishlawmakersexpressedtheideathattheban
shouldimprovethesituationofthosewhowerealreadyenslavedandworkingon
plantations(astheywouldbecomeamore“scarce”and,therefore,morevaluable
resource).However,bythe1820sitbecameobviousthatthiswasnothappening,
andtheproblemofslaveryshouldbeaddressedwithmoreradicalmeasures(Quirk
2011:49).Theideaoffullyabolishingslaverywassupportedbyvariousgroups
withintheBritishpopulation;twomajorpubliccampaignsinsupportofabolition
tookplacein1830–1831andin1832–1833.TheGreatJamaicanSlaveRevolt
(1831–1832)servedasafurtherimpetusforabolition,asitbecameclearthatthe
statusquowithregardtoslaverycouldnotcontinue.In1833,Britainpassedthe
SlaveryAbolitionAct.Thislawearmarkedthethencolossalamountof£20million
ascompensationtoplantationownersforthelossoftheirslaves.Moreover,aperiod
of“apprenticeship”(inmanywayssimilartoslavery)wassetupforformerslaves,
duringwhichtheywereobligedtoworkfortheirformermastersasitwaswidely
believedthatslaveswerenotreadytobecomefullyfree.Nevertheless,thelawof
1833signaledaradicalchangecomparedtotheprevioussituationandbecamethe
triggerfortheadoptionofsimilarlawsinothercountries.
9
About6.5millionslavesweretakenfromAfricaduringtheeighteenthcentury,including2.5
millionbyBritishslavetraders(Quirk2011:30).

9.5TheAbolitionofSlaveryandOtherHardFormsofPersonalDependence 169
Threemainroutesleadingtoabolitionindifferentcountriescanbeidentified:
(1)themassmobilizationofpopulationactivelyprotestingagainstslavery(signing
petitions,organizingboycotts)—theBritishway;(2)aviolentconflictsuchasthe
slaverevoltinHaitiandtheCivilWarintheUSA;and(3)yieldingtostrong
internationalpressure—thisroutewastakenbythemajorityofContinental
Europeancountries.Thus,DenmarkandSwedenabolishedslaveryintheircolonies
bythelate1840s;theNetherlandsfollowedtheirexamplein1863.France
emancipatedaquarterofamillionslavesin1848(Quirk2011:63–64;seealso
FogelandEngerman1974:33–34).
LatinAmericancountriestooktheirownpath,asslaverywasabolished(either
immediatelyorgradually)inArgentina(1813),Colombia(1814),Chile(1823),
Mexico(1829),Bolivia(1831),Uruguay(1842),andEcuador(1851)(ibid.).By
themid-nineteenthcenturyslaverycontinuedtoexistonlyinBrazilandCuba.Brazil
tookitsfirststepstowardsabolitionin1871byintroducingtheRioBrancolaw,
whichproclaimedallchildrenofslavemotherstobefreepeople.Thus,slaverywas
boundtovanishasoldergenerationsofslaveswoulddieandbereplacedbytheir
freechildren.However,untiltheageof21suchchildrenwereobligedtostaywith
themastersoftheirslavemothersasingenuo,whoserolewaslargelysimilartothe
roleofslaves.Aftertheintroductionofthislawmanyslavesescaped,whilemany
otherswereemancipatedbytheirmasterstryingtopreventthemfromescapingand
topreservethenecessarylaborforceontheplantations.Thelastremainingslaves
werelegallyemancipatedinBrazilin1888(Curtin1990:191–195).
TheCubanWarofIndependencecontributedgreatlytotheemancipationof
slaves.Rebelsencouragedslavestoescapeandjointhem,promisingemancipation;
atthesametime,governmentforcespromisedtoemancipatetheslaveswhojoined
theirside.In1868,theSpanishgovernmentintroducedinCubaalawthatwas
essentiallysimilartotheRioBrancolawinBrazil(italsosetupaperiodof
“apprenticeship”fornewlyemancipatedslaves).AllremainingCubanslaveswere
setfreein1886(bythattimetheyconstitutednomorethan3%oftheCuban
population).BothinBrazilandCubatherespectivelawsdidnotlaunchtheemanci-
pationofslaves,butratherprovidedalegalbasisforthealreadywidelyongoing
process(ibid.:202–203).
Itwouldbeanexaggerationtosaythatslaverywascompletelyeliminatedacross
theworldduringthenineteenthcentury.ManyEasterncountriesonlytooklegal
measuresagainstslaveryinthetwentiethcentury(forexample,Nepalin1926,
Bahrainin1937,Omanin1970)(Quirk2011:78–79).However,itwasinthe
nineteenthcenturythatthemostdramaticchangeoccurred,overturningtheset
patternsandpracticesofthepreviouscenturies(orevenmillennia,ifweconsider
thehistoryofslaveryinabroaderhistoricalcontext).
Radicalchangesaffectednotonlyslavery,butalsoserfdom.Thesetwophenom-
enadifferintheiressenceandhistory.Forexample,Baronovnotesthefollowing
featuresinwhichAmericanplantationslaverywasdifferentfromserfdom:(1)slave
societieswerecreatedwiththespecificpurposeofproducingcommoditiesforthe
globalmarket;(2)thesourcesoflaborfeedingtheslavesystemwereconstantly
movingtonewlands;(3)theprocessofprocuringsuchlaborwasinitselfaprofitable
enterprise;and(4)thenotionof“race”wasintroducedtojustifytheexistingsystem
oflabordivision(Baronov2000:90–91).Whileacknowledgingtheseandsome
otherdifferencesbetweenslaveryandserfdom,weconcentrateontheircommon
characteristic,namelythepersonaldependenceofaslave/serfontheirmaster.This
featurewaslegallyeliminatedbytheabolitionlawsinEuropeandtheAmericas,and
inRussiabytheEmancipationReformof1861.Accordingtoacensusconductedin
1857–1859,outofaRussianpopulationof62.5million,23.1millionpeople—both
malesandfemales—wereinserfdom.Thereformchangedtheirstatusandprovided
formerserfswithfullcivilfreedoms,includingtherighttoownproperty,toruna
business,getmarriedwithoutgainingtheirformermasters’consent,andmore.Land
largelyremainedunderthecontrolofthenobility,andpeasantshadtopayforusing
it,whichwastheirgreatestobjectiontothereform(Klyuchevsky 1989;
Zayonchkovskiy1968;Mironov2003;Zakharova2011).Nevertheless,thepersonal
dependenceofserfswaslegallyabolished.
170 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
Theabolitionoftherigidformsofpersonaldependencecanbecountedamong
themostimportantglobalprocessesthattookplaceinthenineteenthcentury.Injust
afewdecades—averyshorttimespanfromtheperspectiveofBigHistory—slavery
andserfdom,previouslywidespreadinthemajorpartoftheecumene,almost
disappearedinmostregions.Moreover,itappearsimpossibletoofferapurely
“materialist”explanationforthisprocess.Indeed,suchexplanationconnectsthe
“globalliberation”withtherapidlydevelopingIndustrialRevolutionthatwas
accompaniedbythetransitionfromthedominanceof“live”labortotheprevalence
of“materialized”labor.Thus,itwasnolongernecessarytocontrolproducersin
person;controlovermaterializedlaborwassufficient.
However,therearegroundstobelievethattheliberationwasnotcaused(atleast
inmanycases)by“economicnecessity.”Forexample,counterfactualmodeling
performedinthe1960sshowedthattheAmericaneconomy(andespeciallythe
economyoftheSouth)wouldhavedeveloped(atleastforafewdecadespost-1866)
quitesuccessfullyevenifslaveryhadnotbeenabolished.Theslave-usingeconomic
systemoftheSouthwasviableatthetimeofabolition,whereasliberationledtoan
economiccrisis(ConradandMeyer1964;Yasuba1971;Engerman1971;Fogeland
Engerman1971,1974).Onemayalsorecollectatthispointthateconomiccrises
weretriggeredbytheabolitionofslaverybytheBritishinJamaicaandother
coloniesintheWesternHemisphere.
Ingeneral,ifthenineteenth-centuryliberationhadresultedfrompurely
economicfactors,itshouldhavedevelopedinanentirelydifferentway:slavery
wouldhavediedoutfirstinthemostdevelopedbranchesoftheeconomy,but
wouldhaveremainedinsomeotherbranches(withahighproportionofphysically
hard,low-qualified,orhumiliatinglabor),possiblyexpandingtosomenewly
appearingspheresofproduction(like,say,theconveyorproduction).
Theliberation,asitoccurredinthenineteenthcentury,wastoaconsiderable
extentaresultoftheinfluenceofconsciousattemptstochangethewhatissothatit
wouldbemoreinaccordancewiththeoughttobe,i.e.narrowingoreliminatingthe
largegapbetweenthem.

9.6TheEmergenceofSocialStatesinEurope 171
9.6TheEmergenceofSocialStatesinEurope
Thelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturieswitnessedthebirthofthemodern
socialstate,asthestatesstartedcreatingsocialsecuritysystemsfortheirpopulations.
Currently,Article22oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsstatesthe
following:“Everyone,asamemberofsociety,hastherighttosocialsecurityand
isentitledtorealization,throughnationaleffortandinternationalco-operationandin
accordancewiththeorganizationandresourcesofeachState,oftheeconomic,social
andculturalrightsindispensableforhisdignityandthefreedevelopmentofhis
personality.”Pensionsystemsarenowavailableinapproximately170countries,
compensationschemesforoccupationalinjuriesareinforceinabout160countries,
benefitsincaseofillnesscanbefoundin130countries,andunemploymentbenefits
havebeenintroducedinabout60countries(Schmittetal.2014).However,thepath
tothecurrentstateofaffairstookmorethanacentury.
9.6.1TheBirthofSocialSecuritySystemsinEurope
intheNineteenthCentury
Untilthesecondhalf(oreventhelastfewdecades)ofthenineteenthcentury,states
tendedtoplayonlyaminimalroleinsocialsecurity.Thus,inWesternEuropean
countriesintheearlynineteenthcenturythisrolewaslimitedtoprovidingstate
pensionstotheinjuredveteransofmilitarycampaigns
10
andhigh-levelgovernment
officials;insomecases,similarprivilegeswereconferredupontheworkersofstate
enterprisesandmines.OnecanalsomentiontheEnglishPoorLaw,underwhicha
systemofrelieftoextremelypoorpeoplewasdeveloped(Tomka2013:155;Hannah
1986:9).Apartfromfamilies,themainsourceofsocialsupportwerevariousfunds
andmutualsocieties,whichprovidedsupportfortheirmembersindifficultlife
situationsoutofthemeansreceivedasmembershipfees(aparticularlylonghistory
ofsuchorganizationscouldbefoundinthehardandriskyminingbusiness).
However,membershipinsuchorganizationswasvoluntary.Theyconsistedmainly
ofpeoplewhocouldaffordtopaymembershipfees;andsocialsupportwasfarfrom
universal(forexample,old-agepensionswerepaidveryrarely)(Hannah1986:6).
Bythemid-nineteenthcentury,someWesternEuropeancountriesdevelopedthe
firstprototypesofthemodernpensionsystem.Thus,theUKintroducedapension
schemeforcivilservantsin1859,whichwasfundedentirelybythestate(anddidnot
requirecontributionsfromthecivilservantsthemselves).Accordingtothisscheme,
aretiredofficialreceivedforeachyearofservice1/60ofhisincomeinthelastyear
ofservice(butnotmorethan2/3¼40/60ofhisincomeinthelastyearofservice)
(ibid.:9).ThelargestprivatebusinessesintheUK—therailwaycompanies—
10
TheUSAalsoprovidedpensionstotheveteransoftheCivilWar,eventhoughothersignificant
aspectsofsocialsecuritydevelopedheremuchlaterthaninWesternEurope(Skocpol1993).
providedcomprehensivepensionschemestotheirmanagementpersonnelandclerks
(butnottowageworkers)bythe1880s.Inatypicalscheme(wheremembershipwas
compulsory)theemployeepaid2.5%ofhissalarytothefund,andthesameamount
wastransferredtothefundbytheemployer.Thesizeofapensionwasdeterminedby
averageearningsandnumberofyearsinservice.Forexample,apensionequaled
25%ofaverageearningsafter10yearsofserviceand67%after44yearsofservice
(ibid.:9–10).
172 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
ThehistoryofmodernsocialsecuritydatesbacktothelawsadoptedinGermany
inthe1880s.Thefirststateprogramofcompulsoryhealthinsuranceforindustrial
workerswasintroducedbythe“IronChancellor”OttovonBismarckin1883.Itwas
followedbyaninsuranceprogramagainstaccidents(1884),andinsurancefor
old-agepensions(1889).ThespreadofsocialsecuritysystemsthroughoutEurope
wasextremelyquick.BorrowingtheelementsoftheGermansystemand
complementingthemwiththeirownexperience,allWesternEuropeanandseveral
EasternEuropeancountrieshadatleastoneactiveprogramofstatehealthinsurance,
accidentinsurance,orold-agepensions,by1901.AtthetimeoftheFirstWorldWar,
allthreetypesofprogramswereinplaceinmostWesternEuropeancountries
(Tomka2013:156).
Wewillnextlookinmoredetailatexamplesoftheearlydevelopmentofsocial
legislationintwopioneercountries,namelyGermanyandtheUK.
9.6.2TheGermanExperience
Tounderstandthereasonsbehindtheemergenceofnationalsocialsecuritylegisla-
tioninGermanyinthe1880s,onehastothinkofthesociopoliticalandsocioeco-
nomiccontextinwhichitoccurred.Somescholarssuggestthattheinitiatives
designedbytheIronChancellormadeuseoftheadvancedGermanneo-absolutist
bureaucracy(whichinheritedPrussiantraditions)inordertomitigateliberaland,in
particular,socialistcallsmadebylabormovements.Theprogramsoughttomeetthe
reasonablesocialistdemandsthatcouldbeimplementedwithintheestablishedsocial
andpoliticalorder(Hicksetal.1995:330;seealsoZollner1982).
TheGermansociallegislationofthe1880sincludedthreemainlaws.Thefirst
law,passedin1883,concernedmandatoryhealthinsurance(forworkersinspecific
industries).Two-thirdsoftheinsurancewasfundedbyworkersandone-thirdwas
financedbyemployers.Nationalregulationinthisfieldwasabsent.Eachworkerwas
amemberofahealthinsurancefundathisowncompany,oralocalinsurance
company,aguildfund,oraprivatefoundation.Alltheemployeesofcertain
industrieswithanincomeoflessthan2000marksperyearweresubjecttoinsurance.
Duringperiodsofdisability,theemployeereceived50%ofhissalary,freemedical
treatment,andessentialdrugs.Relatedcostswereassumedbytheinsurancecom-
pany,whichmadecontractswithprivatephysicianspracticinginthearea(Gibbon
1912:2–7;FrerichandFrey1993:97–99;Zollner1982:35–37).
Thus,theusualbilateralrelationshipbetweendoctorandpatientchangedtoa
tripartiterelationshipbetweentheinsurancecompany,doctor,andpatient.Itwasthe

principalinnovationofthislaw.Gettingfreemedicalcarewasalsoasignificantstep
forwardcomparedwiththereimbursementofmedicalexpensespracticedprevi-
ously.Thenumberofinsuredin1885doubledincomparisonwiththeperiodbefore
theintroductionofthelaw(4.3millionpeoplecomparedtoabouttwomillion).By
1900,thisnumbergrewto9.5million,andby1914ithadincreasedto15.6million,
encompassingapproximatelyaquarterofthetotalpopulation.Thisexpansionwas
largelyduetoagrowthinthenumberofemployeesinthesectorscoveredbythe
insurancescheme,butalsoasaresultoftheinclusionintheschemeofmanynew
sectors(especiallyworkersemployedinagriculture).In1910,thereexistednoless
than23,000healthinsuranceschemes(Tampke1981:76–77;Zollner1982:35–37).
9.6TheEmergenceofSocialStatesinEurope 173
Thesecondlaw,passedin1884,wasrelatedtoinsuranceagainstaccidents.
Employerswereorderedtoorganize“professionalassociations”invariousindustries
thatweretobecontrolledbythenewlyestablishedgovernmentalinsuranceservice.
Fundingforpaymentsincaseofaninsuredeventwasprovidedentirelybythe
employer.Uponbecomingdisabled,anemployeereceivedalifetimepension(the
minimumsizewassetbythestate,apossibleincreasedependingonprevious
earningsandyearsofservice)(FrerichandFrey1993:95–97;Tampke1981:
76–77;Zollner1982:27–29).
Thefirstversionofthelawoncompulsoryaccidentinsurancecoveredworkersin
mines,shipyards,andfactories,aswellasroofersandmasons.Amendmentstothis
lawextendedittotransportworkers(includingrailways,canals,rivertransport),
employeesofpostalandtelegraphcompanies,soldiersandofficersofthearmyand
navy,aswellaspeopleengagedinagriculture,construction,long-distancetrade,and
fishing.Technicalofficersandclerksweretobeinsurediftheirincomedidnot
exceed5000marks;workersweretobeinsuredregardlessofincome(Dawson1913:
102;Rubinow1916a:30–31).By1914,thenumberofaccident-insuredhadreached
28millionpeople(Tampke1981:76).
Finally,thethirdlaw,passedin1889,obligedworkersandemployerstomake
contributions(inequalparts)toold-agepensioninsuranceschemes.Subjecttothis
typeofinsurancewereallworkerswithanincomeoflessthan2000marksperyear.
Pensionswerereceivedbypeopleolderthan70(laterthisthresholdwasloweredto
65),whohadworkedforatleast5years.In1913,1.2millionpeoplewerereceiving
old-agepensionsinGermany(Zollner1982:28–31).
9.6.3TheBritishExperience
IntheUK,theemergenceofmodernsocialsecuritylegislationtookplaceina
verydifferentsocialandpoliticalcontextthanGermany.Reformsweredriven
byLiberalandLaborpoliticians(Hicksetal.1995:330).Apackageofsocial
initiativeswasputforwardbytheLiberalgovernmentwhichcametopowerin
1906.Bytheendof1908,ithadcarriedoutatleastsixlegislativereformsmarkinga
significantsocialchange:theWorkmen’sCompensationActof1906andfivelaws
in1908,includingtheChildrenAct,IncestAct,ProbationofOffendersAct,Labor
ExchangesAct,andtheOld-AgePensionsAct(Jones1994:81).Indeed,1908is
consideredtobeawatershed:
174 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
Theyear’ssymbolicpowerissignificant:itmarksthetransitionfromaBritainskepticalof
stateinvolvementinpublicaffairstoonewillingtoacceptitsoffersofhelp;itcoincideswith
theinstitutionaldeathoftheself-helpmovementthatdefinedVictorianBritain;and,insome
ways,itforeshadowstherelocationofBritishworking-classpolicymakingfromtheindus-
trialNorthtothechambersofParliamentinLondon.(Broten2010:2)TheWorkmen’sCompensationActof1906introducedcompensationforoccu-
pationalinjuriestobereceivedbyrepresentativesofdangerousprofessions.
Employerswereobligedtoinsuretheiremployees.Thislawwasthefirststep
towardstheformationofanationalaccidentinsurancescheme.
TheChildrenActwasaconsolidatinglawthatbroughttogetherthemeasures
previously“scattered”in39differentlegislativeactsaimedatprotectingthelivesof
youngchildrenandpreventingtheirilltreatment.Amongmanyothermeasures,it
wasdeclaredacrimetoallowchildrentosmokeortobeg.Forthefirsttime,the
ChildrenActintroducedtheconceptofjuveniledelinquentbehavior,setupspecial
courtstohearcasesinwhichtheaccusedwereminors,aswellasasystemdesigned
toreplaceimprisonmentbyotherformsofcorrectionalfacilities.Incontrastto
Victorianpolicy,thelawstatedasetofrightsandobligationsofminorsasfull
membersofsociety(Bruce1968:189–194).
TheProbationofOffendersActlaidthefoundationforthedevelopmentof
alternativestoprisonsinthepenitentiarysystem,leavingsomeconvictsanopportu-
nitytoliveinthecommunityunderthesupervisionofaspecialprobationofficer,
whosedutywastoadviseandassistthemonthepathofcorrection(Jones1994:81).
UndertheLaborExchangesAct,anetworkoflaborexchangeswasestablished
acrossthecountry,wheretheunemployedcouldgetinformationaboutavailable
vacancies.By1913,therewere430majorlaborexchangesandmorethan1000
smallofficesinruralareas(ibid.:81).
Ofspecialnoteisthestoryofthedevelopmentofold-agepensionlegislationin
theUK.Thefirstproposalswerebasedontheinsurancesystem.Forexample,in
1878,theBritishphilanthropistBlackleysuggestedthatthegovernmentcreatea
fundtowhicheveryworkingcitizenwouldhavetomakeacertaincontributionso
thatitcouldbeusedtofinancesickpayattherateofeightshillingsperweekand
old-agepensionsattherateoffourshillingsperweek(Gilbert1965:558;Collins
1965:252–253).TheHouseofLordsrejectedBlackley’sproposal.However,a
heateddebateonthenecessityofold-agepensionscontinued;oneofthestrong
argumentsintheirfavorwasthattheycouldprovidemoreadequateandeffective
meansofhelpingthepoorthanthepracticesthathadbeentakingplaceunderthe
clearlyobsoletePoorLaw(Sires1954:248–253).Finally,in1908,theLiberal
governmentannouncedtheintroductionofastateselectivedistributiveschemefor
old-agepensions.Paymentsamountedtofiveshillingsaweekforpeopleolderthan
70withlowincome(lessthan£20ayear);thosewithincomesabove£20butless
than£31and10shillingsayearweretoreceiveoneshillingaweek;elderlypeople

withhigherincomesdidnotreceiveapensionatall(Hannah1986:15;Collins1965:
258).Thetotalcostofthesystemamountedtoabout£6millionperyear,funded
fromgeneraltaxation(Sires1954:248–249;Bruce1968:153).By1912,around
60%ofthepopulationagedover70receivedpensionsunderthisscheme.
9.6TheEmergenceofSocialStatesinEurope 175
Thedistributionofthenewpensionsthroughpostofficesandtheirclearseparationfromthe
poorlawauthoritiesmadethemahighlyacceptablesubstituteforpoorrelief.Thusbegan
thatprocess(stillincomplete)ofremovingthestigmaofwelfareprovisionfromthemindsof
needybeneficiaries.Thenewpensionswereextremelypopular.(Hannah1986:16)
Finally,in1911,theLawonNationalInsurancewasadopted,coveringareassuch
ashealthinsuranceandunemploymentinsurance(Gibbon1912:40–43).Health
insurancecoveredallworkersaged16–70earninglessthan£250peryear,aswellas
workersnotengagedinmanuallaborandearninglessthan£160ayear.Thescheme
wasfinancedbytheemployee,theemployer,andthestate.Theemployeecould
receivesicknessbenefit(tenshillingsaweek),disabilityallowance(fiveshillingsa
week),aswellasalump-sumpaymentonthebirthofachild(30shillings,ortwice
asmuchifboththemotherandfatherofthechildwereinsured).Theinsuredworker
couldalsochooseadoctorfromalistcompiledbytheinsurer,ifnecessary(Jones
1994:85–86;Bruce1968:183–189).
Alloftheselawslaidthefoundationforthesubsequentdevelopmentofsocial
policyintheUK,aswellasinmanyofitscoloniesandprotectorates,formany
decadestocome(Rubinow1916b:26).
9.6.4TheEmergenceofSocialSecurityinGlobalHistory
Intheearlytwentiethcentury,aresearcherofthehistoryofsocialsecurity,Isaac
MaxRubinow,noted:
Thereisnodoubtthatthemodernconceptionofsocialinsurance—asasystemcarryingwith
itcompulsion,statesubsidies,andstrictstatesupervisionandcontrol—hasreachedits
highestdevelopmentinmodernGermany,sothatanysystemembodying,toanylarge
degree,allthesethreeelements,maybedescribedastheGermansystem.Butevenpreceding
theGermanbillsof1881andactsof1883and1884,numerousactswerepassedbymany
German,aswellasmanyotherEuropeanstates,whichembodiedsomeorallofthethree
leadingprinciplesofthisGermansystem....ItmaybeadmittedthatitwasBismarckwho
contributedtothehistoryofSocialInsurancethefirstapplicationofStateCompulsionona
largenationalscale.Buthedidnot“invent”theprincipleofworkmen’sinsurance,northatof
stateinsurance,northatofcompulsion.Inthedecadepriortotheintroductionofthe
compulsoryinsurancesystem,thereexistedinGermanyamultitudeoforganizations,part
ofthemveryoldandpartnew,somecompulsory,somevoluntary,somelocal,some
national,somemutualandbasedonotherplans;someofthemwereconnectedwithespecial
establishments,suchasspecialmines,railways,etc.,somewereconnectedwithtrade
unions;manyofthemwereconnectedwithguilds.Inotherwords,therewerealready
existingalltheelementsoutofwhich,withtheunifyingpowerofalargestate,thesystem
ofnationalcompulsoryinsurancecouldeasilybebuilt.(Rubinow1916b:13–14)
176 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
Indeed,thelegislationintroducedinGermanyinthe1880scanbeconsideredasa
logicalcontinuationofthePrussianlegislativetraditioninthesocialsphere.This
traditionwasespeciallystronginlaborregulationintheminingindustry,whereas
earlyas1776theworkofminerswaslegallyrestrictedtoan8-hourworkingdayand
6-dayworkingweek,andchildren’sandwomen’sworkatthemineswasbanned.In
theearlynineteenthcentury,therewasawell-developedinsurancesystem,forits
time,underwhichminersweregivenfreetreatmentincaseofillnessoraccident,
paymentfortheentiretimespentinhospital,aswellasregularpaymentsincasesof
disability(Tampke1981:72–73;FrerichandFrey1993:62–66).Inthe1840s,the
governmentchangedthelawonguilds.Newformsofguildsofcraftsmenand
factoryworkerswerecontrolledbythestateandadministeredthefundsofpayments
forillness,disability,andold-agepensionsfortheirmembers.Inurbanandrural
areas,therewerenumeroushealthinsurancefundsforthosewhodidnotbelongto
anyguild(Tampke1981:72–73;FrerichandFrey1993:56–58).Asaresultofthese
factors,Tampkeconcludesthat:
thesocialwelfaretraditionexistedlongbeforethe1880s.Admittedlytheselawscovered
predominantlythehandicraftssystem,butuntilthemiddleofthecenturyartisansand
craftsmendidprovidethebulkoftheurbanworkforce.Thischangedwhenrapidly
increasingindustrialization,whichhadsetinbythesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury,
speltdoomforthehandicraftsystemandwhenagrowingnumberofworkersfound
themselvesemployedinindustrieswhichwerenotcoveredbylegislation....Sointhe
1880sitwasnotanewleafthatwasturnedinthehistoryofsocialwelfareinGermanybuta
returntotheoldprincipleofstateinterferenceappliedtoaneweconomicbackground.
(Tampke1981:73)
However,onecanhardlyagreewiththisconclusioninthecontextofthehistory
ofglobalization.Ofcourse,theprinciplesintroducedinthe1880swerenotunprec-
edented.Butwhatwastrulyunprecedentedwasthecombinationoftheseprinciples.
Indeed,theintroductionofcompulsoryaccidentinsurance,compulsoryhealth
insurance(atfirstforspecificfieldsofactivity),andthesystemofold-agepension
insurancegaveimpetustothedevelopmentofthreefundamentaltrendsinsocial
security.TheGermanexperiencewasborrowedbymanyEuropeancountries,ifnot
intermsofspecificpracticaldetails(whichwerecommonlyborrowedaswell),butat
leastintermsoftheconceptoforganizingnationalsocialsecuritysystems.From
Europe,theseideasspreadacrosstheworld.
TheGermanexampleofastatewide,universal,andcompulsorysystemof
sicknessinsurancewasfirstfollowedbyAustria(1888)andHungary(1891)
(Rubinow1916b:20).Afterabout20years,theywerefollowedbymanyother
countries,whichpreviouslyhadvoluntarysicknessinsuranceschemes.In
1909–1913,compulsorysystemsofsicknessinsurancewereintroducedinNorway,
Serbia,GreatBritain,Italy,Romania,andRussia(seeTable9.2).Moreandmore
countriescametorealizethattheonlywaytoincludetheneediestgroupsinto
sicknessinsurancesystemswastointroduceasystemofcompulsorysickness
insurance(Rubinow1916a:21).

9.6TheEmergenceofSocialStatesinEurope 177
Table9.2TimeofsocialsecurityschemesintroductioninvariousEuropeanstates
Country
Accidentinsurance Healthinsurance Old-agepensioninsurance Unemploymentinsurance
Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary Compulsory
GreatBritain 1897 1946 1911 1908 1925 1911
France 1898 1946 1898 1930 1895 1910 1905 1967
TheNetherlands 1901 1929 1913 1916 1949
Belgium 1903 1971 1894 1944 1900 1924 1920 1944
Ireland 1897 1966 1911 1908 1960 1911
Germany 1871 1884 1883 1889 1927
Austria 1887 1888 1927 1920
Switzerland 1881 1911 1911 1946 1924 1976
Sweden 1901 1916 1891 1953 1913 1934
Denmark 1898 1916 1892 1933 1891 1922 1907
Norway 1894 1909 1936 1906 1938
Finland 1895 1963 1937 1917
Italy 1898 1886 1928 1898 1919 1919
Czechoslovakia 1887 1888 1889 1921
Poland 1883 1889 1889 1924
Hungary 1907 1891 1928 1957
Source:Tomka(2013:157)
178 9GlobalSociopoliticalTransformationsoftheNineteenthCentury
Thus,thelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturiesmarkedaradicaltransition
toanewtypeofstate,oneprovidingnational-levelsocialsupportnotonlyto
particularindividualsinneed,buttowholesocialgroups.Thisisthetimewhen
thewelfarestatewasborn.
9.7Conclusion
Thenineteenthcenturywasatimeofprofoundpoliticaltransformations,someof
whichbecameglobalalreadybefore1900(suchastheabolitionofslavery),while
otherscontinuedtheirspreadacrosstheworldinthetwentiethcentury.Globalization
wastightlyintertwinedwiththeseprocesses.Ontheonehand,itcarriednew
politicalphenomenaandinstitutionsbeyondthebordersoftheWorld-Systemcore
countries,intothesemi-peripheryandperiphery.Ontheotherhand,theveryessence
ofpoliticalglobalizationitselfwastoalargeextentformedbytheglobalspreadof
politicalmodernity.
Constitutionalism,universalenfranchisement,democratization,andothercrucial
processesandinstitutionsofthismodernitybeganacquiringaglobalcharacter
largelywiththehelpofsemi-peripheraleliteswithamodernEuropeaneducation.
Theseeliteswereprominentactorsand“carriers”ofpoliticalglobalization.Inthe
latenineteenthcentury,membersofsuchelitesinalmostallmacro-regionsofthe
globalsemi-peripherywerealreadytryingtointroducecertainelementsofpolitical
modernizationintheircountries—forexample,theYoungTurksintheOttoman
Empire,theIranian(Persian)ConstitutionalRevolutionof1906,andtheXinhai
Revolutionof1911thatoverthrewChina’slastimperialdynastyandestablishedthe
RepublicofChina.Asforthecolonialterritories,someelementsofmaturestates
werebroughttherebytheEuropeanpowers.Thepolitical“awakening”ofAsiawas
almostcomprehensive;certainterritoriesthatremaineduntouchedbytheglobaliza-
tionofpoliticalmodernityatthattime(suchasYemenorsomestatesofCentral
Arabia)shouldbeconsideredasexceptionsratherthantherule.Letusnoteonce
againthatthemodernEuropeaneducationofsemi-peripheralelitesplayedamajor
roleintheglobalizationofmodernEuropeanpoliticalinstitutions.Thedevelopment
ofEuropeaneducationanditsrelationtoglobalizationwillbeconsideredinmore
detailinthenextchapter.
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perspective.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.
Broten,N.(2010).Fromsicknesstodeath:ThefinancialviabilityoftheEnglishfriendlysocieties
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Conclusion:TheBigHistoryofGlobalization
ToldinTenPages
12
Theessenceofglobalizationremainsfarfromindisputable.Ofthehundreds
definitionsofglobalization,thisbookhasfollowedtheapproachproposedby
GeorgeModelski,whoseidealayincombiningtwoapproaches:the“connectivist”
approachthatviewsglobalizationasanincreaseintransborderinteractions,
relations,andflows;andtheinstitutionalapproach,whichexplainsglobalization
astheemergenceandevolutionofglobal,planetary-scaleinstitutions.Letusempha-
sizethat“institutions”isawidetermforModelski,asitincludesglobalfreetrade,
multinationalenterprises,globalgovernance,worldwidesocialmovements,
ideologies,andsoon(Modelski2008).Thus,wehaveendeavoredtoanalyzethe
historyofglobalizationfromtwooverlappingpointsofview,namelytheemergence
andexpansionofvariousglobalnetworks,andtheonsetanddevelopmentofglobal
processesthatbroughtdeepchangestothehumanworld.
Ourresearchhassuggestedaninnovativeperiodizationofthehistoryofglobali-
zation.Wehavefollowedtheapproachfromsomerecentworks(Bayly 2004;
Hopkins2002;Robinson2007;Hopper2007;Holton2011)inordertoidentify
thefivemacro-periodsofglobalization,namelyarchaic,proto-modern,earlymod-
ern,modern(withitsclimaxinthefirst“goldenage”ofglobalization),andthe
newest(post-modern)globalization.Thisbookhascoveredthefirstfourperiods.
Whatisnew,however,istheintroductionoftheconceptsofphasetransitions
(large-scalequalitativechangesinglobalconnectivityandthedevelopmentofthe
world)andperiodsoftypogenesisandtypostasis(emergenceandspreadofvarious
innovativeformsofsocial,political,andeconomicorganization)asthebasicnotions
tohelpprovideamoredetailedperiodizationwithinthesemacro-periods,especially
thefirsttwo.
#SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2019
J.Zinkinaetal.,ABigHistoryofGlobalization,World-SystemsEvolution
andGlobalFutures,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05707-7_12
225
12.1ArchaicandProto-ModernGlobalization
Thenetworksofinteractionsamonghumancommunitiescanbetracedbackin
historywellintothePaleolithicAge.“Mini-systems”(Wallerstein’sterm)ofinter-
actionandexchangeofmaterialthingsandgoodsexistedinprimevalsocieties.
Folkloreandmythologicalmotivescouldspreadacrossterritoriesmuchexceeding
thoseofarcheologicalcultures.However,thepre-Neolithicnetworksofinteraction
didnotleaveanysubstantialdirectconnectionwiththemodernworld.TheNeolithic
Revolution,therefore,marksthestartingpointofthehistoryofglobalization,when
theWorld-SystememergedintheMiddleEast—thatveryWorld-Systemwhich,
aftergoingthroughnumerousexpansion/contractioncycles,firsttransformedinto
theAfro-Eurasianworld-system,andlateronintothemodernglobalWorld-System.
226 12Conclusion:TheBigHistoryofGlobalizationToldinTenPages
Intheninthtoseventhmillennia
BCE
,theAfro-Eurasianspacewitnessedthe
emergenceoflooselyconnectedandslow,butyetfunctional,networksofinforma-
tionexchangewhichservedtospreadtechnologiesandinnovations.Thesenetworks
cametoexistindirectconnectionwiththeAgrarianRevolutionintheFertile
Crescent(modernPalestine,Syria,NorthernIraq,andWesternIran).Theytransmit-
tedimportantinnovations,suchasdomesticatedcerealsandcattle—forexample,the
so-calledNearEastern“foundercroppackage”spreadfarfromtheNearEastacross
CentralandSouthernAsiaaround6000
BCE
(ZoharyandHopf2000)andreached
Europeinaround5000
BCE
(Brownetal.2009:108).
AphasetransitiontoanewlevelofWorld-Systemconnectivityandcomplexity
wasrelatedtotheemergenceandthegrowthofcitiesinthefourthtomid-third
millennia
BCE
;V.GordonChildecalledthistransitionthe“UrbanRevolution.”The
emergenceofcities(firstonirrigatedlandsnexttoriverbanks,thenonrain-watered
lands)intensifiedtradeandexchangeofresources,thusstrengtheningthenetwork
spaceoftheearlyWorld-Systemandencouragingearlyglobalization.Lateron,
SargonofAkkadconqueredanumberoftheformerlyindependentcity-statesaswell
assomehinterlandterritoriesandcreatedthefirstempireinthehistoryofhumanity.
Sumer-Akkadiancolonizationengenderedoneofthefirstvividmanifestationsof
socioculturalglobalization,asasetofbureaucratictechnologies(reflectedincultural
artifacts)spreadoveralargeterritorystretchingfromtheMediterraneanshorestothe
IndusValley.
Thisphasetransitionwasfollowedbyaperiodoftypostasis,whentheadventofa
newphasetransitionwasbeingpreparedbythespreadandfurtherdevelopmentof
importantinnovations,suchastechnologiesofmetallurgy,bureaucraticgovernance,
andwritingsystems(mid-thirdtosecondmillennia
BCE
).Thescaleandintensityof
interactionsbetweenthecivilizedandmedium-complexitysocietieswereonthe
increase.Thiscontributedtotheemergenceofthedevelopedbarbarianperiphery,
whoseraidsdeeplychangedtheglobalbalanceofpoweraround1700
BCE
.
Aphasetransitiontotheepochoftheagrarianempirestookplacebetween1200
BCE
and150
CE
,resultingintheappearanceofawell-interconnectedAfro-Eurasian
world-system,whichencompassedamajorityoftheworld’spopulation.Thisworld-
systemwasinterconnectednotonlythroughinformationflows,butalsothrougha
networkofregulartradeinluxurygoods.Themainarteryofthisworld-systemwas
theGreatSilkRoad(Chase-DunnandHall1997:149).DuringtheAxialAge,two

majoreventsoccurred:(1)ChinabecameapartoftheAfro-Eurasianworld-system;
theGreatSilkRoadservedtoestablishregularcontactsbetweenChinaandother
partsoftheworld-system;and(2)Buddhism,thefirst(chronologically)world
religion,cameintoexistence.Onthewhole,theAfro-Eurasianworld-system
reachedapeakofconnectivitybythestartoftheCommonEra.Itwasalmostfully
encompassedbyjustfourempires—theRoman,Parthian,Kushan,andHan
Empires,allinteractingwitheachother,mostlythroughCentralAsianroutes.
Informationnetworksweregrowingindensity,strength,importance,andspeedof
spreadinginnovationsascomparedtothetimesoftheNeolithicRevolution.Thus,
ironoresmeltingwasfirstcarriedoutbytheHittiteslivinginAnatoliainaround
1500
BCE
.In1200
BCE
,afterthecollapseoftheHittiteEmpire,thistechnologyhad
alreadyspreadamongtheNearEasternsocieties.Around1000
BCE
,itwascarried
fromMesopotamiatoIndia,in800
BCE
fromArabiatoEthiopia,andin700
BCE
to
EgyptandChina(Headrick2009:36–37).
12.2EarlyModernGlobalization 227
Inturn,thisphasetransitionwasfollowedbyaperiodoftypostasis,whichwe
denoteasthe“lostmillennium.”ThedevelopmentoftheAfro-Eurasianworld-
systemsloweddownasaresult,amongotherfactors,oftheincreasedglobal
connectivityofthepreviousperiod—thesystemofregulartraderoutestransferred
notonlygoods,butalsopathogens.Thus,theAntoninePlagueplayedastrong,ifnot
decisive,roleinthecollapseoftheHandynastyinChinaandtheweakeningofthe
RomanEmpire,killingaboutone-quarteroftheRomanpopulation(McNeilland
McNeill2003:78).Againstthebackgroundoffrequentlarge-scalepandemicsand
barbarianinvasions,theworldpopulationandGDPsawalmostnoincreasebetween
150and1000
CE
.
World-systemstagnationduringthelostmillenniumwasfollowedbyarevivalin
populationgrowth,globaleconomicoutput,technologicaldevelopment,andurban-
izationatthebeginningofthesecondmillennium—moreexactly,startinginthe
eleventhcenturyandcontinuinginsomeregionsuntiltheBlackDeathbrokeoutin
themid-1300s.ThegreatestcontributiontogrowthoftheworldpopulationandGDP
intheeleventhcenturywasmadebyChina,whichatthetimeexperienced“theSong
economicmiracle.”InotherpartsoftheAfro-Eurasianworld-system,inEuropeand
Indiainparticular,theeleventhcenturywasalsoaperiodofgrowthand“internal
colonization,”aslargeamountsofpreviouslyuncultivatedlandwerebroughtunder
cultivation.TheinterconnectednessoftheAfro-Eurasianworld-systemreachedits
peakfromthelatethirteenthtoearlyfourteenthcenturies(untiltheBlackDeath),
whenallofitsregionsintensivelyinteractedwitheachother(Abu-Lughod1989).
Thisperiodcanbeviewedastheclimaxofproto-modernglobalization.The
unificationofvastterritoriesunderMongolrulecontributedtogreaterconnectivity
intheAfro-Eurasianworld-systematthattime.
12.2EarlyModernGlobalization
DuringtheAgeofDiscovery,stableandregularrelationswereestablishedamong
theregionshostingvirtuallyalltheworld’spopulation.Thiswasnotonlyaphase
transition,butalsothetimeofthebirthoftheglobalworld.The“spinning”ofthe
globalwebstartedwiththevoyageofChristopherColumbusandwaslargely
completedbytheeighteenthcenturywithexpeditionsofJamesCook.Themajor
partoftheexpansionoftheAfro-Eurasianworld-systemanditstransformationinto
theglobalWorld-Systemtookplaceduringthe“longsixteenthcentury”.
228 12Conclusion:TheBigHistoryofGlobalizationToldinTenPages
Theconsequencesofthisprocessweredeepandmanifold.Thus,ascoastal
regionsacrosstheworldmergedintoasingleglobalweb,oneofthedevastating
impactsofthismergerwasthespreadofinfectiousdiseases.However,thiswasjust
oneoutofanumberof“biological”aspectsofglobalizationinthe“longsixteenth
century.”Beforethefifteenthcentury,evolutionintheAmericaswaslargelyinde-
pendentfromthatinAfricaandEurasia,sotheirintegrationintotheglobalwebsetin
motionalarge-scalespeciesexchangebetweentheOldWorldandtheNewWorld
(aphenomenoncommonlyknownastheColumbianexchange).Thediffusionof
AmericancropsdramaticallychangedtheAfro-Eurasiandiets,whichinturnledto
demographicandeconomicchangesintheOldWorld’smacro-regions.Globaltrade
wasundergoingimportanttransformations,asnewregionsandtheirresources
enteredit,andatrulyglobalmarketemergedforcertaingoods.Discoveryofthe
vastresourcesoftheNewWorld(firstofall,silver)andtheirtransferthroughout
theglobeinpreviouslyunthinkablevolumesgreatlyenergizedglobaltradeand
connectivity.
Theearlymodernperiodwitnessedtheemergenceofanumberofprocessesand
institutionswhichweretoacquireaglobalscaleandexertasignificantimpactonthe
historyofglobalization.Thefirstonewastheinventionoftheprintingpress,which
triggeredtheSecondInformationRevolution.Thisdramaticallyreducedthecostof
books,contributingtothedemocratizationofliteracy,andgavebirthtothephenom-
enonofthemassprintingofperiodicals,whichhelpedtointegratelargenumbersof
peopleintoinformationnetworks.Thesecondoneistheso-called“MilitaryRevo-
lution”,aradicalchangeinmilitaryorganization,provision,strategy,tactics,and
weaponrythatresultedinpoliticalandadministrativechangesinmanypartsofthe
Afro-Eurasianworld-system,andledtoitsmajorrestructuring.Theappearanceofa
highlyeffectivemilitarytechnology(the“artilleryrevolution”)gavepowertothe
fewrichandstrongstatesthatcouldaffordit,inturnresultingintheappearanceof
“gunpowderempires”(McNeill1982).Thethirdoneistheformationofthemodern
typeofstatewhichwascharacterizedbystatemonopolizationofthearmy;state
responsibilityforimposingandcollectingtaxes;establishmentofconventional
Weber-typebureaucraticsystems;andsystematizationandmodernizationinthe
legalsphere.Bythelatenineteenthcentury,modernstatescontrolled(directlyor
indirectly)almostalltheworld’spopulatedlandmass.
Whatdidthesetransformationsbringtothevariousregionsoftheworld?The
sixteenthcenturywasmarkedbyasignificantgrowthofpopulation,GDP,number
ofcitiesandcity-dwellers,andtradevolumeinalmostallthelargeststatesinthe
Afro-Eurasianworld-system.Inmanycases,growthwasalreadyperceptibleinthe
secondhalfofthefifteenthcentury,bywhichtimethepopulationintheworld-
systemhadrecoveredfromtheBlackDeathandseveralsubsequentpandemics.The
growthphaseofthenewcycle(whichhappenedsimultaneouslyinmanypartsofthe
world-systemduetothesynchronicityofthepreviouscrisis)wasremarkably

“energized”bythediscoveryoftheNewWorldanditsvariousresources,themost
notablebeingsilverandediblespecies.Althoughcropsandlivestocktookarather
longtimetodiffusethroughouttheglobalWorld-System,Chinaexperiencedthe
massspreadofcorn,peanut,potato,andsweetpotatoalreadyinthesecondhalfof
thesixteenthcentury,whichincreasedthecarryingcapacityoflandandenabled
“additional”populationgrowth.The“globalsilvernetwork”exertedanimmediate
andstronginfluenceontheworldeconomy,playingtheroleofaquantitativeeasing
onaglobalscale.
12.3ModernGlobalization 229
Intheseventeenthcentury,thegrowthphaseofthesociodemographiccyclewas
changedbyacompressionphase,andafull-scalecrisisstruckacrossalmostthe
wholeoftheAfro-Eurasianworld-system,withsomerepercussionsintheNew
Worldaswell(Parker2013).Inthiscase,themaindifferencefromothercyclical
sociodemographiccrisestypicalforcomplexagrariansocietieswasthesynchronous
timingofthecrisisinvariouspartsoftheworld.Thissimultaneitywasduenot
onlytoclimaticconditions,butalsototheincreasedconnectivityoftheglobal
world.Importantly,theGlobalCrisisturnedouttobethelastMalthusian-type
sociodemographiccollapseforanumberofcountries.Eventhoughanew
sociodemographiccyclestartedfollowingtheendoftheGlobalCrisis,inEngland
andJapanitendednotwithanothercollapse,butwithaphasetransitionandescape
fromtheMalthusiantrap.
AftertheendoftheGlobalCrisisanewperiodofgrowthstarted;bothworldGDP
andtheworldpopulationincreasedgreatlyintheeighteenthcentury.Incontrastto
thesixteenthcentury,however,growthintheeighteenthcenturywasnotuniversalin
theOldWorld.ThefirststageoftheGreatDivergencestartedtobecomevisibleas
thesuccessfullydevelopingGlobalNorth(Europe,Russia,EastAsia)gradually
divergedfromtheGlobalSouth.Inthenineteenthcentury,theGreatDivergence
reacheditsdecisivephase.First,thegapbetweentheGlobalNorthandtheGlobal
South,whichonlystartedtoappearintheeighteenthcentury,widenedextensively.
Second,theGlobalNorthitselfsplitintothesuccessfulWesternEuropeandNorth
America,ontheonehand,andthelaggingEast(includingmostofEastAsia),onthe
other.AcceleratedglobalmodernizationgreatlyincreasedthegapinpercapitaGDP
andlivingstandardsbetweentheWorld-Systemcoreandtherestoftheworld.
12.3ModernGlobalization
ThenineteenthcenturywasamajorwatershedintheBigHistoryingeneralandin
thehistoryofglobalizationinparticular.Thiswatershedwasrelatedtothemodern
TechnologicalRevolutionthatbroughtprofoundchangestonearlyallspheresof
humanlife.Newtechnologiesformednewmaterialnetworksthatgraduallyspanned
thewholeworld,leadingglobalconnectivitytoanewlevel.Thesenetworkswere
filledwithnewtypesofcontent,bothmaterialandnon-material.
Theaccelerationoftechnologicaldevelopmentandincreasesinglobalconnec-
tivitygreatlycontributedtofreeingtheWorld-Systemcorecountriesfromthe
Malthusiantrap.Britainwasamongthefirstcountriestoescape,astheintroduction
ofbothborrowedtechnologiesandowninventionsledtosignificantgrowthin
agriculturalproductivity.ThisallowedBritaintosustainpopulationgrowthand
providedapooloflaborforindustrialproduction(duetotheintroductionoflabor-
savingagriculturaltechnologies).Asmodernizationencompassedothercountries
andregions,firstintheWorld-Systemcoreandthengraduallyspillingoverintothe
semi-peripheryandtheperiphery,moresocietiesescapedfromtheMalthusiantrap,
andexperiencedaphasetransition,reachinganewtypeofequilibrium.
230 12Conclusion:TheBigHistoryofGlobalizationToldinTenPages
Thewatershedbetweenearlymodernandmodernglobalization(and,inmany
respects,betweentheearlymodernandmodernworld)iscommonlyattributedtothe
IndustrialRevolution,whichstartedinGreatBritainintheeighteenthcentury.The
IndustrialRevolutionwasamongthemostimportanttechnologicalandeconomic
transformationsoftheeighteenthcentury,whichlaterondramaticallychangedthe
courseofglobalizationandthelifeofhumankindingeneral.Italsoengendereda
numberofneweconomicphenomena,suchastechnologicalparadigmsandeco-
nomiccycles.Indeed,oneimportantfeatureofthemodernTechnologicalRevolu-
tionisthatitcameinwaves.TheIndustrialRevolutionwasthefirstwave,followed
byothers,whichcanbeidentifiedasKondratieffwaves.Theemergenceofanew
cyclicalpatternofeconomicdevelopmentinthenineteenthcenturywasclosely
relatedtotheglobalizationprocessesofthetime.Asrapidlyincreasingglobal
connectivitysecuredthefasterandmoreefficientspreadofeconomicupswings
anddownswingsacrossvariousregionsoftheworld,moreandmoreterritorieswere
impacteduntilnearlythewholeworldbegantofeelalmostsimultaneouseconomic
cycles.
Wewanttoemphasize,however,thatalthoughtheIndustrialRevolutionisa
cruciallyimportantpartofthemodernTechnologicalRevolution,itisstillonlyone
partofthecomprehensivemodernizationprocess,anddoesnotcoverthewhole
process.Inthecontextofthehistoryofglobalization,theIndustrialRevolution
engenderednewtypesofbothnetworksandcontentthatmovedthroughthese
networks.
Whentalkingaboutnewtypesofconnectivityandnetworks,oneshouldpay
specialattentiontothetechnologicalbreakthroughsoftheIndustrialRevolution
relatedtonewtypesofenergy(derivedfromfossilfuels).Steamenergylaidthe
foundationforthedevelopmentofnewmeansoftransportation,suchasrailroads
andsteamships,whichwerecloselyfollowedbyadvancesintelecommunications
(thespreadofthetelegraph).Thesetechnologiesformednewmaterialnetworks,
whichgraduallyspannedtheworld,leadingglobalconnectivitytoanewlevel.
Thesenewlyemergednetworkswerefilledwithnewtypesofcontent,thespread
ofwhichwasalsorelatedtotheIndustrialRevolution—forexample,thefabric
producedinBritishcottonmillswasthefirst“mass”bulkfinishedgood.Mass
factoryproductionreducedthepriceoftextilestosuchalowlevelthatevenwith
theaddedcostoflong-distancetransportation—whichitselfdeclinedrapidlydueto
technologicaladvancementsintransportation—pricesremainedlowandcouldcom-
petewithlocalproductioninvariousregionsoftheworld.Othermass-produced
goods,includingagriculturalones,soonfollowedthesamepattern.

12.3ModernGlobalization 231
However,newcontentfillingglobalnetworkswasnotlimitedtomaterialitems.
Probablythemostimportantnon-materialcontenttransmittedthroughthenetworks
wasEuropeanmodernityitself.Someoftheimportantnon-materialcontentrunning
throughthenetworksincludedknowledgeoneffectivewaysoffightingvarious
diseases(suchasintroducingquarantines),aswellasparticularmedical-and
hygiene-basedtechnologies(suchasvaccinationsandpasteurization).Atthesame
time,increasingphysicalconnectivityandrapidlydevelopingglobaltradenetworks
transferredimportantagriculturalgoods(firstofall,cereals)totheregionssuffering
poorharvests.Allthiscontributedtosignificantlylowermortalityandthestartofa
globaldemographictransition,whichledfirsttoademographicexplosionand
eventuallytoanewtypeofdemographicequilibrium.
Asregardsnon-materialcontenttransmittedthroughglobalnetworks,oneshould
noteanumberofimportantaspectsofEuropeanpoliticalmodernitythatemergedin
thenineteenthcenturyandcametoacquireaglobalcharacterlateron,encompassing
nearlythewholeworldtoday.Thenineteenthcentury,especiallysince1830s,was
thecenturyofthestruggleforvotingrights.Asaresultofthegradualexpansionof
suffrageinmostEuropeancountries,bythestartoftheFirstWorldWartherightto
votewasgrantedtotheoverwhelmingmajorityofadultmalesortotheentiremale
populationoveracertainage.Globalizationandglobalmodernizationinthetwenti-
ethcenturycarrieduniversalenfranchisementtothemajorityoftheworld’snation-
states.Thisphenomenonwasatrue,non-violentrevolutioninthepoliticalsphere:
elitistpolitics,wheredecision-makingwasinthehandsofasmallgroupofwealthy
propertyowners,gavewaytomasspolitics.
Anothercriticallyimportantsocialtransformationofthenineteenthcenturywas
relatedtotheglobal“liberationofslaves.”Almostalllegalformsofpersonal
dependence(includingnotonlyslaveryinthenarrowsenseoftheword,butalso
serfdom)wereeliminatedinthenineteenthcenturyacrosstheworld.Withinjusta
fewdecades,thelegalformsofslaveryandserfdom(whichhadexistedformillennia
invariousregionsoftheecumene)haddisappearedinmostoftheplaceswhereit
hadpreviouslyexisted.
TheprototypeofthemodernsocialstatebeganappearinginEuropeinthelate
nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,asnationscreatedsocialsecuritysystems
fortheirpopulations.Statesbeganprovidingnational-levelsocialsupportnotonlyto
particularindividualsinneed,butrathertowholesocialgroups.Thiswasthetime
whenanewtypeofstate—thewelfarestate—wasborn.Inthetwentiethcentury,
globalizationcarriedthepillarinstitutionsofsuchstatestothesemi-peripheryand
(partially)totheperipheryaswell,makingitagloballyimportantsociopolitical
phenomenon.
Anotherfeatureofpoliticalmodernity,whichspreadacrosstheworld,wasrelated
torevolutions.Multidimensional,deepandextremelyfast(intheBigHistory
perspective),modernizationprocessesexacerbatedstructuraldisproportionsand
frequentlyexposedtheWorld-Systemcorecountriestonewtypesoftraps,which
resultedinperiodsofpoliticalturbulence.Asglobalizationforcedmodernization
processestoincreasinglypenetratethesemi-peripheralandperipheralpartsofthe
World-System,thesetrapsbecameglobalandsystematicallygeneratedepisodesof
sociopoliticalinstabilityinvariousmodernizingcountriesthroughoutthetwentieth
andearlytwenty-firstcenturies.
232 12Conclusion:TheBigHistoryofGlobalizationToldinTenPages
However,societiesgraduallytriedtodeveloppeaceful,non-revolutionary
solutionstoeliminateoutdatedinstitutionsandpractices.Twoofthesesolutions
standoutastheyhavepersistedintothecontemporaryworldandhavebecome
nearlyuniversal—constitutionalism,andtheriseofmodernpoliticalparties.Bothof
thesephenomenaoriginatedinWorld-Systemcorecountriesandbeganspreading
throughouttheworldinthenineteenthcentury(andcontinuedtodosointhe
twentiethcentury).
Globalizationinthenineteenthcenturywastoalargeextentfacilitatedby
transformationsintheeducationalandinformationalspheres.Duringthistime,
criticallyimportantchangestookplaceinEuropeaneducation(firstprimary,and
thenathigherlevels),whichwasundergoingaprofoundchangefroman“elitist”toa
massphenomenon.ModernEuropeaneducationmodelswerenotonlycarriedto
otherpartsoftheworldbyglobalization,butalsoservedasglobalizationtransmitters
themselves.Indeed,theelitesofmanysemi-peripheralandperipheralcountries,
havingreceivedaEuropeaneducation,werelikelytobringthemodelsandideasof
Europeanmodernitybacktotheirhomecountriesandwouldoftentrytoopen
modernEuropean-typeeducationalinstitutions.Asfortheinformationalsphere,
thetrulyglobalspreadofmassmedia(firstofall,theperiodicalpress,most
commonlyintheformofnewspapers)inthenineteenthcenturycontributednot
onlytotheformationofnationalpublicspheres(andemergenceofunifiedinforma-
tionalspaceswithinnation-states),butalsotothegradualappearanceofaglobal
informationalspace,whichbynowencompassesnearlythewholeworldandserves
asoneofthemostimportanttransmittersofglobalization.
12.4TheFirst“GoldenAge”ofGlobalization
Thefinaldecadesofthenineteenthcenturyandthebeginningofthetwentieth
century(untiltheFirstWorldWar)arecommonlyreferredtoasthe“goldenage”
ofglobalization.Thethreepillarsofthis“goldenage”werecapital,trade,and
migration.
Anextremelyimportantroleintheaccelerationofglobalizationprocessesinthe
nineteenthcenturywasplayedbytheenormousgrowthintrade.Thisgrowthwas
enabledbyrevolutionarytechnologiesintransportationandcommunications,finan-
cialmodernization,andtheemergenceofnewfinancialinstrumentsapplicableto
long-distancetrade,theglobaldivisionoflabor,andsoon.
GlobalflowsofpreciousmetalshavelongpermeatedtheAfro-Eurasianworld-
systemandintensifiedwiththeemergenceoftheglobalWorld-System.Akey
innovationofthenineteenthcenturywastheattemptbyvariouscountriestocreate
aninternationalfinancialregulatorysysteminordertomanagetheseflows.Forthis,
monetarysystems(suchasthegoldstandard)weredeveloped.Anothermajor
innovationofthenineteenthcenturywasthecreationofaglobalmarketforcapital,
towhichthespreadofthegoldstandardgreatlycontributed.

References 233
Thenineteenthcenturycantrulybecalledacenturyonthemove.Migration
processesinvolvedlargemassesofpeople.Apartfromtransatlanticmigrationand
movementtofrontierzones,manycountriesandregionsexperiencedcolossal
internalmigration.Migrationprocesseshavebecomethebasisofintenseglobal
urbanization.Massmigrationinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies
was,withoutdoubt,oneofthemostimportantdriversofglobalization,aswellasone
ofitsclearestmanifestations.Theepochofhighhumanmobilitywasabruptlyended
bytheFirstWorldWarandonlypartiallyrenewedafteritended.
Inthenineteenthcenturyandtheearlytwentiethcentury,onecouldobservea
steepacceleratingtrendtowardsthegrowthofglobalconnectivity.However,it
couldnotcontinueuninterruptedovertheFirstWorldWar.Afterthewar,inthe
1920sand1930s,theworldsawanexpansionintradetariffsandotherprotectionist
barriers,aswellasrestrictionsonmigration(suchastheintroductionofpassports
andstrengthenedcontroloverthecrossingofborders),whichledtoamarked
decreaseinglobalconnectivity.AsubstantialreconfigurationoftheWorld-System
turnedouttobenecessaryforconnectivitytosurpassthelevelthathadbeen
achievedduringthefirst“goldenage”ofglobalization.
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