INTRODUCTION 5
on power and “the degree of agency that is attributed to a given entity”
(Duranti 2004, 454; his emphasis) with Ahearn’s expansive attention to form,
we can sketch a structural framework of power and authority to illuminate
the dialectics of sociopolitical agency in practice.
The model I have in mind, derived from M. G. Smith (1956, 1975), identifies
power and authority as fundamental principles that are dialectically impli-
cated in all sociopolitical systems and relations. Authority relations, represent-
ing the administrative logic of a top-down chain of executive commands, are
hierarchical and asymmetrical—as such they include or subsume the subor-
dinate units which they regulate, defining the official order as legitimate, that
is, sanctioned by collective values that are in some sense moral, jural, and even
religious. Political relations, by contrast, are equivalent and symmetrical, rep-
resenting the segmentary logic of power competition as actors and coalitions
vie against each other to influence the regulation of public affairs—the making
of decisions before they are executed. In his original conceptual breakthrough,
Smith (1956) liberated the principles of fission and fusion, of segmentary op-
position and hierarchical inclusion, from the African lineage systems and
“segmentary societies” in which they were embedded by recognizing their
structural characteristics as specific modalities of politics and administration,
principles equally at work in complex polities with specialized bureaucracies,
in political parties, and even in the inner circles of authoritarian regimes. In its
pure, “abstract” form, power operates ultra vires, outside the authority struc-
tures that seek to regulate and domesticate its labile potencies (Smith 1975, 85).
It is ultimately revisionary and revolutionary because it “opposes” authority,
seeking to dismantle its hierarchic relations through radical leveling. Power sui
generis is thus dangerous, polluted, and illegitimate. Since it violates the stric-
tures and structures that channel it through legitimate means and ends, power
is often culturally framed in idioms of pollution—transgressing the moral or-
der, confounding what should be kept apart, and dividing what should be
combined and united. If in vertical terms power is associated with the peo-
ple, from “below,” contra the hierarchical organization of authority relations,
in horizontal terms this subversive capacity is nearly universally associated
with “leftness” and disorder (transformation), opposed to the “rightness” and
normative order of the conservative status quo (reproduction).
Unlike Smith, however, I am less interested in a structural theory of politics
as such than in the more abstract dialectics of power and authority as they
inform the micropractices of social and discursive agency. Whereas authority
and its hierarchic relations of administration highlight the structure of institu-
tions, offices, and symbolic codes at all levels of corporate organization, power
and its segmentary political relations inhere in people and persons. Again,