Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy

Epistemology in Classical Indian Philosophy with special attention to Gaṅgeśa’s definition.

1. Epistemology ( pramāṇa-śāstra ) in Classical Indian Philosophy with special attention to Gaṅgeśa’s Definition of “knowledge,” pramā Stephen Phillips University of Texas at Austin University of New Mexico Albuquerque, October 2024 1

2. Introduction darśana and pramāṇa-śastra Theory of knowledge,  pramāṇa-śāstra , is a rich genre of Sanskrit literature, spanning almost twenty centuries It is carried out in distinct schools of philosophy, various classical  darśana, each of which takes a position on knowledge and justification. Classical Indian epistemology is dominated by theories about pedigree, i.e., views about knowledge-generating processes, called  pramāṇa , "knowledge sources." Perception , inference , and testimony are the principal candidates. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-india / 2

3. Intrinsic vs extrinsic certification svataḥ vs parataḥ prāmāṇya Mīmāṃsā: Certification is not required. Knowledge is “self-certifying,” svataḥ prāmāṇya Vedāntic schools tend to agree; others join Nyāya in disagreeing Nyāya: Certification requires further cognition, an apperceptive determination of knowledge status Gaṅgeśa’s argument: If determination of knowledge status were intrinsic to a knowledge instance, then it would not be possible to doubt a veridical perception, e.g., a river in the distance ( Tattva-cintā-maṇi , perception chapter, Calcutta 184), but it is possible. 3

4. Knowledge of knowledge Apperception, anuvyavasāya : according to Nyāya, a second-order cognition that takes another as object without itself being self-aware. Mīmāṃsā and Vedāntic attack: This generates an infinite regress. (The Buddhist Nāgārjuna may be the earliest so to allege.) Vātsyāyana (c. 450, author of the oldest extant commentary on the Nyāya-sutra , here NyS 2.1.20): If comprehension of perception or another knowledge source landed us in infinite regress, then everyday action and discourse would not go on through comprehension of self-consciously known objects and their known causes. However, everyday action and discourse do proceed for someone comprehending self-consciously known objects and their known causes: when self-consciously I grasp by perception an object or I grasp one by inference or I grasp one by analogy or I grasp one by testimony (the four knowledge sources according to Nyāya), the apperceptive cognition that occurs goes like this: "My knowledge is perceptual" or "My knowledge is inferential" or "My knowledge is from analogy" or "My knowledge is testimonial." 4

5. Knowledge of knowledge, anuvyavasāya Nyāya’s “externalism” ( parataḥ prāmāṇya) : It takes “apperception,” anuvyavasāya , to know that you know. S may well know that p without knowing that she knows that p . K p ≢ KK p . 5

6. Doubt has causes, one of which is controversy sometimes to be resolved by nyāya , “critical reasoning” The Nyāya school is named after the technical term, ‘ nyāya ’, “critical reasoning.” In nyāya investigation: (a) knowledge sources are self-consciously employed, becoming methods of inquiry (b) the knowledge sources/methods are supplemented by suppositional reasoning , tarka , which is a lot like Socratic elenchus 6

7. Acknowledged Irreducible Sources by School Cārvaka: Perception Vaiśeṣika, Yogācāra Buddhism: Perception & Inference Nyāya : Perception , Inference , Analogy , & Testimony Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta: all of the above plus Reasoning to the Best Explanation & Non-cognition 7

8. Nyāya typology of “cognition,” jñāna jñāna , cognition anubhava , presentational experience smaraṇa , remembering pramā , knowledge yathārtha , correct pratyakṣa , perceptual knowledge ayathārtha , incorrect anumiti , inferential knowledge upamiti , analogical knowledge śābda-bodha , testimonial knowledge apramā , non-knowledge viparyaya , falsehood, error pratyakṣa-ābhāsa , pseudo-perception anumity-ābhāsa , pseudo-inferential knowledge etc. Other cognitive types: saṃśaya , doubt; āhārya-buddhi , fantasy, imaginative supposition; tarka , suppositional reasoning 8

9. Skepticism Cārvāka: against induction (as inference depends on generalization, every F as a G, for instance, no one could know that because no one knows every F and every G). Buddhist (Mādhyamaka): justification regress Vedāntic (Advaita, e.g., Śrīharṣa, also Mādhyamaka): The commonly viewed distinctness between two things a and b is incomprehensible because of impossible infinite regress (the “Bradley problem”) Pragmatic and other answers 9

10. Knowledge and truth Nyaya: The truth of a cognition or belief (in the simplest case) is its being about something ɸ that is ɸ ( tadvati tad-prakāraka ). A person S has knowledge ( pramā ) that p just in case her cognition or belief that p is (a) true (b) has been produced in the right way (by a pramāṇa ). 10

11. Knowledge ( pramā ) and “non-knowledge” ( apramā ) Automatic generation of knowledge by perception and other knowledge sources ( pramāṇa ) Certification by inference (signs of pramāṇa called guṇa ) Reflective knowledge ( anuvyavasāya ) and certification ( parataḥ prāmāṇya ) Presentation of “fresh news” ( anubhava ) Non-knowledge (cognition with false propositional content or not produced in the right way) 11

12. What’s ”new” in Navya Nyāya “New” of “New Nyāya” is a modern scholarly invention. Wada (2000: 442–50) argues that Navya Nyāya begins with Udayana. However, for Gaṅgeśa Udayana belongs to old Nyāya For later authors such as Mathurānātha, sometimes Gaṅgeśa himself is not counted as navya but only Raghunātha and his sixteenth- and seventeenth-century followers (Ingalls 1951: 126, 127). 12

13. atha pramā-lakṣaṇa-siddhānta   Now the Right View  On Characterizing Knowledge Text (Tirupati 434, Calcutta 401)   ucyate | yatra yad asti tatra tasya anubhavaḥ pramā | tadvati tat-prakārakânubhavo vā |   Gaṅgeśa : We answer. Knowledge is (D 25 ) “awareness of something there where it is.” Or, (D 26 ) “awareness with 𝜙 as predication content about an object that is 𝜙 .” This seems to leave out justification, which, for Nyāya and many other schools, amounts to being produced by a pramāṇa. So epistemic luck would appear to meet the definition but would not count, at least in English, as knowledge. In a so-called Gettier case due to Pollock (1986), wouldn’t S’s perception of a red ball in a red light, “The ball is red,” meet the definition? Yes, but it would not be knowledge. Had the ball been green, it would have still looked red. Gaṅgeśa’s definitions capture veridicality all right but they do not seem to capture occurrent knowledge, leaving out the condition about proper pedigree. 13

14. Perception Central questions debated across school (some of the outstanding issues and questions that occupy the schools in all periods of their literatures): Are the objects of perception internal to consciousness or external? Are they restricted to individuals, e.g., a particular cow, or are universals, e.g., cowhood, also perceived? How about relations? Absences or negative facts (Devadatta's not being at home)? Parts or wholes? Both? A self, awareness itself? What about perceptual media such as light and ether, ākāśa , the purported medium of sound? Is anything perceptible yogically (God, the īśvara , the ātman or self, puruṣa )? What are the environmental conditions that govern perception, and how do these connect with the different sensory modalities? Are there internal conditions on perception (such as attention or focus, viewed by some as a voluntary act)? Is a recognition, e.g., "This is that Devadatta I saw yesterday," perceptual? And does recognition prove the endurance of things over time including the perceiving subject? Do we perceive only fleeting qualities ( dharma ), as Buddhists tend to say, or qualifiers as qualifying qualificanda (a lotus as qualified by being-blue), as say realist Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā? Does all perception involve a sensory connection with an object that is responsible for providing its content or intentionality ( nirākāra-vāda , Nyāya), or is the content of perception internal to itself ( sākāra-vāda , Yogācāra) How do we differentiate veritable perception, which is defined as veridical, and pseudo-perception (illusion), which is non-veridical? How is illusion to be explained? 14

15. Inference as a Knowledge Source inference for onself inference for another svârtha anumāna parârtha anumāna normally automatic, practically a form of without self-conscious testimony, a tool for debate volition Inference for oneself infallibly generates knowledge (with 100% reliability). Cognitive processes resembling inference but not producing knowledge are termed pseudo-inference , usually failing because of a fallacy (hetv-ābhāsa), such as reasoning from a false or unwarranted premise ( asiddhi ) . 15

16. Inference Premise 1: S a (The mountain is smoky.) Premise 2: (x) (Sx ➡ Fx) (Whatever is smoky is fiery.) ————— Conclusion: F a (The mountain is fiery.) Example: S b ,F b & ¬S c ,¬F c (positive and negative inductive support) ‘ ➡ ’ defined as “is pervaded by,” “entails” ‘¬’ defined as “ɸ is absent at x” 16

17. Inferential knowledge I (K)(G p F a ) ➡︎ (K)G a If a person knows that F-as-pervaded-by-G qualifies a , then the person knows that G a . This has become a standard representation, after Bimal Matilal, The Character of Logic in India (1998), but it leaves out something important, namely, the person’s actually carrying out the inference. 17

18. Inferential knowledge II: “reflection,” parāmarśa (K)S a (A subject knows that something a is S.) (K)(x)(Sx ➡ Fx) (A subject knows that whatever is S is F.) Therefore, (K)F a Provided that reflection has occurred, that is, that the subject has “put together” the information in the two premises. 18

19. Uddyotakara’s three types of inference according to the nature of the inductive support (c. 600 CE ) “ positive and negative” ( anvaya-vyatireka ): inferences based on positive and negative correlations where both are available “ positive only” ( anvaya-vyatireka ) : inferences based on positive correlations only, where there are no known examples of an absence of the probandum property, such as with the universally present property, nameability (there is nothing that is not name able) “ negative only” ( kevala-vyatireka ): inferences based on negative correlations only where outside of the inferential subject or site there are no known cases of the probandum. 19

20. Debate for the truth, vāda Preceded by doubt or controversy (from within one’s own school or from outside) Proceeds by examination of theses and countertheses Employs the recognized knowledge sources as methods of investigation—especially inference —supplemented by tarka , “suppositional reasoning” Does not employ any debater’s trick, obfuscation, etc., which are confined to debate for victory Conducted among like-minded colleagues all sincerely concerned to know the truth 20

21. Testimony I Gautama provides a definition at  Nyāya-sūtra  1.1.7: Testimony is the (true) statement of an expert ( āpta ). An "expert,"  āpta , is a trustworthy authority such that "expert" is not entirely adequate as a translation, “reliable expert” is better. Vātsyāyana in defining the term outlines a moral dimension: An  āpta  is a person who not only knows the truth but who wants to communicate it without deception (Vātsyāyana's commentary under  Nyāya-sūtra  1.1.7). 21

22. Testimony II From a Navya Nyāya perspective: Testimonial knowledge is a matter of comprehending a meaningful statement, a transmitting sentence. The following three necessary conditions for a meaningful statement . grammatical "expectancy,"  ākāṅkṣā (semantic) "fittingness,"  yogyatā proper presentation (pronunciation and the like),  āsatti 22

23. Defeaters and defeater-defeaters ( bādhaka ) Pseudo-provers ( hetv-ābhāsa ), common rather formal fallacies Undercutters ( upādhi ), overlooked additional conditions for a putative vyāpti or general rule: H & U entail S but not H alone. Futile rejoinders ( jāti ), tricky philosophic attacks on inference, targeting usually the putative vyāpti or general rule Clinchers ( nigraha-sthāna ), ways of winning a debate ( twenty-two are identified in the Nyāya-sūtra ) — not usually relevant in vāda , debate for the truth, except that pointing out a pseudo-prover, for example, blocks a putative inference Defeaters ( bādhaka ) utilized in tarka , suppositional reasoning, which are relevant in vāda 23

24. Some forms of what is shown by suppositional reasoning ( tarka ) according to Udayana (c. 1000); there are other lists “self-dependence” (begging the question), ātma-āśraya “mutual dependence” (mutual presupposition), anyonya-āśraya “circularity” (reasoning in a circle), cakraka “infinite regress,” anavasthā “unwanted consequence” (contradiction), aniṣṭa-prasaṅga , “being presupposed by the other,” prathama-upasthitatva “(hasty) generalization,” utsarga “differentiation failure,” vinigamanā-viraha “theoretic heaviness,” gaurava 24

25. The inferential undercutter or “additional condition,” upādhi (x) ( S x ➡ U x) (The upādhi pervades the probandum.) ( x) ( H x & ¬ U x) (The upādhi fails to pervade the prover.) Therefore, (3) ( x) ( H x & ¬ S x). (There is something that has the prover without having the probandum.) (x) (( H x & U x) ➡ S x) 25

26. 26

27. A few pseudo-provers, hetv-ābhāsa (relatively formal fallacies) deviation, counterexample ( vyabhicāra ); some things known to exhibit the prover property (H) and an absence of the probandum (S), e.g., knowledge that there are some things H that are ¬S (e.g., diamonds are earthen things but not scratchable by iron) contradiction ( viruddha ); a putative prover proving the very opposite of the property to be proved, namely, its absence: (x)(Hx ➡ ¬Sx) counterinference ( sat-pratipaksa ); a putative prover that faces another inference with a distinct prover apparently proving the absence of the original’s probandum property. First inference: (x)(Hx ➡ Sx) & H a Second inference: (x)(Gx ➡ ¬Sx) & G a the unestablished ( asiddhi ); a putative prover not known to qualify the inferential subject (e.g., mist on a hill mistaken for smoke) the defeated in advance ( bādhita ); a putative prover that contradicts something that is not just known but certified 27

28. Conflict between the epistemic logics of “the defeated in advance,” bādhita , and “counterinference,” satpratipakṣa Some famous examples: Nyāya inferences to the reality of an enduring self countered by Buddhist inferences to universal momentariness Nyāya theistic inferences countered by Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka atheistic inferences Vaiśesika inferences to the existence of indivisible, permanent atoms countered by Buddhist anti-atomist inferences 28

29. Inference for another ( parârtha-anumāna ) nyāya in the word’s sense as “formal demonstration” That mountain is fiery. (The ‘‘proposition to be proved,” pratijñā .) That mountain is smoky. (The ‘‘reason,’’ hetu .) Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen hearth. (The ‘‘exemplification,’’ udāharaṇa , the statement of the general rule, vyāpti , ‘‘pervasion,’’ as shown by smoke and fire in a kitchen hearth.) That smoky mountain falls under the ‘‘whatever’’ of the general rule, ‘‘Whatever . . . ’’ (The ‘‘application, ’’ upanaya .) That mountain is fiery. (The ‘‘conclusion,’’ nigamana, same as step one, except now proved.) 29

30. “Clinchers,” “points of defeat” in a debate ( nigraha-sthāna ) The first sūtra of the final section of the Nyāya-sūtra lists twenty-two: v iolating the proposition changing the proposition contradicting the proposition proposition retraction changing the prover irrelevance n onsense unintelligibility incoherent speech the misarranged incompleteness superfluity repetition failure to register  incomprehension distraction evasion tu quoque (two wrongs don’t make a right) overlooking the censurable censuring the uncensurable propositional incoherence advancing a pseudo-prover 30