Foreign Policy And Interdependence In Gaullist France Edward Morse

Foreign Policy And Interdependence In Gaullist France Edward Morse
Foreign Policy And Interdependence In Gaullist France Edward Morse
Foreign Policy And Interdependence In Gaullist France Edward Morse

1. Foreign Policy And Interdependence In Gaullist
France Edward Morse download
https://ebookbell.com/product/foreign-policy-and-interdependence-
in-gaullist-france-edward-morse-51954436
Explore and download more ebooks at ebookbell.com

2. Here are some recommended products that we believe you will be
interested in. You can click the link to download.
Interdependence And Foreign Policy New Zealand In The World Since 1935
Malcolm Mckinnon
https://ebookbell.com/product/interdependence-and-foreign-policy-new-
zealand-in-the-world-since-1935-malcolm-mckinnon-49163524
Foreign Policy And Leadership In Nigeria Obasanjo And The Challenge Of
African Diplomacy Steve Itugbu
https://ebookbell.com/product/foreign-policy-and-leadership-in-
nigeria-obasanjo-and-the-challenge-of-african-diplomacy-steve-
itugbu-50233602
Foreign Policy And Regionalism In The Americas Gordon Mace Editor Jean
Philippe Thrien Editor
https://ebookbell.com/product/foreign-policy-and-regionalism-in-the-
americas-gordon-mace-editor-jean-philippe-thrien-editor-51894144
Foreign Policy And Economic Dependence Neil R Richardson
https://ebookbell.com/product/foreign-policy-and-economic-dependence-
neil-r-richardson-51924256

3. Foreign Policy And The Bureaucratic Process The State Departments
Country Director System William I Bacchus
https://ebookbell.com/product/foreign-policy-and-the-bureaucratic-
process-the-state-departments-country-director-system-william-i-
bacchus-51948450
Foreign Policy And Security Strategy Wight Martin
https://ebookbell.com/product/foreign-policy-and-security-strategy-
wight-martin-55945654
Foreign Policy And Leadership In Nigeria Obasanjo And The Challenge Of
African Diplomacy Steve Itugbu
https://ebookbell.com/product/foreign-policy-and-leadership-in-
nigeria-obasanjo-and-the-challenge-of-african-diplomacy-steve-
itugbu-34801590
Foreign Policy And The French Revolution Charlesfranois Dumouriez
Pierre Lebrun And The Belgian Plan 17891793 Patricia Chastain Howe
Auth
https://ebookbell.com/product/foreign-policy-and-the-french-
revolution-charlesfranois-dumouriez-pierre-lebrun-and-the-belgian-
plan-17891793-patricia-chastain-howe-auth-5371414
Foreign Policy And The Media The Us In The Eyes Of The Indonesian
Press 1st Edition Jarno S Lang Auth
https://ebookbell.com/product/foreign-policy-and-the-media-the-us-in-
the-eyes-of-the-indonesian-press-1st-edition-jarno-s-lang-auth-5611042

5. FOREIGN POLICY
AND INTERDEPENDENCE
IN GAULLIST FRANCE

6. Written under the auspices of
the Center of International Studies
Princeton University
A list of other Center publications
appears at the back of the book

7. Edward L. Morse
Foreign Policy
and Interdependence
in Gaullist France
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

8. Copyright © 1973 by Princeton University Press
All rights reserved
LCC 72-5391
ISBN 0-691-05209-3
Library of Congress Cataloging
in Publication data will be found
on the last printed page of this book
Publication of this book has been aided
by a grant from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
This book has been composed in Electra
Printed in the United States of America
by Princeton University Press

9. In memory of
PETER V. WOODWARP

11. CONTENTS
Preface xi
I. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Introduction 3
1. The Transformation of Foreign Policies 7
2. Interdependencies among the Industrialized
Western States 47
II. FRANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF INDEPENDENCI
IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
Introduction 105
3. Limitations on Gaullist Foreign Policy 116
4. Welfare Versus Warfare: Defense Autonomy and
the Dilemma of Insufficient Resources 147
5. Foreign Economic Policy and the Reform of the
International Monetary System 204
6. Crisis Diplomacy: Manipulating Interdependence
in the EEC ' 252
7. Domestic Exigencies and International Constraints 279
8. Conclusions 315
Index 323
vii

13. TABLES
1. Membership in Various International Organ­
izations, 1962-1969 54
2. Population of Selected European States,
1800-1900 138
3. The Total French Defense Expenditure as a
Percentage of the Total Government Budget
and the GNP, 1960-1970 159
4. Flows of French Resources to Less-Developed
Societies as a Percentage of GNP, 1960-1969 163
5. University Attendance in France, 1958-1968 165
6. Consumption, Governmental Expenditure,
Savings and Investment as Percentages of the
GNP in France, 1949-1968 171
7. Comparisons of National Research and De­
velopment Expenditures for Selected Coun­
tries, 1961 and 1967 172
8. Comparisons of Governmental Expenditure
on Research and Development, 1961 and 1969 173
9. Poll of May 13-14, 1969 190
10. Origin and Use of Gold in the Western
World, 1960-1967 210
11. Representation in the Modernization Com­
mittees 291
FIGURES
1. Foreign Trade Outside the Franc Zone, 1959-1967 69
2. Foreign Trade within the Franc Zone, 1959-1967 70
3. Annual Expenditures on National Defense by Year
as a Percentage of the Budget, 1868-1968 161
4. Annual Total Expenditures on Public Education
as a Percentage of the Budget, 1868-1968 164
IX

15. PREFACE
FRENCH foreign policy during the 1960s has received a great
deal of attention from both diplomats and scholars. De
Gaulle's quest for global preeminence combined with a revi-
talization of French society made Gaullist politics a favorite
subject of political controversy and of scholarly analysis. The
sense of drama that enabled de Gaulle to appear to transcend
the world in which he acted was frequently captured in the
analysis of his foreign policy. Most of the writings on the sub­
ject stress particularistic and novel aspects of the external re­
lations of the Fifth Republic. However, the more I studied
French foreign policy during the Gaullist period, the more I
felt that what was special about France was not what others
had called unique. Rather, what has made French foreign pol­
icy in the 1960s so fascinating is the way a generalized condi­
tion of contemporary foreign policy was brought into sharp
focus by the fact that the President of Fifth Republic France
was so blatantly anachronistic.
In short, this endeavor to understand and to evaluate re­
cent French foreign policy is one that stresses a universal
rather than a particular set of conditions. The dilemmas of
recent French foreign policy, especially the contradiction be­
tween the impulse to independence and the necessities of in­
terdependence, are presented here as characteristic of the for­
eign policies of a more general set of states. What are
so starkly apparent in Gaullist France are a set of contradic­
tions that are present in the foreign policies of all highly mod­
ernized states and a set of dilemmas that seem to have devel­
oped from a central paradox of modernization. Objectively,
modernization has brought about increased levels of inter­
dependence among societies; subjectively, however, it seems
to have tightened the psychological hold of the nation-state
over the minds of men. Increasingly, the problems of foreign
policy have required political organization at a level beyond
that of the nation-state. Decreasingly, the nation-state has
Xl

16. PREFACE
been able to serve as an adequate basis for political decision­
making; yet nothing seems able to replace it.
The central problem of this study is to reconcile the par­
ticular experience of France with a general explanation. The
theoretical analysis seems to necessitate a set of investigations
beyond the scope of any single study. It bears upon the rela­
tions among modernized states as well as on the mechanics
of foreign policy in each of them. Even when one looks into
the foreign policies of a single state, a wide spectrum of in­
vestigations is required, for modernization has affected all
three of the major components of foreign policies—their sub­
stantive contents, the processes by which they are formulated,
and their effectiveness. This problem was resolved by select­
ing for analysis those aspects of foreign policy in France that
are the most salient characteristics of foreign policies in mod­
ernized states. It seems that this is the best way to come to
grips with the substantive problem that I have found most
interesting.
The study is divided in two parts. The first is a theoretical
exegesis of the conduct of foreign policy in any highly mod­
ernized society. Examples are drawn mainly, but not exclu­
sively, from the French experience, so that the entire section
also serves as an introduction to Part II. The second part, a
more detailed case study of France during de Gaulle's Presi­
dency, is designed to illustrate in concrete terms the more
abstract and generalized theory of foreign policy. Thus, it
centers upon several characteristics of French foreign policy
that are also general characteristics of foreign policies in all
modernized states. These are: (i) the breakdown in the
distinction between foreign and domestic affairs; (2) the
increased importance of foreign economic policy; (3) di­
lemmas of domestic control that have resulted from interna­
tional interdependence; (4) the calling into question of
governmental priorities for foreign affairs; and (5) the emer­
gence of crisis management and crisis manipulation as part
of the routine procedures of foreign policy control. A chapter
XIl

17. PREFACE
is devoted to each of these aspects of French foreign policy
in de Gaulle's Presidency.
Each problem is evaluated, as well as described, and ex­
plained in terms of the general theory. Too often, there is no
touchstone or standard in foreign-policy analysis for formu­
lating policy evaluations. Two factors alleviate this problem.
First, the general explanation of foreign policies in modern­
ized states presents a theoretical touchstone that serves as a
standard for evaluating French foreign policy. Second, the
general trend of politics in France and, especially, the resigna­
tion of de Gaulle enabled me to treat the de Gaulle years as
a complete unit, one in which articulated objectives can be
contrasted with the outcome of events.
Touching upon a host of additional issues, several of which
could not be examined in more detail, could not be avoided.
The emergence of bureaucratic or group politics in the formu­
lation and execution of foreign policy has become significant
in all highly modernized states; however, it was not possible
to obtain sufficient data to include an analysis of politics with­
in the Council of Ministers or any other body. Similarly, the
growth of international investment and the consequent devel­
opment of a transnational short-term capital market have re­
stricted the autonomy in foreign and domestic political deci­
sion-making in every highly modernized economy, but a
general analysis of the way these phenomena have restricted
French foreign policy goals could not be included.
I had the great fortune to do the research and writing for
this book in a scholarly environment that is remarkably open
to innovative ideas. Richard Ullman, Nicholas Wahl, Harold
Sprout, and Robert Gilpin were extremely helpful in encour­
aging me to develop the ideas embodied in it. They, together
with Oran Young, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Joe A. Oppenheimer,
and Norman Frohlich, were unremitting in both their criti­
cisms and encouragements. Linda K. Morse was, as always,
judicious and wise in the support and encouragement she
XlIl

18. PREFACE
gave me. She offered critical advice, when it mattered, with­
out nudging. Ernst B. Haas, Stanley Hoffmann, Pierre
Hassner, Linda Miller, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Charles
Berry read parts of the manuscript and offered helpful sugges­
tions. Cyril E. Black provided the use of the facilities of the
Center of International Studies in carrying out the research
and writing. Lewis Bateman and Sanford G. Thatcher of the
Princeton University Press offered invaluable advice concern­
ing organization of the book and prevented me from making
serious errors. Virginia Anderson and Dorothy Dey were effi­
cient and patient with me in typing the manuscript. I am
highly indebted to all of these colleagues and friends. Need­
less to say, I remain responsible for any errors of fact or
judgment that may be found in this study.
Princeton University
December 1972
XlV

19. I
MODERNIZATION
AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

21. INTRODUCTION
THERE are two basic perspectives that may be invoked for
theories about contemporary international relations. One fo­
cuses upon the "rules of the game" and attempts to stipulate
laws governing the politics between sovereign entities with the
hope that these laws are sufficiently generalized to be applica­
ble to a large sampling of international systems, past and
present. The other argues that current problems of interna­
tional politics are so different from those of the past that they
must be applicable only to contemporary conditions and de­
rivative from transformational changes in the way semiau-
tonomous political systems adjust their mutually conflicting
goals.
The perspective of this study is the latter. It is based on the
following assumptions: that the foreign policy of Gaullist
France, or of any highly modernized political system, is large­
ly determined by a set of processes, the appearance of which
is relatively recent, certainly no older than a century; that
these processes did not become generalized to a set of so­
cieties until after World War II; that the appearance of these
conditions has been and will continue to be destabilizing for
the international system as a whole; and that the degree to
which the political leadership of any one of these societies can
act to maintain its environment is restricted to an extent that
may be historically unprecedented. Only by viewing contem­
porary foreign policy in these terms can an observer or prac­
titioner of international affairs appreciate the profundity of
the transformation that has occurred in international politics
during the course of this century.
The book is a theoretical case study designed to adduce
evidence for the utility of these assumptions and to substan­
tiate the hypotheses stipulated in Part I. The use of the case
of Gaullist France for these purposes ought to be the most
rigorous test for the hypotheses, since nowhere else in the
modern world has the nationalist cause been so baldly articu-
3

22. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
lated. The dialectic between the will toward national auton­
omy and the exigencies of interstate interdependence was a
sharp counterpoint in de Gaulle's foreign policy, especially
after the termination of the Algerian War in 1962. If any
modern industrialized state would contradict the generaliza­
tions of this study, it would be the Fifth Republic before de
Gaulle's resignation in April 1969. However, it should be a
significant confirmation of these generalizations that even
France confronted the problems of foreign policy that arise
from modernity.
A single theoretical case study will by no means, of course,
provide a complete substantiation. But it can be justified on
several grounds. First, the case of France is selected from a
defined universe: relatively modernized societies where po­
litical systems are democratic. This universe is not so large
as to weaken the force of the generalizations but covers a suf­
ficient number of cases to make them widely applicable. Fur­
thermore, and as noted above, the case selected is apparently
unique, so that it should provide a plausible test of the stipu­
lated hypotheses. A rigorous comparative study that would
exhaust all available cases would, in any case, be beyond the
organizational scope of a single study or the energies of an
individual researcher. Without such inclusion, proof is de­
pendent upon the achievement of a satisfactory level of con­
fidence. It is hoped that this study will provide sufficient
confidence in the generalizations to warrant their further
examination. There is no doubt that every case within the
universe is also characterized by unique traditions and
objectives and that they must be compared if the generaliza­
tions are to be more fully supported. In the absence of that,
confidence in the generalizations must be viewed as a
function of the degree to which the case illustrates the more
general model and of the internal consistency of the theoret­
ical argument.
The general argument itself may be summarized in the fol­
lowing way.
Both the international and domestic settings in which for-
4

23. INTRODUCTION
eign policies are elaborated and conducted have been trans­
formed by the processes of modernization; these transforma­
tions, in turn, have brought about a situation in which foreign
policies associated with modernized states differ on virtually
all significant dimensions from those associated with non-
modernized states.
Internationally, modernization has served to increase the
levels and types of interdependencies among the various so­
cieties of the world, especially the more modern ones. Domes­
tically, it has fostered greater centralization and a greater
priority for domestic rather than external needs—notably,
those needs of an economic nature. As a result of these
changes, three general conditions have developed. First, the
classical distinction between foreign and domestic affairs,
which also lay at the heart of Gaullist foreign-policy ideals,
has largely dissolved, even though the myths associated with
sovereignty and the state have not. Second, the distinction be­
tween high policies and low policies has become less impor­
tant as the latter have assumed an increasingly large role in
the fate of citizens of any state.1 Third, although there have
1 The distinction between high politics and low politics belongs to
the Saint-Simonian tradition of meliorism and was later adopted in
the functionalist school of thought on supranational integration. High
policies refer to a state's security and defense and has traditionally been
conceived as having primary, or higher importance in statecraft. Low
policies refer to relations between citizens in different states or to non-
security intergovernmental relations and are usually identified with
economic transactions.
Areas of low policy were assumed in the Saint-Simonian tradition as
amenable to nonpolitical and technical manipulation by experts. When
combined with the assumption that the growth and the survival of in­
dustrialized societies are dependent upon the international coordination
of national politics related to these technical issues, this argument
produced a powerful prescription for functional integration. Theorists
who argued this position profoundly overestimated both the urgency
of the task and the degree to which technical problems could remain
out of politics. See Ernst Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New
Europe," in Stephen R. Graubard, ed., A New Europe (Boston: Amer­
ican Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1964), pp. 62-88.
Stanley Hoffmann offers another argument on low policies and high
5

24. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
been significant developments in the instrumentalities of po­
litical control, the actual ability of statesmen to control events
either internally or externally has decreased with the growth
of interdependence and is likely to continue to decrease in the
future.
policies in "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and
the Case of Western Europe," Daedalus, xcv (1966): 862-915 and
in International Regionalism, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1968), pp. 177-230. Hoffmann feels that nuclear stalemate
has served to reinforce the attributes of the nation-state by stabilizing
the structure of postwar international society and that low policies do
not generate the spillover expected of them by prophets of interna­
tional integration. While Hoffmann is quite right that the integration-
ists overestimated the potential of economic exigencies for creating
international integration, his denial of any effect of low policies is itself
overstated.
6

25. ONE
THE TRANSFORMATION OF
FOREIGN POLICIES
THE notion that modernization has a revolutionary effect on
foreign policy is not new. Comte and Spencer, for example,
among other optimistic observers of industrialization in the
nineteenth century, argued that war was irrational as an in­
strument of policy in the relations among highly developed
economies. Others, including Hobson and Lenin, surveyed
industrialization and linked it to the "new imperialism" of the
late nineteenth century. They contended that what they un­
derstood as modernization would lead inevitably to conflict
rather than cooperation among the same types of societies.
While experience belies the specific predictions of both
groups, it has reinforced their fundamental premise that for­
eign policy has been radically transformed in societies that
have become highly industrialized. The difficulties that these
observers found in tracing out the effects of various phases
of the modernization process on foreign policy are still puz­
zling. However, there is evidence that indicates that once so­
cieties have reached a phase of high mass consumption or
high modernization they confront a set of problems in all
phases of foreign policy whose similarity is marked.
The hypothesis that underlies this study is that most of the
significant features of the foreign policies of relatively mod­
ernized societies are similar and can be derived from the char­
acteristics of modernity. The immediate implication of this
hypothesis is that the principal set of determinants of foreign
policy can be thought of as relating to domestic social struc­
ture rather than to any of the other sets of variables that the­
orists have suggested.1 By and large, I have chosen to ignore
1 These other variable clusters are neatly defined in James N. Ros-
enau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches
7

26. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
these other clusters of variables because I feel that this one
is compelling. The others are subsumed by those associated
with either social structure in general or modernization in
particular, or they can be invoked to explain variations from
the model.
The argument of this chapter is divided into three parts.
First, the general implications of high levels of modernization
for foreign policy are outlined together with a definition of
to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evan-
ston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92. Rosenau
suggests five sets of variables as follows: (1) "the idiosyncrasies of
the decision-makers who determine and implement the foreign policies
of the nation"; (2) "the external behavior of officials that is generated
by the roles they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective
of the idiosyncrasies of the role occupants"; (3) "governmental vari­
ables"; (4) "nongovernmental aspects of a society which influence its
external behavior"; and (5) "any nonhuman aspects of a society's
external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition
or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials" (p. 43).
Although Rosenau suggests that the importance of each cluster is
yet to be determined and that all are necessary for a theory, each of
these clusters has been used separately as an exclusive approach to the
understanding of foreign policy; and each has been applied to the
study of French foreign policy.
The first is the "great-man" approach that has been characteristic
of some schools of diplomatic history. Writers in this school assume
that foreign policy is determined by the great statesmen of an era. The
genre that describes this kind of writing is generally biographical. In
the case of France, examples are found in Wladyslaw W. Kulski, De
Gaulle and the World; The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Re­
public (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966); and Alfred
Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle, trans. Lois Ames
Pattison (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965).
The second approach has concentrated on institutional or decision­
making foci. See Edgar Furniss, The Office of the Premier in French
Foreign Policy-Making: An Application of Decision-Making Analysis,
Foreign Policy Analysis Series, No. 5 (Princeton, N.J.: Center of In­
ternational Studies, 1954); or John E. Howard, Parliament and Foreign
Policy in France (London: Cresset, 1948).
According to the theory underlying the third approach, different
8

27. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
the universe of states whose foreign policies fit the model of
analysis. The second section consists of an outline of the
breakdown of the ideal distinctions between domestic and
foreign affairs in Western thought. Finally, the transforma­
tions in foreign policy are elaborated with reference to its sub­
stantive dimensions, the processes associated with its formu­
lation, and the instruments used to control its external and
internal effects.
MODERNIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY
The implications of modernization for foreign policy can be
derived from many of the definitions of modernization that
have been formulated. I have chosen to follow Levy's defini­
tion because of its power in isolating those societies in which
I am interested. It is based on two variables: "the uses of in­
animate sources of power and the use of tools to multiply the
governmental forms differ in their capacity to handle foreign policy.
The comparison of monarchy and democracy in these respects in the
case of France is the principal concern of the classical study of the
foreign policy of the Third Republic: Joseph Barthelemy, Domocratie
et politique etrangere (Paris: F. Alcan, 1917).
The fourth approach has been closely identified with geographic
determinism. Perhaps the most famous such interpretation of French
society is Jules Michelet, History of France, 1, trans. Walter K. Kelley
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1844): pp. 328-30. Also noteworthy are
Jules Cambon, "France," in The Foreign Policy of the Powers, ed.
Hamilton Fish Armstrong (New York: Harper and Bros., 1935), pp.
38.; and Jean Gottmann, Geography of France (New York: Henry
Holt, 1954), pp. 245-56.
Finally, the fifth approach has been typical of systemic analysis,
according to which the foreign policy of a society is determined by
specified rules of the game that are requisites of survival. An interest­
ing variation on this approach is found in Grosser's study of the Fourth
Republic foreign policy. Grosser's thesis is that French foreign policy in
the 1950s was imposed by two outside events: the split between com­
munism and anticommunism, and the decolonization issue. See La
Quatridme Republique et sa politique exterieure (Paris: Armand Colin,
1961).
9

28. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
effect of effort."2 Each of these variables is conceived as a
continuum, so that "a society will be considered more or less
modernized to the extent that its members use inanimate
sources of power and /or tools to multiply the effects of their
efforts."3 Accordingly, "among the members of relatively
modernized societies, uses of inanimate sources of power not
only predominate, but they predominate in such a way that
it is almost impossible to envisage any considerable departure
in the direction of the uses of animate sources of power with­
out the most far-reaching changes of the entire system. The
multiplication of effort by application of tools is high and the
rate is probably increasing exponentially."4
Only a few such societies have existed in history, and they
all reached high levels of modernization during the nineteenth
or twentieth centuries. Those for which the generalizations
in this essay are germane include the fourteen societies iden­
tified by Russett and others as "high mass-consumption" so­
cieties.5 To these may be added some societies that are likely
to become so characterized in the near future, and that are
closely associated with these other societies via specialized
international organizations.6 They are all modern democra­
cies. There is no logical reason to assume, however, that the
foreign policies of nondemocratic modernized societies would
not also be subsumed by these generalizations.
The general characteristics of modernized societies include
2 Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 11.
* Ibid. * Ibid., p. 85.
5 See Bruce M. Russett et al., World Handbook of Political and
Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 298.
These fourteen societies are the Netherlands, West Germany, France,
Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand,
Australia, Sweden, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Canada, and the United
States.
6 For example, Italy and Japan are in the group of ten major reserve
countries that became identified with the management and reform of
the international monetary system in the 1960s.
IO

29. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
the growth of knowledge about and control over the physical
environment; increased political centralization, accompanied
by the growth of specialized bureaucratic organizations and
by the politicization of the masses; the production of eco­
nomic surpluses and wealth generalized over an entire popu­
lation; urbanization; and the psychological adjustment to
change and the fleeting rather than acceptance of the static
and permanent.7
It is obvious that each of these characteristics carries with
it momentous implications for the ways foreign policies are
conducted and controlled. For example, the intellectual revo­
lution has expanded the spectrum of feasible goals that
statesmen could hope to obtain in domestic or foreign affairs.
Therefore it results in an emphasis on technological innova­
tion in modern statecraft both for the purpose of achieving
security and for the increased well-being of the members of
society. The politicization of a large percentage of the popula­
tion of modernized societies has infringed upon the reserved
domain of state decision-makers in foreign policy and thereby
restricted their freedom of action. The growth in political and
economic instruments of control at the disposal of modern
governments has similarly served to enhance as well as to re­
strict the decisional domain of governments in foreign and
domestic affairs. Perhaps the most momentous product of
modernization, however, has been the emergence of the
nation-state framework as the most generalized form of politi­
cal organization. The nation-state has provided the frame­
work through which the physical and human environment has
most generally been ordered and through which authority has
been rationalized. A consequence of rationalization of author­
ity, according to Huntington, is the "assertion of the external
sovereignty of the nation-state against transnational influences
and of the internal sovereignty of the national government
7 These five characteristics are adopted from Cyril E. Black, The
Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New
York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 9-34.
H

30. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
against local and regional powers. It means national integra­
tion and the centralization or accumulation of power in rec­
ognized national law-making institutions."8
The consolidation of the nation-state is also one of the cen­
tral enigmas of contemporary politics, for modernization has
been accompanied not only by increased national develop­
ment but also by transnational structures that cannot be sub­
jected to the control of national political bodies individually.
The confrontation of the political structures developed along
the lines of the nation-state with these revolutionary transna­
tional activities is one of the most significant features of con­
temporary international politics. Modernization has resulted
in the integration of individual societies under the political
control of individual governments. These governments, how­
ever, have been confronted by problems that can be solved
with decreasing reliability solely within the terms of the na­
tion-state framework. In other words, modernization has
transformed not only the domestic setting in which foreign
policy is formulated; it has also transformed the general struc­
tures of international society by creating higher levels of inter­
dependence among the diverse national societies, especially
among the more highly modernized ones.
The revolution in modernization has also served to bring
about new forms of diplomacy, especially those that lie on the
predominantly cooperative end of the spectrum,9 including
8 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs.
Europe," World Politics, xvm (1966): 378.
9 Cyril E. Black has commented on this development as follows:
"The organization of peoples into relatively water-tight compartments
of modern states has meant that problems of organization involving
two or more states have had to be solved by other than conventional
political methods. The main method has been the development since
the seventeenth century of principles of international law and diplomacy
that make it possible for modern states to handle certain types of
problems without recourse to violence. A significant aspect of this de­
velopment has been the establishment of international organizations
for the purpose of handling specialized functions affecting many states—
such as communications—and, more recently, worldwide organizations
12

31. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
the development and transformation of international law and
organization and the creation of various types of regional and
global integration. These developments, however, are only
part of a more fundamental set of phenomena whereby do­
mestic and foreign policies have been merged. The creation
of interdependencies among societies, linked by the transna­
tional forces of modernization, has resulted in the externaliza-
tion of domestic policies and the internalization of foreign
policies. The two are linked not only by the general charac­
teristics of interdependence, whereby predominantly domestic
policies have recognizable external and domestic effects, but
also by the creation of policy instrumentalities that are used
for the attainment of both domestic and foreign goals.
There are, of course, many different paths that a society
may follow in the development of levels associated with high
mass consumption; each path and each step of the way have
manifold implications for foreign policies. Likewise, there are
many ways in which a state can deal with interdependence.
Once high mass consumption levels and high interdependence
are reached, however, several common features appear that
can be discussed in general terms and that pertain to demo­
cratic as well as nondemocratic forms of political institutions.
It is to these features as exemplified in French foreign policy
that the argument in this chapter is addressed.
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES
A fundamental distinction between foreign and domestic poli­
cies seems to break down under modernization. This distinc­
tion is much more characteristic of the foreign policies of
governments in the premodern age in both ideal and actual
terms than it is of modernized states. In modernized societies,
the distinction is difficult to maintain because predominantly
political and nonpolitical interactions take place across socie-
with a more general political function of preserving the peace"
(Dynamics of Modernizanon, p. 16).
*3

32. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
ties at high levels and because transnational phenomena are
so significant that territorial, political, and jurisdictional
boundaries are extremely difficult to define. The whole con­
stellation of activities associated with modernization blurs the
distinction in such a way that an observer has to analyze care­
fully any interaction in order to ascertain how it pertains to
foreign and domestic affairs.
Foreign policies can be analytically distinguished from
domestic policies. Foreign policies are, at a minimum, mani­
festly oriented to some aspect or objective external to a politi­
cal system, i.e., to some sphere outside the jurisdiction or
control of the polity. Domestic policies, on the contrary, are
oriented predominantly to some sphere within the jurisdiction
and control of the polity. Foreign policies may be addressed
principally to some domestic interest group, but as long as
they carry some minimum intention and recognition of an
external orientation, they are considered foreign policies.
Classical distinctions between foreign and domestic policies
are normatively based and break down once societies become
modernized. Two sorts of classical distinctions exist. One,
which underlies the Rankean tradition of the primacy of for­
eign policy, stresses the special significance foreign policies
carry that other policies do not. This significance is the con­
cern of foreign policy with the existence and security of a
society: "The position of a state in the world depends on the
degree of independence it has attained. It is obliged, there­
fore, to organize all its internal resources for the purpose of
self-preservation. This is the supreme law of the state."10
The other emphasizes the primacy of domestic over for­
eign affairs. Unlike the Rankean tradition, associated orig­
inally with monarchic foreign policies and later with totali­
tarian ones, this tradition stresses the pacific nature of policy,
its formulation by representative legislative groups, and the
control of external events by open rather than closed-door
10 Leopold von Ranke, "A Dialogue on Politics," in Theodore H.
Von Laue, Leopold Ranfee: The Formative Years (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 168.
M

33. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
diplomacy. In this sense, democracies were thought to suffer
severe disabilities in the conduct of foreign affairs.
In either case, there is an assumption that there exists an
essential divorce between foreign and domestic affairs that
carries with it in political analysis normative tendencies to
stress one of the two while ignoring the other. Foreign policy
has been thought to differ from domestic policy in its ends
(the national interest as opposed to particular interests), its
means (any means that can be invoked to achieve the ends,
as opposed to domestically legitimate means), and its target
of operation (a decentralized, anarchic milieu over which the
state in question maintains little control, as opposed to a cen­
tralized domestic order in which the state has a monopoly of
the instruments of social order).
Whether the substance of the distinction stresses domestic
or foreign affairs, the separation of the two has a strong em­
pirical foundation. Levels of interdependence among all non-
modernized societies were generally so low that governments
could take independent actions in either domestic or foreign
affairs with little likelihood that there would be much spill­
over between them. The instruments used to implement
either domestic or foreign policies did not significantly alter
policies in the other field.
This is not to say that domestic factors did not affect for­
eign policy at all, nor that the general international setting did
not affect the substance of policies. What it does suggest is
that the normative distinction between foreign and domestic
activities was quite well matched by actual conditions. The
degree to which the distinction did not coincide with reality
led to debates about ways to improve the efficacy of separat­
ing foreign or domestic policies, or about their goals. But the
extent of convergence was not so great as to call the distinc­
tion into question.
It was precisely this distinction between foreign and do­
mestic affairs as implied by the principle of the primacy of
foreign policy that was the key to the ideals of Gaullist for­
eign policy during the 1960s. The core of French foreign
1S

34. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
policy consisted in the pronounced contradiction between de
Gaulle's desire to reassert French independence and the exi­
gencies of interdependence and interpenetration characteriz­
ing France and the other societies of the West.11 A policy of
independence, smacking of traditional diplomacy and the
separation of both high and low policies and of foreign and
domestic affairs, confronted the contradictory realities of the
contemporary modernized world. In the long run, the devel­
opment of the new diplomacy, the politics of modern demo­
cratic society, the adumbration of high policies, and the merg­
ing of foreign and domestic affairs also meant that de Gaulle's
implementation of his concept of international relations
would be aborted.12
11 Independence and sovereignty ought to be distinguished from
autonomy. The former terms have psychological and juridical con­
notations while the latter can be measured objectively. For example,
autonomy can be measured along a continuum, at one pole of which
is autonomy and the other pole of which is dependence. Any indi­
vidual or political community is said to be autonomous to the degree
that an objective or set of objectives can be attained without the use
of instrumentalities under the control of another individual or set of
individuals. Autonomy, then, would be defined with reference to a
particular goal or set of goals. Complete autonomy with respect to a
specified set of goals would mean that any such objectives within the
range of human attainment could be reached without recourse to
other individuals or to the resources and/or cooperation of the author­
ities of another political community. Sovereignty, unlike autonomy,
is a legal and normative rather than a behavioral concept.
12 The contrast between ideal policies and actual policies as they
are implemented is one of the oldest and most powerful distinctions
in political analysis. It is a contrast between norms, or desired out­
comes, and actual practices. It was this distinction that served so well
in Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (London: Longmans,
1915), where he distinguished the "dignified parts" of the British
political system (Monarchy and Lords) with the "efficient parts." He
called the latter, or actual structures, the "secret machinery" of British
political decision-making.
A careful distinction between actual and ideal structures can be
found in Levy, Modernization of Societies, pp. 26-30. Levy offers
seven propositions about the relationship between ideal and actual
structures that are germane to the present discussion.
16

35. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
The similarities between the Rankean position on the state
and the Gaullist position cannot be overdrawn. Emphasizing
the primacy of foreign policy over domestic policies, de
Gaulle's entire conception of France was one based on
French international stature. The famous first paragraph of
his Memoirs is concerned with French international position
and the French example for humanity.13 The Constitution of
the Fifth Republic, based on the principles outlined in the
Bayeux speech of June 16, 1946, is one that was designed
specifically with regard to foreign affairs. It was intended to
prevent the recurrence of the situation that arose in June
1940 with the collapse of the Third Republic. The Constitu­
tion had to be one that recognized both the "rivalry of the
parties in our country" and "the present state of the world"
with its "opposed ideologies, behind which lurk the power­
ful states that surround us [and which] do not cease to inject
in our own political struggle an element of passionate con­
troversy."14 Given the anarchic state of the world, France, for
de Gaulle, needed a primacy of foreign over domestic affairs.
If the primacy of foreign policy was required by the state
of international anarchy, it was also prescribed in de Gaulle's
view by the requisites of greatness. The telos of France, as
de Gaulle understood it, could be realized only if France were
in the front-rank of states. Without the material resources for
achieving first-rank status, de Gaulle felt that France could
achieve stature only by being a mediator between any two
concentric circles of conflict. Thus, de Gaulle's designs for the
role of France consisted of a series of diplomatic triads, each
of which centered on France. French political analyst Hass-
nerhas said:
In her anti-American undertaking, France was conceived
to be in competition with the United States in serving as
13 See The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, trans.
Jonathan Griffin and Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1964), p. 3 and pp. 716-70.
14 Roy C. Macridis, ed., De Gaulle: Implacable Ally (New York:
Harper and Row, 1966), p. 41.
1I

36. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
the interlocutor of Germany and of Russia. In her concep­
tion of a desirable international balance, she wished
to serve as intermediary and arbitrator between Russia and
Germany in Europe and between Russia and the United
States in the world.15
And the position of arbitrator required complete independ­
ence and freedom of movement.16
Thus, independence was necessary for the fulfillment of
France's role. At the same time, the goal of independence was
supported by the Gaullist tactics of surprise, the use of nega­
tive policies to deny other states the achievement of their
goals, the manipulation of illusions that appeared to enhance
French power, the articulation of ambitious policies, the fos­
tering of nationalism, and the consummate use of ambiguity
that permitted flexibility both at home and abroad.
The goal of independence and the instrument of the
primacy of foreign policy had similar corollaries in the sep­
aration of foreign and domestic affairs. Independence at the
national level was paralleled therefore by the independence of
the President from the turmoils of domestic politics as well
as by the ability of the President to mobilize the domestic
sphere for purposes of foreign policy.17 Thus the constitution­
al arrangements of the Fifth Republic give the French Presi­
dent exceptional powers to control foreign affairs and to iso­
late foreign affairs from the domestic political situation.18 In
fact, the 1958 Constitution stands as an exception to other
15 Pierre Hassner, "La France aux Mains libres!" Preuves, No. 204
(February 1968), p. 55. This translation and subsequent ones unless
otherwise noted are mine.
16 The general political initiatives for independence in ten years
of Gaullism are summarized in Paul Balta, "Dix Ans de politique
6trangare," Revue de defense nationale, xxiv (1968): 813-35.
17 For a study of the Fifth Republic's Constitution and its doc­
trinal sources, see A. Nicholas Wahl, "The French Constitution of 1958
II: The Initial Draft and its Origins," American Political Science
Review, Lin (1959): 358-82.
18 See J. Chatelain, La Nouvelle Constitution et Ie regime politique
de la France (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1959).
18

37. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
democratic constitutions drawn up during the past two cen­
turies in that it "diminished parliamentary supervision [of
foreign affairs] through the limitation of 'legislative' power."19
It was the only democratic constitution written after World
War II to "vest the supreme authority to conduct foreign re­
lations in the Head of State again."20 Articles 14, 15, 20, 21,
and 49 defined the powers of the President and the advisory
capacity of both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs
Minister with regard to foreign affairs. These powers were
further enlarged by Article 5, declaring the President "pro­
tector of the independence of the nation," and by Article 16,
giving him emergency powers whenever the independence of
the nation is in danger.
The constitutional order of the Fifth Republic, with its
emphasis on the ability of a President to conduct an inde­
pendent foreign policy, falls into a hoary tradition in French
political history known as the administrative tradition or,
more precisely, the monarchic tradition of foreign policy. Ac­
cording to one interpretation of French history,
there has developed . . . a coexistence of two primitive pat­
terns of politics, the state-minded administrative pattern
and the individual-oriented representative pattern. Unin-
tegrated and unreformed, they remain competitive and
mutually hostile because they are supported by hostile
groups in society. . . . In brief, the principle of mixed gov­
ernment has not been realized in modern France.21
The primacy of foreign policy can only occur in the state-
minded administrative tradition of a political order that has
hierarchically defined the interests of the state, and is a com-
19 Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau, European Organizations and
Foreign Relations of States: A Comparative Analysis of Decision-Mak­
ing (Leiden: A. W. Sythoff, 1964), p. 52.
20IbJd., p. 64.
21A. Nicholas WaW, "The French Political System," in Patterns
of Government, ed. Samuel Beer and Adam Ulam, 2d ed. (New York:
Random House, 1962), p. 279. Also see Pierre Avril, Politics in France,
trans. John Ross (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. noff.
!9

38. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
plete divergence from the preceding representative tradition
that was institutionalized in the Constitution of the Fourth
Republic.
The ideal structures of French foreign policy during the
1960s thus represent the coincidence of the re-creation of the
administrative tradition in French politics with de Gaulle's
personal emphasis on a doctrine of political leadership based
on maneuverability in politics just as in war.22 An independ­
ent foreign policy required the freedom of action of the head
of state, who would be able to take advantage of changes at
the international level without the restraint imposed by do­
mestic politics.
In developing a foreign-policy ideal, however, de Gaulle
realized that under modernized conditions foreign and domes­
tic affairs cannot be readily isolated. Given the primacy of
foreign policy in his political thought, he concluded that all
affairs of state, both domestic and foreign, had to be brought
under his direction, so that the national interests abroad could
be most effectively served. In ending the Algerian War
in 1962, in taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, and in withdrawing from the mili­
tary command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in 1966, de Gaulle pursued a general policy of in­
dependence and neutrality. He clothed French foreign policy
with a veil of illusion and hoped it would suggest the imple­
mentation of his highly normative vision of the place of
France in the world. He thought he was creating a situation
22 For a brilliant interpretation of the political elements in de Gaulle's
doctrine of warfare, see Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, trans. Francis K.
Price, 2d ed. (New York: New American Library, 1968), pp. 47-87;
and Lacouture's interpretation of C. de Gaulle, The Edge of the
Sword, trans. Gerard Hopkins (New York: Criterion, i960) and Army
of the Future, trans. F. L. Dash (London: Hutchinson, 1940). These
early books of de Gaulle emphasize the importance of morale and the
regeneration of national elan vital as a basis of effective foreign policy.
These concerns were central to Gaullist political thought throughout
the General's career.
20

39. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
to which the great majority of Frenchmen would give passive
if not active approval.
The whole of French foreign policy in the late 1960s as
articulated by de Gaulle, together with the domestic pro­
grams incorporated to modernize the French economy for
external objectives, the change of the planning process into
a medium for achieving foreign goals, and the invoking of Ar­
ticle 38 of the Constitution after the election of 1967,23 can
be understood as preparation for a final phase of Gaullism.
Fearing that domestic interest groups in their selfish private
concerns would pursue particularistic policies that were con­
trary to the national interest as he perceived it, de Gaulle tried
to mobilize domestic resources for external ends and to direct
external policies in such a way as to assure their continuity
after he completed his tenure as President. The development
of this dual theme of French foreign policy in the late 1960s
assumed an accelerated momentum after the presidential
elections of December 1965. Assured of seven more years as
President, de Gaulle then began to fulfill the telos of the Fifth
Republic as he perceived it.
The failure of de Gaulle to achieve his foreign policy ob­
jectives was signaled by the social and economic crisis of
1968, the renewal of French cooperation in monetary and
security affairs with other states of the West, and his own res­
ignation in 1969, and should not have been difficult to pre­
dict, given the forms of interdependence between France and
these other states, and the illusion of independence and au­
tonomy interdependence gave. Similarly, the breakdown in
23 The external aspects of these domestic programs were spelled out
in de Gaulle's twelfth and fifteenth piess conferences. In the twelfth
press conference of September 9, 1965, he spoke of the Fifth Plan as
a means of creating an independent economy suited for competition
abroad. In the fifteenth press conference, he defended his use of special
powers by invoking Article 38. See Major Addresses, Statements and
Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, March 17, 1964-May
16, 1967 (New York: Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'ln-
formation, 1968), pp. 92-94, 173-76.
21

40. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
the ideal Gaullist view of the separation of foreign and do­
mestic affairs should have been understood as representing
a general foreign-policy failure, since de Gaulle found it more
and more necessary to get involved in domestic affairs and
to mobilize the domestic system in order to serve external
objectives.
Regardless of how the distinction is made, the separation
of foreign and domestic affairs and the primacy of foreign
policy apparently breaks down once societies become rela­
tively modernized. France was such a society by the mid-
1960s. This does not mean, as Friedrich has suggested, that
"foreign and domestic policy in developed Western systems
constitutes today a seamless web."24 Distinctions along the
analytic lines, which were suggested above, still obtain, and
governments still formulate foreign policies with a predomi­
nant external or internal orientation. But foreign and other
policies formulated under modern conditions affect each
other in ways that are not salient in nonmodernized or pre-
modernized societies and that derive from both the domestic
and international interdependence associated with moderniza­
tion as well as from the increased scope of governmental ac­
tivities under modern conditions. Before the Western soci­
eties became highly modernized, for example, the major part
of government expenditures was devoted to three functions:
defense, war debts (the cost of past wars), and governmental
administration. Foreign affairs, in short, was the central con­
cern of premodern governments. As the role of government
in the economy and in domestic social life increases, concern
for foreign affairs must decrease relative to the concern for
domestic affairs. In addition, growing international interde­
pendence means that domestic and foreign policies have more
significant internal and external consequences, which may or
may not be recognized, intended, or foreseen, and which be­
come undesirable as was the case in the allocation of
resources.
24 Carl J. Friedrich, "International Politics and Foreign Policy in
Developed (Western) Societies," in Farrell, Approaches to Compara­
tive and International Politics, p. 97.
22

41. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
The Gaullist regime placed emphasis on conspicuous allo­
cations of resources for external purposes, on nuclear weap­
onry and delivery systems, and on aid to former dependencies.
The extreme visibility of these allocations served to increase
domestic demands for welfare benefits and domestic services
by creating the impression that those resources could be
transferred to domestic ends.25 The visibility of these symbols
of grandeur is at least partially a function of modern com­
munications networks and the increased levels of domestic
or internal interdependence. Similarly, the goal of transform­
ing the international monetary system and the presence of
France in that system resulted in an emphasis on favorable
balance of trade and an increase in the stockpiling of gold.
A consequence of French international monetary policy and
a requisite of it were the restraint of domestic economic
growth and the maintenance of economic stability at home
both to keep prices and wages at artificially low levels. At the
same time, domestic growth is needed both for modernizing
the economy so that an international position can be main­
tained and for satisfying increased domestic demands for
greater wealth.
The growth of international interdependence and the
transformation of domestic structures not only increase the
likelihood of undesirable policy consequences but also serve
to externalize domestic policies and internalize foreign poli­
cies;26 that is, the internal aspects of predominantly externally
oriented policies and the external aspects of predominantly
internally oriented policies have become more significant. Do­
mestic reforms, economic allocations, and external policies
25 This was true even in the early stages of the development of a
striking force. See the criticisms leveled by Raymond Aron, The Great
Debate, trans. Ernst Pawel (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965),
pp. 100-44, and in the party platforms of the socialists and inde­
pendents in 1965 and 1967.
26 Stanley Hoffmann has called this "internalized world politics,"
which, however, he feels comes not so much from interdependence as
from the transformation of "policy stakes" with the impact of nuclear
weapons. See Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign
Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 57.
23

42. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
are inextricable parts of one another. They are linked not
only by the externalities they generate (i.e., their unintended
consequences) but also by the fact that the instrumentalities
invoked to implement either sort of policy are frequently the
same and often lead to contradictory results, as is obvious in
the conflicting impulses toward domestic economic growth
and monetary stability discussed above. Such contradictions
become intractable insofar as economic and social policies,
which are the low policies, have become more significant rela­
tive to the traditional high-policy areas of defense and secu­
rity under relatively modern conditions.
The linkages between domestic and foreign policies consti­
tute the basic characteristic of the breakdown in the distinc­
tion between foreign and domestic affairs in the modernized,
interdependent international system. This proposition does
not imply that foreign and domestic policies are indistinguish­
able; for with regard to articulated goals and problems of
implementation, they remain separate. Rather, it suggests
ways that foreign policies are transformed by the processes
of modernization and the development of high levels of inter­
dependence. These processes have put an end to the norma­
tive distinctions asserting the primacy of one over the other
and overshadow the empirical distinction according to which
foreign policies vary in type with the political institutions
through which they are formulated.
THE DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN POLICIES UNDER
MODERNIZED CONDITIONS
Modern governments devise foreign policies that cluster in
similar patterns and, like other policies, can be anlayzed in
terms of three basic dimensions.27
27 For a general discussion of these dimensions coupled with an
analysis of the literature concerned with the examination of public
policies, see Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A Frame­
work for Choice," in Political Science and Public Policy, ed. A. Ran­
ney (Chicago: Markham Public, 1968), pp. 3-21.
24

43. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
First, all policies have some content or substance, includ­
ing the target toward which they are directed and the aspects
of economic, political, or social life they stress as well as a set
of instrumentalities used to attain them.28
Second, all policies are products of a policy process, the
means by which leadership ultimately chooses one set of pol­
icy contents from many possible sets.
Finally, policies include an evaluative dimension usually
called policy outcomes. Outcomes differ from content or out­
put in that the latter have goals that are manifest, whereas
outcomes are the consequences of policies and may or may
not be intended or recognized by the authorities who formu­
late them.
Each of these three dimensions of foreign policies—the
substantive, procedural, and evaluative—is transformed un­
der the impact of modernization. This transformation has
been all the more glaring inasmuch as the political institu­
tions of the state have remained the basic structures through
which foreign policies are articulated and implemented, al­
though these structures have been substantively transformed
themselves.
CONTENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
The Transformation of Policy Objectives
Preoccupation with high policies and traditional foreign-
policy objectives and instrumentalities has drawn the atten­
tion of scholars away from the changes in policy goals that
have accompanied modernization, and specifically from the
increased salience of low policies and the separation of goals
of power and goals of plenty.
28 In the terminology of political systems analysis, policy contents are
called outputs as opposed to outcomes, or results of policies. Even here,
however, there is little analysis of outputs themselves, but a great deal
of discussion of the "feedback" relationship between outputs and
"demands" and "support." See David Easton, A Systems Analysis of
Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965), pp. 343-63.
2S

44. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Most general discussions of foreign-policy objectives focus
on the goals of high policies, which in the past were generally
conceived as ultimate ends, and were transcendental. The
classical goals of statecraft that Wolfers has defined as goals
of self-extension or goals of self-preservation are transcen­
dental. They describe the policies known as imperialism,
security, prestige, and the ideal of postulated relationship be­
tween the state and the international system.29 Primarily, the
ideal goal of Gaullism was transcendental and was identified
with a certain stature in the international system, or a fixed
set of role premises. In this sense, Gaullist goals were typical­
ly transcendental.
Preoccupation with transcendental goals manifests itself
in certain preferred instrumentalities.30 Thus, discussions of
high policies are usually oriented toward the military dimen­
sions of statecraft. When these discussions pertain to relative­
ly modernized states, they tend to center on technological in­
novations and nuclear weapons systems. This is done under
the assumption that plus qa change, plus c'est la meme chose,
that neither military nor economic interdependence has
grown in recent years, or that it has even diminished consid­
erably.31 In general, it is assumed that the development of
29 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on Interna­
tional Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 81-
102. Wolfers adds a third category which fits a logical but not an
empirical gap: self-abnegation. For a criticism of Wolfers' categories,
see Ronald J. Yalem, "The 'Theory of Ends' of Arnold Wolfers,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, iv (i960): 421-25.
30 I do not wish to get involved in the ancient conundrum regard­
ing means-ends relationships. In general, I take the position that since
all ends are also means, save ultimate ends, the empirical goals de­
scribed here pertain in a general way to means.
31 The Gaullist argument, more persuasively stated in Pierre Gallois,
The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age, trans. Richard
Howard (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963) is also the argu­
ment in Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order and
Justice (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). "The fashion­
able theme of state interdependence today often confuses fact with
26

45. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
nuclear weapons has a double, crosscutting effect. On the one
hand, such weapons tend to result in the demise of the terri­
torial state as a unit capable of providing defense and secu­
rity by creating the first truly global international system
linked together by the possibility of unacceptable levels of hu­
man destruction.32 On the other hand, nuclear weapons are
said to reaffirm the viability of the nation-state as a political
unit, by providing its absolute defense by means of deter­
rence. Hoffmann has argued the following:
What tends to perpetuate the nation-states decisively in a
system whose universality seems to sharpen rather than
shrink their diversity is the new set of conditions that gov­
ern and restrict the rule of force: Damocles' sword has be­
come a boomerang, the ideological legitimacy of the na­
tion-state is protected by the relative and forced tameness
of the world jungle.33
norm, reality with aspiration. And even when it avoids this confusion,
it draws too optimistic conclusions from interdependence" (p. 325).
Osgood and Tucker argue that interdependence has decreased in both
economic and military terms since 1914. While they seem to me to
be correct in indicating that increased interdependence would not
lead to optimistic conclusions, I feel that they are quite wrong on the
empirical question regarding the level of interdependence.
32 This thesis, popularized by John H. Herz in "The Rise and
Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics, ix (1957): 473-93,
has been revised in his "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections
on the Future of the Nation-State," Polity, 1 (1968): 12-34. Herz's
error was not in first assuming and then denying that territoriality
ceased to be part of the traditional state entity. Rather, it was assum­
ing that territory was the most fundamental basis of the state. Indeed,
territory, as he now argues, has not lost its original function. Rather,
the nonterritorial boundaries of the state, especially the barriers to
communication, have been overcome by the transnational structures
of modernization.
33 Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the
Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," in Daedalus, xcv
(1966): 865; and in International Regionalism, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 181.
27

46. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Whichever is the case—and, obviously, both aspects are
relevant84—the possession of nuclear weapons is only one
dimension of statecraft of modern states, albeit the most elu­
cidated one. There is, therefore, great danger of error in se­
lecting only that dimension for the purpose of examining the
transformation of objectives. It is not only because nuclear
proliferation has been rather slow that this study does not
focus on it as the basis of foreign policies in modernized states
but also because the costs of maintaining viable deterrence
systems, even for the superwealthy, have been part of the in­
creased salience of low policies.
Returning to the descriptive level, the most significant
changes in foreign policy goals accompanying modernization
come at two levels. In the first place, concerning transcen­
dental goals, the classical goals of power and security have
been expanded when not superseded by goals of wealth and
welfare. Transcendental goals always have some empirical
referent with which they are partially, but never wholly, iden­
tified, and what is interesting about these empirical referents
is that "they change; new ones are created; old ones pass out
of existence; and their relations ... are shuffled."35
Though the transformation of policy goals that accom­
panied modernization is quite striking with reference to the
ideal identification of power with territory and population,
it is less apparent when power is identified with wealth, as it
was in mercantilist doctrine, which underlies classical notions
34 A highly balanced analysis of both schools of thought can be
found in Pierre Hassner, "The Nation State in the Nuclear Age,"
Survey, No. 67 (1968), pp. 3-27. Hassner concludes that "nuclear
weapons are the most powerful factor in favour of the twin night­
mares of a tyrannical and of an anarchical world; by the same token,
they are the most powerful incentive toward attempting to build a
more tolerate and responsible one, in which nation-states would
learn that cooperation is the pre-condition of independence and self-
limitation the pre-condition of power" (p. 27).
35 Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Rapid Social Change and Some Implications
for Modernization," International Conference on the Problems of
Modernization in Asia, June 28-July 7, 1965, Report (Seoul, Korea:
Asiatic Research Center, 1965), p. 657.
28

47. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
of power politics.36 The pursuit of both was thought to in­
volve zero-sum conditions. Power, like wealth, was thought
to be a universal constant. One state's gain meant another
state's loss. Actual transformations associated with modern­
ization and involving both domestic economic growth and
international interdependence have changed these notions as
well. The old ideals of diplomacy and the traditional sorts of
goals depended on conditions that have radically changed but
that, as Knorr has argued, "persisted throughout the nine­
teenth and the first part of the twentieth century."87 These
conditions, then, changed with rapid domestic economic
growth, with the development of economic and other inter­
national interdependencies, and with the politicization of
large groups in mass societies that were making increased de­
mands upon governments.
Gaullist foreign policy, which was, in part, based on a posi­
tion of weakness, sought to re-create the zero-sum conditions
of mercantilism so that French power could be increased as
the power of other states, principally the United States, di­
minished. Since the rules of the game had changed, the Gaul­
list efforts could have only short-term effect. Even here, the
effect was partially a mirage in that de Gaulle's international
monetary position was articulated at a time when the interna­
tional monetary system was undergoing crisis (see Chap­
ter 5).
Rapid domestic economic growth, one of the prime indices
of modernization, has a profound effect on both the relative
priority of domestic and foreign goals, and the substance of
each. Once economic growth sets in as a continuous dynamic
process, the value of accretions of territory and population
dwindles and the "domestic savings and investment and the
advancement of education, science and technology are [seen
se See Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign
Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics,
ι (1948): 1-29.
87 Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 23.
29

48. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
as] the most profitable means and the most secure avenues
to the attainment of wealth and welfare."38 The logic of eco­
nomic growth, in short, turns men's minds away from the ex­
ternal goals associated with the ruling groups of early mod­
ern Europe and toward the furthering of national wealth by
domestic means and under conditions of peace.39
Domestic economic growth offers only a partial explana­
tion of the transformation of foreign policy goals described
above. In addition, the salience of low policies and the re­
placement of conflictual, zero-sum behavior with cooperative
strategies of foreign policies are the result of the transnational
character of the international system and the interdependen-
cies that have developed among modernized states. Low pol­
icies, in this sense, derive from the interactions of citizens in
various states and from the actions of governments in the
interests of their citizens or their responses to private group be­
havior in order to assure general stability or the achievement
of other goals. These other goals are themselves undermined
by the scope of nongovernmental transnational and interna­
tional interchanges, and may also be predominantly domestic
and pertain to welfare or social services.
Another aspect of the increased prominence of low policies
involves the interests of governments in building new transna­
tional structures in order to achieve both international and
domestic goals. For example, one of the motivations for cre­
ating European Economic Community (EEC, Common
Market) was the expectation that it would bring increased
wealth to the citizens of each member-state as a result of
38 Ibid., p. 22.
39 Recent economic thought on the relationship between war and
economic growth falls into a great tradition of non-Marxist economic-
political theory. For a history of these theories, see Edmund Silberner,
La Guerre et la paix dans Vhistoire des doctrines economiques (Paris:
Sirey, 1957). Most of these theories are unsubstantiated. For another,
briefer, review see George Modelski, "Agraria and Industrie: Two
Models of the International System," in The International System, ed.
Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1961), pp. 118-19.
30

49. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
increased levels of trade. Thus, a principal characteristic of
foreign policies under modernized conditions is that they seek
cooperation rather than conflict, and conflictual or political
activities take place within the context of predominantly
cooperative arrangements. Plays for power or position among
modernized states occur in the nonzero-sum worlds of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and NATO rather than
in predominantly conflictual arenas.
The low policies, in short, have become central to inter­
national politics among the modernized states and involve
the building up of international collective goods in defense
and NATO, and in international wealth-and-welfare organ­
izations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the EEC. It is within the parameters set by the
need for cooperation that interplays of power and position
can occur.
The collectivization of objectives in such matters as mone­
tary and trade policies, which assume increased importance
along with domestic welfare, has also set severe restrictions
upon the traditional objective of independence. Since the
modernized world is a highly interdependent one, both be­
cause of the existence of transnational politics and other phe­
nomena in communications and trade, and because of policies
intentionally fostered by governments that increase interde­
pendence, the ideal view of independence has been chal­
lenged. No amount of political will can re-create a world
where independence can be obtained, except at costs that no
government is willing to incur. This was even more true for
Gaullist France than for other modernized societies, given the
primacy of national autonomy in its foreign policy objectives.
Two of the chief characteristics of foreign policies con­
ducted under modernized conditions are their predominantly
cooperative rather than conflictual nature, and the change in
goals from power and position to wealth and welfare—or, at
least, the addition of these new goals to the more classical
ones. Both factors are accompanied by the loss of autonomy
of any society in international affairs.
31

50. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
INCREASED DOMESTIC DEMANDS AND THE
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
It is a paradox at the heart of foreign policies in all modern­
ized societies that increased demands on governments have
resulted in a short-run problem of resource allocation, so that
predominantly external goals have decreased in relative prior­
ity to predominantly internal goals. At the same time, how­
ever, increased introspection has been countered by the in­
creased sensitivity of domestic conditions to international
events as a result of international interdependence and in­
creases in international activities taken on by the citizens of
all modernized societies.
One of the distinctive features of all modernized govern­
ments, democratic and authoritarian alike, is their multifunc-
tionality. In both ideal and actual terms, they are not merely
regulative agencies in a "night-watchman" state, but are and
are seen as creators and redistributors of wealth. Increasing
demands on governments have helped create the modern wel­
fare state brought about by increased politicization of citi­
zens. A government is confronted with the "dilemma of rising
demands and insufficient resources"40 when its domestic de­
mands are greater than the resources available to meet them,
and when, at the same time, it must maintain even existing
levels of commitments abroad. The demands may arise from
the politicized poor who want a greater share in economic
prosperity, the military who desire new weapons systems, and
the government who wish to maintain public order in societies
increasingly sensitive to labor and minority group disruption,
etc., and are added to the "rising cost and widening scope of
activities required to keep mature urban societies viable."41
One inexorable result of these increased demands on govern­
ments is the curtailment of external commitments; another
is the decreased relative priority of external goals, and both
constitute an added dimension to the costs of independence.
40 Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands
and Insufficient Resources," World Politics, xx (1968): 660-95.
41 Ibid., p. 685.
32

51. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
Much of the debate over the French force de frappe during
the 1960s was specifically cast in terms of a "guns or butter"
issue where there was a clear economic case to be made
against the expenditure of funds on the nuclear striking
force.42 Aside from political and strategic arguments against
the force de frappe, there were economic arguments based, on
the one hand, on allocations within the armed forces, where
there was fear of offsetting the balance between conventional
and nuclear forces,43 and, on the other hand, on general re­
source allocations, where there was a tension between re­
sources destined for social services (social security, pensions,
etc.) and those for a nuclear force.
The latter is especially the case as one looks at the leftist
criticisms of the force de frappe. It was not just the general
level of resources allocated to defense that was in question.
The proportion of expenditure actually declined from 5.6 per­
cent of the GNP and 28 percent of the budget in 1961 to 4.4
percent and 20 percent respectively in 1967. Rather, it be­
came a question of whether a society the size of France could
afford to allow 10 percent of its scientific manpower, 60 per­
cent of its electronics industry, and 70 percent of its aero­
space industry to be devoted to a nuclear striking force.44 It
is not the nuclear force that was directly called into question,
but the policy of independence for which international mili­
tary cooperation is based on a pre-1945 notion of defense.
Modern weapons technology "requires a high level of inter-
42 The main arguments for and against the nuclear striking force
are outlined in the symposium Pour ou contre la Force de Frappe
(Paris: Editions Didier, 1963); Alexandre Sanguinetti, La France et
I'arme atomique (Paris: Ren6 Julliard, 1964); Club de Grenelle,
Steele de Damocles: La Force nucleate stratogique (Paris: Couderc,
1964); and Club Jean Moulin, La Force de Frappe et Ie citoyen (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1961).
4S In the 1968 budget nuclear armament had absolute priority over
conventional forces, and this imbalance in defense was responsible for
the date within the armed forces on a return to NATO.
44 See Wolf Mendl, "Perspectives on Contemporary French Defense
Policy," World Today, xxiv (1968): 55.
33

52. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
national coordination,"45 not only for defense purposes but
also for purposes of cost sharing.
It may well be that the multiplier effect of allocating
resources abroad or investing them in military hardware for
external purposes produces greater goods domestically than
would allocations directly meeting the increased demands.46
However, with increased politicization it is more likely that
any external allocations will be highly visible, as was the case
of U.S. expenditures in Vietnam, or French expenditures on
a nuclear striking force, and that they will therefore be viewed
as the squandering of the domestic wealth. This situation is
all the more likely to arise in modern democracies where such
allocations afford groups in opposition to the government the
opportunity to raise questions.
In the contemporary world with instantaneous communica­
tions across boundaries, demands for increased services in
one society also stem from their existence elsewhere. There
are several ways that the dilemma can be met, and each of
these has external effects, whether they are indirect or direct,
intended or unintended. The Sprouts have summarized
a number of the indirect effects as follows:
First, efforts may be made to expand the economy
Second, the rulers may prudentially revise their order
of priorities....
Third, the rulers may ... divert public attention to other
values....
Fourth, the men in power may try to change the opin­
ions of dissenters....
45 Ibid., p. 56. See also Alastair Buchan, The Implications of a
European System of Defense Technology: Defense, Technology and
the Western Alliances (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967),
pp. 9-10.
46 Charles P. Kindleberger, for example, has argued that "vertical
integration" of companies in a specific field transnationally from the
procurement through the sales stages may "involve a loss for the
world, though perhaps a gain for a country" (American Business
Abroad [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969], p. 19). Similar
arguments have been made for investments in aircraft and other in­
dustries associated with predominantly military objectives.
34

53. TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES
Fifth, . . . the rulers may try to silence dissent and oppo­
sition . . . by threat or exercise of coercion or even
of death.47
In addition, these resources can be secured by various kinds
of external activities involving cooperation and compatible
efforts with other governments. One of the goals of the EEC,
for example, is a rational division of labor making available
a greater pool of resources to each of the member govern­
ments in return for giving up some domestic and external
autonomy. This pooling of resources serves to create interna­
tional collective goods and also serves to increase interde­
pendence among societies, further limiting the freedom of any
modern state to pursue a traditional policy of independence.
CHANGES IN THE PROCESSES OF
FOREIGN POLIGY-MAKING
Like other processes of policy-making, those associated with
foreign policy change under modernization. Cabinet-style
decision-making gives way to administrative politics as the
information that must be gathered for policy-making in­
creases, as the number of states and functional areas which
must be dealt with rise, and as personnel standards become
professionalized. Despite the predictions made at the turn of
the century by the ideologues of democracy, policy-making
has not been democratized as much as it has been bureaucra-
tized. At the same time great losses of control at the top
have occurred and have been well documented.48
47 Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Dilemma of Rising Demands,"
pp. 690-91. Emphasis theirs.
48 See Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 2d ed. (Glencoe,
111.: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 172-97; Charles E. Lindblom, "The
Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, xix
(1959): 79-88; and Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 49-166.
The foreign policy process in the Fifth French Republic is ex­
amined in Jean Baillou and Pierre Pelletier, hes Affaires otrangeres
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), pp. 42-137.
35

54. MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
The major transformation brought about by changes in the
policy-making process has been the decreased relevance of
macro-level rational actor models for understanding policy
and the increased importance of both group and bureaucratic
politics models.49 Policy-making in modern bureaucracies un­
dermines the ability of a political leader to pursue effectively
any definite external goals. Rather, interest-group politics as­
sumes greater importance and foreign policy becomes more
and more a reflection of what occurs in the bureaucracies
upon which leadership depends for information and position
papers.
Policy-making in modern bureaucracies involves both lat­
eral bargaining among the members of various administra­
tive branches dealing with foreign affairs and vertical or hier­
archical bargaining among members of various strata in a
single organization.50 The single spokesman in foreign affairs
long prescribed as a necessity for security is made impossible
by the characteristics of modern bureaucracies. Plurality in
the number of foreign-policy voices is accompanied by the in­
creased significance of routine, daily decision-making in low-
policy areas that contrasts with the more unified and
consistent nature of decision-making in crises and in high
politics. With such increases in routine, control at the top
becomes more difficult. The aspects of control of routine can
be summarized under two headings, organization and size.
Organization
Modern governments are organized predominantly along
functional domestic lines into such departments as agricul­
ture, labor, and education. The domestic-foreign distinction
that seemed to fit the nineteenth-century model of govern-
49 An important explication of these models is found in Graham T.
Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American
Political Science Review, LXIII (1969): 689-718.
50 Paul Y. Hammond, "Foreign Policy-Making and Administrative
Politics," World Politics, xvn (1965): 656-71; see also idem, "The
Political Order and the Burden of External Relations," World Politics,
xix (1967): 443-64.
36

55. Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:

56. kavaltajan polttomerkin. Mitä… voitteko hetkistäkään luulotella, että
isänmaanne on saavuttava vapauden ja rauhan, nämä kallisarvoiset
asiat, joita te kaikki ikävöitte, voitteko luulotella, että Saksanmaa on
saavuttava tämän päämäärän, jos te Saksin vaaliruhtinaan kera
auliisti taivutte katolisen keisarin mielivallan alle… Ja mitä ajattelette
sitte siitä uskon ja tunnustuksen vapaudesta, jonka lipulle me kaikki
olemme vannoneet uskollisuutta, jonka puolesta suuri manalle
mennyt kuninkaamme uhrasi henkensä? Luuletteko, että tämä
vapaus saavutetaan siten, että te häpeämättä tahdotte rikkoa
pyhimmät valat ja sitoumukset…? Voitte olla varmat siitä, etteivät
lupauksenrikkojain saastutetut kädet voi konsanaan kannattaa pyhää
asiaa… Ja sentähden kuulkaa sanani ja harkitkaa niitä tarkoin… vielä
on aikaa peräytymiseen… ottakaa sananne takaisin ja ajatelkaa, että
mitä me nyt toimimme, se on kerran alistettava tulevaisuuden
lahjomattoman tuomion alaiseksi… ottakaa sananne takaisin, ja mitä
nyt olette tulleet lausuneeksi jalon mielen kuumeisessa
levottomuudessa ja jännityksessä, toivoen kerrankin saavuttavanne
korkean päämääränne, sitä ei tulla lukemaan teille pahaksi, enkä
minä sitä koskaan muista muuten kuin, kuten nyt olen sanonut,
todistuksena siitä, mihin jalotkin miehet voivat tapausten ja
toiminnan ahdingossa joutua."
Jos nämä sanat olisi lausuttu yksitellen näille miehille, olisi
epäilemättä valtiokansleri saavuttanut tarkotuksensa ja asiat
painautuneet entiseen luonnolliseen uomaansa, mutta nyt pidättivät
he toinen toistaan, kukaan ei uskaltanut rikkoa tehtyjä keskinäisiä
sitoumuksia, ja sille ainoalle heistä, joka uskalsi johtaa puhetta, oli
yksityisesti enemmän hyötyä siitä, jos heidän aikeensa onnellisesti
vietiin perille. Mutta ennenkuin hän oli ehtinyt lausua mitään
enempää, käänsi valtiokansleri herroille selkänsä ja meni
muutamaan sisempään huoneeseen. Hänen katseensa oli hetkisen

57. viivähtänyt vanhassa eversti Winckelissä, ikäänkuin hän olisi tahtonut
tätä erityisesti puhutella, mutta sitte poistui hän. Everstit ja kenraalit
seisoivat ilmeisesti neuvottomina, ja useammat nostelivat jo
jalkojaan seuratakseen poistunutta, erittäinkin sinisen rykmentin
eversti, joka kenties elävämmin muisti käytyjen taistelujen loiston ja
ne siteet, joilla nämä taistelut ja sankarikuninkaan muisto sitoivat
yhteen hänen sotilaansa: ja kohtaus valtiokanslerin kanssa näiden
tunteiden vaikutuksen alaisena olisi saattanut murtaa rikki salaliiton.
Mutta silloin otti eversti Krokow sananvuoron, ja hän osasi niin kietoa
horjuvamieliset, että hän sai tahtonsa lävitse ja päätettiin asettaa
luotettavia vahteja Krokowin omasta rykmentistä sen talon ympärille,
missä valtiokansleri asui.
Städ oli ollut tämän kaiken hiljaisena ja näkymättömänä
todistajana, ja tälle jäykälle, hidastuumaiselle miehelle, jonka
tahdonsuunnan yleensä määräsi enemmän vaisto kuin
harkitseminen, selkeni asia, joka hänelle kentiesi ainaiseksi olisi
jäänyt pimeäksi, jolleivät tämän päivän tapahtumat ja se suonenisku,
jonka hän oli saanut, olisi ikäänkuin virittäneet hänen mieltään
erityiseen herkkyyteen, jollainen tavallisesti ei tullut hänen osakseen.
Hän hiipi ulos ja onnistui huomaamatta pääsemään kadulle. Hänen
askeleensa olivat hieman veltot verenvuodon tähden, ja turvonnutta
käsivartta särki kovasti, mutta hän ei välittänyt siitä, vaan käveli
kuumeisella joustavuudella katua eteenpäin. Saavuttuaan
asuntoonsa otti hän laukustaan nahkakukkaron, jonka hän kiireesti
avasi. Se oli täynnä kiiltäviä kultarahoja, osaksi hänen monivuotisen
säästäväisyytensä ja kieltäymystensä hedelmiä. Hän pisti sen
taskuunsa, riensi talleihin ja satuloi, niin nopeasti kuin hänen kipeä
käsivartensa salli, Hammarin hevosen, tarttui ohjaksiin ja talutti sen
Witten asunnolle, missä hän sitoi sen porraspieleen. Sen jälkeen

58. käveli hän katua myöten suuren, synkän talon luo, joka ei ollut
varsin kaukana, ja kolkutti portille.
Vanhanpuoleinen mies tuli suuri avainkimppu kädessään ja avasi,
ja Städ pyysi, että hänet vietäisiin Hammarin luo. Siihen ei mies
suostunut, mutta lopuksi onnistui Städ käyttämällä sitä
kaunopuheisuutta, joka hänen nahkakukkaronsa sisällöllä oli,
saamaan tahtonsa lävitse, ja hetkistä myöhemmin seisoi hän
kalpeana ja kookkaana vangitun, kookkaana tuomitun toverinsa
edessä. Mutta täällä näytti hänen olevan vaikeampi kuin konsanaan
saada sanaakaan huuliltaan, ja jos pimeässä huoneessa olisi ollut
valoisampaa, olisi Hammar huomannut, kuinka suuret kyynelet
raskaasti vierivät Städin poskia ja partaa pitkin. Nyt ei hän sitä
nähnyt, ei edes tiennyt, kuka hänen luoksensa tuli, ja pysyi
sentähden vaiti. Städin epätoivoinen yritys saada suustaan joku
käsitettävä sana, josta yrityksestä kuitenkin sukeutui rajulta
nyyhkytykseltä kuuluva ääni, johdatti äkkiä Hammarin ajattelemaan,
että hänen luonaan tosiaankin oli Städ.
"Sinäkö se olet, Städ?" kysyi hän.
"Niin!" vastasi Städ. "Ja minä vaihdan paikkaa sinun kanssasi, ja
huomenna ammutaan minut, eikä sinua, minä olen ollut
valtiokanslerin luona…"
"Luulen, että olet taas tehnyt jotakin hullua, Städ", sanoi Hammar,
nousten olkipehkuilta, joilla hän makasi, ja tarttuen Städin käteen.
"Olet ollut valtiokanslerin luona… oletko saanut hänen määräyksensä
minun vapauttamiseeni, onko minun asiani uudestaan tutkittu ja
minut julistettu syyttömäksi…?"

59. "Milloin olen tehnyt muuta kuin hullua, Hammar?" sanoi Städ.
"Mutta nyt täytyy siitä kerran tulla loppu… Sanon sen tosissani, anna
minulle anteeksi, Hammar, ja kun tulet kotiin Svenarumiin, niin
tervehdi isää ja äitiä ja sano, että kuolin kuin kristitty ihminen… Ja
sitte voit antaa heille tämän ja lisätä, ettei näissä kultarahoissa ole
verta eikä kyyneliä, sillä useimmat niistä sain itsensä autuaan
kuningasvainajan nähden, kun olimme siepanneet Würzburgin, kun
vanha arkkunen kannettiin ylös kellarista ja pohja irtaantui ja
kultarahat vierivät pitkin linnanpihaa, muut olen säästänyt kokoon."
Näin sanoessaan ojensi hän kukkaron ja ylijääneet kultarahat
Hammarille ja lisäsi: "Olen ollut tuhma, minun olisi pitänyt aina
antaa sinun ajatella ja toimia vain kuten sinäkin;… nyt on se
myöhäistä…"
Hän kertoi, kuinka kaikki oli käynyt valtiokanslerin luona, oman
tunnustuksensa, kenraalien ja everstien käynnin ja että valtiokansleri
oli heidän vankinaan ja että jo tänään tai huomenna koko sotajoukko
joutuisi Olut-Yrjön haltuun, jollei sitä ennen tapahtuisi jotakin, joka
tekisi tyhjäksi petollisten herrojen vehkeet.
"Sotamarski!" huudahti silloin Hammar, unhottaen oman vaaransa
ja sen kuoleman, joka häntä odotti.
"Sotamarski", toisti Städ, "hän oli minunkin mielessäni, ja
huomaan, etten tällä kertaa ajatellutkaan niin tuhmasti, ja sentähden
olen nyt täällä, ja sinun on tällä kertaa toteltava minua… me olemme
yhtä pitkät ja ulkona alkaa pian hämärtää, vanginvartia ei huomaa
että ulos menet sinä enkä minä…"
"Minä? Onko minun…?" kysyi Hammar ja laski kätensä Städin
olalle. "Ei, ei, Städ,… tuon tehtävän saat itse suorittaa, ja sillä
ratsastusretkellä tulet niin varmasti korpraaliksi kuin minä…"

60. "Minä en jaksa", keskeytti Städ sallimatta Hammarin päättää
ajatustaan. "Isku, jonka annoit minulle, kävi syvemmälle kuin sinusta
uskoin, minä en jaksa nousta hevosen selkään."
Ja kuinka hän puhuikaan, kääntyi asia niin, että Hammar harrastui
valtiokanslerin pelastukseen yhtä tulisesti kuin hän innostui Städin
menettelyn jaloudesta. Hän puristi lämpimästi tämän kättä ja sanoi
lähtöä tehdessään:
"Sinä olet saavuttava tarkotuksesi, Städ, niin totta kuin nimeni on
Hammar ja me molemmat olemme Svenarumin poikia, tahdon lähteä
sinun asiallesi ja suorittaa sen mitä sinä olisit suorittanut, jollei
taistelumme aamupäivällä olisi tullut väliin… ole tyyni, olen täällä
takaisin aamulla hyvissä ajoin, ja sentähden en tahdo ottaa
aarrettasikaan!"
Städin vielä tehtyä selkoa, missä hevonen oli, lähti Hammar, eikä
vanginvartia lainkaan estellyt häntä menemästä. Olihan tullut vain
yksi mies ja yksi mennyt, ja se oli antanut hänelle kunniallisen
palkkion, — siinä kaikki, mitä vanginvartian aivoihin mahtui, ja
tyynellä omallatunnolla sulki hän oven Hammarin jälkeen.
Hammar löysi pian hevosensa, joka iloisesti hirnui häntä vastaan,
ja silmättyään eteiseen — sillä huolimatta katkerasta tappiosta,
jonka hänen sydämensä oli tänään kärsinyt, ei hän kuitenkaan
voinut unhottaa kuinka paljo hänelle kallisarvoista oli siellä sisällä
heittäytyi hän satulaan ja ratsasti matkaansa. Onneksi Hammarille oli
vahdinmuutto äsken tapahtunut kaupunginportilla, ja uusi
vartiojoukko, joka hyvin tunsi hänet, vaan ei vielä ollut kuullut
puhuttavan siitä rikoksesta, josta hänet oli tuomittu, päästi hänet
estelemättä lävitse, kun hän ilmotti, että hän vei määräyksiä

61. valtiokanslerilta sotamarskille. Ja salaman nopeudella kiidätti hän
tietä eteenpäin.
Ulkona tasangolla oli vielä verrattain valoisaa, vaikkakin taivaalla
alkoi vilkkua muutamia tähtiä. Hammar oli mahtanut ratsastaa
neljänneksen peninkulmaa, kun hän näki edellään seurueen, johon
kuului kaksi herraa ja kaksi naishenkilöä, paitsi paria palvelijaa, jotka
ratsastivat soveliaan etäällä herrasväestä. Hän aavisti heti, keitä
ratsastajat olivat, ja hänen aavistuksensa vahvistuivat. He olivat
Susanna ja Anna ja heidän petolliset ritarinsa.
Hänen sydämensä lävitse viilsi kuin kaksiteräinen miekka, ja veri
kuohui hänen suonissaan. Hänen päässään humisi, hän näki, ja
kuitenkin oli ikäänkuin sumu levinnyt hänen silmiensä eteen. Hän
tosin oli vähäpätöinen mies, mutta koskaan ei hän enää voinut
rakastaa tyttöä, joka niin saattoi halveksua hänen varotustaan ja
avosilmin ratsastaa kunniansa perikatoa vastaan. Hirveämpi ei voinut
seuraavana päivänä olla hänen kulkunsa telotuspaikalle kuin hänen
ratsastuksensa nyt leikkiälaskevan ja nauravan seurueen ohitse.
Mutta hän ei saanut viivytellä, hänen täytyi edelle; kysymyksessä oli
jotakin, joka oli paljoa enemmän kuin hänen rakastettunsa kunnia.
Ja hän kannusti hevostaan, ja jalo eläin syöksi eteenpäin hänen
keralla, ikäänkuin olisi aavistanut kuinka tärkeää oli päästä nopeasti
hiljakseen ratsastavan seurueen ohitse.
"Seis!" jyrähti käskevä ääni Hammarin juuri kiidättäessä ohi.
Se oli ratsumestarin ääni. Hän tiesi hyvin Hammarin
kuolemantuomion ja estäisi epäilemättä hänen matkaansa ja tekisi
tyhjäksi Städin urhokkaan tuuman, jollei onni nyt olisi Hammarille
suosiollinen. Tämä ajatus välähti kuin salama hänen sumentuneen
päänsä lävitse, ja tahtomattaan sipaisi hän kädellään poveaan, jossa

62. hän tunsi enonsa onnea tuottavan kiven. Hän iski kannuksensa
hevosen kylkiin ja kiiti vastaamatta eteenpäin. Mutta ei ainoastaan
ratsumestari, vaan molemmat naisetkin olivat tunteneet hänet, ja
hän kuuli heidän päästävän puoleksi tukahtuneen huudahduksen.
Samassa paukahti laukaus, ja Hammar kuuli kuulan vinkuvan
ohitsensa. Hän oli pari hevosen pituutta huviratsastajain edellä, ja
hän kääntyi nopeasti ympäri ratsastaessaan eteenpäin, ja hän näki
tai oli näkevinään molempien naisten kurotetuin käsin pitelevän
ratsumestarin kättä, jossa olevasta pistoolinsuusta keveä savupilvi
kiemurteli avaruuteen. Uusi laukaus pamahti ja hän kuuli nopeaa
nelistystä takanaan. Hän katsoi vielä kerran taakseen. Hän näki
molempien herjojen pysähtyneen naistensa kera tielle, kun taasen
molemmat palvelijat kannustivat hevosiaan hurjimpaan laukkaan
tavottaakseen hänet.
Muuta hän ei enää ratsastajista nähnyt, ja surumielinen, kalpea
hymy vilahti hänen kauniiden kasvojensa yli, hänen taputtaessaan
hevostaan kaulalle. Hän tunsi ratsunsa. Palvelijain raskasjalkaiset
hevoset eivät voineet tavottaa niin jaloa eläintä, ja takaa-ajajain
kaikukin häipyi yhä loitommalle kuuluvista. Vanha temppeliherrojen
linna seisoi kuin kaamea kummitus hänen sivullaan, ojennellen
hänen jälkeensä pitkiä käsivarsiaan, jotka näyttivät pidentyvän
nousevan kuun hohteessa. Kun hän oli päässyt pois linnan varjosta,
joka oli pimeämpi, kylmempi ja kaameampi sentähden, että se sulki
itseensä tai tulisi sulkemaan tuhottuna kaiken sen, mitä hän oli
unelmoinut ja toivonut, ihanaa ja suloista, silloin oli myös
jälestäajajain hevosten töminä tykkänään hälvennyt kuulumasta.
Parin tunnin ratsastuksen jälkeen näki hän joukon ratsumiehiä
istuvan hevostensa selässä pienehkön kylän suurimman talon

63. edustalla. Hän tunsi heidät heti ruotsalaisiksi ja kysyi sotamarskia.
Tämä oli tulossa, ja Hammar hyppäsi hevosensa selästä ja astui
sisään. Herra Juhana Banér istui illallisellaan, ja koko hänen
ulkonäkönsä osotti levottomuutta, huolia ja huonosti salattua
harmia.
"Kuka sinä olet?" kysyi hän tuimasti.
"Olen ratsumies herra Swickert Nierothin komppaniasta ja
nimeltäni Städ!" vastasi Hammar ja kertoi sen jälkeen kaiken, minkä
Städ oli kertonut hänelle saksalaisten everstien ja kenraalien
esiintymisestä valtiokanslerin luona ja hänen vangitsemisestaan ja
mainitsi, että ainoa pelastuksen mahdollisuus olisi se, jos sotamarski
voisi saapua ennenkuin suurempia onnettomuuksia tapahtuisi.
Juhana Banér hypähti pöydästä, hänen silmänsä salamoivat ja
hänen otsallaan loisti synnynnäinen majesteetillisuus.
"Minä pidän sinusta, Städ", sanoi hän lyöden Hammaria olalle.
"Tästä hetkestä lukien olet korpraali Swickert Nierothin
komppaniassa… ja nyt Magdeburgiin!"
Myöhään illalla saapui sotamarski Magdeburgiin. Historiasta
tunnetaan kylliksi, että hänen saapumisensa pelasti valtiokanslerin,
teki salaliittolaisten tuumat tyhjiksi ja teki mahdolliseksi uuden
ajanjakson saapumisen tämän pitkällisen sodan historiassa.
Valtiokanslerin asunnon ympärille asetetut vahdit katsoivat
kummissaan sotamarskiin, jonka he luulivat olevan kaukana
Magdeburgista ja johon nähden he eivät olleet saaneet mitään
toimiohjeita. Pääjohtajat Krokow, Wedell ja Lohausen olivat sitä
paitsi lähteneet Schönebeckiin vastaanottamaan vaaliruhtinaan
määräyksiä, niin että salaliittolaisilta puuttui sillä hetkellä

64. yhtenäisyyttä ja heidät siten helposti voitettiin. Kenraalimajurit
Ruthwen ja Lesslie y.m. kutsuttiin viipymättä valtiokanslerin luo ja
neuvottelussa, joka täällä pidettiin, päätettiin, että valtiokansleri
lähtisi merenrantaa alaspäin "pitämään vaaria asioista alamaan
puolella ja ottamaan vastaan Preussista tulevaa sotajoukkoa, jotta,
jos joko miehistö hullaantuisi tai tiet tulevaisuudessa tahdottaisiin
katkaista, eivät hän ja sotamarski olisi samassa paikassa", vaan jos
toinen sortuisi, niin toinen voisi jäädä kykeneväksi turvaamaan
Ruotsin ja evankeelisen tunnustuksen asiaa.
Tämä päätös pantiin jo samana iltana toimeen. Eskadroona eversti
Hannu Wachtmeisterin ratsuväkeä ja komppania rakuunia saivat
määräyksen istua ratsaille keskellä yötä ja vartoa pohjoisella
kaupunginportilla. Hammar, joka ei voinut rauhottua ennenkuin sai
tavata vanhaa herraansa, kapteeni Witteä, riensi heti saatuaan
tiedon tehdystä päätöksestä hänen asuntoonsa.
Hämmästyksekseen tapasi hän täällä sekä Susannan että Annan,
ja kun hän astui yli kynnyksen, päästivät molemmat huudahduksen
ja riensivät häntä vastaan, mutta ikäänkuin heitä olisi pidättänyt
jokin äänetön mahtikäsky tai pelästyttänyt ratsumiehen kalpea ja
murjottu ulkonäkö ja syvä, synkkä, jäätävä katse, jonka hän heihin
heitti, loivat he silmänsä maahan, vetääntyivät takaisin ja katosivat
viereiseen huoneeseen.
Muutamin sanoin ilmotti Hammar kapteenille, että hän nyt saattoi
naisväkineen seurata valtiokansleria pohjoiseen ja että hän oli
sotamarskilta saanut siihen suostumuksen. Yhden aikaan oli
kapteenin oltava pohjoisella kaupunginportilla. Lähtö tapahtuisi
silloin. Tämä tieto ei kuitenkaan näyttänyt lainkaan herättävän

65. kapteenin mielessä sitä iloa, jota Hammar oli odottanut. Hänen
silmänsä viipyivät siihen sijaan tutkivina ja läpitunkevina suosikissa.
"Pekka!" sanoi hän vihdoin tarttuen nuoren ratsumiehen käteen.
"Olet ollut minulle rakas jo monet vuodet ja rakkaammaksi olet tullut
vuosi vuodelta… onko totta, mitä tyttäreni äsken minulle kertoi,
oletko puuttunut kaksintaisteluun ja onko sinun sentähden
kuoltava?"
"Kyllä!" vastasi Hammar hetken jälkeen, jollaikaa hirveä taistelu
taisteltiin hänen sisällään.
"Tottele sitte neuvoani, poika… uskallan taata hengelläni, että kun
asia on tullut selvitetyksi, niin sinä olet viaton… tule sentähden
mukanani kotiin, kunnes saamme korjata kaiken ja sinä voit
kunnialla palata uudestaan sotaan… nyt ei ole aikaa tehdä asiasta
selkoa minulle eikä se ole tarpeellistakaan."
"Ei, ei, kapteeni", vastasi Hammar kiihkeästi ja pontevasti. "Sitä
tietä kunniaan en tahdo kulkea, mutta voitte uskoa minua, kun
sanon, että kuolen ystävyytenne arvoisena, ja tästä ystävyydestä
kiitän teitä… Sanokaa myös ystävällinen sana isälleni ja äidilleni
kotona, jos he elävät, ja pyytäkää heitä, etteivät uskoisi niitä pahoja
sanoja, joita kentiesi kuulevat minusta!"
Kyynelet virtailivat hänen silmistään, suonenvedon tapaisesti
puristi hän kapteenin kättä ja syöksyi ulos.
Siinä valonkajanteessa, joka hänen ovea avatessaan virtasi osaan
eteisestä, näki hän Annan valoisan olennon. Hän seisoi siellä yhtä
kalpeana kuin Pekkakin, ja tämän sulettua oven riensi hän häntä
vastaan ja tarttui hänen käteensä.

66. "Ole tyyni, Pekka", kuiskasi hän. "Susanna rakastaa sinua eikä
ketään muuta!"
Enempää hän ei voinut sanoa, hän vaipui kokoon
suonenvedontapaiseen itkuun. Hammar riensi kadulle tuskan
valtaamana ja sisimmässään tuntien kuinka turha ja tyhjä oli tämä
tunnustus, jonka tieto hänen häpeällisestä kuolemastaan oli
pusertanut ystävättären huulilta.
Yhden aikaan yöllä näki hän valtiokanslerin lähtevän
Magdeburgista ja hänen seurueessaan näki hän kapteenin ja
molemmat neitsyet.
Kello oli juuri lyönyt kaksi, kun hän seisoi vankilan portin edustalla.
Vanginvartia esteli, mutta Hammarilla oli mukanaan kaksi toveria,
jotka vakuuttivat, että hän oli kuolemaan tuomittu, ja niin pääsi hän
sisään.
"Sinä olet korpraali, Städ", huudahti hän tämän tavatessaan, ja
sen jälkeen vaipui hän ponnistuksista ja sielunkärsimyksistä tyyten
uupuneena vankilan oljille.
3.
KUSTAA HORNIN SODAN AIKAAN.
Kaikista niistä tarinoista, joita Svenarumin vanha lukkari osasi
kertoa — nyt ovat hänen luunsa levänneet haudassa jo monen
miespolven ajan, sillä hänkin kuului karoliinien aikaan, ja hänen
nuoruutensa ja miehuutensa sattui kolmikymmenvuotisen sodan

67. kanssa yhteen — kaikista hänen tarinoistaan ei hänen itsensä eikä
hänen kuulijoidensa mielestä, hääseuroissa tai kirkkomäellä, ollut
yksikään merkillisempi kuin se, joka alkoi sanoilla: "Niin, Kustaa
Hornin sodan aikaan —", ja joka sentähden myöhemminkin kulki
suvusta sukuun nimellä: "Kustaa Hornin sodan aikaan", jota mekin
olemme käyttäneet. Tämä olkoon mainittu lyhyenä johdantona,
merkitäksemme sen lähteen — suulliset kansanmuistot — josta
olemme ammentaneet.
* * * * *
— — — Korpraali Städin vetivät toverit vastoin hänen tahtoaan
vankilasta, johon hän oli vapaaehtoisesti heittäytynyt pelastaakseen
kauan väärin tuntemansa toverin, mutta tultuaan vankilan portaille
istuutui hän ja jäi siihen istumaan, sanoivatpa toverit mitä
sanoivatkin. Tämä oli ainoa voimanilmaus, johon hän enää pystyi.
Hänen luonnostaan hidas ajatuskykynsä oli tyhjentynyt siihen
hommaan, jolla hän koetti pelastaa toverinsa Hammarin, ja nyt otti
luonto oikeutensa. Lopulta oli toverien pakko hänet jättää, ja päivän
ensimäinen valonsäde näki vielä kalpean ja synkän ratsumiehen
istuvan vankilan porraskivellä, ovella, jonka taakse Hammar oli
sulettu.
Mutta aamun vaietessa tuli myöskin se osasto, jonka oli vietävä
Hammar telotuspaikalle. Se tuskin teki mitään vaikutusta Hammariin.
Hän istui liikkumatonna ja katsoi synkkiin, tummiin sotilaskasvoihin,
jotka olivat hänen edessään. Vankilan ovet avattiin, ja Hammar
tuotiin ulos. Hän oli näköjään tyyni ja leppyisä. Nähtävästi oli hän
päässyt sovintoon itsensä ja kohtalonsa kanssa, joka kenties oli
hänelle tervetullut. Sillä varmaankin oli elämä hänelle nyttemmin
vain taakka, josta hän halusi päästä. Hän oli pettynyt rakkaudessaan,

68. sentähden tahtoi hän kuolla; ja että hänen kuolemansa oli yhdistynyt
häpeään, — mitä ylimalkaan merkitsikään se asia niin vähäpätöiselle
miehelle kuin hänelle. Suuret luodot ne murretaan myrskyn ja
aaltojen kuohulla, vain niitä muistetaan, kukapa kysyykään
hietajyvästä, joka on huuhtoutunut rannalta meren syvyyteen?
Korpraali Städ oli kuitenkin toista mieltä. Hänelle oli hietajyvänen
kallio, joka voitokkaana kohottaisi päälakensa taivasta kohden, kun
myrsky olisi mennyt menojaan ja aallot uinailisivat levossa sen
jalkojen juurella. Tämä jäykkä liikkumaton olento nousi pystyyn, kun
hän näki Hammarin, ja hän laski raskaasti kätensä sen sotilaan
hartioille, joka oli häntä lähinnä.
"Seis!" sanoi hän. "Olen puhutellut valtiokansleria, ja Hammar saa
mennä vapaana… minut on vietävä kuolemaan."
Hänet vietiin syrjään ja tahdottiin jatkaa matkaa portaita alaspäin,
mutta se ei ollut Städin mieleen. Hän asettausi tielle ja huusi niin
kovasti, että se olisi voinut herättää koko kaupunginosan:
"Niin kauan kuin elän ei se saa tapahtua… ainakaan en tahdo elää
enää viattomasti tuomitun jälkeen!" Ja hän vetäisi miekkansa, lujasti
päättäneenä, että Hammarin tie kulkisi telotuspaikalle ainoastaan
hänen ruumiinsa ylitse.
Epäilemättä olisi hän siten saanutkin tahtonsa lävitse, jollei hänen
ja Hammarin kohtalo olisi ollut toinen. Muutamien sylien päässä oli
joukko ratsumiehiä, ja joukon johtaja oli vankilan portailla olijain
huomaamatta hypännyt hevosensa selästä ja rientänyt luo. Hän oli
nähnyt ja kuullut kaiken ja juuri Städin vetäistessä miekkansa maalle
huusi hän jyrisevästi: "seis!" Kaikki kohottivat katseensa. Huutaja oli
sotamarski, herra Juhana Banér. Huolimatta niistä tärkeistä ja

69. huolestuttavista asioista, joiden kera niin hän kuin valtiokanslerikin
olivat puuhailleet viime yön, oli viimeksi mainittu kuitenkin joutanut
muistamaan ratsumiestä ja hänen kuolemaan tuomittua toveriaan.
Sotamarski oli menossa leiriin, mutta alotti kierroksensa vankilasta.
Kysymykseensä, mitä oli tekeillä, sai hän luonnollisesti sen
vastauksen, että Hammar oli vietävä telotuspaikalle.
"Ja nimesi on Hammar?" kysyi hän kääntyen tähän. "Yöllä oli
kuitenkin nimesi Städ, mitä se merkitsee?"
"Olin Städin asialla, ja kun minun oli aamulla kuoltava, niin arvelin,
että voin lainata hänen nimensä, koska se koitui hänelle hyödyksi
eikä vahingoksi!" vastasi Hammar.
Tyytyväisyyden ja ihailun loiste välähti Banérin suurissa silmissä.
"Sellaista väkeä pitäisi olla kosolta hädän hetkenä!" sanoi hän.
"Minä vapautan teidät molemmat!"
Hän käski sen jälkeen upseeria, joka vahtia johti, ilmottamaan
asian sotaoikeudelle. Städ olisi kyllä ansainnut rangaistuksen, koska
oli käynyt toverinsa kimppuun, mutta hänen itsesyytöksensä ja
nopea päättäväisyytensä, joka oli pelastanut valtiokanslerin, pyyhki
pois hänen rikoksensa.
Tästä päivästä lähtien ei Städ eronnut Hammarista, vaan tunnusti
hänet pääkseen, paremmaksi minäkseen. Kaikki kateus oli haihtunut
kuin tuuleen, eikä ollut kaukana, ettei hän hävennyt
korpraalintitteliään, jonka hän katsoi oikeastaan kuuluvan
Hammarille. Tämä hymyili surumielistä hymyään joka kerta kuin
tämä asia tuli puheeksi, mutta ei virkkanut mitään. Hän oli yleensä
muuttunut tuosta päivästä, syyskuun 19:sta, jona Städin tähden oli

70. mennyt vankeuteen. Hän oli hiljainen ja umpimielinen eikä mielellään
viihtynyt toverien joukossa, ei enää ollut ensimäinen ilossa ja
leikinlaskussa. Mutta kun kuulat vinkuivat ja oli käytävä vihollisten
kimppuun, silloin oli hän aina kaltaisensa, kenties vain
huimapäisempi kuin ennen, ja Jumala armahtakoon sitä, joka
taistelun tuoksinassa osui joutumaan Hammarin ja Städin väliin; hän
oli nähnyt viimeisen hetkensä, kuten ainakin vasaran ja alasimen
välissä.
Ja vuodet kuluivat. Juhana Banér retkeili Saksassa sinne ja tänne,
kohotti Ruotsin vaipuvan asian ja kosti verisesti viekkaalle ja
pelkurimaiselle Saksin vaaliruhtinaalle, ja kaikkialla olivat Städ ja
Hammar mukana, ja edellinen sai juoda kyllästymään asti entisen
kateutensa maljasta, sillä huolimatta kaikesta Hammarin
urhoollisuudesta ei hänen kuultu tekevän mitään vaatimuksia. Vasta
viiden vuoden kuluttua eli 1640, kun Juhana Banér teki satumaisen
retkensä Regensburgiin Etelä-Saksassa ottaakseen sekä keisarin että
hänen luokseen kokoontuneet valtaruhtinaat vangiksi, pääsi Hammar
neljännysmieheksi Smålannin ratsuväessä. Mutta sittekin hän oli
askelta alempana Städiä, ja tämä kiroili ja tappeli kuin riivattu
paluuretkellä Regensburgista pohjoiseen päin. Se ei kuitenkaan
auttanut. Urhea Juhana Banér kuoli 1641, ja Lennart Torstensson tuli
syksyllä samana vuonna Saksassa olevan sotaväen sotamarskiksi,
mutta lehti ei ottanut kääntyäkseen Hammarille.
"Se käy paremmin, saatpas nähdä, kunhan kerran pääset pois
porttivajasta!" sanoi korpraali Städ ja nyhjäsi Hammaria kylkeen. Se
tapahtui samana iltana, jona uusi sotamarski oli tarkastanut
joukkojaan Leipzigin taistelun edellä, jossa me voitimme yhden
ihanimpia voittojamme tässä sodassa — kuitenkin menettäen
sellaisia miehiä kuin Erik Slang ja Liljehök.

71. Mutta kuinka kävikään, niin portti vaja oli kylläkin pitkä. Kului
edelleen kaksi vuotta, ja vasta sitte pääsi Hammar korpraaliksi. Hän
itse ei siihen kuitenkaan pannut erittäin suurta arvoa eikä merkillistä
kyllä Städkään.
"Se on vasta alkua!" sanoi hän. "Ja saatpas nyt nähdä, eikö se ala
vedellä paremmin!"
Sinä vuonna jouduimme sotaan Tanskan kanssa, joka kadehti
meitä.
Lennart Torstensson ilmestyi ruotsalaisen pääjoukon kanssa
Tanskaan
kuten salama, ja Skåneen tunkeutui toinen ruotsalainen joukko
Kustaa
Hornin johdolla.
Hänen sotaretkensä sinne se on saanut nimen: "Kustaa Hornin
sota" ja tämä säilyi niin kauan kansan muistossa, että vielä satoja
vuosia tämän jälkeen skånelaiset talonpojat asettivat ajanlaskunsa
tämän sodan mukaan ja sanoivat: "Se tapahtui niin ja niin monta
vuotta ennen Kustaa Hornin sotaa tai sen jälkeen."
* * * * *
Maantietä, joka vei Svenarumin kirkolle, kulki eräänä päivänä
elokuun alussa 1644 kaksi miestä. Toinen oli nähtävästi muuan niistä
monista, jotka olivat palanneet kotiin sodasta, näkemättä
toteentuneena ainoaakaan niistä kultaisista unelmista, joiden kera
olivat lähteneet maailmaan. Hänen takkinsa oli kulunut ja ryysyinen
ja lisäksi näytti hänen ulkoasunsa hoitamattomalta ja puhui
pettyneistä elämän toiveista. Katse oli raukea, vaikkakin se saattoi
olla ruumiillisten kärsimysten seuraus, sillä hän kulki puujalan avulla,

72. jonka ponsi oli toisen kainalon alla ja toisessa kädessä keppi; mutta
tuuhea tukka joka pörröisinä suortuvina riippui hänen päänsä
ympärillä, paksu parta, joka ympäröi hänen kalpeita sisäänpainuneita
poskiaan — kaikki näytti todistavan, ettei mies ainoastaan ollut
vajonnut kurjuuteen, vaan että hän oli hylännyt toivonkin ponnistella
pois kurjuudestaan. Toinen oli aivan toisenlainen ulkonäöltään. Hän
oli pieni mies, päätään lyhempi kookasta soturia, ja hän oli
ulkoasultaan kaikin puolin siistitty mies ja hyvinvoivasta, rattoisasta
näöstään päättäen oli hyvissä olosuhteissa ja eli tyytyväisenä
itseensä ja ympäristöönsä. Hyväntahtoiset, mutta vilkkaat silmät ja
omituinen piirre suun ympärillä osotti, että mies mielellään jakoi
lähimäisensä kanssa, jolleikaan juuri rahojaan, niin sitä rikkautta,
jota hänellä oli sisällään. Tähän kuului ennen kaikkea tyhjentymätön
varasto kertomuksia kaikista mahdollisista henkilöistä ja tapauksista,
varsinkin omassa pitäjässä. Hän oli Svenarumin lukkari.
"Vai niin, hyvä mies", sanoi hän kuultuaan, että soturi parka aikoi
mennä Angvediin… "Niin, siellä on nyttemmin enää vanha Katri
jälellä… ukko Jussi meni pois, hän… malttakaas, niin, siitä on joulun
aikaan juuri yhdeksän vuotta, se oli samana syksynä, kun Stensjön
kapteeni tuli sodasta kotiin, jaa, niin oli… tunnette kai hänet,
kapteenin…?"
Soturin kasvot kalpenivat kalpenemistaan hänen kuullessaan
lukkarin ystävällistä puhetta, ja ilmeisesti vain suurella
ponnistuksella, ainakin lukkarin mielestä, saattoi hän säilyttää
tyyneytensä vastatessaan?
"Kapteenin tunnen kyllä, olen muistellut häntä juuri tuosta
vuodesta, jolloin hän lähti Magdeburgista…"

73. "Niin", jatkoi lukkari, "kun hän palasi kotiin, toi hän mukanaan
viestin, että Angvedin torpan poika… hänen olisi pitänyt olla
kunnokas ja urhoollinen mies… että hän oli kuollut, ja se vaikutti niin
ukko Jussiin, että hän otti ja kuoli joulun aikoihin samana vuonna…"
"Suriko hän sitte poikaansa niin paljo?" kysyi soturi.
"Kyllä, se tuli kaiken muun kukkuraksi… Nähkääs, hän oli kuvitellut
itsekseen, että hänen olisi saatava suuri summa rahaa vanhalta ukko
Laurilta, kunnianarvoisan kirkkoherran isältä, ja niitä hän ei
saanut…"
"Vai niin, hän ei saanut…?" keskeytti soturi jokseenkin kiihkeästi,
joka lukkarilta ei suinkaan jäänyt panematta merkille.
"Ei… se oli nyt vain unelma, jonka ukko Jussi oli saanut
päähänsä… eikä hän saanut rahoja, ei saanut… vaan sitte hän kuoli,
ja siitä päivin istuu Katri muori yksin tuvassaan Angvedissa, ja kyllä
kai hänkin olisi jo aikoja sitte mennyttä, jollei…"
"Jollei…?" kiirehti soturi, kun lukkari keskeytti juttelunsa,
taittaakseen muutaman pitkän koivunritvan.
"Jaa, nähkääs, se asia on yhteydessä kapteenin perheen kanssa,
nähkääs… neitsyt Susanna… hän on muhkea nainen, saattepas
nähdä, soreavartaloinen ja kaunis, ja hänen silmänsä säteilevät kuin
tähdet taivaan laella… mutta palattuaan kotiin Saksasta mainittuna
vuonna on hän ollut kuin mikäkin elävä kuvapatsas, jäykkä ja kylmä,
ja aina käy hän mustiin puettuna… kukaan ei ole nähnyt hänen edes
vetävän suutaan hymyyn kaikkien näiden yhdeksän vuoden
kuluessa… mutta ei hänen ole nähty itkevänkään. Voisi väittää, ettei
hänellä ole sydäntä, jollei hän olisi niin hyvä köyhiä ja

74. apuatarvitsevia kohtaan. Sen sanoo hänen paras ystävänsä, neitsyt
Anna Skytte, joka on pitkät ajat oleskellut hänen luonaan… Hän on
myös sorea neitsyt, saattepas vain nähdä, vaikka hän on vaalea kuin
lilja. Kosijoita heillä on ollut molemmilla, ja sen voi hyvin käsittää,
kun he ovat niin sorjia ja lisäksi rikkaita… mutta eivät he vain ota
onkeen…"
"Hm!" pani soturi ja pysähtyi kuivaten otsaansa takkinsa hihalla.
"Käytte niin kalpeaksi, hyvä mies", sanoi lukkari ja pani kätensä
hänen olalleen. "Kävely on kai liiaksi kysynyt voimianne… tulkaa, niin
istumme täällä hetken… vai niin, aiotte Angvediin, eihän sinne ole
pitkältä, kunhan pääsemme kirkon ohitse… mutta eikö olisi parasta,
että menisitte nyt suoraa tietä Stensjöhön, siellä voisitte saada hyvän
yösijan…"
"Ei, ei", vastasi soturi, istuuduttuaan kivelle tien reunalla. "Ei, kun
olen päässyt näin lähelle, niin tahdon mennä perille, vaikkapa lopun
kulkisin ryömimällä… tunnen olevani sairaampi kuin voin sanoakaan,
ja kuka tietää, enkö jäisi makaamaan Stensjöhön, ja herra voisi
kutsua minut, ilman että olen täyttänyt lupaukseni, minkä annoin
Angvedin torpan pojalle, josta olette puhunut…"
"Lupauksen…?"
"Niin, lupauksen, että veisin itse hänen viimeisen tervehdyksensä
hänen vanhemmilleen, jos tapaisin heidät elossa… tervehdys tulee
tosin myöhään, mutta tahdon sen kuitenkin viedä perille. Nyt
sanotte, että muorikin olisi mennyttä, jollei neiti Susanna…"
"Niin, jollei neiti Susannaa olisi ollut. Sillä hän on vähän väliä
käynyt Katrin luona, eikä mene yhtään viikkoa, jottei hän taivaltaisi

75. kerran tai pari metsämökkiin."
"Hm… sanotteko niin?" lausui soturi ja katsoi tutkivasti lukkariin.
Istuttuaan hetkisen jatkoivat he matkaansa kirkolle, lukkarin yhä
keskeyttämättä ja ilmeisellä mielihyvällä jatkaessa puhettaan
Angvedista, ukko Jussista ja Katri muorista, vanhasta Laurista, joka
kulki kuin varjo ympärinsä peläten pienintäkin risahdusta ja tuskin
uskaltaen katsoa kehenkään ihmiseen, vielä vähemmän ketään
puhutella, ja niin yhteen jonoon kirkkoherrasta, kunnianarvoisesta
Pietari Laurinpojasta, Stensjön kapteenista, neitsyt Annasta ja
neitsyt Susannasta. Kirkon luona he erosivat. Lukkari meni kotiinsa,
ja soturi jatkoi matkaansa Angvediin, vaikkakin hänen kulkunsa kävi
yhä hitaammin ja hänen yhä useammin täytyi laskeutua tielle voimia
kokoamaan.
Oli ilta ja kuudan, kun hän vihdoin sai näkyviinsä pienen
mökintuvan, joka pilkotti puiden välitse. Hän pani käden silmilleen,
kun hän sai nähdä sen, ja seisoi kauan liikahtamatta; sen jälkeen
kääntyi hän hitaasti ja näytti nauttivan siitä, että antoi katseensa
verkkaan siirtyä puusta puuhun, pensaista ja kivistä nurmeen
maassa, ja kukkiin ja järveen, joka hänellä oli takanaan ja josta hän
kaukaa saattoi erottaa Stensjön herraskartanon. Ja vielä kerran pani
hän kätensä silmilleen. Mutta sitte tarttui hän taas suurella
ponnistuksella kainalosauvaansa ja kulki lyhyen taipaleen, joka enää
oli jälellä hänen ja tuvan välillä. Hän ei kuitenkaan mennyt tuvan
ovelle, vaan vetääntyi puiden välitse suuren seljapensaan taa ja
ryömi sitte hyvin hiljaa tuvan ikkunan luo.
Kuu paistoi suoraan pieneen ikkunaan ja heitti leveän valojuovan
huoneeseen, mutta seljapensas, joka ikkunasta hieman syrjässä,
peitti uteliaan, jotta hän saattoi pitää silmällä kaikkea mitä tuvassa

76. tapahtui tulematta itse nähdyksi. Sisällä istui vastatusten ja niin, että
ikkunasta näki heidät syrjästä päin, kaksi naista, toinen vanha ja
kyyristynyt, toinen nuori ja kaunis, jolla oli ihmeen ihanat, säteilevät
silmät. Hänellä oli helmassaan suuri kirja, jonka päällä hän piti
ristittyjä käsiään. Hän luki sulosointuisella äänellä muutaman
rukouksen, jota vanhus hänen vastassaan kuunteli hartaasti. Kun
hän lopetti rukouksen, olivat molemmat hetken aikaa vaiti. Mutta
sitte sai nuorempi sanoiksi:
"Palaan nyt jälleen vanhaan pyyntööni, Katri muori, en voi sallia
teidän jäävän kauemmaksi tähän vanhaan tupaan, joka milloin
hyvänsä voi luhistua päänne ylitse."
"Älkää puhuko siitä!" vastasi vanhus äänellä, joka ilmaisi sisällistä
rauhaa ja tyytyväisyyttä keskellä niiden aaltojen kuohua, jotka olivat
musertaneet ja pyyhkäisseet pois kaiken, mikä hänelle oli rakasta ja
kallista ja toivorikasta. "Älkää puhuko siitä, neitsyt Susanna… Suuri
kiitos siitä, että tahdotte minulle hyvää, mutta ei minun sovi asua
Stensjön herraskartanossa, ja tupa pysyy kyllä kuosillaan niin kauan
kuin sitä tarvitsenkin."
"Mutta ettekö sitte ajattele sitä, että vanha Lauri voi tulla minä
hetkenä hyvänsä ja häätää teidät pois?"
"Ei, sitä en luule hänen tekevän, ja jos hän sen tekee, niin
tottapahan silloin löytyy joku keino…"
"Älkää sanoko niin, Katri muori… ettekö voi käsittää, että sellaiset
sanat surettavat minua! Tiedätte, kuinka rakas minulle oli hän, reipas
Pekka, teidän poikanne… ja Jumala tietää, että olen mielessäni
ajatellut itseäni hänen puolisonaan aina siitä pitäen kuin ensin opin
hänet tuntemaan, jonka tähden olen kantanut surupukua aina hänen

77. kuolinpäivästään ja lisäksi alituisena muistona siitä surusta, jonka
valmistin hänelle viimeisenä päivänä, jona näimme toisemme elävin
silmin… Ah, jospa vain silloin olisin voinut hillitä hullua ylpeyttäni ja
sanonut hänelle mitä oli sydämelläni, hän olisi silloin ainakin lähtenyt
pois syyttämättä minua sydämessään… Kuitenkin, siellä missä hän
nyt on, näkee hän ja tietää, että häntä enkä ketään muuta olen aina
rakastanut enkä koskaan tule ketään muuta rakastamaan… Ja
sentähden, Katri muori, kun niin on, kuinka voitte epäröidä
muuttaessanne minun luokseni… Ettekö sitte ole huomannut näiden
monien vuosien kuluessa, kuinka sydämestäni pidän teistä, aivan
kuin olisin teidän tyttärenne… Sanokaa siis, että suostutte, Katri
muori, sanokaa ja tulkaa mukanani kotiin…"
"Jumala siunatkoon teitä, jalo neiti, kaikesta hyvyydestänne ja
siitä, että pidätte poikani muistoa rakkaana… Mutta kuinka voitte
luulla, että hän koskaan olisi voinut kiinnittää katsettaan teihin tai
sydämessään ajatella, että voisitte tulla hänen…?"
"Sitä olette nyt kysynyt minulta joka kerta, kun olemme puhuneet
tästä asiasta", sanoi Susanna, "ja yhtä usein olen sanonut teille, että
poikanne ajatteli minua sydämessään ja minä kehotin häntä siihen…
Ja se on minua surettava kaiket elinpäiväni, että erosimme niin
kuten erosimme, sillä se oli minun vikani, enkä voi konsaan käsittää,
mikä kumman henki minut oli sinä päivänä saanut valtaansa… Mutta
pari isäni ystävää oli sinä päivänä luonamme ja he tahtoivat viedä
minut ja ystäväni Annan erään vanhan linnan raunioille… näin, että
se kiusasi Pekkaa, ja olin kyllin ilkeä siitä iloitakseni, mutta minusta
tuntui, etten koskaan ollut selvemmin nähnyt, että hän todellakin
minua rakasti… ei, älkää keskeyttäkö minua, tahdon muistella sitä,
sillä se tekee hyvää sydämelleni;… ja kun hän sitte selvin sanoin
varotti meitä seuraamasta nuoria upseereja… ette voi uskoa, kuinka

78. Welcome to our website – the perfect destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. We believe that every book holds a new world,
offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth.
That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of
books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to
self-development guides and children's books.
More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge
connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an
elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can
quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally,
our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time
and fully enjoy the joy of reading.
Join us on a journey of knowledge exploration, passion nurturing, and
personal growth every day!
ebookbell.com