labour law 3- Employee Compensation Act.pptx

Law

1. Employees Compensation Act

2. Objective An Act to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their employees of compensation for injury by accident.

3. Amendments The most recent significant change to the Employee's Compensation Act (formerly the Workmen's Compensation Act), is the increase in the monthly wage limit for calculating compensation from ₹8,000 to ₹15,000, effective from January 3, 2020. This means that for injuries or deaths occurring on or after this date, the maximum monthly wage considered for compensation is ₹15,000. Additionally, the minimum compensation amounts have also been revised, with a minimum of ₹1,40,000 for death-related claims and ₹1,70,000 for permanent total disablement. 

4. Amendments Wage Limit Increase: The monthly wage used to calculate compensation has been raised from ₹8,000 to ₹15,000.  Minimum Compensation: The minimum compensation payable has been increased to ₹1,40,000 for death claims and ₹1,70,000 for permanent total disablement claims.  Notification: The change was implemented through a notification by the Ministry of Labour and Employment.  .

5. Amendments Retrospective Effect: The wage limit increase does not have retrospective effect, meaning it only applies to injuries and deaths occurring on or after January 3, 2020.  Other Changes: The Act has seen other amendments over the years, including name change to Employee's Compensation Act in 2010 and updates to Schedule III regarding occupational diseases.

6. S 2 : Who is Workman / Employee ? “employee” means a person, who is— ( i ) a railway servant as defined in clause (34) of section 2 of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), not permanently employed in any administrative district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II; or (ii) (a) a master, seaman or other members of the crew of a ship, (b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft, (c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle. (d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company, and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may be, is registered in India; or (iii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to any employee who has been” injured shall, where the employee is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them;’;

7. .         Who is an Employer ?    "Employer" includes any body of persons whether incorporated or not and any managing agent of an employer and the legal representative of deceased employer, and, when the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, means such other person while the workman is working for him;

8. .         Who is a "managing agent"   Any person appointed or acting as the representative of another person for the purpose of carrying on such other person's trade or business, but does not include an individual manager subordinate to an employer;

9. Wages Includes any privilege or benefit which is capable of being estimated in money , other than a travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession or the contribution paid by an employer to an employee towards any pension or provident fund or a sum paid to an employee to cover any special expenses entailed by him by the nature of his employment.

10. Method of calculating wages under the Act      Monthly wages means the amount of wages deemed to be payable for a month's service (whether the wages are payable by the month or by whatever other period or at piece rates), and calculated as follows, namely:-- (a) where the *[employee] has, during a continuous period of not less than twelve months immediately preceding the accident, been in the service of the employer who is liable to pay compensation, the monthly wages of the *[employee] shall be one-twelfth of the total wages which have fallen due for payment to him by the employer in the last twelve months of that period;

11. Method of calculating wages under the Act      (b) where the whole of the continuous period of service immediately preceding the accident during which the *[employee] was in the service of the employer who is liable to pay the compensation was less than one month, the monthly wages of the *[employee] shall be the average monthly amount which, during the twelve months immediately preceding the accident, was being earned by a *[employee] employed on the same work by the same employer, or, if there was no *[employee] so employed, by a *[employee] employed on similar work in the same locality; (c) in other cases [including cases in which it is not possible for want of necessary information to calculate the monthly wages under clause (b)], the monthly wages shall be thirty times the total wages earned in respect of the last continuous period of service immediately preceding the accident from the employer who is liable to pay compensation, divided by the number of days comprising such period. (2)- omitted by Act 15 of 1933

12. Method of calculating wages under the Act      (Explanation.--A period of service shall, for the purposes of this section be deemed to be continuous which has not been interrupted by a period of absence from work exceeding fourteen days. (2)- omitted by Act 15 of 1933

13. S 3: What is the liability of the Employer? In case an employee suffers from a heart attack in the office If he is absent from work for 3 days. If he came to work drunk and got knocked by a cyclist and broke his elbow.

14. S 3: What is the liability of the Employer? (1) If personal injury is caused to a *[employee] by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation : Provided that the employer shall not be so liable -- (a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the *[employee] for a period exceeding three days; (b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death or permanent total disablement caused by an accident which is directly attributable to— ( i ) the *[employee] having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or (ii) the wilful disobedience of the *[employee] to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of *[employees], or (iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the *[employee] of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of *[employee

15. S 3: What is the liability of the Employer? (2) If an *[employee] employed in any employment specified in Part A of Schedule III contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment, or if a *[employee], whilst in the service of an employer in whose service he has been employed for a continuous period of not less than six months (which period shall not include a period of service under any other employer in the same kind of employment) in any employment specified in Part B of Schedule III, contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment

16. S 3: What is the liability of the Employer? or if a *[employee] whilst in the service of one or more employers in any employment specified in Part C of Schedule III for such continuous period as the Central Government may specify in respect of each such employment, contracts any disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment, the contracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section and, unless the contrary is proved, the accident shall be deemed to have arisen out of, and in the course of, the employment: Provided that if it is proved,-- (a) that an *[employee] whilst in the service of one or more employers in any employment specified in Part C of Schedule III has contracted a disease specified therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment during a continuous period which is less than the period specified under this sub-section for that employment; and

17. S 3: What is the liability of the Employer? b) that the disease has arisen out of and in the course of the employment, the contracting of such disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section: Provided further that if it is proved that a *[employee] who having served under any employer in any employment specified in Part B of Schedule III or who having served under one or more employers in any employment specified in Part C of that Schedule, for a continuous period specified under this sub-section for that employment and he has after the cessation of such service contracted any disease specified in the said Part B or the said Part C, as the case may be, as an occupational disease peculiar to the employment and that such disease arose out of the employment, the contracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section.

18. S 3: What is the liability of the Employer? (2A) If a *[employee] employed in any employment specified in Part C of Schedule III contracts any occupational disease peculiar to that employment, the contracting whereof is deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section, and such employment was under more than one employer, all such employers shall be liable for the payment of the compensation in such proportion as the Commissioner may, in the circumstances, deem just.

19. S 3: What is the liability of the Employer? (3) The Central Government or the State Government, after giving, by notification in the Official Gazette, not less than three months' notice of its intention so to do, may, by a like notification, add any description of employment to the employments specified in Schedule III and shall specify in the case of employments so added the diseases which shall be deemed for the purposes of this section to be occupational diseases peculiar to those employments respectively, and thereupon the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply, in the case of a notification by the Central Government, within the territories to which this Act extends or, in case of a notification by the State Government, within the State as if such diseases had been declared by this Act to be occupational diseases peculiar to those employments.

20. S 3: the Employer’s liability (4) Save as provided by sub-sections (2), (2A)] and (3) no compensation shall be payable to a *[employee] in respect of any disease unless the disease is directly attributable to a specific injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. (5) Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to confer any right to compensation on a *[employee] in respect of any injury if he has instituted in a Civil Court a suit for damages in respect of the injury against the employer or any other person; and no suit for damages shall be maintainable by a *[employee] in any Court of law in respect of any injury-- (a) if he has instituted a claim to compensation in respect of the injury before a Commissioner; or (b) if an agreement has been come to between the *[employee] and his employer providing for the payment of compensation in respect of the injury in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

21.     S 4: What is amount of Compensation ?                (1)      Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:-   Where death results from the injury an amount equal to [fifty percent] of the monthly wages of the injured workman multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of [ Rs.1,20,000 ]whichever is more;      

22. Sec 4: The amount of the compensation        Where permanent total disablement results from the injury an amount equal to [sixty percent] of the monthly wages of the injured workman multiplied by the relevant factor;   Or  an amount of [ 1,40,000 ], whichever is more.        

23. Sec 4: The amount of the compensation?   Where permanent partial disablement results from the injury   In the case of an injury specified in Part-II of Schedule-I, such percentage of the compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is specified therein as being the percentage of the loss of earning capacity caused by that injury; And in the case of an injury not specified in Schedule – I, such percentage of the compensation payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity (as assessed by the qualified medical practitioner) permanently caused by the injury;        

24. S 5:Method of calculating wages In this Act and for the purposes thereof the expression “monthly wages” means the amount of wages deemed to be payable for a month’s service (whether the wages are payable by the month or by whatever other period or at piece rates), and calculated as follows, namely: (a) where the employee has, during a continuous period of not less than twelve months immediately preceding the accident, been in the service of the employer who is liable to pay compensation, the monthly wages of the employee shall be one-twelfth of the total wages which have fallen due for payment to him by the employer in the last twelve months of that period;

25. S 5:Method of calculating wages (b) where the whole of the continuous period of service immediately preceding the accident during which the employee was in the service of the employer who is liable to pay the compensation was less than one month, the monthly wages of the employee shall be the average monthly amount which, during the twelve months immediately preceding the accident, was being earned by an employee employed on the same work by the same employer, or, if there was no employee so employed, by an employee employed on similar work in the same locality;

26. S 5:Method of calculating wages (c) in other cases, including cases in which it is not possible for want of necessary information to calculate the monthly wages under clause (b), the monthly wages shall be thirty times the total wages earned in respect of the last continuous period of service immediately preceding the accident from the employer who is liable to pay compensation, divided by the number of days comprising such period. Explanation: A period of service shall, for the purposes of this section be deemed to be continuous which has not been interrupted by a period of absence from work exceeding fourteen days.

27. Calculation of Compensation The amount of compensation payable by the employer shall be calculated as follows: (a) Death: In case of death, 50% of the monthly wages × relevant factor or ` 1,20,000, whichever is more, and ` 5,000 for funeral expenses. (b) PTD: In case of permanent total disablement specified under Schedule I, 60% of the monthly wages × relevant factor or ` 1,40,000, whichever is more. (c) PPD: In case of partial permanent disablement specified under Schedule I, 60% of the monthly wages × relevant factor × the percentage of the loss in earning capacity (specified in Part II of Schedule I).

28. Calculation of Compensation (d) PPD not specified: In case of partial permanent disablement not specified under Schedule I, 60% of the monthly wages × relevant factor × the percentage of the loss in earning capacity (as assessed by a qualified medical practitioner). (e) Temporary disablement: In case of temporary disablement (whether total or partial), a half-monthly installment equal to 25% of the monthly wages, for the period of disablement or 5 years, whichever is shorter.

29.        What is fatal accident and non-fatal accident ? Fatal accident is one that results in the death of the workman.              Non-fatal accident is one that causes injury to the workman resulting in partial or permanent physical disablement by which he loses his earning capacity.     

30.    When / Where claim application is to be filed ?      In case of fatal accident the dependents of the deceased workman are entitled to file a claim application before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Act.    In case of non-fatal accident the injured worker who suffered partial or permanent disablement and lost his earning capacity can file an application under the Act.                           

31. When / Where claim application is to be filed ?   The applicants shall file the claim before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation of the area in which—   the accident took place which resulted in the injury; or the workman or in case of his death, the dependent claiming the compensation ordinarily resides; or the employer has his registered office:    

32. Whether application can be made to the Central Labour Department ?       No.   The applications can be made to the Commissioners for Workmen's Compensation as notified by the State Government as required under the Act.  No official of Central Labour Department is notified as Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation.     

33. What is limitation period to file an application ?                    A claim application shall be filed within two years from the date of accident.  However, the C.W.C. may entertain the application after limitation period by condoning the delay after hearing the parties.    

34. Who are the opposite parties to the claim ?                             The employer of the workman is  the  Opp.  Party  in   any   claim  application.  In case the employer has obtained an Insurance Policy covering the risk of workman, such insurer may be made as 2 nd  Opp. Party.    

35. Whether an agreement can be made between Workman and Employer ?                 Yes, only in non-fatal cases and such agreements shall be registered with the Commissioner by the parties as per Section 28 of the Act.   In case a memorandum of any agreement the registration of  which is required by section 28, is not sent to the Commissioner as required by that Section, the employer shall be liable to pay the full amount of compensation  which  he  is liable to pay under the provisions of the Act, and notwithstanding anything contained in the provision to sub-section (1) of section 4, shall not, unless the Commissioner otherwise directs, be entitled to deduct more than half of any amount paid to the workman by way of compensation whether under the agreement or otherwise.      

36.     Who are the dependents of the deceased workman ?               Dependent means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely: a widow, a minor [legitimate or adopted] son, and unmarried [legitimate or adopted] daughter, or a widowed mother; and if wholly dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, a son or a daughter who has attained the age of 18 years and who is infirm;  if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, a widower,      

37.     Who are the dependents of the deceased workman ?                 5. a parent other than a widowed mother, 6. a minor illegitimate son, an unmarried illegitimate daughter or a daughter [legitimate or illegitimate or adopted] if married and minor or if widowed and minor, 7. a minor brother or an unmarried sister or a widowed sister if a minor, 8. a widowed daughter-in-law, 9. a minor child of a pre-deceased son, 10. a paternal grandparent if no parent of the workman is alive      

38.  What is the responsibility of the Employer on the occurrence of the accident ?                    Where an accident occurred in the premises of an employer, which results in death or serious bodily injury the employer shall send a report to the Commissioner giving the circumstances,      

39.     Whether a shop employee covered by the Act ?                Yes.    Though the schedule of the W.C.Act does not cover the Shop Employee, the A.P.Shops & Estts . Act provides for applicability of W.C.Act , 1923 in case of accidental injuries / death of workman. ,      

40.     Where does the appeal lie ?                           The appeal lies with the High Court on the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation.    .        

41. Doctrine of Notional Extension Section 3(1) of the Employees Compensation Act uses the word “employment” and “arising out of” and “in course of employment” is a wider concept as these terms are not limited only to the accidents which may occur in employment place but this is extended to the outer sphere of employment place depending upon the fact whether he was working in course of employment or not. In such cases, the employer shall be liable to pay compensation. This extended liability of the Employer is called the Doctrine of Notional Extension. The extent of Employer’s liability and concept of “arising out of” and “in course of employment” is decided in the landmark case of Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja

42. Notional Extension of time and space/Principle of added peril Notional Extension and Added Peril.docx

43. Case laws If a worker ,engaged on daily rate basis for construction of a building to be let out, meets with an accident, i s the employer liable for payment of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act? An employee, after marking his presence during layoff in the factory ,sustained injury on the way while returning home. Is he entitled to compensation for injury? A workman died due to heart attack at the factory gate, while on way to join duty . Will it amount to an industrial accident ,and will compensation be payable? Death of an employee, a week after falling unconscious due to inhaling and excessive working on cooking gas. Does it amount to an accident ,entitling his dependents for compensation? A salesman died in the arrak shop in a homicidal attack . Will it amount to an 'accident' for claiming compensation. An employee, who jumped from the train , met with an accident while going to his workplace. Will he be entitled to compensation? An employee was murdered by her husband at the workplace . Will it amount to an industrial accident for payment of compensation?

44. Case laws The dependents of a workman dying due to assault by a mob on his way to workplace, will he be entitled to compensation? A supervisor died in stone quarry suffering from giddiness . Will it amount to accident during the course of employment? Claim was made for compensation after two months of a worker's fall because of giddiness ,while on duty . Will it be sustainable?

45.      Case Laws                   If a worker ,engaged on daily rate basis for construction of a building to be let out, meets with an accident. Is the employer liable for payment of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act? Yes. ( Asmolh Beebi v. Marimulhu , 1990 LLR 450) (Mad HC). An employee, after marking his presence during layoff in the factory ,sustained injury on the way while returning home. Is he entitled to compensation for injury? Yes. Sathyabhama v. Employees' Stale Insurance Corporation, 1991 LLR 567: 1991 (63) FLR 339: 1991-11 LLN 181 (Ker HC).        

46.      Case Laws                   3. A workman died due to heart attack at the factory gate, while on way to join duty . Will it amount to an industrial accident and will compensation be payable? Yes. General Superintendent TeIcher Thermal Station v. Bijuli Naik , 1994 LLR 922: 1994-II LLN 636 ( Ori HC). 4. Death of an employee, a week after falling unconscious due to inhaling and excessive working on cooking gas. Does it amount to an accident ,entitling his dependents for compensation? Yes. Divisional Personnel Officer, Western Railway Jaipur v. Ashiya Begam , (1994) II LLJ 795: 1994 LLR 11 (Raj HC).        

47.    Case Laws                     5. A salesman died in the arrak shop in a homicidal attack . Will it amount to an 'accident' for claiming compensation. Yes. Mathew ' oseph v. ' oney Sunny, (1995) 11 LL) 1122: 1995 LLR 390: 1995-11 LLN 645 (Ker He). 6. An employee, who jumped from the train , met with an accident while going to his work place. Will he be entitled to compensation? No. Director-General, Combat Vehicles & Research Establishment, Avadi v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour II, Madras, 1995 LLR 460 (Mad HC).        

48.      Case Laws                   7. An employee was murdered by her husband at the workplace . Will it amount to an industrial accident for payment of compensation? No. Special Officer, Periyakulam Anna Polythene Workers' Industrial Coop. Society Ltd. v, Ayyammal , 1995 LLR 115 (Mad HC). 8. The dependents of a workman dying due to assault by a mob on his way to workplace, will not be entitled to compensation. Maherunisha Ahemadkhan Patkan wlo Ahemadkhan Sahebkhan Pathan v. ESI Corporation, 1995 LLR 34: 1995-1 LLN 394: 1995-11 LLj 1 ( Guj He).        

49.     Case Laws                     9. A supervisor died in stone quarry suffering from giddiness . Will it amount to accident during the course of employment? No. Swamalata Samal v. Chaudhary Kanduri Charan Das, 1996 LLR 348: 1995 LIC 703 (Ori He). 10. Claim was made for compensation after two months of a worker's fall because of giddiness ,while on duty . Will it be sustainable? No. Gangaben Wd /O. Chhaganbhai Havabhai ... vs The Regional Director, E.S.I. LLR 301: 1995¬II LLN 1174 (Guj He). https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1955636 .        

50. Landmark Cases in EC Act 1. Sunil Industries v Ram Chandar Pradhan Applicability 2. Saurashtra Salt Mfg. Co v Bai Valu Raja. 1958 Employers' liability for compensation 3. General Manager , Best undertaking, Bombay v Agnes. 1964 Arising of and in course of employment. 4. Mackinnon Mackenzie &Co v Ibrahim Mohammad Issak , 1970. Do 5. Shakuntala Chandrasekhar Shreshti v Prabhakar Maruti Garvali . 2007. Stress and Strain 6. Rita Devi v New India Assurance Co Ltd. 2000. Is Murder an accident? 7. Kerala State Electricity Board v Valsala K.1999 Compensation when due and penalty for default. 8. Pratap Narain Singh Deo v Srinivas Sabata . 1976 Do

51. Court Cases 9. New India Assurance Co v V.K.Neelakandan . 1996 Availability of benefit 10. United India In surance Co Ltd v Alavi . 1998. Do 11. Roshan Deen V Preeti Lal. 2002 Registration of Agmnt . 12. Malati Sardar vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr . 2016. Issue of territorial jurisdiction

52. Rita Devi Case One Dasarath Singh was a driver of an auto rickshaw owned by Lalit Singh. The vehicle in question was registered as a public carrier vehicle used for hire by the passengers. This vehicle was insured with the respondent-Insurance Company. On 22nd of March, 1995, it is stated that some unknown passengers hired the above auto rickshaw from rickshaw stand at Dimapur between 5 to 6 p.m. It is also not in dispute that the said auto rickshaw was reported stolen and the dead body of driver Dasarath Singh was recovered by the police on the next day, the auto rickshaw was never recovered and the claim of the owner for the loss of auto rickshaw was accepted by the respondent-Insurance Company and a sum of Rs.47,220/- was settled by the said company towards the loss suffered by the owner

53. Rita Devi Case The Supreme Court, after considering the fact of the instant case, observed that there is no doubt that ‘murder’, as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a ‘murder’ which is not an accident and a ‘murder’ which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. The Court further observed that if the dominant intention of the act of felony is to kill any particular person, then such killing is not an accidental murder but is a murder simplicitor , while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act, then such murder is an accidental murder.

54. Rita Devi Case Applying the above stated principle in the instant case, the Supreme Court held that a driver of the auto rickshaw was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the auto rickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the auto rickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the auto rickshaw, then it cannot but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the auto rickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the auto rickshaw was the objectof the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the auto rickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the auto rickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased ( Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing the theft of the auto rickshaw.

55. Sunil Industries, M/s. v. Ram Chander Pradhan The employer runs a workshop of shaping steel sheets into various shapes and forms. The workman, who was working as a press operator, sustained injuries to his right index finger and thumb while working on a press. The injuries led to amputation of 2.5 × 0.5 cm of the index finger. The workman filed a claim for compensation of ` 25,000 with interest ,@ 16 per cent per annum. The employer claimed that the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act would not apply to his establishment. The Commissioner held that the Workmen’s Compensation Act applied and the employer was directed to pay compensation in a sum of ` 29,814 together with ` 5,000 as penalty and interest at 12 per cent per annum. The employer appealed under S. 30 of the WCA before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. That appeal came to be dismissed.

56. Sunil Industries, M/s. v. Ram Chander Pradhan The counsel submitted before the Supreme Court that the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not apply to his establishment , as S. 2(n)(ii) of the Act provides that ‘a workman is a person employed in a capacity specified in Schedule II’. He then referred to Schedule II of the Act and pointed out that under Item 2 of Schedule II, a person would be a workman provided he is employed in any premises where a manufacturing process as defined in Cl. (k) of S. 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 was being carried on. He submitted that this showed that the provisions of the Factories Act were being incorporated into the Workmen’s Compensation Act. He submitted that this is also clear from the fact that over the years, there have been a number of amendments to the Workmen’s Compensation Act incorporating provisions of the Factories .

57. Sunil Industries, M/s. v. Ram Chander Pradhan He then referred to Ss. 2(k) and 2(m) of the Factories Act and submitted that under the Factories Act, the manufacturing process must be in a factory where ten or more workers are working (if the manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power) or twenty or more persons are working (if the manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power). He submitted that a joint reading of all these provisions makes it clear that even for the purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act only those persons who are employed in a factory within the meaning of the Factories Act, 1948 would be entitled to make a claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

58. Sunil Industries, M/s. v. Ram Chander Pradhan The Supreme Court did not accept the submissions of the learned counsel and held that it is true that the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 has been amended on a number of occasions; however in spite of numerous amendments the legislature has purposely omitted to specifically provide that only a workman who is employed in a factory, as defined in the Factories Act, could make a claim. All that has been done is that in Schedule II of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it is inter alia clarified that persons employed, otherwise than in a clerical capacity, in any premises wherein a manufacturing process as defined in Cl.

59. Sunil Industries, M/s. v. Ram Chander Pradhan of S. 2 of the Factories Act, 1948, are workmen. Significantly, the definition of the word “Factory” as appearing in Cl. (m) of S. 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 has not been incorporated in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Thus, it is clear that for the Workmen’s Compensation Act to apply, it is not necessary that the workman should be working in a factory as defined in the Factories Act, 1948. It has not been denied that the workshop of the appellant would fall under Cl. (k) of S. 2 of the Factories Act. Therefore, the respondent would be a workman within the meaning of the words as defined in the Workmen’s Compensation Act

60. Saurshtra Salt Mfg Case v Bai Valu Raja In Saurashtra Salt manufacturing Co., there are temporary and permanent workers both being employed by this company. One among them was appellant who worked on a temporal basis with that same company.. The salt works were owned by appellant, located at Porbandar , near a creek where employees could go through two ways; either through land route which is about six to seven miles long or using boats that operate to get across for an hour. The Asmavati stairway marks one end while on other side lies Porbandar town from where it can be crossed as point A up-to point B which has some sandy shore located at Porbandar end of creek. From point B people crossing from A disembarked from boat. After going through this sandy part then proceed up to salt seawall then eventually enter into salt works. ”

61. There were few employees who after going by boat for purposes reaching their work places and thinking about going back drowned giving rise to 7 workmen compensation act cases further filed against them also under Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation found that it was an accident arising out of their work process that led to the tragedy. The Appellant moved to High Court of Saurashtra (Now Mumbai) and second court dismissed this appeal as elaborated in this discussion. This legal position was challenged by the Appellant before  Supreme Court  and they wanted clear meaning of “Doctrine of Notional Extension” as well as what is “arising out of and in the course of employment” Saurshtra Salt Mfg Case

62. Judgment While on a public road, in a public place or upon a public vehicle, an employee is in his capacity just like any other member of the public anywhere except that he is at work unless otherwise dictated by its very nature Closeness of place where accident occurred vis-a-vis place of work is irrelevant for this purpose. It should however be observed that even under notionally expanded working areas in which employers retain full control over employees’ actions through disciplinary codes etc., once they hit onto 5th Avenue they enter into no man’s land as they all become members of the public and whilst in such a place employers’ acts cannot be imputed on them [ Commrs . for Port of Calcutta v Kaniz Fatema AIR 1961 Cal. 310]. A worker does not start work from the time he steps out to his work place and is on its way to it. He is certainly throughout his employment once he arrives at a workplace or a point or an area which is so nearly up to notional extension beyond which the employer will not be liable to pay compensation for any accident that may happen to him. The Supreme Court held, however, that in view of the situation revealed by evidence before it, the accident did not occur during the course of employment as while crossing over river because this theory of notional extension could not reach up to where boat capsized.

63. BEST Case The case involved a bus driver, P. Nanu Raman, employed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation’s transport service, managed by the Bombay Electricity Supply and Transport Committee. After completing his day’s work, Raman boarded a bus to return home. Unfortunately, the bus met with an accident, resulting in injuries that led to Raman’s death. His widow, Mrs. Agnes, sought compensation through the Court of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, claiming that her husband’s death was a result of an accident that occurred “out of and in the course of his employment. The central issue was whether the accident that led to Raman’s death occurred during the course of his employment. This hinged on the interpretation of Section 3 (1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, which states, “If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provision of this chapter.” .

64. BEST Case The court, in its judgment, held that a bus driver is given the facility to travel in any bus belonging to the undertaking, not as a grace, but as a right for the efficiency of the service. This right was considered a condition of his service, and there was an implied obligation on his part to travel in the said buses as part of his duty. The court also noted that the doctrine of reasonable or notional extension of employment, developed in the context of specific workshops, factories, or harbours , applies to such a bus service. The doctrine needs to be adapted to meet its peculiar requirements. In the case of a city transport service, the entire fleet of buses forming the service would be the “premises.” .

65. General Manager, BEST Undertaking, Bombay v. Agnes. The majority of the bench (Justices Subba Rao and Mudholkar ) held that the accident occurred to Nanu Raman during the course of his employment, and therefore, Mrs. Agnes was entitled to compensation. However, Justice Raghubar Dayal disagreed, stating that Rule 19 cannot be construed as a condition of service of the bus drivers of the corporation and, therefore, cannot artificially extend the period of their duty and, consequently, the course of employment by the time occupied in travelling by the bus. This case is significant as it broadened the interpretation of “course of employment” under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, particularly in the context of city transport services. It underscored the fact that the facilities provided to an employee for the efficiency of the service, such as the right to travel in any bus belonging to the undertaking, can be considered as part of the employee’s duty .

66. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Private Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommad Issak Hassan Ibrahim was employed as a deck-hand, a seaman of category II on the ship. The medical log book of the ship showed that on December 13, 1961 Shaikh Hassan complained of pain in the chest and was, therefore, examined, but nothing abnormal was detected clinically. The Medical Officer on board the ship prescribed some tablets for Shaikh Hassan and he reported fit for work on the next day. On the 15th, however, he complained of insomnia and pain in the chest for which the Medical Officer prescribed sedative tablets. The official log book of the ship shows that on the 16th when the ship was in the Persian Gulf, Shaikh Hassan was seen near the bridge of the ship at about 2.20 a.m. He was sent back but at 3 a.m. he was seen on the Tween Deck when he told a seaman on duty that he was going to bed.

67. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Private Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommad Issak At 6.15 a.m., he was found missing and a search was undertaken. The dead body, however, was not found either on that day or later on. The evidence does not show that it was a stormy night. The Commissioner made a local inspection of the ship and saw the position of the bridge and deck and found that there was a bulwark more than 3½ feet. Nobody saw the missing seaman at the so-called place of accident. The Additional Commissioner held that there was no material for holding that the death of the seaman took place on account of an accident which arose out of his employment. But in view of the serious and important nature of the issues, the High Court proceeded to decide the questions of law arising in the appeal. Chandrachud J., allowed the appeal and reversed the judgment of the Additional Commissioner.

68. Mackinnon Mackenzie Case Judgment The principal question that arises in this appeal before the Supreme Court is whether the accident arose in the course of employment and whether it arose out of employment within the meaning of S. 3 of the Act. The Supreme Court observed that to come within the Act, the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words “in the course of the employment” mean “in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it” . The words “ arising out of employment” are understood to mean that “during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered” .

69. Mackinnon Mackenzie Case Judgment In other words, there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression “arising out of employment” is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such—to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger, the injury would be one which arises ‘out of employment’. To put it differently, if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act.

70. Mackinnon Mackenzie Case Judgment The Supreme Court further held that in the case of death caused by accident, the burden of proof rests upon the workman to prove that the accident arose out of employment as well as in the course of employment. But this does not mean that a workman who comes to court for relief must necessarily prove it by direct evidence. Although the onus of proving that the injury by accident arose both out of and in the course of employment rests upon the applicant, these essentials may be inferred when the facts proved justify the inference. On the one hand, the Commissioner must not surmise, conjecture or guess; on the other hand, he may draw an inference from the proved facts so long as it is a legitimate inference. It is of course impossible to lay down any rule as to the degree of proof which is sufficient to justify an inference being drawn, but the evidence must be such as would induce a reasonable man to draw it. The Court in this case set aside the decision of the High Court and allowed the appeal and held that the Additional Commissioner did not commit any error of law in reaching his finding and the High Court was not justified in reversing it.

71. Daivshala v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC In the present case, the deceased was employed as a watchman in a Sugar Factory, and his duty hours were from early morning 3 am to 11 am. On 22-4-2003, the deceased left home on his motorcycle to report for duty. However, unfortunately, he never reached his workplace, as when he was 5 kms away from the factory, he was involved in a fatal accident. He left a widow, four children and his mother behind. In a claim filed under the EC Act, the employer and the insurance company stated that since the accident occurred outside the precincts of the factory, the accident had not arisen ‘out of’ or ‘in the course of his employment’. However, the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation awarded Rs. 3,26,140 along with interest at the rate 12% per annum to the family members. Further, the Insurance Company was directed to deposit the amount since there was a valid Insurance Policy, and the employer was asked to pay 50% of the awarded amount as penalty. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Insurance Company filed an appeal before the Bombay High Court (‘High Court’). The High Court relied on ESI Corpn ., v. Francis De Costa, (1996) 6 SCC 1 (‘Francis De Costa case’), and set aside the Commissioner’s order holding that since the deceased was on his way to his employment, the accident could not be said to have its origin in the employment.

72. Daivshala v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC The Court stated that Section 51E of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (‘ESI Act’), clearly neutralised the holding in Francis De Costa case (supra), when it provided that an accident occurring to an employee while commuting from his residence to the place of employment for duty or vice versa, shall be deemed to have arisen ‘out of’ and ‘in the course of employment’. The only condition was that nexus between the circumstances, the time and place in which the accident occurred, and the employment had to be established.

73. Daivshala v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC The Court stated that all that we were examining here was whether a meaning given to the phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment” insofar as it dealt with accidents happening while commuting to the place of work and vice versa in the ESI Act, could be said to be the same for the phrase “accident arising out of and in the course of employment” occurring in Section 3 of the EC Act.

74. Daivshala v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC Further, both Acts are beneficial legislations intended as social security measures to ameliorate the conditions of employees. The Court stated that as rightly noticed by Chief Justice (Retd.) Ganjendragadkar in the 62nd Law Commission Report, the only difference between the two statutes was that while the ESI Act applied to factories and notified establishments, the EC Act applied to other employers, as defined. The Court stated that it is well settled that where statutes in pari materia serve a common object in absence of any provision indicating to the contrary, it is permissible for a court of law to ascertain the meaning of the provision in the enactment by comparing its language with the other enactment relating to the same subject matter.

75. Daivshala v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC Thus, the Court interpreted the phrase “accident arising out of and in the course of his employment” occurring in Section 3 of the EC Act to include accident occurring to an employee while commuting from his residence to the place of employment for duty or vice versa, provided the nexus between the circumstances, time and place in which the accident occurred and the employment was established. The Court stated that considering that the deceased was a night watchman and was dutifully proceeding to his workplace to be well on time, there was a clear nexus between the circumstances, time and place in which the accident occurred and his employment as watchman. The accident having clearly arose out of and in the course of employment, the was justified in ordering the claim under the EC Act. Thus, the Court set aside the judgment passed by the Bombay High Court and judgment passed by the Commissioner was restored....

76. Stress and strain Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali Prakash Chandrakant Shreshti was working as a cleaner in a vehicle. He was travelling in the said vehicle in the night of 27-9-2002. He suddenly developed chest pain. He was admitted to Government Hospital, Mangaon where the doctor declared him dead. T he incident had occurred while deceased was performing his duties. The mother filed a claim before the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation. The vehicle being insured with the United India Insurance Company, it was also impleaded as a party. The fact that at the time of his death, the deceased was discharging his duties is not disputed. The autopsy was conducted wherein the cause of death was opined as cardiac arrest due to Rupture Aortic Aneurysm. No injury on his body was found. It was alleged: “... My son died while working in the vehicle and due to the strain of work... .” The issue with which the Court is concerned is: Whether the accident occurred during the course of employment and out of employment?

77. Stress and strain Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali The Court observed in the instant case that: 1. Stress and strain arising during the course of employment, 2. Nature of employment, 3. Injury aggravated due to stress and strain.

78. Stress and strain Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali The deceased was travelling in a vehicle. The same by itself cannot give rise to an inference that the job was strenuous. Only because a person dies of heart attack, the same does not give rise to automatic presumption that the same was by way of accident. A person may be suffering from a heart disease, although he may not be aware of the same. Medical opinion will be of relevance providing guidance to court in this behalf. Circumstances must exist to establish that death was caused by reason of failure of heart was because of stress and strain of work. Stress and strain resulting in a sudden heart failure in a case of the present nature would not be presumed. No legal fiction therefore can be raised. As a person suffering from a heart disease may not be aware thereof, medical opinion therefore would be of relevance.

79. Stress and strain Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali Each case, therefore, has to be considered on its own fact and no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefore. Similarly, in a case where it has been brought on record that the deceased was suffering from chest disease and was previously being treated for such disease. It is also noted that the job of the deceased was only to switch on or off and, therefore, the doctor had clearly opined that there was no scope for any stress or strain in his duties.

80. Stress and strain Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali The principles are: (1) There must be a causal connection between the injury and the accident and the accident and the work done in the course of employment. (2) The onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resulting strain which contributed to or aggravated the injury. (3) If the evidence brought on records establishes a greater probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would be enough for the workman to succeed, but the same would depend upon the fact of each case.

81. Stress and strain Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali Injury suffered should be a physiological injury. Accident, ordinarily, would have to be understood as unforeseen or uncomprehended or could not be foreseen or comprehended. A finding of fact, thus, has to be arrived at, inter alia , having regard to the nature of the work and the situation in which the deceased was placed. There is a crucial link between the causal connections of employment with death. Such a link with evidence cannot be a matter of surmise or conjecture. If a finding is arrived at without pleading or legal evidence the statutory authority will commit a jurisdictional error while exercising jurisdiction.

82. Key Themes on Employee Compensation Employer's Liability: Employee Eligibility: Accidents and Injuries: Occupational Diseases: Compensation and Calculation Dependents and Death:

83. Factors Affecting Compensation: E mployee's monthly wages, N ature of injury, and E xtent of disability.

84. Compensation Calculation: H ow to calculate compensation for different types of injuries (permanent, temporary, partial, total). Explain the provisions related to compensation for dependents in case of employee

85. Sharadabai W/O Nagappa Ors vs Abdul Karim S/O Abdul Majid Ors on 12 November, 2020 The deceased was driving the truck of Respondent 2 from Ambala to Meerut. Indisputably he was in the course of his employment. Considering the manufacturer's specification, the cabin of the truck was not air-conditioned and would have been a baking oven in the middle of the afternoon in the sultry monsoon heat of June 2003, when the temperature was touching 42.60 C in Yamunagar ,Haryana. It was a compulsion for the deceased to stay fresh and alert not only to protect the truck from damage but also to ensure a smooth journey and protect his own life by safe driving. The possibility of the truck also requiring water to prevent overheating cannot be completely ruled out.

86. Sharadabai W/O Nagappa Ors vs Abdul Karim S/O Abdul Majid Ors on 12 November 2020 Every action of the driver of a truck to ensure the safety of the truck belonging to the employer and to ensure his own safety by a safe journey for himself has to be considered as incidental to the employment by  extension  of the  notion al employment theory. A truck driver who would not keep himself fresh to drive in such heat would be a potential danger to others on the road by reason of any bona fide errors of judgment by reason of the heat. The theory of  notion al  extension  .

87. Court case on Notional Extension of Time and Place Daya Kishan Joshi & Anr . v. Dynemech Systems (P) Ltd. , (2018) The deceased was employed as an engineer for promoting sales and installation of products which required him to move around in the field. While returning from field work, he met with an accident resulting in death. Holding that his being on the road related to the nature of his duties, not only the injury was caused during the currency of the employment but also arose out of the employment. 

88. Notional Extension of Time and Place An accident arising out of employment implies a causal connection between the injury and the accident and the work done in the course of employment. Employment should be the distinctive and proximate cause of the injury. The three tests for determining whether an accident arose out of employment are : At the time of injury the employee must have been engaged in the business of the employer and must not be doing something for personal benefit. That accident occurred at the place where he is performing his duties. Injury must have resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service , or inherent in the nature of the condition of employment

89. Notional Extension of Time and Place The general principle that evolve are : There must be a causal link between the injury and the accident, and the work done in the course of employment. The onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resultant strain which contributed to or aggravated the injury. It is not necessary that the workman must be actually working at the time of his death or that death must occur while he was working or had just ceased to work and Where the evidence is balanced , if the evidence shows a greater probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of the personal injury, it would be enough for the workman to succeed.

90. Notional Extension of Time and Place But where the accident involved a risk involved a risk common to all humanity and did not involve any peculiar or exceptional danger resulting from the nature of employment or where the accident was the result of an added peril to which the workman by his own conduct exposed himself , which peril was not involved in the normal performance of the duties of his employment, then the employer will not be liable.

91. Compensation in case of Occupational diseases. Employees employed in certain types of occupations are exposed to the risk of contacting certain diseases , which are peculiar and inherent to those occupations, An employee contacting an occupational disease is deemed to have suffered an accident out of and in course of employment and the employer is liable to pay compensation for the same. Occupational disease have been categorized in Parts A , B and C of Schedule iii. The employer is liable to pay compensation.

92. Compensation in case of Occupational diseases. When an employee contracts any disease specified in Part B , while in service for a continuous period of 6 months under one employer . Period of service under any other employer in the same kind of employment shall not be included. When an employee contracts any disease specified in Part C , while he has been in continuous service for a specified period , whether under one or more employers , proportionate compensation is payable by all the employers , if the employee had been in service under more than one employer.

93. Compensation in case of Occupational diseases. If an employee has after the cessation of the service contracted any disease specified in Part B or Part C , as an occupational disease peculiar to the employment and that such disease arose out of the employment , the contracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of the Act.

94. The Doctrine of Added Peril The doctrine of added peril is a principle applied in Indian worker compensation cases. It acts as a defence for employers in situations where an employee gets injured. It essentially limits an employer’s liability when an employee gets injured on the job. Here’s a breakdown of the doctrine: Employer’s Responsibility:  The Employees’ Compensation Act, generally mandate employers to compensate workers for injuries  arising “out of and in the course of employment .” Added Peril:  This doctrine comes into play when an employee, while performing their job duties, engages in an activity that i s not part of their regular duties. Involves a significantly higher risk of injury than their normal tasks. Employer Not Liable:  If an employee gets injured due to this added peril, the employer may not be responsible for providing compensation under the aforementioned acts. The rationale is that the injury wasn’t caused by a risk inherent to the employee’s regular job.

95. The Doctrine of Added Peril The application of this doctrine is particularly relevant in industries where the nature of work can involve hazardous conditions. Employers are generally expected to ensure a safe working environment and provide adequate training and safety measures. However, if an employee deviates from standard operations or safe practices, leading to an accident or injury, the Doctrine of Added Peril can shield employers from liability.For example, in a manufacturing setting, if an employee decides to operate machinery in a manner not sanctioned by their employer or safety protocols and sustains an injury, the employer can invoke this doctrine as a defence, arguing that the employee’s actions constituted an added peril.

96. Stress and Strain/ Occupational Disease In Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali [AIR 2007 SC 248] Jyothi Ademma v. Plant Engineer, Nellore, AIR 2006 SC 2830 Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd ., Kerala State Electricity Board v. Valsala K Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata The New India Assurance Company Limited v. V.K. Neelakandan United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Kamlesh & Ors .: Bhurangya Coal Co. Ltd. v. Sahebjan Mian And Anr .: Gouri Kinkar Bhakat v. Messrs Radha Kissen Cotton Mills : R.B. Moondra & Co. v. Mrs. Bhanwari And Another : Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation, Ltd. v. S. Poomalai

97. Occupational Disease Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation, Ltd. v. S. Poomalai The court here expanded on the notion that injuries must directly arise from employment duties to qualify for compensation. It was held that the injury must be a result of employment conditions or responsibilities and if an accident occurs due to a risk that is not an incident of employment, the employee’s claim may not be successful. This case highlighted the importance of distinguishing between general occupational risks and those created by personal disregard for safety. R. B Moondra & Co. v. Mrs. Bhanwari And Another This judgment clarified that even if an employee’s actions are reckless, as long as they fall within the scope of employment responsibilities, the Doctrine of Added Peril does not apply. The court recognised that the use of petrol by a worker for cleaning purposes was not prohibited and was related to his job, thereby ruling that the resulting accident was indeed an occupational hazard.

98. Cases on accident Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. Bhim Manya Chettri, 2009 LLR 46 (Cal He). State of Mnharashtra v. Arti Ashok Kapshikar , 2008 LLR 1052 (Born He). Mnnager , National Insurance Company Ltd., Gulbarga v. Mnhabooba Bi, 2008 LLR 1028 (Kam HC). South Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. v. Shyarna Nagvanshi , 2008 LLR 783 (SN) ( Chht He). Union of India v. Dhara Singh, 2008 LLR 748 (Raj He).  

99. Cases on accident New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. K.S. Puttappa , 2007 LLR 992 (Kam He). Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Joseph, 2007 LLR 988 (Ker He). National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mat. Param Pal Singh, through his father Sh. Santokh Singh, 2007 LLR 984 (Del He). National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Balwwa , (1994) 1 LLj 433: 1993 LLR 835 (Kar He). Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshli v. Prabhakar Maruli Garuali , 2007 LLR 185 (SC).  

100. Cases on accident United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Susheela, 2004 LLR 425 (Kam He). BriJum Mumbai Municipal Corporation v. Dashrathsatyawan Gawade , 2007 LLR 205 (Born HC). Shakuntala Chandrakant Shr,shti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garuali , 2007 LLR 185 (SC). Thati Ranga Rao v. L. Varalaxmi , 2007 LLR 19 (AP He). Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sabitri Devi, 2006 LLR 818 ( Jhar HC).  

101. Cases on accident Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., Chennai v. D. Sakunthala , 2006 LLR 809 (Mad He). K. Vijayalakshmi v. Management of Amatgmations REPCO, Madras, 2006 LLR 798 (Mad HC). Shah v. Rajankutty , 2005 LLR llU (Ker He). Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Santhi , 2005 LLR 1066 (Mad He). Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rachna Devil 2005 LLR 902 (P&H He).  

102. Thank You