6 Introduction
(Jordana et al., 2018, 2011). In a nutshell, these national agencies have been
endowed, by governments, with specific regulatory powers and competences.
This separation of tasks, between governments and non-majoritarian institutions,
has altered the balance of power between institutions, and this has had, inter alia,
a number of unexpected consequences (Wilks and Bartle, 2002).
The literature on agenda-setting and policy framing offers the best approach
to delve deeper into this phenomenon. As we will see in the next chapter, sev-
eral scholars have pointed out the importance of exploring their increasing role
in agenda-setting and policy-making, but much has yet to be explored. To be
specific, one of the main absences in the literature on agenda-setting within the
regulatory state is the insufficient attention paid to the implications of independ-
ent regulatory agencies’ powers in agenda dynamics (Majone, 2006). Other than
a few examples, the question of whether agencies’ discretion is reduced or not
during the agenda-setting process, and under which conditions, is worthy of study
from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.
1.3 Agenda-setting, policy framing, and bureaucracies
Although the political science and sociology literatures have focused on a mul-
titude of actors, with social movements having a certain prevalence, the way
institutions can act as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ or ‘claim makers’ over the political
attention deserves consideration.
In fact, it is already well known that institutions, and more generally, bureau-
cracies, can act as ‘entrepreneurs’ by creating categories and stigmatizing some
behaviors (Becker, 1963). The idea that institutional actors, through their ability
to promote specific representations of social reality (Douglas, 1986) to further
their own agenda, play an important role in public issues is now acknowledged
in the literature. More specifically, the literature presents several studies showing
how bureaucracies and regulatory authorities can function as political actors and
promote a given representation of policy issues in some cases. In this respect,
Lowi (1969) found the emergence of unelected regulatory agencies to be prob-
lematic in its correspondence to a significant weakening of the role of parliaments
in policy-making. Against this background, Bawn (1995) has been among the pre-
cursors capturing the trade-offs between agencies’ technical competence and their
unexpected political control. In a similar vein, Carpenter (2001), focusing on the
origins of American bureaucracy, showed that bureaucracies can forge their auton-
omy by making use of expertise to advance policy proposals and influence policy
agendas. Additionally, American governmental agencies have been the object of
numerous studies demonstrating their capacity to exert leverage over policy agen-
das. For example, Schneider (1985a) identified ‘public regulatory bureaucracies’
and government agencies as categories, which, in the literature, have often been
highlighted as social problem entrepreneurs. Other studies emphasize the role of
federal agencies in the emergence of social issues, with particular attention paid
to alcoholism (Wiener, 1981; Chauncey, 1980) and smoking (Troyer and Markle,
1983). In other areas, Randall and Short Jr (1983) show how the Occupational