Sunny Ang vs public prosecutor [1966]

Sunn Ang the accused was charged and convicted for the murder of his girl friend Jenny. A Singapore case related to the law of evidence. Circumstantial evidence, Relevancy, Continuity.

1. SUNNY ANG v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1966] 2 MLJ 195 Ikram Abdul Sattar 1124977

2. Sunny Ang v PP [1967] 2 MLJ 195 Sunny Ang , the appellant was charged and convicted of the murder of his girlfriend Jenny. The facts adduced by the prosecution were so compelling that the court reached the irresistible conclusion that the appellant had murdered the deceased . The court in this case, totally relied on circumstantial evidence. This case demonstrates the application of c ircumstantial evidences stated in S. 8 of Evidence Act 1950 .

3. Fact of the case: On 27 th August 1963, the offence was committed about 5pm at sea near 2 island called  Pulau Dua which known as the Sister islands. The appellant hired a sampan from a boatman called Yusof and on his  directions Yusof had taken both the appellant and Jenny (victim) to a place  between the two islands where he dropped anchor . The appellant stated that his object in going there was to collect corals and that Jenny was to assist him in doing so. Appellant assisted Jenny to put on the diving equipment and allowed her, a novice diver wearing a flipper which had previously been cut, into water which he know were hazardous which resulted the death of the deceased .    

4. Application of S.8 of Evidence Act 1950 Principle and scope of section 8 The facts admissible under this section can be classified under three headings namely motive, preparation, and conduct. 1- Motive Motive is the reason why a person does a particular act. Illustration (b) provides: A sues B upon a bond for the payment of money. B denies the making of the bond. The fact that at the time when the bond was alleged to be made B required money for a particular purpose is relevant .

5. Is ther e a motive: 1- In this case, the appellant had been made a bankrupt in October 1962 and was still a bankrupt on 27 August 1963, t he day on which the offence was committed. Since appellant was a bankrupt and in need of money might be the motive for committing the crime .  On 27 August 1963, Jenny was insured against accidents with several insurance companies, the total sum being $450,000. The beneficiary named in some of the policies was the appellant's mother. In the case of the other policies the benefit was to go to Jenny's estate .

6. Jenny, who was 22 years of age made a will on the 7th August 1963 in which the appellant's mother was named as the sole beneficiary. The appellant accompanied Jenny to the solicitor's office when instructions for the preparation of the will were given to the solicitor. P reparation s by the Appellant: Preparation is a preliminary act which leads to the commission of the offence.   Is there any preparation by the appellant?

7. ( a)    On 27 August 1963 the appellant allowed Jenny to go down into the water near  Pulau Dua. According to an expert witness, it was not safe for a novice  to dive alone. (b)   Jenny had only a little experience of scuba diving and might  fairly be described as s novice diver. This was known to the appellant,  although he claimed that she had made good progress under his tuition . (c)    The waters near Pulau Dua were dangerous and hazardous. The appellant had dived in these waters on previous occasions and was in a position to know this.

8. (d)   The heel strap was severed and on examination it was found that the strap had been cut in 2 places by knife or sharp instrument. The 4 points above show s that appellant had prepa red before attempting to commit th e offence. He knew that the water near Pulau Dua was dangerous and it surely will endanger the life of Jenny. Both from the top and on the heel the flipper has been cut by knife or sharp instrument. T hese facts clearly show that the re was preparations on the part appellant.

9. P revious or subsequent conduct . One of the insurance policies under which Jenny was insured for the sum of $150,000 had lapsed on the 26th August 1963 but was renewed by the appellant on the morning of the 27th August 1963 for another five days. The appellant, however, did not renew or extend his own insurance policy which had been taken out at the same time .

10. The conduct of the appellant after the disappearance of Jenny was described by Yusof and other witnesses that there was a lack of urgency in the conduct of the appellant at the relevant time. The appellant did not go down into the water himself even after Jenny had failed to come to the surface . Less than 24 hours after the disappearance of Jenny, the appellant made formal claims on the three insurance companies which had issued policies covering her against accidents.

11. The court in this case, had totally relied on circumstantial evidence. Th e cumulative effect of all the evidence were so compelling that the court reached the irresistible conclusion that the appellant had murdered the deceased. It was held that “a lthough Jenny's body has never been found, there is overwhelming evidence on the record that the appellant murdered her . ”