The 3rd Asean Reader Kee Beng Ooi Sanchita Basu Das Terence Chong

The 3rd Asean Reader Kee Beng Ooi Sanchita Basu Das Terence Chong
The 3rd Asean Reader Kee Beng Ooi Sanchita Basu Das Terence Chong
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5. THE 3RD
ASEAN
READER

6. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) was established as
an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-
political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider
geostrategic and economic environment.
The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including
ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and
Cultural Studies (RSCS).
The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees
from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers
of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. An Executive Committee oversees day-
to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute’s chief academic and administrative
officer.
15-01549 00 ASEAN Reader.indd 2 21/7/15 9:36 am

7. THE 3RD
ASEAN
READER
Compiled by
Ooi Kee Beng, Sanchita Basu Das,
Terence Chong, Malcolm Cook,
Cassey
Lee and
Michael Yeo
I5ER5
YUSOF ISHAK
INSTITUTE

8. Published in Singapore in 2015 by
ISEAS Publishing
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 119614
E-mail: [email protected]
Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission
of the copyright holders and ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute.
© 2015 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
The 3rd ASEAN Reader / compiled by Ooi Kee Beng, Sanchita Basu Das, Terence Chong,
Malcolm Cook, Cassey Lee and Michael Yeo Chai Ming.
1. ASEAN.
2. Regionalism—Southeast Asia.
3. Southeast Asia—Politics and government.
4. Southeast Asia—Social conditions.
5. Southeast Asia—Economic integration.
6. Southeast Asia—Economic policy.
7. Southeast Asia—Strategic aspects.
8. Southeast Asia—Foreign relations.
I. Ooi, Kee Beng.
II. Basu Das, Sanchita.
III. Chong, Terence.
IV. Cook, Malcolm.
V. Lee, Cassey.
VI. Yeo, Michael Chai Ming.
VII. Title: Third ASEAN Reader
VIII. Title: ASEAN Reader
JZ5333.5 A9A851 2015 2015
ISBN 978-981-4620-61-1 (soft cover)
ISBN 978-981-4620-62-8 (E-book PDF)
Every effort has been made to identify copyright holders; in case of oversight, and on
notification to the publisher, corrections will be made in the next edition.
The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication
rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not
necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.
Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd.
Printed in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd
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9. CONTENTS
Preface xii
Forewords to the First and Second ASEAN Reader
ASEAN: Conception and Evolution xiii
ASEAN: The Way Ahead xix
New Challenges for ASEAN xxiv
SECTION I: ASEAN: THE LONG VIEW
Section Introduction by Ooi Kee Beng 3
 1. Southeast Asia and Foreign Empires 5
WANG GUNGWU
 2. Southeast Asia and the Great Powers 9
NICHOLAS TARLING
 3. The Evolving Nature of ASEAN’s Economic Cooperation: Original Vision and
Current Practice 14
NARONGCHAI AKRASANEE
 4. From Political/Security Concerns to Regional Economic Integration 17
RODOLFO C. SEVERINO
SECTION II: COUNTRY ANALYSES
Section Introduction by Ooi Kee Beng 25
 5. Political Figures and Political Parties: Indonesia after Soeharto 27
HUI YEW-FOONG
 6. Malaysia: Close to a Tipping Point 31
OOI KEE BENG
 7. Thailand: The Military’s Power Persists 36
MICHAEL J. MONTESANO
 8. Vietnam: Reforms Show Mixed Results 41
LE HONG HIEP
 9. The Philippines: Challenging Conventional Wisdom 45
MALCOLM COOK
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10. 10. Myanmar: Late Embrace of ASEAN 49
TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN
11. Timor-Leste and ASEAN 54
DOUGLAS KAMMEN
SECTION III: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF THE REGION
Section Introduction by Terence Chong 61
Southeast Asian Societies
12. Civil Society in Southeast Asia 65
LEE HOCK GUAN
13. Multicultural Realities and Membership: States, Migrations and Citizenship in Asia 69
MARUJA M.B. ASIS AND GRAZIANO BATTISTELLA
14. Education in Southeast Asia: Investments, Achievements, and Returns 75
DIEP PHAN AND IAN COXHEAD
15. Asian Pentecostalism: Renewals, Megachurches, and Social Engagement 79
TERENCE CHONG AND DANIEL P.S. GOH
16. The Rise of Middle Classes in Southeast Asia 84
TAKASHI SHIRAISHI
The Southeast Asian Economy
17. Urbanisation and Development in South-East Asia 91
GAVIN W. JONES
18. Understanding the ASEAN Development Gap 95
MARK McGILLIVRAY, SIMON FEENY, AND SASI IAMSIRAROJ
19. Tourism Policy-Making in Southeast Asia: A Twenty-First Century Perspective 99
LINDA RICHTER
Southeast Asian Politics
20. Low-Quality Democracy and Varied Authoritarianism: Elites and Regimes
in Southeast Asia Today 107
WILLIAM CASE
21. Social Foundations of Governance in Contemporary Southeast Asia 112
GARRY RODAN AND CAROLINE HUGHES
22. Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia:
Theoretical Views, Conceptual Pitfalls and Empirical Ambiguities 117
MARCO BÜNTE
23. Authority and Democracy in Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic Movements 122
JUDITH NAGATA
24. Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region 126
EUAN GRAHAM
vi Contents
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11. SECTION IV: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Section Introduction by Cassey Lee 133
25. Is There a Southeast Asian Development Model? 135
HAL HILL
26. Global Production Sharing, Trade Patterns, and Industrialization in Southeast Asia 140
PREMA-CHANDRA ATHUKORALA AND ARCHANUN KOHPAIBOON
27. Chinese Trade Policy After (Almost) Ten Years in the WTO: A Post-Crisis Stocktake 145
RAZEEN SALLY
28. Southeast Asia Beyond the Global Financial Crisis: Managing Capital Flows 150
JAYANT MENON AND AEKAPOL CHONGVILAIVAN
29. Impact of Eurozone Financial Shocks on Southeast Asian Economies 153
JAYANT MENON AND THIAM HEE NG
30. The Collective Influence of Smaller States in the US-China Security Dilemma 157
JA IAN CHONG
31. China and Japan in “ASEAN Plus” Multilateral Arrangements:
Raining on the Other Guy’s Parade 160
CHIEN-PENG CHUNG
SECTION V: INSTITUTIONS OF ASEAN
Section Introduction by Malcolm Cook 167
32. The Cambodia-Thailand Conflict: A Test for ASEAN 169
SOKBUNTHOEUN SO
33. ASEAN in the Twenty-First Century: A Sceptical Review 172
SHAUN NARINE
34. Facing Unfair Criticisms 176
AHMAD FUZI BIN ABDUL RAZAK
35. Challenges Facing the New ASEAN Secretary-General 180
TERMSAK CHALERMPALANUPAP
36. ASEAN Governing Mechanisms 184
ADB INSTITUTE
SECTION VI: ASSESSING ASEAN’S INTERNAL POLICIES
Section Introduction by Sanchita Basu Das 191
37. Challenging ASEAN: A “Topological” View 193
DONALD K. EMMERSON
38. Thinking and Feeling ASEAN: The Challenges of Integration and Identity 198
MOE THUZAR
Contents vii
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12. ASEAN Political Security Community
39. Achieving an ASEAN Security Community 205
JOSE T. ALMONTE
40. Turning Points Beyond the Comfort Zone? 209
MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY
ASEAN Economic Community
41. Implementing the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 217
HADI SOESASTRO
42. Towards an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 221
DENIS HEW
43. Understanding ASEAN’s Connectivity 226
SANCHITA BASU DAS
44. Enhancing the Institutional Framework for AEC Implementation 231
HELEN E. NESADURAI
45. What is a Single Market? An Application to the Case of ASEAN 237
PETER J. LLOYD
46. Non-Tariff Barriers: A Challenge to Achieving the ASEAN Economic Community 241
MYRNA S. AUSTRIA
47. Towards a Truly Seamless Single Windows and Trade Facilitation Regime in
ASEAN Beyond 2015 246
JONATHAN KOH AND ANDREA FELDMAN MOWERMAN
48. An Assessment of Services Sector Liberalization in ASEAN 251
DEUNDEN NIKOMBORIRAK AND SUPUNNAVADEE JITDUMRONG
49. Financial Integration Challenges in ASEAN beyond 2015 256
MARIA MONICA WIHARDJA
50. Free Flow of Skilled Labour in ASEAN 261
CHIA SIOW YUE
51. Toward a Single Aviation Market in ASEAN: Regulatory Reform and
Industry Challenges 266
ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
52. An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement 273
TERENCE CHONG
53. Civil Society and the ASEAN Community 278
MAY-ANN LIM
54. The Evolving ASEAN Human Rights System: The ASEAN Human Rights
Declaration of 2012 284
GERARD CLARKE
viii Contents
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13. 55. Divided or Together? Southeast Asia in 2012 290
BRIDGET WELSH
56. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 294
CAROLINA S. GUINA
57. ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community: An Assessment of its Institutional Prospects 298
JULIO S. AMADOR III
58. Executive Summary of the Mid-Term Review of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community Blueprint (2009–2015) 303
THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT
SECTION VII: ASSESSING ASEAN’S EXTERNAL INITIATIVES
Section Introduction by Malcolm Cook 311
59. Trust-Building in Southeast Asia: What Made it Possible? 313
MOHAMED JAWHAR HASSAN
60. South China Sea: Glacial Progress Amid On-Going Tensions 317
IAN STOREY
ASEAN Processes
61. Driving East Asian Regionalism: The Reconstruction of ASEAN’s Identity 323
HERMAN JOSEPH S. KRAFT
62. Pakistan, SAARC and ASEAN Relations 328
FAIZAL YAHYA
63. Neither Skepticism nor Romanticism: The ASEAN Regional Forum as a
Solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game 334
TSUYOSHI KAWASAKI
64. ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism 337
MARK BEESON
65. How the East Asia Summit Can Achieve its Potential 342
NICK BISLEY AND MALCOLM COOK
66. ‘Talking Their Walk’? The Evolution of Defense Regionalism in Southeast Asia 347
SEE SENG TAN
67. ASEAN FTAs: State of Play and Outlook for ASEAN’s Regional and Global Integration 352
RAZEEN SALLY
68. Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs Towards the RCEP 357
YOSHIFUMI FUKUNAGA AND IKUMO ISONO
69. RCEP and TPP: Comparisons and Concerns 362
SANCHITA BASU DAS
Contents ix
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14. 70. Enhancing the Effectiveness of CMIM and AMRO: Selected Immediate
Challenges and Tasks 367
REZA SIREGAR AND AKKHARAPHOL CHABCHITRCHAIDOL
ASEAN’s Major Power Relations
71. ASEAN’s Adventures 373
EVELYN GOH
72. Developing an Enduring Strategy for ASEAN 375
ERNEST Z. BOWER AND MURRAY HIEBERT
73. Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation: The Institutionalization
of Regional Security Cooperation and the Evolution of East Asian Regionalism 378
DAVID ARASE
74. China-ASEAN FTA Changes ASEAN’s Perspective on China 384
WANG YUZHU AND SARAH Y. TONG
75. Japan’s Trade Policy with Asia 388
SHUJIRO URATA
76. Managing Integration in East Asia: Behind Border Issues in Japan-ASEAN
Trade Agreements 392
YOSE RIZAL DAMURI
77. Fortifying the Japan-ASEAN Strategic Partnership: Abe’s Quest for Viable
Hedging Policies 397
SUEO SUDO
78. Prospects for Korean-Southeast Asian Relations 401
LEE JAEHYON
79. China’s Two Silk Roads: Implications for Southeast Asia 404
DAVID ARASE
SECTION VIII: SOUTHEAST ASIA: PERIPHERAL NO MORE
Section Introduction by Ooi Kee Beng 411
80. ASEAN Beyond 2015: The Imperatives for Further Institutional Changes 413
RIZAL SUKMA
81. Design Faults: The Asia Pacific’s Regioinal Architecture 418
ALLAN GYNGELL
82. ASEAN’s Economic Cooperation: Original Vision, Current Practice and
Future Challenges 421
EMIL SALIM
x Contents
15-01549 00 ASEAN Reader.indd 10 21/7/15 9:36 am

15. 83. The 2030 Architecture of Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free
Trade Agreements 425
SUTHIPHAND CHIRATHIVAT AND PITI SRISANGNAM
84. ASEAN and Major Power Transitions in East Asia 429
BILAHARI KAUSIKAN
Bibliography 437
The Contributors 473
The Compilers 485
Contents xi
15-01549 00 ASEAN Reader.indd 11 21/7/15 9:36 am

16. PREFACE
T
his Third Volume of the ASEAN
Reader series is published this year
when the first phase of community-
building in ASEAN is ending, and its next
phase is being charted by the Association’s
political leaders. The forewords to the first
volume by ASEAN Founding Fathers Thanat
Khoman of Thailand and S. Rajaratnam
of Singapore (published in 1992), and to
the second volume by ISEAS Chairman,
Professor Wang Gungwu (published in 2003),
are included to refresh us on the origins of
ASEAN and the continuing challenges the
48-year-old Association has been facing, and
will continue to face into the future.
There are more than 80 articles in this
Volume III by scholars and experts from
Southeast Asia and beyond. They address
issues from different perspectives, from
the long-term view and country analysis, to
comparative issues and specific challenges in
ASEAN, Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific,
to relations of major powers and their
impacts on ASEAN and its members. The
next phase of community-building in ASEAN
beyond 2015 will be more challenging as
the Association and the region face new
and unprecedented challenges from within
and from without. These include intensified
US-China engagement, complex China-
Japan relations, a more confident India,
rising nationalism, widening income gaps
within ASEAN countries, global economic
uncertainties, and threats to human security
in the region from international terrorism
and contagious diseases. To ensure peace,
security and prosperity, individual ASEAN
countries and the region will have to work
closely together in the next phase of ASEAN
community-building. In the coming years,
ASEAN may even see a new member, Timor-
Leste.
Readers interested in the ASEAN Com-
munity and in ASEAN’s external engagements
will find Volume III interesting. So also those
keen to understand issues influencing the
direction of regionalism in Southeast Asia
and to see where the ASEAN Community is
heading. Many of the articles in this third
volume have been published previously,
either by ISEAS or other publishers. We
thank all the publishers for their permission
to use the selected works.
This volume would not have been pos-
sible without the efforts of the editorial
team headed by Dr Ooi Kee Beng, Deputy
Director of ISEAS, and including co-
editors Dr Terence Chong, Dr Cassey Lee,
Dr Malcolm Cook, and Ms Sanchita Basu
Das. Mr Michael Yeo, as editorial assistant,
provided sterling support for the team.
Tan Chin Tiong
Director
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
15-01549 00 ASEAN Reader.indd 12 21/7/15 9:36 am

17. FOREWORD TO THE ASEAN READER
ASEAN: Conception and Evolution
O
n 8 August 1967 the “Bangkok
Declaration” gave birth to ASEAN,
the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, an organization that would unite
five countries in a joint effort to promote
economic co-operation and the welfare of
their peoples.
After repeated unsuccessful attempts in
the past, this event was a unique achievement,
ending the separation and aloofness of the
countries of this region that had resulted
from colonial times when they were forced by
the colonial masters to live in cloisons etanches,
shunning contact with the neighbouring
countries.
In effect this historical event represented
the culmination of the decolonization
process that had started after World War  II.
Following their victory in the war, the colonial
powers tried their best to maintain the status
quo. However, since they had not even
been able to ensure the protection of their
territories against the Japanese invasion,
how could they justify their claim to control
them again. In their defeat, the Japanese
had effectively undermined colonial rule
THANAT KHOMAN
Reprinted from K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique, Chandran Jeshurun, Ananda Rajah, Joseph L.H. Tan, and
Pushpa Thambipillai, comps., The ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), by
kind permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
by granting some form of autonomy or
even independence to the territories they
had earlier invaded, thus sowing the seeds
of freedom from the colonial masters. The
process of decolonization, inside and outside
the United Nations, then advanced at a fast
pace and led to the emergence of a number
of independent and sovereign nations.
This created an entirely novel situation
which necessitated new measures and
structures. Thailand, as the only nation
which had been spared the plight of colonial
subjection thanks to the wisdom and political
skill of its Monarchs, felt it a duty to deal with
the new contingencies. Pridi Panomyong, a
former Prime Minister and statesman, tried to
promote new relationships and co-operation
within the region. I, myself, posted as the
first Thai diplomat in the newly independent
India, wrote a few articles advocating some
form of regional co-operation in Southeast
Asia. But the time was not yet propitious. The
world was then divided by the Cold War into
two rival camps vying for domination over
the other, leading the newly emerging states
to adopt a non-aligned stance.
15-01549 00 ASEAN Reader.indd 13 21/7/15 9:36 am

18. When, as Foreign Minister, I was entrusted
with the responsibility of Thailand’s foreign
relations, I paid visits to neighbouring
countries to forge co-operative relationships
in Southeast Asia. The results were, however,
depressingly negative. Only an embryonic
organization, ASA or the Association of
Southeast Asia, grouping Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand could be set up.
This took place in 1961. It was, nevertheless,
the first organization for regional co-
operation in Southeast Asia.
But why did this region need an
organization for co-operation?
The reasons were numerous. The most
important of them was the fact that, with
the withdrawal of the colonial powers, there
would have been a power vacuum which
could have attracted outsiders to step in
for political gains. As the colonial masters
had discouraged any form of intra-regional
contact, the idea of neighbours working
together in a joint effort was thus to be
encouraged.
Secondly, as many of us knew from
experience, especially with the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization or SEATO, co-operation
among disparate members located in distant
lands could be ineffective. We had therefore
to strive to build co-operation among those
who lived close to one another and shared
common interests.
Thirdly, the need to join forces became
imperative for the Southeast Asian countries
in order to be heard and to be effective. This
was the truth that we sadly had to learn. The
motivation for our efforts to band together
was thus to strengthen our position and
protect ourselves against Big Power rivalry.
Finally, it is common knowledge that
co-operation and ultimately integration
serve the interests of all — something that
individual efforts can never achieve.
However, co-operation is easier said than
done.
Soon after its establishment in 1961, ASA
or the Association of Southeast Asia, the
mini organization comprising only three
members, ran into a snag. A territorial
dispute, relating to a colonial legacy, erupted
between the Philippines and Indonesia on
the one hand and Malaysia on the other. The
dispute centred on the fact that the British
Administration, upon withdrawal from North
Borneo (Sabah), had attributed jurisdiction
of the territory to Malaysia. The konfrontasi,
as the Indonesians called it, threatened
to boil over into an international conflict
as Malaysia asked its ally, Great Britain, to
come to its support and British warships
began to cruise along the coast of Sumatra.
That unexpected turn of events caused the
collapse of the fledgling ASA.
While ASA was paralysed by the dispute
on Sabah, efforts continued to be made
in Bangkok for the creation of another
organization.
Thus in 1966 a larger grouping, with East
Asian nations like Japan and South Korea as
well as Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia,
Taiwan, New Zealand, South Vietnam and
Thailand, was established and known as
ASPAC or the Asian and Pacific Council.
However, once again, calamity struck.
ASPAC was afflicted by the vagaries of
international politics. The admission of the
People’s Republic of China and the eviction
of the Republic of China or Taiwan made it
impossible for some of the Council’s members
to sit at the same conference table. ASPAC
consequently folded up in 1975, marking
another failure in regional co-operation.
With this new misfortune, Thailand, which
had remained neutral in the Sabah dispute,
turned its attention to the problem brewing
to its south and took on a conciliatory
role in the dispute. At the time, I had to
ply between Jakarta, Manila, and Kuala
Lumpur. After many attempts, our efforts
paid off. Preferring Bangkok to Tokyo, the
antagonists came to our capital city to effect
their reconciliation.
At the banquet marking the reconciliation
between the three disputants, I broached
xiv Foreword to The ASEAN Reader: ASEAN: Conception and Evolution
15-01549 00 ASEAN Reader.indd 14 21/7/15 9:36 am

19. the idea of forming another organization for
regional co-operation with Adam Malik, then
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
of Indonesia, the largest country of Southeast
Asia. Malik agreed without hesitation but
asked for time to talk with the powerful
military circle of his government and also to
normalize relations with Malaysia now that
the confrontation was over. Meanwhile, the
Thai Foreign Office prepared a draft charter
of the new institution. Within a few months,
everything was ready. I therefore invited the
two former ASA members, Malaysia and the
Philippines, and Indonesia, a key member, to
a meeting in Bangkok. In addition, Singapore
sent S. Rajaratnam, then Foreign Minister,
to see me about joining the new set-up.
Although the new organization was planned
to comprise only the former ASA members
plus Indonesia, Singapore’s request was
favourably considered.
The first formal meeting of representatives
from the five countries — Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand — was held in the Thai Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. The group then retired
to the seaside resort of Bangsaen (Pattaya
did not exist at that time) where, combining
work with leisure — golf to be more exact
— the ASEAN charter was worked out. After
a couple of days, using the Foreign Office
draft as the basis, the Charter was ready.
The participants returned to Bangkok for
final approval of the draft, and on 8 August
1967, the Bangkok Declaration gave birth to
ASEAN — the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. (ASEAN owes its name to Adam
Malik, master in coining acronyms.)
The formation of ASEAN, the first
successful attempt at forging regional co-
operation, was actually inspired and guided
by past events in many areas of the world
including Southeast Asia itself. The fact that
the Western powers, France and Britain,
reneged on their pacts with Poland and
Czechoslovakia promising protection against
external aggression, was instrumental in
drawing the attention of many countries
to the credibility of assurances advanced
by larger powers to smaller partners. The
lesson drawn from such events encouraged
weak nations to rely more on neighbourly
mutual support than on stronger states that
serve their own national interests rather than
those of smaller partners. For Thailand, in
particular, its disappointing experience with
SEATO taught it the lesson that it was useless
and even dangerous to hitch its destiny to
distant powers who may cut loose at any
moment their ties and obligations with lesser
and distant allies.
Another principle to which we anchored
our faith was that our co-operation should
deal with non-military matters. Attempts
were made by some to launch us on the path
of forming a military alliance. We resisted;
wisely and correctly we stuck to our resolve to
exclude military entanglement and remain
safely on economic ground.
It should be put on record that, for many
of us and for me in particular, our model has
been and still is, the European Community,
not because I was trained there, but because
it is the most suitable form for us living in this
part of the world — in spite of our parallel
economies which are quite different from
the European ones.
However, although we had clearly defined
our aims and aspirations, international
realities forced ASEAN to deviate from its
original path. Several developments began to
preoccupy ASEAN: the defeat and withdrawal
of the United States from Vietnam and even
from the mainland of Asia; the growing
Vietnamese ambitions nurtured by the heady
wine of victory; and the threat of Ho Chi
Minh’s testament enjoining generations of
Vietnamese to take over the rest of French
Indochina in addition to the northeastern
provinces of Thailand. Such developments
forced ASEAN to turn its attention to more
critical issues, like Cambodia, with the result
that economic matters were almost entirely
neglected and set aside.
Foreword to The ASEAN Reader: ASEAN: Conception and Evolution xv
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20. Although not the original plan or
intention of the founders of ASEAN, the
effective and successful opposition to
the implementation of Vietnam’s Grand
Design, using only diplomatic and political
means, won a great deal of plaudits and
international credit, lifting it from an
insignificant grouping of small countries
to a much courted organization with which
more important states now seek to have
contact and dialogue. This has not been a
negligible result. Indeed, ASEAN has greatly
benefited from its deviated performance.
ASEAN has now become a well established
international fixture.
While applauding the successes of the
Association, it is not my intention to pass
over its weaknesses and shortcomings.
In the first place, the partnership spirit
is not fully developed. Some parties seek to
take more than to give even if in choosing
the latter course, they may be able to take
much more later on. Indeed, some of them
do not hesitate to reduce their allotted share
in projects, which, in their opinion, would
not immediately bring the highest return,
and thus they leave the burden to other
members. In fact, it is common practice at
many meetings, to jockey for selfish gains
and advantages, not bearing in mind the
general interest.
Nevertheless, the most serious short-
coming of the present system resides in the
lack of political will as well as the lack of trust
and sincerity towards one another. Yet each
and everyone in their heart realizes that the
advantages of ASEAN accrue to them all, and
no one is thinking of leaving it.
Be that as it may, there is no readiness to
admit to these shortcomings. That is why
they put the blame for these deficiencies
on the Secretariat which was set up by the
governments themselves. Indeed, they
distrust their subordinate officials to the
point that they have not been willing, until
recently, to appoint a Secretary-General
of ASEAN, but only a Secretary-General in
charge of the Secretariat.
Whatever problems exist at present, it
is not my intention to dwell on them. They
should, however, be resolved as expeditiously
and effectively as possible. Personally, I prefer
to look ahead and chart out a course that will
lead to the objectives originally set out, so as
to meet the expectations of our peoples.
The question we should ask is: ASEAN,
quo vadis? Where do we go from here?
To this, I would reply that, first of all, we
must set ourselves on the economic track we
designed for the Association. This is necessary,
even imperative, now more than ever as the
world is being carved into powerful trade
zones that deal with one another instead of
with individual nations. At present, many
countries outside our region are prodding us
to integrate so that a single or more unified
market will simplify and facilitate trade. That
stands to reason and yet it was only in 1992
when all partners were convinced of the
veracity of the proposition, when the then
Thai Prime Minister, Anand Panyarachun,
officially put the idea of an ASEAN Free Trade
Area for discussion at the ASEAN Summit at
Singapore. This meaningful move was logical
since ASEAN was born in Thailand. However,
it may take some fifteen years — as requested
by some members — before a rudimentary
single, integrated market comes into being.
For the months and years to come, gradual
economic integration should be the credo for
ASEAN if we want our enterprise to remain
viable and continue to progress. Otherwise,
it may become stagnant, unable to keep up
with the pace of global activity. In spite of the
Maastricht setback where the Danes voted
against ratifying the Treaty on European
Union, the European Community will most
probably witness sustained expansion with
the addition of former EFTA members as well
as a number of Central and East European
countries waiting to join. Meanwhile, NAFTA
— the North American Free Trade Area — is
coming into being, parallel to another one
further south of the American continent.
Likewise, on the southeast wing of Europe,
Turkey is busy organizing some form of
xvi Foreword to The ASEAN Reader: ASEAN: Conception and Evolution
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21. co-operation with the Islamic states of the
Black Sea region of the defunct Soviet
Union. All these activities should be sufficient
indication that there is an urgent need for
ASEAN to scrutinize itself, to update its role,
and to implement wider and more serious
organizational reforms — measures that are
more meaningful than simply revamping the
Secretariat.
On the non-technical side, political will
and the spirit of partnership greatly need to
be strengthened. In the future, competition
will be severe. Political and economic
pressure through the use of unilateral
measures and threats will be resorted to
without mercy by those who believe in brute
force rather than civilized negotiations, a
method which I call “crowbar” diplomacy
proudly proposed by the “Amazon Warrior”
before the legislative authorities of her
country. Without appropriate adjustments
and improvements, ASEAN may lose in the
race for survival. And time is of the essence.
ASEAN, in my opinion, does not have much
leeway to idle or doodle. We should realize
that two or three years are all we really have
to implement urgent reforms.
While the pursuit of economic aims, as
originally assigned, is essential, it does not
mean the Association should abandon the
considerable political gains it has made. On
the contrary, ASEAN should continue to
build upon the prestige and recognition that
the outside world has accorded it. The results
of ASEAN’s past performance especially in
the resistance against Vietnamese military
conquests and territorial expansionism, as
well as the unqualified success in preserving
peace and stability against all odds, are
evident. Without doubt, ASEAN must
strive to consolidate these assets which will
complement its efforts on the economic side.
In other words, the arduous task ahead for
the Association will be a double- or triple-
track endeavour which can be crowned
with success provided that the weaknesses
mentioned earlier are remedied and all the
members, for their own good and that of
their people, decide to carry out their duties
and obligations with determination and a
sense of purpose.
On the other hand, we should foresee
that, in time to come, not only will ASEAN
have to face the difficult task of creating and
maintaining harmony among its members
who have different views, different interests,
and are of different stages of development
— factors that in the past have made the
adoption of needed reforms so uneasy —
but ASEAN will also have to cope with the
extremely complicated problems of dealing
with hard-nosed opponents and interlocutors
among the developed countries.
Finally, as with all organizations and
entities, ASEAN will have to realize that it will
not be nor can it be the ultimate creation.
In truth, it should be only a stepping stone,
a preliminary or intermediate stage in the
process of international development. As
the world progresses, so will ASEAN. At this
juncture, everyone within the Association is
aware of this reality. It should be prepared
to move on to the next stage and raise its
sights towards wider horizons. Some nascent
possibilities like PECC (the Pacific Economic
Co-operation Council) and APEC (the Asia
Pacific Economic Co-operation forum) are
already in existence and more or less ready
to bloom into something more stable and
viable. So far, ASEAN members have not
been willing to merge with the new entities,
for various reasons, the most important of
which may be a lack of conviction in the
latters’ viability. Perhaps correctly, ASEAN
members prefer to wait for more convincing
indications assuring them of their capacity
to survive. They continue to insist that
ASEAN remains the nucleus from which
peripheral relationships might radiate.
This is not an unwise approach, apparently
dictated by realism and caution in view of
the audacity and increasing arrogance of
certain major powers. A precipitous decision
may result in undesirable entanglement or
worse strangulation. Nevertheless, it may
be wise for ASEAN not to lose sight of two
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22. important countries further to the south of
Asia — Australia and New Zealand. If and
when, they should express a clear willingness
and desire to play a genuine partnership
role, they should be welcome to join in any
common endeavour. Their contribution
will undoubtedly increase the strength
and capacity of our existing and future co-
operative undertakings, thus enabling us to
meet with every chance of success in future
encounters and negotiations with similar
entities of other continents.
Lately, ASEAN has taken up a new
assignment by engaging in discussions on
security matters, more precisely on the
Spratly Islands which are claimed by a
number of nations, including Vietnam and
the People’s Republic of China. The dispute
threatened to erupt into an armed conflict
after concessions for oil exploration were
granted by the People’s Republic of China
to some American oil companies. If one
or more contestants resort to violence the
dispute may degenerate into an ugly conflict
thereby disrupting the peace and stability of
the region. For that reason, Indonesia has
already been moved to organize “workshop”
discussions to explore the possibility of an
acceptable solution.
In the light of the Spratly problem, the
ASEAN members prepared a draft “Code of
International Behaviour” which rules out any
resort to violence. This draft was tabled at the
Manila Ministerial Meeting in 1992 which
approved it, as did the PRC and Vietnam,
a dialogue partner and a signatory of the
ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Co-operation
respectively. This was what ASEAN could
do, although it was only a moral gesture.
Obviously, it could not obtain from the main
parties to the dispute, a categorical pledge
not to resort to violence. It may not be much.
It was nevertheless better than nothing and
certainly better than to bury one’s head in
the sand. It is hoped that in this, as in any
other case, wisdom and restraint will prevail.
What will ultimately be the fate of ASEAN?
To this question, I am ready to offer a candid
reply, forgetting my role as a co-founder of
the Association. My faith in the usefulness
and “serviceability” of ASEAN cannot and
will not diminish. If anything, members will
find it beneficial to strengthen it. This is the
rationale. In the post Cold War world, the
Western countries find it fit to assert with little
restraint or moderation their ascendancy and
dominance, and some even seek to establish
their hegemony over the entire world by
claiming undisputed leadership in a so-called
New World Order framework because of the
absence of Soviet challenge and rivalry. The
ultimate result would be that other nations
will, ipso facto, become nothing but mere
pawns of different size. The smaller ones will
shrink still further and become even smaller
and less significant. In fact, they will count
less on the world scene than before the
advent of the New World Order. Therefore,
if they do not combine their minuscule
strength, they will lose all meaning. Now
the only place where they can do something
with a measure of success is none other than
the ASEAN forum. Therefore, for our own
interests, we cannot afford to be oblivious of
this plain truth and fail to act accordingly.
Bangkok
1 September 1992
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23. FOREWORD TO THE ASEAN READER
ASEAN: The Way Ahead
I
f the last decade of the 20th century, to
whose final death throes we are now the
unhappy witnesses, can be termed the
Age of Nationalism, then the 21st century,
whose pale dawn is visible over the horizon,
can be aptly described as the Coming Age
of Regionalism. This Foreword focuses
on regionalism rather than on ASEAN
because the latter is no more than a local
manifestation of a global political, economic
and cultural development which will shape
the history of the next century.
Should regionalism collapse, then ASEAN
too will go the way of earlier regional attempts
like SEATO, ASA and MAPHILINDO. All that
remains today of these earlier experiments
are their bleached bones. Should the new
regional efforts collapse, then globalism, the
final stage of historical development, will
also fall apart. Then we will inevitably enter
another Dark Ages and World War III, fought
this time not with gun-powder, but with
nuclear weapons far more devastating than
those exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
S. RAJARATNAM
Reprinted from K.S. Sandhu, Sharon Siddique, Chandran Jeshurun, Ananda Rajah, Joseph L.H. Tan, and
Pushpa Thambipillai, comps., The ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), by
kind permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Modern technology and science are
pushing the world simultaneously in the
direction of regionalism and globalism.
What is responsible for today’s economic
disintegration, disorder and violence is the
resistance offered by nationalism to the
irresistible counter-pressures of regionalism
and globalism.
As of today, there are only two functioning
and highly respected regional organizations
in the world. They are, in order of their
importance and seniority, the European
Community (EC) and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The first
came into being in 1957 and the second in
1967. A mere ten years separates the two.
The population of the European Community
as at 1990 was 350 million, and that of
ASEAN an estimated 323 million. In terms of
population, they are not all that unequal. In
terms of political and economic dynamism,
though, the gap is qualitatively wider. The
economic dynamism and the proven political
cohesion of ASEAN is nevertheless slowly
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24. xx Foreword to The ASEAN Reader: ASEAN: The Way Ahead
but steadily narrowing the gap between the
European Community and ASEAN. To com­ -
pare ASEAN with the so-called Little Dragons
of Asia is to compare unrelated political
species. The Little Dragons are lone wolves
hunting separately. They lack collective
strength or awareness. With them it is a case
of each wolf for itself. In the case of ASEAN,
as integration proceeds, its strength will be
the cohesiveness of over 300 million people
with far greater resources than any of the
lone baby dragons.
The most remarkable feature about the
two regional organizations is their continuity
and coherence despite the persistence
and often unmanageable turbulence and
tensions that have and still characterize
the post-war world. There have been some
100 international, civil, racial and religious
conflicts. Far from abating, these are
growing in number. By comparison the
European Community and ASEAN are the
still centres in the eye of the storm. There
is apprehension that chaos, not order, is the
draft of world politics and economies today.
For many, the expectation is that tomorrow
will be worse than yesterday and that history
has been a descent from the Golden Age
to the Dark Ages. To quote the poet Yeats,
though the world is seemingly intact: “Things
fall apart, the centre cannot hold.”
Yet the two multi-racial and multi-cultural
regional organizations I have mentioned
continue to grow in maturity, cohesive-
ness, and confidence. They believe that
regionalism can survive the buffeting winds
and storms.
The European Community, unlike ASEAN,
has had far more experience with regional
organization because its founding members,
in particular Britain, France, Holland,
Belgium and even Germany participated in
the creation and management of far-flung
complex global empires. Their scientific
and technological cultures were many light
years ahead of all preceding cultures and
civilizations. However eminent and admirable
pre-European traditional civilizations were,
the 19th and 20th century culture created
by the West cannot be surpassed or displaced
by invoking ancient creeds. Only Japan has
so far demonstrated that the gap between
medieval and modern cultures can be
narrowed and possibly over taken. Moreover,
only Western nations and Japan have
demonstrated a capacity for constructing
massive modern empires, though un-
fortunately, they demonstrated this by their
ability to organize and unleash modern wars.
No Asian nation, however, has fought, let
alone won, wars of comparable magnitude.
Saddam Hussein’s chest-thumping has the
resonance of hollow drums.
Western Europeans have over a period of
500 years built a chain of multi-racial and
multinational empires that at their peak
stretched from Portugal and Spain to the
Pacific shores of Russia, and parts of Asia and
Africa. So reconstituting a West European
regional community should be child’s play
for them.
But creating and managing, within a
brief period of only 25 years, an ASEAN
community of six economically and in-
dustrially underdeveloped peoples who had
no experience of administering a modern,
complex multi-racial regional organization
verges, in my view, on the miraculous.
The reach of the ancient empires of
Greece, Rome, China, India, Persia and
Babylon, ruled by allegedly Divine emperors,
was ludicrously short and their claims of
being rulers of world empires were fanciful
exaggerations. The effective extent of their
empires did not go beyond the palace and
surrounding villages.
Modern nationalism, regionalism and
globalism are of a different order politically,
economically and even psychologically.
Nationalism is a 19th century concept.
Earlier forms of nationalism were, in fact,
imperialism. It united petty principalities,
states and clans into nations. These have now
outlived their usefulness.
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25. Foreword to The ASEAN Reader: ASEAN: The Way Ahead xxi
But regionalism is based on concepts
and aspirations of a higher order. Asian
regionalism was first launched on 25 April
1955 at Bandung. It was initially a com-
prehensive Afro-Asian Conference presided
over by Heads of Government. It included
legendary figures like Sukarno, Nehru,
Zhou Enlai, Kotalawela of what was then
Ceylon, Sihanouk and Mohammed Ali, the
Prime Minister of Pakistan. However, this
regional effort did not last long. Asian and
African nationalisms which helped speed up
the collapse of Western, and later Japanese
imperialisms, did not last long.
Within a few years after its founding,
not only Afro-Asian solidarity but also the
solidarity of individual Asian and African
nation states was in disarray. The destruction
of nationalism is today being brought about,
not by Western imperialism, which had
already grown weary, thanks to two world
wars, of holding sway over palm and pine, but
by Third World nationalism. The economic
and political underpinnings of European
nationalisms were in fact, even before the start
of the 20th century, beginning to crack. In
fact, Lord Acton, towards the end of the 19th
century, predicted the inevitable collapse
of nationalism. I quote his judgement —
“Nationality does not aim either at liberty or
prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the
imperative necessity of making the nation
the mould and measure of the state. It will
be marked by material and moral ruin.” This
prophecy is as accurate today as it was when
Lord Acton made it in 1862. So was Karl
Marx’s prophecy about the inevitable collapse
of nationalism but for different reasons. He
predicted the overthrow of nationalism and
capitalism by an international proletariat. So
did Lenin and so did Mao with their clarion
call of: “Workers of the World unite.”
Internationalism has a long history.
Chinese, Christians, Greeks, Romans and
Muslims were never tired of announcing
themselves as “World Rulers”. However, after
World War II, empires went out of fashion. It
is today being gradually replaced by a more
rational form of political and economic
organization.
The early years of the 20th century
witnessed, for example, experiments with
a novel form of regionalism — continental
regionalism. It was formed by simply
prefixing the word “Pan” to the continents
of Europe, Asia and America — Pan-Europa,
Pan-America and Pan-Asia, of which Japan,
after having in 1905 defeated the Russian
fleet in one of the most decisive naval battles
ever fought in the Tsushima Straits, became
Asia’s most persistent publicist. After World
War II, Pan-African and Pan-Arab move-
ments were added to the list. However, these
early “Pan” movements have since then
either collapsed totally or are in the process
of violent disintegration because of dissen-
sion on grounds of race, religion, language
or nation.
However, the word “Pan” has recently
been revived in East Europe. It is called
“Pan-Slavism” and is today being revived
with bloody vengeance. The multi-racial and
multi-cultural Yugoslav nation that President
Tito created during World War II and which
is today being torn apart is a grim warning
of what can happen to nations possessed by
racial and religious demons.
The new regionalism that is now emerging
out of the ruins of post-World War II
national­ ism appears to have learnt from
the errors of the past. A more sophisticated
and realistic form of regionalism is being
constructed, not as an end in itself but as
the means towards a higher level of political,
social and economic organization.
I propose to do no more than list the
names of some of the new regionalisms now
taking shape. Basic to this approach is that
there is not going to be any sudden great
leap forward from regionalism to globalism.
However, none of the new regionalisms
now taking shape are as bold as either the
European Community or ASEAN. The latter
two are more rationally focussed regionalism.
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26. But a word of caution is necessary. We must
know how to handle these new regionalisms
intelligently. They could be steps towards
global peace, progress and cultural
development or they could be fuel for
World War III.
Foremost among the new regional
approaches is the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific
Economic Co-operation forum. Among the
many other regional concepts waiting in
the wings are: the Organisation of Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD);
the Group of Seven (G7); East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC); Pacific Economic
Co-operation Conference (PECC); the
amiable Little Dragons of South Korea,
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan for which
no acronym has yet been announced. There
are also the distant rumbles of the possible
emergence of Big Dragons but as a Chinese
saying goes: “There is a lot of noise in the
stairways, but nobody has so far entered the
room.” One fervently hopes that when a Big
Dragon turns up, it would be an amiable
Great Dragon and one which would know its
way around the Spratly and Paracel Islands
but without being a Dragon in a China shop.
World War II started, it must be remembered,
simply because the German and Japanese
Dragons got their maps all wrong.
Real regionalism requires a world-view if
it is not to lose its way in the global world
of modern technology and science. It must
also have a rational and deep understanding
of the new history which is being shaped
not by heroic individuals, but through the
co-operative interaction of some 5 billion
people who today live in a vastly shrunken
planet and who, thanks to growing literacy
and fast-as-light electronic communication,
are better informed about the world we live
in than earlier generations.
Nobody, not even super-computers can
predict what will happen when each day the
flow of history is cumulatively determined
by individual decisions made by 5 billion
human beings who are asserting their right
to a decent and just society. Fewer and
fewer people today believe that oppression,
hunger and injustice is God’s will to which
they must meekly submit. People today know
the difference between “Let us pray” and
“Let us prey”.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse
of communism has, in no way, made for a
more peaceful world. Wars have ended in the
Western world but not so elsewhere. World
War III, should it ever be unleashed, would
be the last war mankind will ever fight.
As a student of history, I believe that it is
not common ideals but common fears that
generally hold groups and nations together.
The moment the common fear disappears,
the brotherhood becomes an arena for
dissension, conflict and even bloodshed.
Two world wars and what is going on in
Africa, Asia and Central Europe provide
ample proof that we live in dangerous times
today.
However, I believe there is evidence
suggesting that ASEAN is an exception to
the rule. ASEAN was born on 8 August 1967
out of fear rather than idealistic convictions
about regionalism. As one of the two still
surviving founder members of ASEAN (the
other being Dr Thanat Khoman) I can attest
to the triumph of fear over ideals.
The anticipated military withdrawal of
the Americans from Vietnam in the eighties
raised the spectre of falling non-communist
dominoes in Southeast Asia. It appeared
then that both the East and West winds of
communism had joined forces to sweep over
Southeast Asia.
Fortunately, Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand
came to ASEAN’s rescue. The Sino-Soviet
split started. The East and West communist
winds were suddenly blowing in contrary
directions.
The second outburst of ASEAN fear was in
December–January 1980 when Vietnam with
the backing of the Soviet Union proclaimed
the liberation of not only its Indochina
xxii Foreword to The ASEAN Reader: ASEAN: The Way Ahead
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27. Empire but also of the whole of Southeast
Asia.
Fortunately for the first time in the history
of an Asian regionalism, ASEAN, instead
of trembling with fear, dug its toes in and
decided to stand up against a Vietnam that
had never ceased to boast that it had defeated
two great Western powers in Vietnam — first
the French and then the Americans.
So in the case of Vietnam, it was not belief
in regionalism but resolution, born out of
common fear, that eventually brought about
the collapse of communist Vietnam.
Today a new fear haunts ASEAN and
which, I believe, now makes inevitable the
emergence of ASEAN regional solidarity,
and, no less important, the actualization
of the ASEAN Free Trade Area or AFTA.
I also believe this solidarity will manifest
itself politically and militarily so long as a
common fear persists.
Singapore
1 September 1992
Foreword to The ASEAN Reader: ASEAN: The Way Ahead xxiii
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28. FOREWORD TO THE SECOND ASEAN READER
New Challenges for ASEAN
N
o one in the 1950s expected that
anti-colonialism in Southeast Asia
would give way to anti-communism
and that this would be followed less than
40 years later by the triumph of capitalism.
That last triumph did not mean that there
would be greater certainty in the region.
ASEAN has had to adjust to a world dominated
by a single superpower. Since September 11,
2001, this dominance is starker still and all
countries face a newly aroused United States
of America. ASEAN will have to see if it now
has more choice to pick its own script or will
be told what new role it has to play. There are
signs, however, that a series of changes may
have stirred ASEAN to new life.
After 35 years, this is a more mature
ASEAN, whose member states have survived
experiments with different regional
organizations and have had their wits
sharpened considerably by that experience.
They now know better how small and
medium-sized states can survive and how
they must generate innovative thinking if
they want to prosper. Since the financial crisis
WANG GUNGWU
Reprinted from Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar, comps., The Second ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), by kind permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
of 1997, they have been given additional
lessons about the effects of globalization and
become sensitive to the pressures from non-
state actors and other transnational groups.
The essays selected in this volume tell us
how ASEAN has adapted to the radical and
unpredictable changes that have dogged the
organization since its foundation and how it
might deal with uncertainties in the future.
The victory of liberal capitalism in a
globalized market economy requires that all
Southeast Asian states be alert to America’s
policies in the region if they want to maximize
the benefits to themselves. It is, of course, not
enough to do that. They must continue to
look to the economic might of Japan whose
commitments in Southeast Asia from before
the foundation of ASEAN have been of major
importance to the region’s development. It
is obviously in ASEAN’s interest to ensure
that Japan remains committed. In addition,
a nuclear South Asia and the awakening of
India’s high-tech entrepreneurship has great
potential for the region’s security as well as
the future growth of the ASEAN economies.
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29. Foreword to The Second ASEAN Reader: New Challenges for ASEAN xxv
Nevertheless, given America’s fresh interest
in Asia, China’s role requires close attention.
Now that America does not need to balance
the ambitions of the Soviet Union, its
relations with the People’s Republic of
China have become vital. Increasingly, that
relationship will impact directly on ASEAN.
Should that become volatile, it could place in
considerable strain the historical differences
among ASEAN members in their attitudes
towards the PRC.
The newest challenges have come from the
war in Iraq. September 11 had galvanized the
American people to a war in Afghanistan that
provoked different reactions among ASEAN
members. The states that faced terrorism
threats of their own were quick to show
sympathy, while states where the majority of
the population is Muslim have been careful
how much they should say or do. The war in
Iraq has intensified the region’s concerns.
It was not surprising that the United States
won the war quickly. But the uncertainties
afterwards are less predictable. How they
will play out for each ASEAN member state
will depend on two factors that provide
special challenges for ASEAN. I refer to the
sensitivities of countries with large Muslim
populations, and the growing China factor
in the larger East Asian region. China, of
course, has always been there to the region’s
north and Islam had penetrated deeply into
parts of the Malay world for 700 years. Both
are known variables, but the challenges are
now more sharply focused.
In Southeast Asia, what its Muslim
extremists may do is unlikely to lead to
anything like massive American interventions
as in the Vietnam War. U.S. national interests
are too peripheral to the region for ASEAN
members to be so threatened. At most, this
may allow the American government to
pressure the national elites of each country
to crack down on groups that support the
enemies of the United States. For the ASEAN
members who have benefited from American
aid for decades, this is nothing new. But
for them to single out their own Muslim
nationals in any discriminatory way would be
unacceptable.
China provides yet another dimension in
ASEAN’s relations with the outside world.
Its Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism do
not match Islam in its capacity to advance
universalist claims. Chinese values have been
essentially agrarian and constrained by its
deep-rooted bureaucracy. But the fact is,
China’s physical and population size backed
by an ancient lineage, with strong ideals of
unity and cultural superiority, has enabled
it to resist the claims of alien universalist
faiths. Thus, although the Chinese cannot
mount a serious challenge to modern values
by appealing to their own past, they have the
critical mass to absorb and digest whatever
they wish to take from other cultures.
What is more relevant, China is close to
home. It is the land neighbour of three of
its members, and within easy reach to two
others on the mainland. Although peaceful
trading has been the norm and relations had
been mainly personal and feudal, China has
been able, for at least the last 600 years, to
exert pressure across the land borders from
the provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan. Will
future relations always be based on principles
of sovereignty and state equality? Will the
new China genuinely encourage multilateral
relations through ASEAN regionalism? China
has sought to transform residual suspicions
in the region by engaging ASEAN as an
economic entity. It might even use ASEAN
to help overcome the present barriers to a
larger East Asian regionalism.
At another level, China is a fast growing
economy that competes with Southeast Asia
for foreign investment and markets. This
could become a severe test of regional co-
operation in the decades to come, but it may
well be the challenge that the region needs to
raise ASEAN to a higher level of co-operation.
Furthermore, most of the descendants of
Chinese immigrants who have settled in
Southeast Asia still retain links with “Greater
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30. xxvi Foreword to The ASEAN Reader: New Challenges for ASEAN
China” (the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Macao). Their entrepreneurial skills and
family and language networks could serve
both their adopted countries and whichever
parts of China they choose to work with. It is
expected that these local citizens of Chinese
descent would provide some of the bridges
that ASEAN and “Greater China” might want
to have in the future. But if closer relations
fail to ameliorate the economic discrepancies
that arise, what economic levers will the
government in Beijing use? Given that this
is still unknown, Southeast Asian leaders
may try harder to strengthen their intra-
region collaboration and also ensure that
their economic links be further extended to
the Asia-Pacific, South Asia and other major
economic groupings.
Southeast Asia does not have strong
cards to play with. If ASEAN is perceived as
ineffectual and possibly vulnerable to both
Muslim extremists and PRC blandishments,
interested powers like the United States
are likely to go back to bilateral links to
support their own vital interests. China and
a de-stabilized Muslim world impinge on
different sectors of Southeast Asian society
and politics. The region’s dilemma is that,
if it chooses to depend on the United States
as the superpower, it risks internal divisions
between those who prefer Asian com-
promises and those who want U.S. guarantees.
ASEAN members recognize that they live in a
world where the United States seeks absolute
security for itself. If that remains so in the
foreseeable future, the choices for Southeast
Asia, with or without its ASEAN structure,
are limited. The only alternative is to join
other interested groups to persuade the
superpower not to depend on military might
or adjust to the sole superpower’s priorities.
Singapore
27 August 2003
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31. Section I
ASEAN: THE LONG VIEW
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33. INTRODUCTION
Ooi Kee Beng
T
he history of Southeast Asia is a
chequered one. Not only are we talking
about a region dissected for several
hundred years by colonial expediencies, we
are also dealing with its bifurcated geography:
the southern territories largely configured
by coastal ways of life, and the northern
territories by riverine and agricultural
activities. The political systems and thoughts
that flowed out of these were therefore
understandably dissimilar. Layer upon layer
of external influences placed over centuries
are clearly evident, affecting various areas
differently. The Indic and Buddhist kingdoms
of old, for example, were overwhelmed by
latter-day Muslim regimes in the archipelago,
but not in continental Southeast Asia. Along
the eastern coastline of Indo-China, it was a
Sinic influence instead that remained strong
for two millennia. In so-called modern times,
European powers laid claim to whatever areas
other European powers had not yet called
their possession — at least until the Japanese
expelled them in 1942.
The Europeans could not reclaim these
liberated lands in 1945, and in the few places
where they persisted — they could not hold
them for long. Worse still, they could not
reclaim their old authority. Thus, the region
went through an essential transformation
after the Second World War, and ended up
as a jigsaw of nation-states, an alignment that
suited some more than others. Since 1968,
however, the ambition to construct a regional
body — ASEAN — is being gradually fulfilled.
In this section, Wang Gungwu discusses
how “Southeast Asia” evolved as a concept,
and how — despite the trading routes that
passed through the seas in the region — it
was never as important as the continental silk
route in Central Asia was. ASEAN, as Wang
sees it, is also essentially different from the
European Union and comparisons between
the two should be made with caution. In
his piece, Nicholas Tarling deliberates the
history of regionalism in Southeast Asia,
and the complex conditions under which
the attempts at regional cooperation have
operated. This is followed by Narongchai
Akrasanee’s revelation of the diplomatic
context for key achievements in ASEAN’s
development towards economic integration.
Finally, Rodolfo Severino — drawing upon
his insider’s knowledge on the workings
of ASEAN as an organization — examines
its development from its origins. He charts
ASEAN’s shifting concerns from security
matters during the Cold War, to economic
cooperation, and the present bold search
— informed by the pursuit of geo-security
— for an ASEAN that is broadly and deeply
integrated.
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35. 1. SOUTHEAST ASIA AND
FOREIGN EMPIRES
WANG GUNGWU
Reprinted in excerpted form from Ooi Kee Beng, “Southeast Asia and Foreign Empires”, in The Eurasian Core
and Its Edges: Dialogues with Wang Gungwu on the History of the World (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2015), pp. 94–140, by kind permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Ooi Kee Beng: May I suggest that we continue
discussing Southeast Asia as a concept?
Wang Gungwu: As I mentioned earlier, the
term really came out of World War II, from the
Mountbatten Command in Colombo, which
was called the South East Asia Command.
The term stuck, and it did so because of the
advent of decolonization. The British and
the Americans found it useful, and I think
the French and Dutch followed thereafter.
Decolonization made them think of the
region’s future, which they feared would be
similar to what had become of the Balkans —
fragmented, and in effect a power vacuum.
European experiences were transposed on to
the region, and the notion was that, where
there is fragmentation, big powers would
intervene. So a quick look around showed
an independent but fragile India on one
side, and on the other, Communist China,
one of the five powers in the United Nations
Security Council.
The strategic planners saw a potential
political vacuum, and to get down to work
they needed a coordinated bigger picture.
Identifying Southeast Asia as one region
helped them visualize the future. This
didn’t happen immediately, by the way.
The Americans took some time to accept it
because they thought in terms of East Asia,
or the Western Pacific. They never looked
at South Asia much, the way the British and
the French did. On their side, Europeans
saw India and they saw China; and they saw
the region in between as a residue. So the
French used the term “Indochine”, which is
very interesting because it showed that the
French had understood the area to be a bit of
China and a bit of India. For Western powers
that had been moving eastwards, this area
would have indeed been orientated through
references to India and China.
OKB: In the early days, the British were
denoting the region as “Farther India”.
WGW: Farther India, yes. They were thinking
in terms of the projection of British power
out of India, an extension into the Malay
Peninsula and into Burma. Burma was
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36. 6 Wang Gungwu
actually managed as a province of India, a
tail end of India; something the Burmese
have never forgiven them for. So their view
was always India-centred. The Americans
however were concerned with the Philippines
and Japan, and tended strategically to be
China-centred.
It is significant that “Southeast Asia” is
really a British conception. The Americans
eventually saw that it could be useful, but even
then, this was more among the academics.
The strategic thinkers still largely thought
in terms of East Asia. Even the universities
subsumed Southeast Asia under East Asia;
only a few took up the idea of Southeast Asia
studies, such as Cornell, and then eventually
Michigan and Berkeley. But many other
universities didn’t! The British were very
early on that front. Take London University’s
School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS) for example, which immediately had
a Southeast Asia division, alongside South
Asia, and East Asia. I think London University
already had that clear idea about this, while
Oxbridge took a little while longer, because
they were not that interested, and they were
looking at the classical era. So I would say
it’s a post-war British conception, which was
eventually accepted by everybody, and by
strategists.
…
OKB: Can one describe Southeast Asia
historically through Silk Road, or trade
routes, politics? The ports were not sufficient
in themselves. Instead, they were quite
peripheral in the larger context, and survived
because they were part of the trading
activities going on between the empires.
WGW: That’s a very interesting way of
describing it. It is apparent where the
continental side is concerned. Where the
maritime side is concerned, we are dealing
with a very new perspective, with the Silk
Road image being transposed on to the sea.
The Silk Road in the north was still basically a
Eurasian power system, with areas in between
and with powerful states at both ends. So it
was always the part in between that expressed
the relationship between different ends.
I won’t say the maritime system in
Southeast Asia was like the Silk Road. We
think of the Silk Road as having the Roman
Empire and the Han Empire at the far ends,
and in between there were the Iranian
Empire, the Arabs and even the Moghul
Empire. The routes in between all these were
in areas nobody took the trouble to control,
since they were based in oases surrounded by
desert. And they were not agrarian like these
powers were. There are similarities enough
for us to apply this pattern to the maritime
region in Southeast Asia. But the one was the
Eurasian centre, while the other was on the
edges and was not regarded as significant.
In terms of political power and even wealth
generation, Southeast Asia was not that
important. The essential economic power
came from agrarian surplus supporting the
political system, the army, the garrisons, and
so on.
OKB: Today, ASEAN groups together a
number of states, all of which know how
vulnerable they are individually. For them to
stay united and enhance their credibility, they
have to be each other’s peers and to always
make decisions unanimously.
WGW: This is a by-product of being
between India and China. From day one,
decolonization took place under the shadow
of the great powers and was affected by how
these were planning their own futures. Even
though unspoken, the underlying thought
which the British had already come up with
— and in that way we are still a product
of that imagination — was that sooner or
later the region as a whole will be clamped
between India and China. So what do you
do? If you are Balkanized, you will always be
subject to one or the other. They sold the
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37. Southeast Asia and Foreign Empires 7
idea that they could help us, which they are
still doing. The Americans joined in, and
so Britain and America basically offered a
guarantee that if we welcomed them, they
would help us against the two powers. The
Cold War, of course, increased the sense of
urgency throughout the region. One side
had become communist, and the other side
was capitalist.
So decolonization taking place during the
Cold War was the full context. The underlying
idea was that these places between India
and China offered a strategic opportunity
for the West. And now we have President
Obama’s pivot to the region. India is no
threat today, so they focus on China. You
have a counterbalancing act going on, and
this is where Australia comes in. Whether
they like it or not, Australia represents the
West. They are here in the neighbourhood!
So if Australia participates, then the West is
in the region.
OKB: They are more than just deputy sheriff
to the Americans then?
WGW: They are actually integral to the whole
set-up. Having U.S. marines in Darwin doing
elaborate surveillance from the south is not
accidental. It is an extension of the whole
process, and the justification for that is that
Southeast Asia needs protection. At the same
time, the Southeast Asians who worry about
India and China feel that the only chance
they have is to let the West in. If you look at
the economics alone, the whole of Southeast
Asia is not as strong as China or Japan, or
even Korea. India still has some problems in
South Asia, and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka
create some awkwardness for the Indians,
but basically the gap is still frighteningly big,
and so the Southeast Asians feel justified in
allowing the West a role. It makes them sleep
better at night.
That is why we have the business of ASEAN
being in the driver’s seat. The language is
very interesting, because putting it that way
justifies the third leg — not only India and
China, but also the West. This centrality of
Southeast Asia is based on an assumption
that this will forever be the only way that
Southeast Asians can feel secure, locked
as they are between those two. This pro-
ceeds from the post-1945 process of de-
colonization. There is an extraordinary and
interesting continuity here, and I would say
it is the brainchild of the British — British
idea, American capacity and Australia as the
instrument of their partnership; altogether
guaranteeing security and stability for the
Southeast Asians.
OKB: They handled their retreat very well,
didn’t they, the British?
WGW: Beautifully! Look at the British
Commonwealth. It was a brilliant invention.
Most people now dismiss it, but I would advise
against that. The idea is extremely powerful.
It doesn’t depend on power; it depends on
diplomacy and negotiated agreements and
a sharing of insights about what the future
should look like strategically. And if you look
at it that way, then the Commonwealth has a
different, though seemingly minor, function.
It is there to provide a backdrop upon which
a lot of other things can take place. A sense
of sharing of political culture can continue
via the Commonwealth. It doesn’t offer any
clear alternative, but it is an alternative, to
either India or China. That’s all you need,
actually.
The Commonwealth remains peripheral
though, because in the end you do need a solid
territorial base; and that is why ASEAN — the
Southeast Asian Ten — was an extraordinary
step forward. It has not been very long since
the last member joined. Cambodia came in
1999, only fifteen years ago. So it’s too early
to say whether it will succeed or fail. It’s just
beginning, just growing into a three-sided
reality, with Southeast Asia in the centre. It’s
brilliant. The ASEAN peoples all know this.
So do the other players.
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38. 8 Wang Gungwu
OKB: The common tendency to study ASEAN
by comparing it to the EU misses the point
entirely then.
WGW: The EU is different. I think the EU
is only important to us in the sense that we
look at how far one can go without getting
into big trouble. We watch what they do and
learn from their mistakes, and if there are
ideas there which will help us, then we can
take them. But it cannot be a model; it’s a
totally different story. ASEAN is entirely
strategic. The EU had strategic origins as
well, what with NATO and the Cold War; but
that is all over, so it is a different story now.
The dynamics are different.
I use the Mediterranean concept because
I think what will make the Anglo-Americans
and the Indians even happier is if they can
complete this arc from Japan all the way
down to India, and so contain China. They
would then feel safe. You would then see the
South China Sea as a real Mediterranean.
Keeping the Chinese out of the Indian Ocean
and the western Pacific is part of this policy
of containment. So the South China Sea
remains the final region needed to complete
this picture. Should they succeed, then you
will have a Mediterranean setting stretching
from Japan and Korea down to Java and
the Malay Peninsula, dividing two sides
completely, just as the Muslim and Christian
worlds are separated by the Mediterranean.
The West knows that they cannot incorporate
China into their story. China is too big, too
powerful and too rich, and it has too much
of its own history. This is the reality that they
have to accept.
Now, on the Chinese side, many of their
leaders accept the reality that they are not
able to challenge the United States. What
they want is to be sure that they are safe from
external attack and intervention. That’s all
they want. To do that, they must have a very
special relationship with the United States.
In between, however, there are many
proxies, so who knows what will happen there.
That’s a situation that has to be managed. It
is in a way the expression of a long stand-off
between those two sides. How big or small
the arc will be, and who will be included or
excluded is for the future to decide.
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39. S
outheast Asia has secured over the past
half century both a large measure of
interstate peace and cooperation and
a degree of autonomy from great powers
outside the region that few observers had
hoped for and scarcely any anticipated.
Those have been coupled with a measure
of economic and social development that,
though far from equitable in its coverage and
set back by a major crisis in the late 1990s,
also indicated a remarkable transformation.
A region of revolt had become a region that
invited investment, though also speculation.
To that the work of ASEAN (Association
of South East Asian Nations) has made
a substantial contribution. Many were
disappointed with its slow progress towards
the cooperative economic projects that it
set out as its priority. What was achieved was
what that vaunted priority in fact, by design
or otherwise, tended to conceal, a practice of
political collaboration that in the event was
to open up much wider economic prospects.
By contrast to the European regional
project, ASEAN was avowedly based on the
nation-state. That was the prime source of
its success, though some would also say its
ultimate limitation. The region had come
almost entirely under the formal rule of
Western powers and been segmented into
parts of their empires. Within the frontiers
they had created or affirmed, however,
their rule had come to be contested by
a nationalism that they had also helped
to create. Within the colonial states they
built up, an alternative leadership offered
the way to modernity. The destruction of
the Western empires by the Japanese gave
it, rather unwittingly, an opportunity it
would not otherwise have had so soon or
perhaps so amply. But its achievement, the
winning of independence, was won piece-by-
piece, colony by colony, and the new states,
though claiming as modern states now did,
to be nation-states, inherited the colonial
frontiers. Just as the colonial states had little
in common but their colonialism, those
that replaced them had little in common
but their nationalism. Any attempt to build
regionalism had to take that into account.
Politically, the outside powers rather stood
back from the region-building of the 1960s
and 1970s, though the Soviet Union (SU)
thought ASEAN was a US plot and it was
2. SOUTHEAST ASIA AND
THE GREAT POWERS
NICHOLAS TARLING
From: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers, Nicholas Tarling, Copyright © 2010 Nicholas Tarling, Routledge,
reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK.
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40. 10 Nicholas Tarling
indeed often presented as anti-communist,
to some extent another piece of its own
camouflage. The UK and the US in fact
recognised that any open intervention in
the venture would be counter-productive.
They were reducing their involvement in
the region, and that was both a source of
apprehension to regional leaders and an
opportunity.
The attempt to extend ASEAN on the
part of its founders, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand, met
the distrust of Vietnam. Vietnam’s invasion
of Cambodia in 1979 indeed led ASEAN
to cooperate with China, itself at odds with
Vietnam’s patron, the SU. It was only in the
1990s that all ten Southeast Asian states were
included in the Association. But how far,
some leaders wondered, particularly perhaps
in Singapore, could it even so provide for the
security of the region? Would it be necessary
to counter the influence of a rising China by
ensuring after all the continued presence of
other major powers in the region?
Division within Southeast Asia, both
within states and between or among them,
had led to or invited intervention from
outside, and statesmen recognised that, if
it were to be limited, they must seek both
internal and intra-state stability. A contestant
in a state or contestant states must not
look for aid or support in maintaining
or subverting a regime. The nationalist
revolution in Southeast Asia — and so it may
be described even though independence
was achieved with quite disparate levels of
violence — culminated in what might be
called a novel conservatism. The nation-
states were successor states. The frontiers
they inherited must be accepted. The
values the Western states enjoined, without
necessarily practising, must be followed.
States were sovereign. Non-intervention and
non-interference were the watchwords, even
though ‘minorities’ were left behind and old
claims unresolved. So far and no further, so
far as national revolution was concerned.
The values were, of course, those of the UN
Charter, and were at the core of the concept
of a world of states. But they had been re-
endorsed as the principles of co-existence,
set out in the Zhou-Nehru understanding
of 1954 and at the Bandung conference of
1955, and were appropriated by the ASEAN
leaders. They were, of course, idealistic in
nature. But they also represented a realistic
attempt to deal with the crucial problem of a
world of states. States are unequal in power,
and, though the distribution of power will
vary over time, they will remain so. Setting out
and invoking the principles of co-existence
provide a way of moderating the exertion of
that power and the effect of its inequality.
They provide, of course, only one way,
even if honestly applied rather than merely
used as camouflage. The fact that, while
sovereignty may be equal, power is not, has to
be recognised. A small state, particularly if it
is the neighbour of a great one, will be ready
to compromise the exertion of its sovereignty
at times, if it hopes to preserve the essence of
it. A powerful state will see itself as entitled
to exert an influence outside its frontiers
commensurate with its power, and it will be
a matter of judgement to determine how far
that may extend at the expense of others.
Without such flexibility, the world of states
could not function even as well as it does. The
principles it invokes would be weaker, not
stronger, if their idealism were not suffused
by realism.
The creators of ASEAN recognised that.
Within their region the states they had
inherited and sought to sustain were very
unequal in size, potential and power. The
principles of co-existence and the practice
of compromise could be strengthened
by a regional association built upon the
independent states. That would at once
endorse the principles and provide a vehicle
for compromise. But it would also provide
a means by which the disparities of power
could be both moderated and accepted.
If that were not done, the smaller powers
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41. Southeast Asia and the Great Powers 11
might be tempted to look outside the region
for support against a potential intra-regional
hegemon. If it were done, that hegemon
would find a means of exerting its influence
that avoided eliciting an extra-regional
challenge. The imbalance within a region
could be adjusted without the need for an
outside check.
How was a newly-independent state to
provide for its security? It was perhaps
significant that those who took the initiative
in promoting regional association were the
leaders of newly-independent Malaya. In
particular they had in mind their much larger
wrap-around neighbour, Indonesia. At home,
there were some who questioned the creation
of the new state: was it not dividing the Malay
world? Would not an Indonesia Raya provide
better security for the continuance of the
‘Malay race’? and in the Republic itself,
there were those who saw the new state of
Malaya as a colonial creation, brought into
existence by collaboration rather than the
proper revolutionary struggle. At the time,
moreover, Indonesia had been arming itself,
initially above all as a means of defeating the
challenges the outer islands had presented to
the central government in 1956–58 and then,
of course, to exert pressure on the Dutch
finally to depart from West New Guinea/
Irian. If it were successful there, it might look
to other colonial remnants, even if they could
not be regarded as part of a successor state,
the Borneo territories, Portuguese Timor. In
any case the big brother could exert pressure
on the newly-independent little brother.
The largest and most populous state in the
region, it could indeed expect to influence
its neighbours, and some such expectation
had to be met if the system was to work. But
a counter-balance was at least a desirable
precaution.
The steps the Malayan leaders took after
1957 seemed puzzling, if not confused,
certainly difficult to appraise. Various
motives were suggested. But the essential
clue was surely their search for security in
the region, in particular with respect to
their great neighbour. They might, as a
Canadian official put it believe in ‘the safety
of numbers’.
1
Rather than merely pursue
the bilateral treaty that Indonesia proposed,
Malaya sought multilateral relations with its
neighbours. Its initial attainment was to be
limited to the tripartite ASA, but the rhetoric
of its leaders and their officials envisaged a
more encompassing association in the future.
That was, of course, attained with the
creation of the five-power ASEAN of 1967
and its later extension to cover all the ten
states in the Southeast Asia of the 1990s.
The course of events was far from even or
linear. But, following the confrontation of
Malaysia pursued by the Sukarno regime,
and the abortive attempt to resolve it
through Maphilindo, Indonesia accepted
an alternative, ASEAN, in effect, though
not so presented, an extension of ASA, in
which the influence it necessarily had in the
region could be deployed in a way that its
neighbours could accept and to an extent
that would not lead them to call on powers
outside the region.
The subsequent extension of ASEAN took
place only after the wars on the mainland had
been concluded. Its original members had
hoped that it might contribute to the end
of the war, and the proposal for a Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN]\
— again put forward by Malaysia — was
designed to proffer a means by which an
accommodation might be reached among
all the Southeast Asian nations as the end
of the second Indo-China war seemed to
be at hand. Vietnam’s response, however,
was for the most part negative, shifting only
when it came under pressure from China.
Its invasion of Cambodia was followed
by China’s punitive war early in 1979. It
also put it at odds with ASEAN, since it
breached Cambodia’s sovereignty, and it
was necessary to uphold that, even when it
was in the hands of a despicable regime, the
Khmer Rouge, and even though the invasion
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42. 12 Nicholas Tarling
was a liberation. It was on this basis that
ASEAN and China cooperated. When the
Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia, and
a settlement was reached, the way was at last
open for the accession of the mainland states
to the Association. By a most indirect route,
even involving collaboration with an outside
power, ASEAN had attained a position that
it had long sought as the basis of peace and
stability within the region, prerequisite for
limiting the role of outside powers, including
China.
ASEAN extended the idea that, rather than
seeking security from outside the region,
its members could secure it by agreement
inside, perhaps more effectively. Regional
cooperation, argued Thanat Khoman of
Thailand, insulated participating countries
from manipulation by foreign powers,
friendly and hostile. It answered the ‘need
for a more effective effort to neutralize any
eventual interference or intervention on the
part of others in our affairs and interests’.
2
By
resolving intra-regional disputes, or setting
them aside, Southeast Asian states might
avoid the need to call on outside powers and
foreclose their opportunities for intervention.
And they could deal with outside powers by
acting as a group, not only on the economic
front, which would also help to bring them
together politically, and add to regional
stability, but politically as well. ZOPFAN, too,
was not merely an endeavour to contribute
to peace in Indo-China. ‘The policy is meant
to be a proclamation that this region of ours
is no longer to be regarded as an area to
be divided into spheres of influence of the
big powers’, Dr Ismail told the 4
th
ASEAN
meeting in March 1971. ‘It may be regarded
as a project to end or prevent small countries
in this region from being used as pawns in
the conflict between the big powers.’
3
Whether that was an account of history
that took sufficient account of local initiatives
is doubtful, but politically it offered the states
something more they could share. In fact
there was a dynamic among the outside states
as well as among those within the region. A
strong element of rivalry had driven their
interest in Southeast Asia. ASEAN leaders
recalled that, particularly after the major
changes among the great powers of the
late 1980s and 90s. Steps to diminish rivalry
among the outside powers would enhance
the security of the region and its component
states. Ambitious though it would be,
regional leaders might conceive the hope
of extending their diplomatic steps on to a
wider platform, that of East Asia or the ‘Asia-
Pacific’ as a whole, for example.
Not surprisingly, whatever the depth of
their knowledge of history, Southeast Asian
leaders wanted to ensure that the past
was not ‘repeated’. That, they conceived,
involved establishing stability within each
state and among the states of the region,
so foreclosing the opportunity or the need
for intervention from outside. Could that
be achieved? It involved two paradoxes:
accepting the colonial frontiers, though they
had been constructed with another purpose,
that of avoiding conflict among the imperial
powers; and constructing a regionalism
that insisted on the sovereignty of states.
If achieved, could it be sustained? That
involved judgment and forbearance within
regimes and among them. It also required,
even so, acceptance on the part of outside
powers, particularly on the part of the rising
power, China, that had once seen states in
the region as in some sense tributary. Was
there after all to be another element in the
pattern that mixed national and regional
commitments? How would it fit?
3rd ASEAN Reader.indb 12 21/7/15 9:37 am

43. Southeast Asia and the Great Powers 13
NOTES
1. Arthur Menzies/Ottawa, 18.3.59, 172. PM 434/10/1 Pt 2, National Archives (NA), Wellington.
2. Quoted in M. Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia. The Politics of Survival, Baltimore and London: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 43.
3. Quoted in R.K. Jain, ed., China and Malaysia, New Delhi: Radiant, 1984, p. 153.
3rd ASEAN Reader.indb 13 21/7/15 9:37 am

44. 3. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF ASEAN’S
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Original Vision and Current Practice
NARONGCHAI AKRASANEE
Printed in abridged format from introductory remarks given at the High Level Conference on the Evolving
Nature of ASEAN’s Economic Cooperation, organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,
9 October 2014. An abridged version of this speech will appear in a book to be jointly published by the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and the Asian Development Bank. Used with the kind permission of the
author and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
I
t is my great pleasure to be back at the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
(ISEAS) after many years and to have
a chance to speak at the High-Level
Conference on the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) today.
It could be said that my ASEAN story has
developed over the years for two reasons —
interest and opportunity. Out of interest,
during my studies in Australia and the United
States in the 1960s, I studied and then wrote
my dissertation on protectionism. When I
came back to Thailand, my home country,
and started working, I was determined
to fight against protectionism, which was
basically the industrial policies of that time.
Recalling the early 1970s, when countries
in the region like Singapore and Malaysia
started opening up their economies, I had
opportunities to work with the National
Economic and Social Development Board
of Thailand. My work was on industrial and
trade policies. At the same time, I was doing
research on regional cooperation — on
ASEAN, in particular. I knew at the time that
economies of scale, not protectionism, would
help a country to industrialize. So ASEAN
economic cooperation would definitely
enhance Thailand’s industrialization process.
We had, at that time, the Kansu Report
1

on ASEAN economic cooperation, which
supported this concept.
And when ASEAN held its first summit
in Bali in 1976, the agenda on economic
cooperation, to which I had made some
contribution was very much derived from
the Kansu Report’s recommendations. The
Report’s recommendations were also the
origin of the agreements on the ASEAN
Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA)
2

and ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP).
3
Before economic cooperation was
brought to discussion seriously in 1976–77,
political and security issues featured much
more dominantly on ASEAN’s agenda. The
economic issue was brought up at the first
summit, and became ASEAN’s major concern
during and after the second oil crisis in 1979.
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45. The Evolving Nature of ASEAN’s Economic Cooperation 15
The oil crisis was a wake-up call for
ASEAN countries to accelerate the process
of industrialization by means of export pro-
motion. There was then a consensus among
ASEAN policymakers about having a serious
look at ASEAN economic cooperation.
For this purpose, a high level Task Force
was appointed in 1985, consisting of three
members from each of ASEAN’s five
founding members — Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
I was a member of Thailand’s team. The
Chairman of the Task Force was Mr Anand
Panyarachun, a very senior Thai technocrat
who later became the Prime Minister of
Thailand in 1991–93.
I recall Thailand’s active involvement in
the ASEAN Task Force in 1985–86, which
produced a comprehensive report on
ASEAN cooperation. A few years later, the
end of the Cold War and the break-up of the
Soviet Union opened up an opportunity for
ASEAN to work with Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV), whose
market economy strategies were starting
to materialize. This period saw the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) greatly assisting
the CLMV countries through the Greater
Mekong Subregion Program (GMS).
4
It was
also the time when ASEAN expanded further
to eventually incorporate all ten Southeast
Asian countries by 1999.
By another accident of history, Mr Anand
Panyarachun became the Prime Minister of
Thailand in 1991, following a military coup
d’état early that year. Taking this opportunity,
and also with encouragement from Prime
Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore, Mr
Panyarachun picked up the concept of an
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) from the
Task Force Report of 1985/86. An AFTA
lobby team was appointed and I was a
member of that team.
The AFTA negotiations started in
September 1991 and concluded in January
1992, with the signing of the Agreement in
Singapore in February 1992. Most of the
countries were very willing to participate in
the negotiations, which therefore went very
smoothly and were finalized quickly.
The international trade environment
was also favourable to AFTA. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
was conducting the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, starting from 1986, and was
about to be concluded in 1992. So for most
ASEAN countries, AFTA liberalization was
considered to be a proper prelude for GATT
liberalization. Then, as the Uruguay Round
was expected to be concluded in 1994, AFTA
began in 1993.
5
Working for the many governments of
Thailand since 1974 gave me opportunities
to get involved in ASEAN issues deeply.
When I became the Minister of Commerce in
1996/97, I had chances to work with ASEAN
Economic Ministers to deepen ASEAN’s
economic cooperation. We knew then that
from the cooperation on trade in goods
through AFTA, we should move on to trade
in services. We also understood the need to
allow the freer flow of direct investments
among us, meaning encouraging national
treatment for our ASEAN investments.
Thus, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on
Services (AFAS),
6
ASEAN Investment Area
(AIA),
7
and freer flow of professionals were
promoted.
The ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting
in Cebu in 1997 was the foundation leading
to the Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of
the ASEAN Charter in 2007, followed by the
signing of the ASEAN Charter, which came
into effect in 2008.
While focusing on the common goal
of regional cooperation, ASEAN has con-
tinued to work with external partners, as its
principle is open regionalism. One of the
most important turning points in ASEAN
cooperation with external partners was
its participation in the APEC
8
Economic
Leaders’ Meeting in the United States in
1993. Other institutions like the ASEAN
Plus Three,
9
the East Asia Summit,
10
and
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46. 16 Narongchai Akrasanee
the ASEAN+6
11
are also examples. The
agreements between ASEAN and its partners
have helped reinforce the openness of the
so-called “open economy” of Asian countries.
As for Thailand, moving beyond 2015,
ASEAN has become “central” to the
country’s development strategy. In terms of
economic cooperation, Thailand’s strategy
for its future development involves three
layers: (1) the first is the GMS, which is the
closest one to Thailand and which involves
the CLMV countries, highlighting the
significance of a regional production and
market base; (2) the second is ASEAN’s
other mainland and maritime countries,
which allows for optimal resource allocation
under the AEC 2015, and requires Thailand
to implement appropriate policies to
improve its most competitive areas; (3) the
third is the “ASEAN plus” mechanism,
which suggests the internationalization of
Thailand’s economic policies.
I have shared with you on how I have
been involved in ASEAN and how the idea
of ASEAN economic cooperation developed.
As for Thailand’s policy strategy concerning
ASEAN, I am very optimistic that this is the
way for countries like Thailand — being a
developing country in the Southeast Asian
mainland, surrounded by the fast-growing
countries of CLMV, and open economies like
Malaysia, Singapore, and a big neighbour
Indonesia — to move forward, together with
these countries, for regional development
and prosperity.
Thank you very much.
NOTES
 1. A study on ASEAN economic cooperation conducted by the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP). The report was completed in 1972 and was known as the Kansu Report (after its leader,
Professor G. Kansu).
 2. Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) signed in Manila on 24 February
1977.
 3. Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) signed in Kuala Lumpur on 6 March 1980.
 4. The GMS was established in 1992 and consists of China (specifically Yunnan Province and Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region), Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand.
 5. The AFTA scheme had been transformed into the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement or ATIGA
since May 2010.
 6. The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) signed in Bangkok on 15 December 1995.
 7. Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) signed in Makati on 7 October 1998.
The AIA Agreement has been transformed into the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement
(ACIA) which took effect in March 2012.
 8. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) began as an informal Ministerial-level dialogue
group with twelve members in 1989. The Economic Leader’s Meeting in 1993 was the first APEC
Summit.
 9. ASEAN Plus Three (APT) cooperation began in 1997 between ASEAN and China, Japan and South
Korea.
10. The First East Asia Summit (EAS) was held on 14 December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
attended by the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea
and New Zealand. The United States and Russia has joined the EAS since 2011.
11. Economic cooperation between ASEAN countries and six other nations — Australia, China, India,
Japan, South Korea, New Zealand — under the EAS, towards the establishment of the Comprehensive
Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA). CEPEA was initiated in the second EAS in 2007.
3rd ASEAN Reader.indb 16 21/7/15 9:37 am

47. 4. FROM POLITICAL/SECURITY
CONCERNS TO REGIONAL
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
RODOLFO C. SEVERINO
Printed in abridged format from a presentation given at the High Level Conference on the Evolving Nature of
ASEAN’s Economic Cooperation, organised by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 9 October
2014. An abridged version of this speech will appear in a book to be jointly published by the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies and the Asian Development Bank, by kind permission of the author and the Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies.
T
he Association of South East Asian
Nations, or ASEAN, from its very
beginning, has had two objectives.
The first is to prevent the historical disputes
among its member-states from developing
into armed conflict. The other is to keep
the major external powers from using the
region as an arena for their quarrels. At
the beginning, all five founding states were
threatened by the rise of Communism, then
abetted by like-minded external powers.
Soon, however, Communism ceased to be an
armed threat.
The formation of ASEAN in 1967 was also
made possible by the transformation taking
place in Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest
country in terms of population, land area,
the economy, and activism in international
affairs. It would not do for Indonesia simply
to join the young Association of Southeast
Asia, or ASA, ASEAN’s template-association
composed of three future members of
ASEAN — Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand — and taking over most of ASA’s
practices and structures. An entirely new
association had to be set up not only because
of Indonesia’s status but also because of her
ideological predilections. Thus, Indonesia’s
highest-ranking point-man for ASEAN, Vice
President Adam Malik, Presidium Minister
for Political Affairs and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, invited Burma and Cambodia to join
the new association. Unfortunately, those two
states, like Indonesia staunchly non-aligned,
demurred, said to be suspecting that ASEAN
would be a replacement for SEATO, another
brainchild of the United States in its web of
military alliances. The U.S. was then mired
in its Indochina war, although the U.S. was
showing signs of her determination to get
out of the Indochina quagmire. At the same
time, Indonesia was transforming itself from
the Sukarno to the Soeharto era, from autarky
in economic policy to relative openness
to international markets, foreign aid and
investments, from the Left in foreign policy
to a more balanced posture in international
affairs.
Malaysia had territorial and other
jurisdictional disputes with all of its immediate
neighbours. There were occasional tensions
between Thailand and Malaysia over several
issues. Indonesia was opposed, militarily and
otherwise, to the formation of Malaysia as a
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48. 18 Rodolfo C. Severino
British-inspired enterprise. The Philippines
was hostile to the inclusion of Sabah in
the new Federation of Malaysia. Singapore
and Malaysia had recently undergone an
acrimonious separation as well as having
territorial disputes between them. It was
mostly to prevent these disputes, through
consultation, through golf games and
personal friendships, from erupting into
something worse that ASEAN was formed.
A WORLD DIVIDED
The world when ASEAN was founded in
1967 was very different from what it is
today. The Cold War was at its height. Part
of it was America’s venture into Indochina,
with the support of some ASEAN member-
states. It was in this situation that ASEAN
as an association sought to position itself in
the middle, although some of its individual
member-states remained part, openly or
covertly, of the U.S. web of alliances in East
Asia. The twin-objectives of ASEAN — to keep
disputes among members from developing
into armed conflict and the quarrels of the
strong from involving Southeast Asia — have
basically remained the same throughout its
almost half a century of existence.
Nevertheless, especially at the beginning,
these objectives have had to be disguised, as
ASEAN wanted to continue to be seen only
as an association for economic and cultural
cooperation, in order to avoid being mistaken
for a defence pact allied with the United
States. However, the progression of ASEAN
from purely political and security concerns
to a group of countries professing to discern
some value in regional economic integration
and socio-cultural and environmental
cooperation as mutually reinforcing is plain
for all who are well-informed and observant
to see.
A LEGITIMATE ASEAN ENDEAVOUR
In fact, it was not until the first ASEAN
Summit, in February 1976, that economic
cooperation was officially recognised as a
legitimate ASEAN endeavour. It was not
until early in 1975 that Economics Minister
Widjojo Nitisastro and Trade Minister Radius
Prawiro of Indonesia went to ASEAN capitals
to lobby their counterparts into supporting
them in their proposal to hold the first
ASEAN meeting devoted exclusively to
economic matters. The ASEAN Summit set
the agenda for the first meeting of ASEAN
economic ministers and decided its place
and date, in Kuala Lumpur in March 1976.
1
In terms of economic cooperation (this was
before “integration” ceased to be a dirty word
in ASEAN), the association at first publicly
saw its main function as its member-states
giving one another tariff preferences on trade
in goods and reducing non-tariff barriers to
them. They did this through the Preferential
Trading Arrangements, an intra-ASEAN
agreement in which each of the then-five
ASEAN member-states committed themselves
to reducing tariffs on their imports from the
others. The agreement likewise calls for the
removal of quantitative restrictions on such
imports and other non-tariff barriers to them,
also within certain timeframes. The tariff-
cutting schedule is largely on track, no doubt
helped by the member-countries’ World
Trade Organization (WTO) commitments.
However, non-tariff barriers have become
the means of choice demanded by some
sectors for government protection against
regional competition. ASEAN economies
are thus prevented from becoming truly and
comprehensively integrated on a regional
basis.
2
In this same spirit of protectionism,
and eschewing the benefits that regional
economic integration is supposed to bring
to the nation-state, ASEAN saw industrial
cooperation as giving each member-
country a regional monopoly on a certain
manufactured product or group of products.
Thus, Indonesia and Malaysia were eventually
allowed, under the ASEAN Industrial Projects
scheme, to build urea fertilizer plants in Aceh
and Sarawak, respectively, with government
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49. From Political/Security Concerns to Regional Economic Integration 19
protection from regional competition.
Similarly, in 1982, the ASEAN Economic
Ministers approved the Philippine proposal
for a copper-fabrication plant, with which the
Philippines had substituted its original AIP
project of superphosphates after proposing
ammonium sulfate fertilizer and then a pulp
and paper plant, depending, presumably, on
the lobbying power of the company or sector
involved.
Starting with its soda-ash project, Thailand
had a similar history of changing proposals.
Having discovered deposits of natural gas
in its national territory, Bangkok in 1983
announced plans to produce urea fertilizer.
Indonesia and Malaysia naturally viewed
this with misgivings. The ASEAN Economic
Ministers approved in 1990 the potash-
mining project that Thailand had proposed in
replacement of its original proposal. In 2004,
the Thai Government decided to pull out of
the project, claiming that potash mining was
for private enterprise to undertake.
Singapore, with its doctrinal and pragmatic
devotion to the free market and aversion to
“states deciding what industries to put up for
a protected and exclusive regional market”,
3

nevertheless had originally proposed for itself
the manufacture of diesel engines. However,
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines
were not willing to accept engines below 200
horsepower — or give up their own plan to
set up plants for the manufacture of such
engines, which made up the bulk of the
regional market.
I was to write, “The PTA agreement would
cover ‘basic commodities’, particularly food
and energy, the products of the ASEAN
Industrial Projects and ASEAN Industrial
Complementation schemes, and lists of
goods to be negotiated among the parties.
Implementation of the PTA started at the
beginning of 1978. It initially covered 71
products after much hard bargaining on
the 1,700 items that had been considered.
By 1986, the number of items covered had
grown to 12,700 and, by 1990, to 15,295.
The margin of preference was originally an
insignificant 10 per cent, but was increased
to 20–25 per cent in 1980. The cut-off import
value was raised from the original US$50,000
to US$10 million in 1983 until it was in
effect abolished in 1984. On the occasion
of the 1987 ASEAN Summit, the economic
ministers signed a protocol committing the
ASEAN countries to place in the PTA within
five years (with Indonesia and the Philippines
allowed seven years) at least 90 per cent of
items traded among them with at least 50 per
cent of the value of intra-ASEAN trade. The
margin of preference for the new items was
increased to 25 per cent and for those already
in the PTA to 50 per cent, something that
the economic ministers had already agreed
upon four years before. The ASEAN content
requirement would be reduced in five years
from 50 to 35 per cent (42 per cent in the
case of Indonesia), but ‘on a case-by-case
basis’; after five years, it could be brought
back up to 50 per cent.
“Still, intra-ASEAN trade did not grow
much. Because the coverage of the PTA
was negotiated product by product, the
tendency of the ASEAN member-countries,
true to the protectionist spirit and import-
substitution policies of the time, was to
include mostly items that were not likely to
be traded (among them). The inclusion of
snow ploughs and nuclear reactors became
the object of derision within knowing circles.
The national exclusion lists were long. In any
case, even with a margin of preference of 50
per cent, a PTA tariff would remain high if the
most-favoured-nation tariff was set at a lofty
level. Tariff rates were not brought down;
those ASEAN products that were covered
were only given 25- to 50-per cent discounts
on high tariffs. At their 1991 meeting, the
economic ministers observed that, while
intra-ASEAN trade in items covered by the
PTA had grown from US$121 million in 1987
to US$578 million in 1989, it accounted for
an ‘insignificant’ proportion of total intra-
ASEAN trade.”
4
It would be easy enough, with the
considerable help of hindsight, to blame the
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50. 20 Rodolfo C. Severino
wrong policies or the negotiators or both
for ASEAN’s failure to integrate Southeast
Asia’s economies sufficiently to present a
serious competitive challenge to China and
other continent-sized economies in East Asia
for direct investments and export markets.
However, we have to remember that, in many
ways, ASEAN was a pioneering enterprise
and, devoid of experience, was, without
meaning to, showing the way to other
regional associations of states. Moreover,
Southeast Asia’s economic theorists were
still under the spell of economists like the
Argentine Raul Prebisch, the first Secretary-
General of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
However, until today, the political power
of lobbies and special interests has been
helping to shape state decisions in many
ASEAN countries.
THE PRIVATE SECTOR
At first, the ASEAN Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (ASEAN CCI) was given the
authority and mandate, for example, to
identify products for inclusion in ASEAN
industrial complementation schemes. As
ASEAN gave up in the late 1980s on trying
to manage industrialisation and moved
towards letting firms essentially decide their
own responses to the market, the private
sector, with some exceptions, was reduced
to seeking photo opportunities with leaders
and ministers and thus demonstrating their
connections with those in power.
Again with some exceptions, the ASEAN
private sector was also reduced to begging for
consultation on the formulation of policies
that affect their interests or to ignoring
government policies altogether. Today,
ASEAN leaders and ministers all urge ASEAN
to “consult” the “private sector” on any
economic moves that it makes. How extensive
and effective those consultations have been
depends, of course, on the political system of
the country concerned. In any case, it seems
to me, there is no such thing as a common
position of the ASEAN “private sector” in
support of regional economic integration;
only fragmented positions favourable to and
favoured by each company or sector.
THE CHALLENGE OF CHINA
As the 1990s approached, the ASEAN
economies were confronted with the rise of
China as a formidable competitor for foreign
direct investments (FDI) and export markets.
In 1976, China attracted a negligible amount
of foreign investments. By 1992, largely
because of the Deng Xiaoping reforms of the
early 1980s, this figure had soared to about
US$11 billion or more than 6.5 per cent of
the world’s total FDI flows and to more than
US$52.7 billion or almost 9 per cent in 2002.
In comparison, FDI flows to ASEAN (and
much of this was concentrated in Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand), had been overtaken
by China as it recorded an aggregate of less
than US$11 billion and slightly more than 6.5
per cent of global investments in 1992. Ten
years later, ASEAN attracted a mere US$17
billion in FDI, a meager 2.7 per cent of the
global total, with China striking more than
US$52.7 billion or more than 8 per cent. (By
2013, ASEAN seemed to have recovered its
FDI lustre, with Indonesia joining Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand as the darling of
international investors, and ASEAN and
China each recording more than 8.5 per cent
of the world’s total flows.)
5
Meanwhile, the “September 1985 Plaza
Accord . . . reached at the Plaza Hotel in New
York among the finance ministers of Japan,
France, West Germany, the United Kingdom
and the USA, had resulted in the substantial
depreciation of the US dollar against
the other leading currencies. The yen’s
consequent appreciation prompted Japanese
companies to relocate from Japan and invest
and establish production chains in the
ASEAN countries, contributing significantly
to those countries’ industrialization.”
6
Shortly afterwards, MERCOSUR was
created, with the Treaty of Asunción being
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51. From Political/Security Concerns to Regional Economic Integration 21
signed in March 1991. The European Union
was being envisioned, the Maastricht Treaty
concluded in February 1992. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was being negotiated among Canada, Mexico
and the United States of America. Globally,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was being converted into the more-
binding World Trade Organization (WTO),
as the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations was signed
in December 1991.
These facts and figures alarmed some
ASEAN leaders enough to go along with
proposals to make of ASEAN an integrated
economy, a highly competitive production
base that is linked with and open to the rest
of the world. Thus, they decided to conclude
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
7
THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
Ten years later, with all ten of ASEAN’s current
members on board, they decided to call the
ASEAN economic-integration enterprise the
ASEAN Economic Community. I can only
surmise that the ASEAN leaders agreed to
this proposition, in order to show the world
the association’s seriousness in integrating
the regional economy, knowing that only
a regionally integrated market will attract
the investments necessary for the national
development of each of them. The only
way to demonstrate their seriousness was to
invoke the spirit of the European Union, or
the European Economic Community, as the
most economically successful of all regional
associations of sovereign states.
The Blueprints of the ASEAN Political/
Security Community and of the ASEAN
Socio-Cultural Community are full of words
like “promote”, “encourage”, “build”,
“develop”, “increase”, “intensify”, “advance”,
“enhance”, “facilitate”, “improve“, “support”,
and “strengthen”, indicating that these
communities are never-ending works in
progress. These may also mean an acknow-
ledgement that much of the work envisioned
in the Blueprints is to be carried out by
national governments and other domestic
entities rather than by ASEAN as a group.
On the other hand, the Blueprint for the
ASEAN Economic Community carries with
it a “Strategic Schedule” that commits the
parties, in four two-year tranches (2008–
2015), to specific collective undertakings, as
“priority actions”, within certain time frames.
Thus, to estimate the prospects of achieving
the AEC in 2015, the Asian Development Bank
passed to the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies in 2011 the request of the ASEAN
Secretariat for help in assessing the situation.
ISEAS commissioned global experts to help
undertake this task from the points of view
of non-tariff barriers, services, investments,
competition policy and intellectual property
rights, sub-regional development, relations
with external partners, dispute-settlement,
and institutions. In addition, a survey was
undertaken to ascertain companies’ and
their decision-makers’ views on these matters.
The view of the experts and business leaders
was unanimous. If the commitments in the
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint
were to be taken at face value, then the
conclusion was inevitable — ASEAN was far
from being an integrated economy.
8
However, there is another way of looking
at this. That is to view it as a measure of how
far ASEAN has gone since its founding in
1967, a measure of a work in progress. One
may also look at it as the ASEAN leaders’
re-affirmation of their aspirations for and
commitment to the export orientation,
reliance on market forces and openness to
the international economic community of
their countries’ economies.
9
THE FUTURE
ASEAN has no choice but to integrate the
Southeast Asian economy, not only for
investment and other economic reasons, but
also for geo-strategic ones. For, increasingly,
ASEAN will continue to be taken seriously
by the rest of the world, and thus maintain
3rd ASEAN Reader.indb 21 21/7/15 9:37 am

52. 22 Rodolfo C. Severino
its “centrality” in the growing number of
schemes and “architectures” in the Asia-
Pacific, only if it is economically strong and
resilient and is perceived by the rest of the
world as such. It will continue to be so only if it
integrates the regional economy — and carry
out domestic political reforms — enough to
win back the investments and exports that
had been lost to China in recent years. And
one can integrate the regional economy and
carry out the necessary domestic political
reforms, only if peace and stability prevail in
the region, values are shared and converge,
and the habit of working together is widely
inculcated, starting with the cultivation of
a strong regional, as distinct from a purely
national, identity, in dealing with a growing
number and intensity of transnational
problems.
In any case, ASEAN agreements are not
self-executory; they depend on individual,
sovereign nation-states, and thus on the will
of the decision-makers in those states, for
implementation or compliance. At the same
time, ASEAN’s external partners in its FTAs
or Comprehensive Economic Partnerships
may each have different strategic views and
purposes in pursuing and concluding them
than those of the ten-member ASEAN. This
is all the more reason for ASEAN to strive for
economic integration, political cohesion and
functional cooperation.
NOTES
1. Joint Communiqué: The First ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Bali, 23–24 February 1976,
accessed 6 October 2014 in the ASEAN Secretariat Website (http://www.asean.org/news/item/
joint-communique-the-first-asean-heads-of-government-meeting-bali-23-24-february-1976).
2. See below.
3. Mr. S. Rajaratnam, foreign minister of Singapore, as quoted in M. C. Abad, Jr., ASEAN Secretariat:
“The Role of ASEAN in Security Multilateralism: ZOPFAN, TAC and SEANWFZ”, a paper presented
at the ASEAN Regional Forum Professional Development Programme for Foreign Affairs and
Defence Officials, Bandar Seri Begawan, 23–28 April 2000; downloaded 8 September 2014 from the
ASEAN Secretariat Website (http://www.asean.org/archive/arf/7ARF/Prof-Dment-Programme/
Doc-10.pdf).
4. Severino, Rodolfo: Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 215–16.
5. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
6. Severino, Rodolfo: “Politics of Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Cooperation” in
Japan Center for Economic Research: Asian Economic Policy Review (Tokyo, 2011).
7. Severino: Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2006), pages 222 et seq.
8. Basu Das, Sanchita, Jayant Menon, Rodolfo C. Severino, and Omkar Lal Shrestha, eds.: The ASEAN
Economic Community: A Work in Progress (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013; Manila:
Asian Development Bank, 2013).
9. Ibid., pages 1 et seq.
3rd ASEAN Reader.indb 22 21/7/15 9:37 am

53. Section II
COUNTRY ANALYSES
3rd ASEAN Reader.indb 23 21/7/15 9:37 am

54. 3rd ASEAN Reader.indb 24 21/7/15 9:37 am

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Vennachar Abinger Addington OWilliam
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Ventry Proton Grey, E. R. OCarby Johnson
Verchères Verchères Verchères QTrefflé Lussier
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Vernon Osgoode Russel ODuncan
McDonald
Vernon Mines,
W. O.
King’s N SJohn R. Ilsley
Vernonville Haldimand Northumberland,
W. R.
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Verona Portland Addington OAlexander
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Versailles St. Grégoire Iberville QIsidore
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Verschoyle Dereham Oxford, S. R. OJohn Dynes
Vesta Brant Bruce, S. R. ORobert
Cannon
Vicars Havelock Huntingdon QJames Wilson
Victoria Victoria B CHenry
Wootton
Victoria, W. O. Carleton N BGeorge R.
Boyer
Victoria, W. O. Cumberland N SJ. M. Henny
Victoria CornersReach Ontario, N. R. OJames Phair
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King’s N SJohn Brown
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Cape Breton N SAlexander C.
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Brasher
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Lamothe

59. Vigo Flos Simcoe, N. R. ODennis
Gallagher
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Aulnaies
St. Roch des
Aulnaies
L’Islet QA. Depuis
Village RichelieuSt. Mathias Rouville QN. D. D.
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Villanova Townsend Norfolk, N. R. OJohn McLaren
Villiers Otonabee Peterborough OW.
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sen.
Vincennes St. Luc Champlain QP. Lacourcière
Vine Innisfil Simcoe, S. R. ORichard
Simpson
Vinoy Suffolk Ottawa QJoseph Leduc
Vinton Litchfield Pontiac Q
Violet Ernestown Lennox OJames L.
Hicks
Virgil Niagara Niagara OJames S.
Clement
Vittoria CharlottevilleNorfolk, S. R. OGeorge D.
McCall
Vivian Whitchurch York, N. R. ORobert
McCormick
Voglers’s Cove,
W. O.
Lunenburg N SJ. H. R. Fayle
VroomantonBrock Ontario, N. R. OJohn Tesky
Vyner Plympton Lambton OJohn Gates
Waasis Station,
W. O.
Sunbury N BGeorge Grass
Wabashene Tay Simcoe, N. R. OT. W. Buck
Wakefield Wakefield Ottawa QJames
McLaren

60. Waldemar Amaranth Wellington, N. R. ODavid Jenkins
Wales Osnabruck Stormont OWilliam Baker
* WalkertonBrant Bruce, S. R. OMalcolm
McLean
Walkerville Sandwich, EastEssex OHenry McAfee
Wallace Wallace Perth, N. R. OJames Taggart
Wallace Cumberland N SM. B. Huestis
Wallace Bridge,
W. O.
Cumberland N SRichard J.
Scott
* WallaceburgChatham Kent OLionel H.
Johnson
Wallace Ridge,
W. O.
Cumberland N SJohn McNiel
Wallace River,
W. O.
Cumberland N SDavid Purdy
WallacetownDunwich Elgin, W. R. OJohn McKillop
Wallbridge Sidney Hastings, W. R. OF. B. Prior
Wallenstein Wellesley Waterloo, N. R. OHenry Powell
Walmer East Zorra Oxford, N. R. ORobert Parker
Walpole IslandChatham Kent O
Walsh CharlottevilleNorfolk, S. R. OD. W. McCall
Walter’s Falls Holland Grey, N. R. OThomas P.
Walker
Waltham Waltham Pontiac QJohn Landon
Walton McKillop Huron, C. R. ORobert
Pattison
Walton Hants N SJ. W.
Stephens
Wanstead Plympton Lambton OMaurice
McVicar
Warburton Lansdown Leeds, S. R. OJ. H. Keating
Warden Shefford Shefford QE. D. Martin

61. Ward’s Creek
Road, W. O.
King’s N BA. Stapleford
Wardsville Mosa Middlesex, W. R. OW. D.
Hammond
Wareham Osprey Grey, E. R. OGeorge Wright
WarkworthPercy Northumberland,
E. R.
OIsrael
Humphries
Warminster Medonte Simcoe, N. R. OW. George
Deacon
Warner Caistor Monck OJonas R.
Melick
Warren, W. O. Cumberland N SC. S.
Chapman
Warsaw Dummer Peterboro’, E. R. OThomas Choat
Wartburg Ellice Perth, N. R. OE.
Frommhagen
Warwick, EastSt. Medard Arthabaska QOnésime
Tessier
Warwick, WestWarwick Lambton OJohn H. Morris
Washademoak,
W. O.
Queen’s N BNevine
McAlpine
Washago Orillia Simcoe, N. R. OR. H. Cozzens
Washington Blenheim Oxford, N. R. OWilliam Dunn
Waterborough,
W. O.
Queen’s N BC. H. Fanjoy
Waterdown Flamboro’, EastWentworth,
N. R.
OJames B.
Thompson
* WaterfordTownsend Norfolk, N. R. ODavid Wilson
* Waterloo, EastShefford Shefford Q
* Waterloo,
West
Waterloo,
North
Waterloo, N. R. OC. Kumpf
Waterville Compton Compton QL. W. Wyman
Waterville, W. O. Carleton N BJ. H. Seely

62. Waterville, W. O. King’s N SThomas
Jacques
Watford Warwick Lambton OMurdo McLeay
Watson’s
Corners
Dalhousie Lanark, N. R. OJohn Munro
Watson
Settlement,
W. O.
Carleton N BJohn Watson
Waubamik Ferguson Muskoka ORobert Reid
Waubuno Moore Lambton OThomas
Moore
Waugh’s River,
W. O.
Colchester N SJ. Murphy
Waupoos Marysburg Prince Edward OMorgan L.
Ketchum
Waverly Tay Simcoe, N. R. OJohn
Bannister
Waverly Halifax N SJohn Lingley
Waweig, W. O. Charlotte N BMargaret
Ruddick
Way’s Mills Barnston Stanstead QE. S.
Southmayd
Weaver
Settlement,
W. O.
Digby N SMichael
Weaver
Webber’s, W. O. Annapolis N SMrs. S. A.
Webber
Webster’s Creek,
W. O.
Victoria N BM. Albert
Weedon Weedon Wolfe QSiméon
Fontaine
Welcome Hope Durham, E. R. O

63. Weldford, W. O. Kent N BCharles
Cummins
* Welland Crowland Welland OThomas
Burgar
Welland PortGainsboro’ Monck OSamuel
Holmes
* WellesleyWellesley Waterloo, N. R. OJohn Zoeger
WellingtonHillier Prince Edward ODonald
Campbell
* Wellington
Square
Nelson Halton OWalter S.
Bastedo
Wellman’s
Corners
Rawdon Hastings, N. R. OAndrew
Sherman
Welsford Queen’s N BF. Woods
Wendover Plantagenet, N.Prescott OWilliam Lamb
Wentworth,
W. O.
Cumberland N SLemuel Bigney
West Arichat,
W. O.
Richmond N SEmmélie
Marchant
West Arran Saugeen Bruce, N. R. OThomas McKie
West Bay Inverness N SJames
McDonald
West Bolton Bolton Brome QMartin
Duboyce
West Branch,
East River of
Pictou, W. O.
Pictou N SWilliam
Dunbar
West Branch,
Nicholas River,
W. O.
Kent N BT. Curran
West Branch,
River John,
W. O.
Pictou N SMrs. J. McKay

64. West Branch,
River Philip,
W. O.
Colchester N SR. F. Black
West Brome Brome Brome QS. L.
Hungerford
West Brook Kingston Frontenac OAndrew Bridge
West BroughtonBroughton Beauce QCyrille Vallée
Westbury Westbury Compton QAllan Lothrop
West Chester,
W. O.
Cumberland N SMrs. Mary J.
Purdy
West Chester
Lake, W. O.
Cumberland N SE. Sutherland
Westcock, W. O. WestmorelandN B
West Ditton Ditton Compton QPhilias
Gendreau
West Dublin,
W. O.
Lunenburg N SR. B. Currie
West Essa Essa Simcoe, S. R. ODavid
Henderson
* West FarnhamFarnham Missisquoi QWilliam
Donahue
Westfield Wawanosh,
East
Huron, N. R. OMrs. Helps
Westfield, W. O. King’s N BN. H. Deveber
West Flamboro’Flamboro’, W.Wentworth,
N. R.
OJ. B. Irving
West Glassville,
W. O.
Carleton N BJ. R. Ronald
West Gore,
W. O.
Hants N SM. Wallace
West
Huntingdon
Huntingdon Hastings, N. R. OPhilip Luke
West HuntleyHuntley Carleton OEdward Horan

65. West Lake Hallowell Prince Edward OHenry
Lambert
West McGillivrayMcGillivray Middlesex, N. R. OWm. Fraser
West MagdalaSouthwold Elgin, W. R. ODonald Turner
Westmeath Westmeath Renfrew, N. R. OAlexander
Fraser
West MontroseWoolwich Waterloo, N. R. OJacob Benner
Westmoreland
Point
WestmorelandN BThos. E.
Oulton
* Weston York York, W. R. ORobert
Johnston
West OsgoodeOsgoode Russell OJohn C. Bower
Westover Beverley Wentworth,
N. R.
OB. McIntosh
Westport North CrosbyLeeds, S. R. OJohn H.
Whelan
Westport Digby N SJoseph
Bancroft
West Potton Potton Brome QM. L. Elkins
West Quaco St. John N BMrs C. Nugent
West River Pictou N SWilliam Munro
West River
Station
Pictou N SW. S. Graham
West SheffordShefford Shefford QGeorge Tait
West Side of
Lochabar, W. O.
Antigonishe N SAlexander
Stewart
Westville Pictou N SDuncan
Balfour
* West
Winchester
Winchester Dundas OWilliam Bow
Westwood Asphodel Peterborough,
E. R.
OSamuel Griffin
Wexford Scarboro’ York, E. R. OJ. T. McBeath

66. Weymouth Digby N S
Weymouth
Bridge
Digby N S
Whalen Biddulph Middlesex, N. R. OJ. H. Milson
Wheatland Wickham Drummond QEdward
McCabe
Wheatley Mersea Essex OGeorge
Middleton
Wheaton
Settlement,
W. O.
WestmorelandN BA. E. Killam
Whitby Whitby Ontario, S. R. OR. H. Lauder
Whitehead,
W. O.
Guysborough N SJ. H. Feltmate
Whitehurst ElizabethtownBrockville OJohn Bell
White Lake McNab Renfrew, S. R. OAlexander
Stirling
White Mud RiverPortage la
Prairie
Marquette MPeter Garrioch
White Point,
W. O.
Queen’s N SJ. Challoner
White Rose Whitchurch York, N. R. OJared Lloyd
White’s Cove,
W. O.
Queen’s N BS. V. White
Whitevale Pickering Ontario, S. R. ODonald
McPhee
Whitfield Mulmur Simcoe, S. R. OP. D. Henry
Whittington Amaranth Wellington, N. R. OR. Bowsfield
Whitton Whitton Compton QDonald
Beaton
Whycocomagh Inverness N SPeter
McDonald
Wiarton Amabel Bruce, N. R. OB. B. Miller

67. Wick Brock Ontario, N. R. OJohn
Chambers
Wickham, W. O. Queen’s N BG. N. Golding
Wicklow Haldimand Northumberland,
W. R.
OC. E. Ewing
Wicklow, W. O. Carleton N BThomas H.
Estey
Wickwire
Station, W. O.
Halifax N SSamuel Key
Widder Bosanquet Lambton OAdam Duffus
Widder StationBosanquet Lambton OThomas
Kirkpatrick
Wilfrid Brock Ontario, N. R. OJohn
Chambers
Wilkesport Sombra Bothwell OWilliam Kinball
Willetsholme Pittsburgh Frontenac OJosias Abrams
Williamsdale,
W. O.
Cumberland N SAndrew Taylor
Williamstown CharlottenburgGlengarry ODuncan
McLennan
Williamstown,
W. O.
Carleton N BThomas
Lindsay
Williscroft Elderslie Bruce, N. R. OGeorge
Williscroft
Willowdale York York, W. R. OJacob Cumner
Willowgrove,
W. O.
St. John N BWilliam
Francis
Wilmot Annapolis N SJ. A. Gibbon
Wilmur LoughboroughAddington OWilliam Northy
Wilson’s Beach,
W. O.
Charlotte N B
Wilton Ernestown Lennox OSydney
Warner

68. Winchelsea Usborne Huron, S. R. ORobert
Middleton
Winchester Winchester Dundas OC. T.
Casselman
Winchester
Springs
WilliamsburgDundas OJames Greer
Windermere Watt Muskoka OThomas Aitkin
Windham CentreWindham Norfolk, N. R. OJohn
Lindabury
Windham Hill,
W. O.
Cumberland N SJohn Bragg
* Windsor Sandwich, EastEssex OAlex. H.
Wagner
Windsor, W. O. Carleton N BWilliam Britton
Windsor Hants N SPeter S.
Burnham
Windsor
Junction, W. O.
Halifax N SWilliam
Rennells
Windsor MillsWindsor Richmond QC. E. Wurtelle
Wine Harbor,
W. O.
Guysboro’ N S
Winfield Peel Wellington, C. R. OJohn Hambly
Winger Wainfleet Monck OJacob Winger
Wingham Turnberry Huron, N. R. OPeter Fisher
Winona Saltfleet Wentworth,
S. R.
OJoseph
Carpenter
WinterbourneWoolwich Waterloo, N. R. OP. S. Kilborne
Winthrop McKillop Huron, C. R. OAlex. Murchie
Wisbeach Warwick Lambton OJoanna Bowes
Woburn Scarborough York, E. R. OH. M.
Campbell
Wolfe Island Wolfe IslandFrontenac OGeorge
Malone

69. Wolfstown Wolfstown Wolfe QNorbert Roy
Wolfville King’s N SGeorge V.
Rand
Wolverton Blenheim Oxford, N. R. OThomas
Dawson
* WoodbridgeVaughan York, W. R. OC. H. Dunning
Woodburn Binbrook Wentworth,
S. R.
OWilliam
Ptolemy
Woodford Sydenham Grey, N. R. OJohn Thomson
Woodham Blanchard Perth, S. R. OJonathan
Shier
Woodhill Toronto GorePeel OThomas Ward
Woodlands Osnabruck Stormont OR. H. Stewart
Wood Point,
W. O.
WestmorelandN BS. Outhouse
Woodside Halifax Megantic QThomas Wood
Woodslee Maidstone Essex OW. S. Lindsay
* WoodstockBlandford Oxford, N. R. OG. Alexander
Woodstock Carleton N BJames Grover
Woodstock Road
Station, W. O.
Carleton N BJohn S.
Leighton
* WoodvilleEldon Victoria, N. R. OJohn C.
Gilchrist
Woodville, W. O. Hants N SShubael
Parker
Wooler Murray Northumberland,
E. R.
OLorenzo F.
Gould
Wotton Wotton Wolfe QBenjamin
Milette
Wreck Cove,
W. O.
Victoria N SJohn Morrison
Wright Wright Ottawa QJoshua Ellard

70. * WroxeterHowick Huron, N. R. OGeorge A.
Powell
Wyandot Maryboro’ Wellington, N. R. OJ. D. Johnson
Wyebridge Tiny Simcoe, N. R. ODaniel
McGregor
* Wyoming Plympton Lambton OJohn
Anderson
Yale Yale B C
Yamachiche Machiche St. Maurice QArthur Lacerte
Yamaska Yamaska Yamaska QL. H. Lafleur
Yarker Camden, EastAddington OJ. A. Shibley
Yarm Clarendon Pontiac QRobert
McJanet
Yarmouth Yarmouth N SA. J. Hood
Yarmouth CentreYarmouth Elgin, E. R. OWilliam Mann
Yelverton Manvers Durham, E. R. OJames A.
Curry
Yeovil Egremont Grey, S. R. OJoseph
Bunston
Yoho, W. O. York N BWm. Arbuckle
* York Seneca Haldimand OHy. A. Duggan
York Mills York York, E. R. OWilliam Hogg
York River Faraday Hastings, N. R. OJ. C. George
Yorkville York York, E. R. OJames Dobson
Young’s Cove,
W. O.
Queen’s N BR. Snodgrass
Young’s PointSmith Peterborough,
W. R.
OPatrick Young
Zealand Oso Addington OJoseph Davis

71. Zephyr Scott Ontario, N. R. OManuel N.
Dafoe
Zetland Turnberry Huron, N. R. OL. J. Brace
Zimmerman Nelson Halton ORobert Miller
Ziska Monck Muskoka OW. H. Spencer
Zurich Hay Huron, S. R. ORobert Brown

72. [1] Late Six mile Cross.
[2] Late Spring Hill Road, W. O.
[3] Closed during Winter.
[4] Late Cameron, W. O.
[5] Late Channel Islands, W. O.
[6] Late Allendale Mills.
[7] Late McNab, Glengarry.
[8] Late Grass Pond
[9] Late “Evangeline.”
[10] Late Balmer’s Island.
[11] Late “Foster’s Cove, W. O.”

73. List of Post Offices closed and not
subsequently re-opened, between
the 1st of July, 1871, and the 1st of
July, 1872.
NAME OF OFFICE. ELECTORAL DISTRICT.DATE OF CLOSING.
Borelia Ontario, N. R. O1st March, 1872.
Chamcook, W. O. Charlotte N B1st July, 1872.
Country Harbour, W. O.Guysborough N S1st July, 1872.
Digdeguash, W. O. Charlotte N B1st October,
1871.
Dornoch Oxford, S. R. O1st April, 1872.
Drury Simcoe, N. E. O1st March, 1872.
Felton Russell O1st July, 1872.
Gold Mines, Mount
Uniacke, W. O.
Hants N S1st July, 1872.
Green Point Prince Edward O1st February,
1872.
Indian River Peterborough,
E. R.
O1st September,
1871.
Lameque, W. O. Gloucester N B1st January,
1872.
Largie Elgin, W. R. O1st September,
1871.
Latimer Frontenac O1st June, 1872.
Leavens Grey, N. R. O1st January,
1872.

74. Lower Hillsborough,
W. O.
Albert N B1st May, 1872.
Mathers Peterborough,
E. R.
O1st April, 1872.
Mekinac Champlain Q1st July, 1872.
Middleton, W. O. WestmorelandN B1st January,
1872.
Mount Webster Leeds, S. R. O1st February,
1872.
Pelham Union Monck O1st December,
1871.
Plumweseep, W. O. King’s N B1st August,
1871.
Ullyatt Grey, N. R. O1st September,
1871.
Wayside, W. O. Cumberland N S1st July, 1872.
Willowgrove Haldimand O1st June, 1872.
Woodbury Brant, S. R. O1st June, 1872.
Woods Harbour, W. O.Shelburne N S1st April, 1872.

75. List of changes in the names of Post
Offices, between the 1st of July,
1871, and the 1st of July, 1872,
inclusive.
LATE NAME OF OFFICE.ELECTORAL DISTRICT.NEW NAME OF OFFICE.
Allendale Mills Peterboro, E. R. OLang.
Balmer’s Island Renfrew, S. R. OStewartville.
Cameron, W. O. Inverness N SEmerald, W. O.
Channel Islands, W. O.Cape Breton N SEskasoni, W. O.
Evangeline Stanstead QSt. Hermenegilde.
Foster’s Cove, W. O.Victoria N BThree Brooks, W. O.
Grass Pond Brome QSt. Etienne de Bolton.
McNab—Glengarry Glengarry OLochinvar.
St. Etienne St. Maurice QSt. Etienne des Grés.
Six Mile Cross Huntingdon QAnderson’s Corners.
Spring Hill Road, W. O.Cumberland N SAthol.

76. POST OFFICE TRANSACTIONS FOR
THE MONTHS OF AUGUST AND
SEPTEMBER, 1872.
NEW POST OFFICES ESTABLISHED.
NAME OF POST
OFFICE.
TOWNSHIP OR
PARISH.
ELECTORAL DISTRICT.POSTMASTER.
AUGUST.
Bardsville Monck Muskoka OCharles Bard.
BatchewanaFisher Algoma OW. J. Scott,
jun.
Cambridge
Station, W. O.
King’s N SJohn C.
Neiley.
Condon
Settlement,
W. O.
King’s N SWm.
McConnell.
Esquimaux
Point
Saguenay QD. B. McGie.
Factory Dale,
W. O.
King’s N SRobert R.
Ray.
Forest City,
W. O.
York N BWilliam R.
Cully.
Grande Vallée Gaspé QLouis
Fournier.
[12]
HarlockHullett Huron, C. R. OThomas
Neilans.

77. Harmony,
W. O.
King’s N SAustin
Spinney.
Jackson Road,
W. O.
King’s N SAlexander
Nichol.
Lake George,
W. O.
King’s N SA. P.
Hudgens.
Little Ridge,
W. O.
Albert N BBenjamin
Bray.
Magpie Saguenay QPeter Skelton.
Mascouche Mascouche L’Assomption QJ. O.
Lamarche.
Midland, W. O. King’s N BW. Mitchell
Case.
Mill Cove,
W. O.
Queen’s N BMrs. Nancy
Sparks.
Mingan Saguenay QBenjamin
Scott.
Natashquan Saguenay QC. A.
Deschamps.
Palmer RapidsRaglan Renfrew, S. R. OH. F.
McLachlin.
Pemberton
Ridge, W. O.
York N BCyrus B.
McKenney.
Perm Mulmur Simcoe, S. R. OPaul
Gallagher.
Pleasant Vale,
W. O.
Albert N BR. Alder
Colpitts.
Prosser Brook,
W. O.
Albert N BDavid H.
Beeman.
St. James’
Park, (sub)
WestminsterMiddlesex, E. R. OJohn Taylor.

78. St. Mary’s,
W. O.
Kent N BOlivier
LeBlanc.
Sheldrake Saguenay QJohn Collas.
Upper BedfordStanbridgeMissisquoi QN. C. Martin.
Upper
Hampstead,
W. O.
Queen’s N BReuben G.
Cameron.
Urquharts,
W. O.
King’s N BNathaniel
Urquhart.
Waterside,
W. O.
Albert N BGeorge
Coonan.
Whitney, W. O. NorthumberlandN BJames
Russell.
Willowgrove
(re-opened)
Oneida Haldimand OHugh Stuart.
SEPTEMBER.
Allan Mills Burgess, NLanark, S. R. OWilliam Allan.
Avondale,
W. O.
Carleton N BJohn E.
McCready.
Clinch’s Mills,
W. O.
St. John N BChas. F.
Clinch.
French Lake,
W. O.
Sunbury N BA. H. Smith.
Reedsdale Inverness Megantic QJames Reed.
Richibucto
Village, W. O.
Kent N BUrbain Breau.
Seely Brunel Muskoka OObadiah
Seely.
Spence Spence Muskoka OF. W.
Ashdown.

79. Uphill Dalton Victoria, N. R. OJoseph
Calhoun.
[12] This office was reported as having been established on
the 1st June 1872, but did not go into operation until the 1st
August, 1872.
CHANGES IN POST OFFICES ALREADY
ESTABLISHED.
OfficÉ ClosÉd.
La Tortue, Co. Laprairie, Q.
NamÉ ChangÉd .
Mascouche, Co. l’Assomption, Q., to Mascouche Rapids.

80. POST OFFICES IN CANADA,
ON THE 1st JULY, 1872,
ARRANGED ACCORDING TO
PROVINCES AND ELECTORAL
DISTRICTS.
POST OFFICES
IN THE
PROVINCE OF ONTARIO,
ARRANGED ACCORDING TO
ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND TOWNSHIPS.
ADDINGTON.
AbingÉ .
Vennachar.
AnglÉsÉa .
Cloyne.
Ashby.
—

81. BarriÉ.
Hardinge,
Harlowe.
BÉdford .
Fermoy,
Glendower.
CamdÉn , East.
Camden, East,
Centreville,
Colebrook,
Croydon,
Desmond,
Enterprise,
Moscow,
Napanee Mills,
Newburgh,
Overton,
Yarker.
Canonto , South.
—
ClarÉndon .
Ardoch,
Buckshot.
DÉnbigh .

82. Denbigh.
Effingham .
—
HinchinbrookÉ .
Deniston,
Parham.
Kaladar .
Flinton,
Glastonbury,
Kaladar.
KÉnnÉbÉc .
Arden.
Loughboro ’.
Desert Lake,
Lapum,
Loughboro’,
Railton,
Spaffordton,
Wilmur.
MillÉr.
Gemley.
OldÉn.

83. Long Lake,
Mountain Grove.
Oso.
Deerdock,
Zealand.
PalmÉrston .
Ompah.
Portland .
Bellrock,
Harrowsmith,
Hartington,
Murvale,
Petworth,
Verona.
ShÉffiÉld .
Clareview,
Erinsville,
Tamworth.
ALGOMA.
Assiginack .
Manitowaning.
FishÉr.

84. Batchewana.
Howland .
Little Current.
Korah.
Sault Ste. Marie.
NÉÉbing .
Fort William.
ParkÉ.
Pointe aux Pins.
The following Post Offices are in the unsurveyed portion of Algoma:—
Bruce Mines,
Collin’s Inlet,
Garden River,
Killarney,
Michipicoten River,
Silver Islet,
Spanish River,
Thunder Bay.
BOTHWELL.
CamdÉn .
Croton,

85. Dawn Mills,
Dresden,
Thamesville.
Dawn.
Rutherford.
EuphÉmia .
Florence,
Shetland,
Sutherland’s Corners.
Howard .
Botany,
* Morpeth,
Ridgetown,
Selton.
Orford .
Clachan,
Clearville,
Duart,
Highgate.
Sombra .
Baby’s Point,
Becher,
Port Lambton,
Sombra,
Wilkesport.

86. ZonÉ.
* Bothwell.
BRANT, NORTH RIDING.
Brantford , East.
Cainsville.
DumfriÉs , South.
Glen Morris,
Harrisburg,
* Paris,
Paris Station,
Rosebank,
St. George.
Onondaga .
Onondaga,
Tuscarora.
BRANT, SOUTH RIDING.
Brantford , WÉst.
* Brantford,
Burtch,
Falkland,
Langford,
Mohawk,
Mount Vernon,
Newport.

87. Burford .
Burford,
Cathcart,
Fairfield Plain,
Harley,
New Durham.
Oakland .
Oakland,
Scotland.
Tuscarora .
—
BROCKVILLE, TOWN.
ElizabÉthtown .
Addison,
* Brockville,
Fairfield, East,
Greenbush.
* Lyn,
New Dublin,
Whitehurst.
BRUCE, NORTH RIDING.
AlbÉrmarlÉ .
Colpoy’s Bay,
Mar.

88. AmabÉl .
Allenford,
Park Head,
Skipness,
Wiarton.
Arran.
Arkwright,
Burgoyne,
Elsinore,
Invermay,
Tara.
BrucÉ.
Glammis,
Gresham,
Inverhuron,
North Bruce,
Tiverton,
Underwood.
Bury.
—
Eastnor .
—
EldÉrsliÉ .
Carnegie,

89. Chesley,
Dobbington,
* Paisley,
Williscroft.
Lindsay .
—
SaugÉÉn .
Dumblane,
Normanton,
* Saugeen,
West Arran.
BRUCE, SOUTH RIDING.
Brant.
Dunkeld,
Ellengowan,
Elmwood,
Malcolm,
Maple Hill,
Outram,
Scone,
Vesta,
* Walkerton.
Carrick .
Ambleside,
Carlsruhe,
Formosa,

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