The Dictators Hitlers Germany And Stalins Russia Overy Richard
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The Dictators Hitlers Germany And Stalins Russia Overy Richard
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RICHARD OVERY
The Dictators
Hitler~s Germany and Stalin~s Russia
ALLEN LANE
an imprint of
PENGUIN BOOKS
The Dictators
Hitler~s Germany and Stalin~s Russia
ALLEN LANE
an imprint of
PENGUIN BOOKS
Contents
List of Illustrations IX
List of Tables and Maps Xlll
Maps XIV
Abbreviations xxv
Preface XXVII
Introduction: Comparing Dictatorships xxx
I Stalin and Hitler: Paths to Dictatorship I
2 The Art of Ruling 54
3
Cults of Personality 98
4
The
Party State 132
5
States of Terror 176
6
Constructing Utopia 218
7
The Moral Universe of Dictatorship 265
8
Friend and Foe:
Popular Responses
to Dictatorship 3
04
9
Cultural Revolutions 349 10 Commanding the Economy 392
II Military Superpowers 441
12
Total War 483
13 Nations and Races
540
14 Empire of the Camps 593
Vll
List of Illustrations IX
List of Tables and Maps Xlll
Maps XIV
Abbreviations xxv
Preface XXVII
Introduction: Comparing Dictatorships xxx
I Stalin and Hitler: Paths to Dictatorship I
2 The Art of Ruling 54
3
Cults of Personality 98
4
The
Party State 132
5
States of Terror 176
6
Constructing Utopia 218
7
The Moral Universe of Dictatorship 265
8
Friend and Foe:
Popular Responses
to Dictatorship 3
04
9
Cultural Revolutions 349 10 Commanding the Economy 392
II Military Superpowers 441
12
Total War 483
13 Nations and Races
540
14 Empire of the Camps 593
Vll
CONTENTS
Conclusion: Two Dictatorships
Bibliography
Notes
Index
Vlll
Conclusion: Two Dictatorships
Bibliography
Notes
Index
Vlll
List of Illustrations
FIRST SECTION
I Josef Stalin at the height of his powers.
2 Stalin
at a meeting of the
Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, with
President Kalinin on his left.
3 Stalin applauding his audience after a speech
on the new
constitution in
1936.
4 A poster of the two leaders Lenin and Stalin, c. 1936.
5 A propaganda session in the Soviet countryside, c. 1930.
6 A march past of athletes in Red Square in Moscow in 1937.
7 Andrei Vyshinsky in 1938 as Chief Procurator of the Soviet Union.
8 A diploma awarded in 1931 for denouncing rich peasants to the
authorities.
9 The Praesidium building of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine in
Kiev.
10 Building the fourth section of the Moscow metro in the I940s.
II The Unforgettable Meeting by V. Yefanov, 1936.
12 A party member subjecting a group of Russian prostitutes to a
course of political re-education.
13 Troflm Lysenko, the Soviet 'people's scientist'.
14 The giant statue Worker and Collective Farm Woman by Vera
Mukhina,
on top of the Soviet pavilion in
Paris in 1937.
15 An anti-religious demonstration in Moscow in the I920S.
16 A painting of the young Stalin talking to peasants in 1902 by
A. Kutateladze.
17 A group of Stakhanovite coal-miners pose after winning the
national mineworkers competition.
IX
FIRST SECTION
I Josef Stalin at the height of his powers.
2 Stalin
at a meeting of the
Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, with
President Kalinin on his left.
3 Stalin applauding his audience after a speech
on the new
constitution in
1936.
4 A poster of the two leaders Lenin and Stalin, c. 1936.
5 A propaganda session in the Soviet countryside, c. 1930.
6 A march past of athletes in Red Square in Moscow in 1937.
7 Andrei Vyshinsky in 1938 as Chief Procurator of the Soviet Union.
8 A diploma awarded in 1931 for denouncing rich peasants to the
authorities.
9 The Praesidium building of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine in
Kiev.
10 Building the fourth section of the Moscow metro in the I940s.
II The Unforgettable Meeting by V. Yefanov, 1936.
12 A party member subjecting a group of Russian prostitutes to a
course of political re-education.
13 Troflm Lysenko, the Soviet 'people's scientist'.
14 The giant statue Worker and Collective Farm Woman by Vera
Mukhina,
on top of the Soviet pavilion in
Paris in 1937.
15 An anti-religious demonstration in Moscow in the I920S.
16 A painting of the young Stalin talking to peasants in 1902 by
A. Kutateladze.
17 A group of Stakhanovite coal-miners pose after winning the
national mineworkers competition.
IX
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
18 A couple playing draughts in the Gorky Park of Culture and Rest
In 1937.
19 The writer Maxim Gorky after his return to the Soviet Union in
1932.
20 The writer Mikhail Bulgakov.
21 A Georgian woman learning to write using the new alphabet
imposed in the late 1920S.
22 The painting At an Old Urals Works by Johanson, winner of the
all-Soviet art exhibition of 1929.
23 Tractors lined up at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory in 1935.
24 Dividing up the landlords' land in the new Latvian socialist
republic.
25 The woman tractor driver who became a Stakhanovite model for
other women workers on collective farms.
26 Architects and town-planners work on the reconstruction of
Moscow in 1946.
27 A 1936 poster on 'Fascism Means War'.
28 A poster on the threat of war: 'Accursed be the Warmongers!
Mothers of the World Fight for
Peace'.
29 A former student checks shells in an arms factory.
30 A group of women volunteers in 1941 fighting with partisans
against the German invasion.
3
I Women building barricades and preparing Leningrad's defences.
32 Soldiers of General GUfyev's units kneel at the presentation of
the Lenin Banner before departing for the Stalingrad front.
33 German soldiers pose with executed partisans.
34 A train filled with Soviet Jews from Belorussia in 1932.
35 A bas-relief of Stalin at Taganskaya station in Moscow.
36 Stalin and Lenin's mausoleum.
SECOND SECTION
I Adolf Hitler on the path to power.
2 Hitler voting in the general election of March 1936.
3 Hitler welcoming a group of Hitler Youth in 1936.
4 Hitler in 1935 with Rudolf Hess and Joseph Goebbels.
x
18 A couple playing draughts in the Gorky Park of Culture and Rest
In 1937.
19 The writer Maxim Gorky after his return to the Soviet Union in
1932.
20 The writer Mikhail Bulgakov.
21 A Georgian woman learning to write using the new alphabet
imposed in the late 1920S.
22 The painting At an Old Urals Works by Johanson, winner of the
all-Soviet art exhibition of 1929.
23 Tractors lined up at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory in 1935.
24 Dividing up the landlords' land in the new Latvian socialist
republic.
25 The woman tractor driver who became a Stakhanovite model for
other women workers on collective farms.
26 Architects and town-planners work on the reconstruction of
Moscow in 1946.
27 A 1936 poster on 'Fascism Means War'.
28 A poster on the threat of war: 'Accursed be the Warmongers!
Mothers of the World Fight for
Peace'.
29 A former student checks shells in an arms factory.
30 A group of women volunteers in 1941 fighting with partisans
against the German invasion.
3
I Women building barricades and preparing Leningrad's defences.
32 Soldiers of General GUfyev's units kneel at the presentation of
the Lenin Banner before departing for the Stalingrad front.
33 German soldiers pose with executed partisans.
34 A train filled with Soviet Jews from Belorussia in 1932.
35 A bas-relief of Stalin at Taganskaya station in Moscow.
36 Stalin and Lenin's mausoleum.
SECOND SECTION
I Adolf Hitler on the path to power.
2 Hitler voting in the general election of March 1936.
3 Hitler welcoming a group of Hitler Youth in 1936.
4 Hitler in 1935 with Rudolf Hess and Joseph Goebbels.
x
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
5 Young girls from the Bund deutscher Madel are addressed by
Hitler Youth officials
and leaders.
6 Adolf Hitler with Heinrich Himmler.
7 The National Socialist lawyer Roland Freisler.
8 Hitler examining a model of an Autobahn bridge with the
engineer Fritz
Todt and his deputy Albert Speer.
9 Model for the great Congress Hall.
10 Poster idealizing mother and child in the Third Reich.
II Chart from a book on genetics published in 1936.
12 The ideal National Socialist family.
13 A member of the Russian National Socialist Party poses in Berlin.
14 The expressionist poet Gottfried Benn.
15 Hitler visits the Exhibition of Degenerate Art in Munich in 1937.
16 Still from the film of the 193 5 ceremony honouring the martyrs
of the National Socialist movement in Munich.
17 German girls from the Sudetenland.
18 A labour battalion returning home at the end of the day.
19 Women at the Ravensbruck concentration camp stand ready to
begin
work in the camp factory. 20 Gathering including Hermann Goring and the SA leader Ernst
Rohm.
21 Hitler Youth.
22 Hitler a few months after assuming supreme command of the
armed forces in February
1938.
23 A woodcut from 1942 based on a drawing by the Soviet artist
Mikhail Pikov which shows German forces routed in front
of
Moscow.
24 The bombed ruins of the Guinsburg House in Kiev after German
attacks in the summer
of
1941.
25 An army order published in German and Belorussian in August
1941 requiring the population of the village of Zizicha to leave
or be shot.
26 A Red Army soldier murdered on the eastern front.
27 A young Jewish child is assessed racially by German officials.
28 A gypsy baby at Auschwitz, with the camp tattoo on its forearm.
29 A camp drawing from the Buchenwald concentration camp in
1944·
Xl
5 Young girls from the Bund deutscher Madel are addressed by
Hitler Youth officials
and leaders.
6 Adolf Hitler with Heinrich Himmler.
7 The National Socialist lawyer Roland Freisler.
8 Hitler examining a model of an Autobahn bridge with the
engineer Fritz
Todt and his deputy Albert Speer.
9 Model for the great Congress Hall.
10 Poster idealizing mother and child in the Third Reich.
II Chart from a book on genetics published in 1936.
12 The ideal National Socialist family.
13 A member of the Russian National Socialist Party poses in Berlin.
14 The expressionist poet Gottfried Benn.
15 Hitler visits the Exhibition of Degenerate Art in Munich in 1937.
16 Still from the film of the 193 5 ceremony honouring the martyrs
of the National Socialist movement in Munich.
17 German girls from the Sudetenland.
18 A labour battalion returning home at the end of the day.
19 Women at the Ravensbruck concentration camp stand ready to
begin
work in the camp factory. 20 Gathering including Hermann Goring and the SA leader Ernst
Rohm.
21 Hitler Youth.
22 Hitler a few months after assuming supreme command of the
armed forces in February
1938.
23 A woodcut from 1942 based on a drawing by the Soviet artist
Mikhail Pikov which shows German forces routed in front
of
Moscow.
24 The bombed ruins of the Guinsburg House in Kiev after German
attacks in the summer
of
1941.
25 An army order published in German and Belorussian in August
1941 requiring the population of the village of Zizicha to leave
or be shot.
26 A Red Army soldier murdered on the eastern front.
27 A young Jewish child is assessed racially by German officials.
28 A gypsy baby at Auschwitz, with the camp tattoo on its forearm.
29 A camp drawing from the Buchenwald concentration camp in
1944·
Xl
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
30 A group of European Jews waiting after arrival at
Auschwitz-Birkenau.
3
I Two women liberated by the Red Army from a camp in
Pomerania
at the end of the war.
32 Three women truck drivers for the German air force, captured by
the American
7th Army at the end of the war. ILLUSTRATION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank John Cunningham at the Society for
Co-Operation in Russian
and Soviet Studies (SCRSS) and Marek Jaros
at the Wiener Library (WL), the Institute of Contemporary History,
for their help with the pictures in this book.
Copyright for the following pictures
is held by the
S CRSS: first section,
pictures
1-12, 14, 16-21, 23-36; second section, pictures 23-26,
31.
Copyright for the following pictures is held by the WL: second section,
pictures 12,
13,20,27. The following images were supplied by the WL,
copyright unknown: second section, pictures
1-10, 15-22,28-3°,32.
Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders but this has not
been possible in all cases. If notified, the publishers will be pleased to
rectify any omissions at the earliest opportunity.
Xli
30 A group of European Jews waiting after arrival at
Auschwitz-Birkenau.
3
I Two women liberated by the Red Army from a camp in
Pomerania
at the end of the war.
32 Three women truck drivers for the German air force, captured by
the American
7th Army at the end of the war. ILLUSTRATION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank John Cunningham at the Society for
Co-Operation in Russian
and Soviet Studies (SCRSS) and Marek Jaros
at the Wiener Library (WL), the Institute of Contemporary History,
for their help with the pictures in this book.
Copyright for the following pictures
is held by the
S CRSS: first section,
pictures
1-12, 14, 16-21, 23-36; second section, pictures 23-26,
31.
Copyright for the following pictures is held by the WL: second section,
pictures 12,
13,20,27. The following images were supplied by the WL,
copyright unknown: second section, pictures
1-10, 15-22,28-3°,32.
Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders but this has not
been possible in all cases. If notified, the publishers will be pleased to
rectify any omissions at the earliest opportunity.
Xli
List of Tables and Maps
TABLES
Table 4.1 Membership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union 1917-1953
Table 4.2 Membership of the National Socialist Party
1919-1945
Table 5.1 Sentences of Cases brought to Trial by State
Security 1930-I 9 53
Table II.I Defence Expenditure in Germany and the Soviet
Union 1928-1939
Table 12.1 Resources and Military Output of the Soviet
Union and Germany 1941-1945
Table 14.1 German Concentration Camp Population
1933-1945
Table 14.2 Number of Prisoners in ITLs and ITKs 1930-1953
Table 14.3 Admissions, Escapes, Deaths and Releases in the
GUlag Camps
1934-1947
MAPS
I Germany in 1933
2 The Soviet Union in the 193 os
3
The
Party organization in Germany
4
The camp system in central Russia and
Siberia
5 The camp system in Greater Germany
6
The camp system in the Western
Soviet Union
Xlll
138
140
195
453
498
612
613
615
XIV
XVI
XV111
XX
XXll
XXIV
TABLES
Table 4.1 Membership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union 1917-1953
Table 4.2 Membership of the National Socialist Party
1919-1945
Table 5.1 Sentences of Cases brought to Trial by State
Security 1930-I 9 53
Table II.I Defence Expenditure in Germany and the Soviet
Union 1928-1939
Table 12.1 Resources and Military Output of the Soviet
Union and Germany 1941-1945
Table 14.1 German Concentration Camp Population
1933-1945
Table 14.2 Number of Prisoners in ITLs and ITKs 1930-1953
Table 14.3 Admissions, Escapes, Deaths and Releases in the
GUlag Camps
1934-1947
MAPS
I Germany in 1933
2 The Soviet Union in the 193 os
3
The
Party organization in Germany
4
The camp system in central Russia and
Siberia
5 The camp system in Greater Germany
6
The camp system in the Western
Soviet Union
Xlll
138
140
195
453
498
612
613
615
XIV
XVI
XV111
XX
XXll
XXIV
o 100 2~0 km
I Germany in I933
I Germany in I933
Bavaria
-Munich
PRUSSIAN
PROVINCES
I East Prussia
2 Brandenburg
3 Pomerania
4 Grenzmark-Posen-
Westpreussen
5 Silesia
6 Saxony
7 Schleswig-Holstein
8 Hanover
9 Westphalia
10 Hesse-Nassau
I I Rhine Province
12 Hohenzollern
--International boundary
--Land boundary
-------Province boundary
D Lander
D Prussia
~ Special regimes for
Danzig and Saar
LANDER
I Thuringia
II Hesse
ill Hamburg
IV Mecklenburg-Schwerin
V Oldenburg
VI Brunswick
VII Anhalt
vm Bremen
IX Lippe
X Liibeck
XI Waldeck
XII Schaumburg-Lippe
-Munich
PRUSSIAN
PROVINCES
I East Prussia
2 Brandenburg
3 Pomerania
4 Grenzmark-Posen-
Westpreussen
5 Silesia
6 Saxony
7 Schleswig-Holstein
8 Hanover
9 Westphalia
10 Hesse-Nassau
I I Rhine Province
12 Hohenzollern
--International boundary
--Land boundary
-------Province boundary
D Lander
D Prussia
~ Special regimes for
Danzig and Saar
LANDER
I Thuringia
II Hesse
ill Hamburg
IV Mecklenburg-Schwerin
V Oldenburg
VI Brunswick
VII Anhalt
vm Bremen
IX Lippe
X Liibeck
XI Waldeck
XII Schaumburg-Lippe
Soviet Socialist Republics
I Karelo-Finnish S.S.R.
2 Estonian S.S.R.
--Boundary of Soviet Socialist Republics (S.S.R.)
~ Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (A.S.S.R.)
3 Latvian
S.S.R.
4 Lirhuanian S.S.R.
5 Moldavian S.S.R.
6 Georgian S.S.R.
7 Armenian
S.S.R.
W Na,ional Regions (N.R.) & Autonomous Provinces (A. P.)
8 Azerbaidjan S.S.R.
9 Turlunen S.S.R.
10 Tadjik S.S.R.
II Kirghiz S.S.R.
o 300 600 miles
I
o 300 9~okm
2 The Soviet Union in the 19305
Bare" ts
Sea
ARCTIC
.~
I Karelo-Finnish S.S.R.
2 Estonian S.S.R.
--Boundary of Soviet Socialist Republics (S.S.R.)
~ Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (A.S.S.R.)
3 Latvian
S.S.R.
4 Lirhuanian S.S.R.
5 Moldavian S.S.R.
6 Georgian S.S.R.
7 Armenian
S.S.R.
W Na,ional Regions (N.R.) & Autonomous Provinces (A. P.)
8 Azerbaidjan S.S.R.
9 Turlunen S.S.R.
10 Tadjik S.S.R.
II Kirghiz S.S.R.
o 300 600 miles
I
o 300 9~okm
2 The Soviet Union in the 19305
Bare" ts
Sea
ARCTIC
.~
'Soviet Socialist Republics (S.S.R.)
Soviet Socialist Republics
(A.S.S.R.)
A.S.S.R.
National Regions
a enets N.R.
b Komi-Permvak .R.
e Ostyak.Vogu! N.R.
d Yamal-Nenets. 1.R.
e Taimvr N.R.
Evenki N.R.
g Chukor N.R.
h
Koryak N.R.
Sea
~f
Okhotsk
PACIFIC
OCEAN
SAKHAUN
ISLAND
& Autonomous Provinces
i Oiror A.P.
Khakass A.P.
Jewish A.P.
Adygei A.P.
Cherkess A.P.
n Karachai A.P.
o Nagorno Karabakh A.P.
South Osserian A.P.
Garno Badakhshan A.P.
Soviet Socialist Republics
(A.S.S.R.)
A.S.S.R.
National Regions
a enets N.R.
b Komi-Permvak .R.
e Ostyak.Vogu! N.R.
d Yamal-Nenets. 1.R.
e Taimvr N.R.
Evenki N.R.
g Chukor N.R.
h
Koryak N.R.
Sea
~f
Okhotsk
PACIFIC
OCEAN
SAKHAUN
ISLAND
& Autonomous Provinces
i Oiror A.P.
Khakass A.P.
Jewish A.P.
Adygei A.P.
Cherkess A.P.
n Karachai A.P.
o Nagorno Karabakh A.P.
South Osserian A.P.
Garno Badakhshan A.P.
~ Occupied territory
III German satellite state
---Greater Germany
---Gaue
o
I
o
•
Gau capital
Party city
Party headquarters
50
SWITZERLAND
3 The Party organization in Germany
"------t
---~
Dresden. ~
Saxony
ITALY
III German satellite state
---Greater Germany
---Gaue
o
I
o
•
Gau capital
Party city
Party headquarters
50
SWITZERLAND
3 The Party organization in Germany
"------t
---~
Dresden. ~
Saxony
ITALY
'ZERLAND
ITALY
my
Pomerania
Danzig
Danzig
West
Prussia
• Konigsberg
East Prussia
·Posen
Wartheland
Lower Silesia
Breslau·
SLOVAKIA
1
./-.. ..; ';.,~."
' __ ...... _~J
ITALY
my
Pomerania
Danzig
Danzig
West
Prussia
• Konigsberg
East Prussia
·Posen
Wartheland
Lower Silesia
Breslau·
SLOVAKIA
1
./-.. ..; ';.,~."
' __ ...... _~J
o
I
o 3
00
..'!,~
~~,,~,~~::~
;--%
"~~
---
"
600 miles
9~0 km
•
4 The camp system in central Russia and Siberia
® GULag labour camps
• POW camps
--Approximate boundaries of labour
camp administrative divisions, 1941
ISS:l Area holding camps of
Complete Isolation
• Region set aside exclusively for
forced labour, and administered
by the Security Police
I
o 3
00
..'!,~
~~,,~,~~::~
;--%
"~~
---
"
600 miles
9~0 km
•
4 The camp system in central Russia and Siberia
® GULag labour camps
• POW camps
--Approximate boundaries of labour
camp administrative divisions, 1941
ISS:l Area holding camps of
Complete Isolation
• Region set aside exclusively for
forced labour, and administered
by the Security Police
AG
1 and Siberia
® GULaglabo • ur camps
POW camps
-A pproximate b
camp
d. oundaries f
1 ~ a mlllistr . 0 abour
~ Area hold. anve divisions, 1941
C
lllgcam f
omplete I 1 . ps 0
•
soatlon
Region set . d
forced labo as! e exclusively for
b h
ur, and ad .
y t e Security
P 1· mlllisrered
o ICe
1 and Siberia
® GULaglabo • ur camps
POW camps
-A pproximate b
camp
d. oundaries f
1 ~ a mlllistr . 0 abour
~ Area hold. anve divisions, 1941
C
lllgcam f
omplete I 1 . ps 0
•
soatlon
Region set . d
forced labo as! e exclusively for
b h
ur, and ad .
y t e Security
P 1· mlllisrered
o ICe
Wuhlheide
IX*
e Unterliiss FrOhnaU
j Liebenaue/ x*
lahde o Langenhagen lk HenkointsdorfQ@e
eOhrbeck ~. <3>-Hannover Fa ense~~rin en reg OBerlin
BaQ. e • GenthmO GroG-e
Eilsen
'"
Ahlem 0 Watenstedt-Maideburg beeren Gose~
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e eHonnetal 0 :Plestemz
~o;~~:~ Blankenburg@ Halberstadt" *vJ, ... .,
KrefeldQ ( OWetter ! *m Osendorf ®Ragunh
Diissseldor{¢' . . 0Meschede ~/,OEichenberg • B6hlitz-""-
J !Leverku~?0®Sohnger;~~~~~:inkel Kasse f.Breiten~u SC~~~~:allu~i;e~~~~~g '\.resden
BEL G I U M " ( ... Alsdorf !ff Id ' Kulkw it~.Peres -Bohlen , I
-...... :..,.Aachen eSiegen 0 ef.? ,/ *IV • '
.' Lippendorf cosse~~~~j:/ ·,
o
o
I 'Kranichfield • ® Oederan @
\') @)Ettingsh~usen Bibra ® @ Freiberg
Zwickall® Chemnitz
,,--t' freiesneen '."-,. 1 •
"
.... " • . P auene.@Ober
Romhild FalkenstelO ® Leutensdorf-,
LUX ,,,, ) J~_~~ _ngeorgeostadt MaltheU"?
Rudersberg
Leonber
g.
0Rotenbach (Schrezheim)
Neckerh!se:Felibach .. Wasseralfingen
(jf)0
Neck.menzlingen
e He .~h€i.m:'Mergerstetten
.' "'OOffingen
Ehi~~--:n q>,./ ' e. Augsburg
VII* Pilsen -Ka~l~~\~ -
',.
Mj'O~a~
,'" .....
~ ... -,
-,
~""""'''''
............
FRANCE
*VI
Munchen-Berg am Laim e .. /./ .. " .... ' .... ~." ,
•
Mundl,~n-Moosach
50
ITALY
,
50 I~O km
5 The camp system in Greater Germany
•
Iadlors[ ..... \,,,-,, . / ... ..,.,
• rursterfvalde
~ Schwerig • Bren
Wildfelde
"
@Chrd tiasradt
'-
• eRothenburg
®Lobau
.:5::2u e e Kleinschona * XIII
eTerschen @Morchentiem
:-. ... J~'-'f---\-- "f'Z:
Hradischko .........
• ~ he~ '"\ •• t).·
eKrehanirz P d I
•
• Jirowitz ar uitz r
.eTworschowitz L_ ......... ,,~
.,i.now itz Marke
•
Plan a.d. Lainsit
Valentin
St. Dionysch
~."\
/ Niklasdorf
IX*
e Unterliiss FrOhnaU
j Liebenaue/ x*
lahde o Langenhagen lk HenkointsdorfQ@e
eOhrbeck ~. <3>-Hannover Fa ense~~rin en reg OBerlin
BaQ. e • GenthmO GroG-e
Eilsen
'"
Ahlem 0 Watenstedt-Maideburg beeren Gose~
Hamm HiJ...desheim Hal;~e~:~n • ~".~e itz~all
e eHonnetal 0 :Plestemz
~o;~~:~ Blankenburg@ Halberstadt" *vJ, ... .,
KrefeldQ ( OWetter ! *m Osendorf ®Ragunh
Diissseldor{¢' . . 0Meschede ~/,OEichenberg • B6hlitz-""-
J !Leverku~?0®Sohnger;~~~~~:inkel Kasse f.Breiten~u SC~~~~:allu~i;e~~~~~g '\.resden
BEL G I U M " ( ... Alsdorf !ff Id ' Kulkw it~.Peres -Bohlen , I
-...... :..,.Aachen eSiegen 0 ef.? ,/ *IV • '
.' Lippendorf cosse~~~~j:/ ·,
o
o
I 'Kranichfield • ® Oederan @
\') @)Ettingsh~usen Bibra ® @ Freiberg
Zwickall® Chemnitz
,,--t' freiesneen '."-,. 1 •
"
.... " • . P auene.@Ober
Romhild FalkenstelO ® Leutensdorf-,
LUX ,,,, ) J~_~~ _ngeorgeostadt MaltheU"?
Rudersberg
Leonber
g.
0Rotenbach (Schrezheim)
Neckerh!se:Felibach .. Wasseralfingen
(jf)0
Neck.menzlingen
e He .~h€i.m:'Mergerstetten
.' "'OOffingen
Ehi~~--:n q>,./ ' e. Augsburg
VII* Pilsen -Ka~l~~\~ -
',.
Mj'O~a~
,'" .....
~ ... -,
-,
~""""'''''
............
FRANCE
*VI
Munchen-Berg am Laim e .. /./ .. " .... ' .... ~." ,
•
Mundl,~n-Moosach
50
ITALY
,
50 I~O km
5 The camp system in Greater Germany
•
Iadlors[ ..... \,,,-,, . / ... ..,.,
• rursterfvalde
~ Schwerig • Bren
Wildfelde
"
@Chrd tiasradt
'-
• eRothenburg
®Lobau
.:5::2u e e Kleinschona * XIII
eTerschen @Morchentiem
:-. ... J~'-'f---\-- "f'Z:
Hradischko .........
• ~ he~ '"\ •• t).·
eKrehanirz P d I
•
• Jirowitz ar uitz r
.eTworschowitz L_ ......... ,,~
.,i.now itz Marke
•
Plan a.d. Lainsit
Valentin
St. Dionysch
~."\
/ Niklasdorf
Wuhlheide
nburge
IX*
-..., Frohnau
• Unterliiss \"Fehrbellin I
Liebenau~ /" Dreetz@ • X*
liahde @Langenhagen fIenningsdorfO o·
.Ohrbeck /. 4> H Falkensee ~Finkenkreg ()Berlin
Baq"f • annover Genthih0 GroG-.
he Eilsen " ,~hlem ® ~atenstedt- Magdeburg beeren e
eBeelen Hildesheim Hallendorf.~ .Leitzkau Gosen
.Honnetal .I-~ssen '~ ,Piesteritz
fd Blankenburgo Halberstadt",*VI!",
~
: *m Osendod ORagunh
eMeschede flt/"' 0Elchenberg • Sohlitz-'-
Kasse .Sre;te.oau Schkopau® ihren~er~ "'-
el. -... Spergau •• Lelpzlg Dres den
.Slegen Affoldern --... * Kulkwit~.Peres-Bohlen I
"' / ~ f IV Lippend o~ Cossebau?e.O Q
f '"'i:;:ralllchfield.. ® Oedera~® Ss lge ~
0Ettmgshausen Blbra . e ® Freiberg
• ~reiesn~~n '~'-\. '" Pla~:I:au@ Chemnitz •
• Romhild Falkenstein" $ Leuten s~i rf~
Fr.fuIHurt-• Rieneck Johanngeorgenstadt '
Heddemheim " ; MaltheUer?
/~ . ./ VII * Pilsen-Kal~~~;"
',.
( .
Mj!;osehau
( .... -
eOdheim
\"-..
-,
-...' .........
e ®Heilbronn
Rudersberg
l.d:m.berg. @Rotenbach (Schrezheim)
!se~Fellbach +Wasseralfingen .,.J~- --"
e@ ® Heidenheiffi~Meigetsfe':ten
. gen .. /
Ehingen._ J' /$ Offingen
/...... .. @.Augsburg
*V1
MUnchen-Berg am Laim. /.'''---.'''' .,>,
• Mjjnch.e~ "-Moosach
•
""s
$
-_lii~rw elle ~~ '"
i'
•
orst ',,~ ....
.Fiirstery\valde
'~Schwerig .Sretz
o Christiastadt
Wildfe1de
• ®Rothenburg
®L6bau
1tXII
=ub
•
iL \-,dentin
St.
Dionysch
) .....
/' Niklasdorf
Baltic
OStrowo.
e Posen
-Lenzingen
•
Grodcziec
Generalgouvernment
*xv
SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
• Work Education Camps
(Gestapo)
o Work Education Camps of
fir
ms and communes
o
Several camps at same
p
lace/same city
Selzec.
* Concentr ation camps
I Neucngammc
II Bergen Beisen ill Mittelbau-Dora
IV Buchenwald
V Natzweiler
VI Dachau
vn Flossenburg
vrn Sachsenburg
IX Ravensbrlick
X Sachsenhausen
XI Theresienstadt
xu Mauthausen
XlII GroR Rosen
XIV Warsaw
XV Plaszow
nburge
IX*
-..., Frohnau
• Unterliiss \"Fehrbellin I
Liebenau~ /" Dreetz@ • X*
liahde @Langenhagen fIenningsdorfO o·
.Ohrbeck /. 4> H Falkensee ~Finkenkreg ()Berlin
Baq"f • annover Genthih0 GroG-.
he Eilsen " ,~hlem ® ~atenstedt- Magdeburg beeren e
eBeelen Hildesheim Hallendorf.~ .Leitzkau Gosen
.Honnetal .I-~ssen '~ ,Piesteritz
fd Blankenburgo Halberstadt",*VI!",
~
: *m Osendod ORagunh
eMeschede flt/"' 0Elchenberg • Sohlitz-'-
Kasse .Sre;te.oau Schkopau® ihren~er~ "'-
el. -... Spergau •• Lelpzlg Dres den
.Slegen Affoldern --... * Kulkwit~.Peres-Bohlen I
"' / ~ f IV Lippend o~ Cossebau?e.O Q
f '"'i:;:ralllchfield.. ® Oedera~® Ss lge ~
0Ettmgshausen Blbra . e ® Freiberg
• ~reiesn~~n '~'-\. '" Pla~:I:au@ Chemnitz •
• Romhild Falkenstein" $ Leuten s~i rf~
Fr.fuIHurt-• Rieneck Johanngeorgenstadt '
Heddemheim " ; MaltheUer?
/~ . ./ VII * Pilsen-Kal~~~;"
',.
( .
Mj!;osehau
( .... -
eOdheim
\"-..
-,
-...' .........
e ®Heilbronn
Rudersberg
l.d:m.berg. @Rotenbach (Schrezheim)
!se~Fellbach +Wasseralfingen .,.J~- --"
e@ ® Heidenheiffi~Meigetsfe':ten
. gen .. /
Ehingen._ J' /$ Offingen
/...... .. @.Augsburg
*V1
MUnchen-Berg am Laim. /.'''---.'''' .,>,
• Mjjnch.e~ "-Moosach
•
""s
$
-_lii~rw elle ~~ '"
i'
•
orst ',,~ ....
.Fiirstery\valde
'~Schwerig .Sretz
o Christiastadt
Wildfe1de
• ®Rothenburg
®L6bau
1tXII
=ub
•
iL \-,dentin
St.
Dionysch
) .....
/' Niklasdorf
Baltic
OStrowo.
e Posen
-Lenzingen
•
Grodcziec
Generalgouvernment
*xv
SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
• Work Education Camps
(Gestapo)
o Work Education Camps of
fir
ms and communes
o
Several camps at same
p
lace/same city
Selzec.
* Concentr ation camps
I Neucngammc
II Bergen Beisen ill Mittelbau-Dora
IV Buchenwald
V Natzweiler
VI Dachau
vn Flossenburg
vrn Sachsenburg
IX Ravensbrlick
X Sachsenhausen
XI Theresienstadt
xu Mauthausen
XlII GroR Rosen
XIV Warsaw
XV Plaszow
® GULag labour camps
• POW camps
--Approximate boundaries of labour
camp administrative divisions, 1942
6 The camp system in the Western Soviet Union
200
200
400
• POW camps
--Approximate boundaries of labour
camp administrative divisions, 1942
6 The camp system in the Western Soviet Union
200
200
400
BA-B
BA-MA
Cheka
CPSU
DAP
DNVP
Freikorps
Gestapa
Gestapo
GNP
Gosplan
GPU GUlag
GUPR
IG Farben
ITK
ITL
IWM
KGB Komsomol
NAIl
NI
NKGB
NKVD
Abbreviations
B undesarchi v -Berlin (Lich terfelde )
Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv (Freiburg)
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter
revolution
and Sabotage
Communist
Party of the Soviet Union
Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (German Workers' Party)
Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National
People's Party)
Free Corps (volunteer militia)
Geheime Staatspolizeiamt (Secret State Police Office)
Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police)
Gross National Product
State Planning Commission
State Political Directorate
Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps
Main Administration of Forced Labour
Interessengemeinschaft Farben AG (Interest Group
Dyes)
Corrective Labour Colony
Corrective
Labour Camp
Imperial War Museum (London)
Committee
of State Security
All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League
National Archives II, College
Park, Maryland
National Income
People's Commissariat of State Security
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
xxv
BA-MA
Cheka
CPSU
DAP
DNVP
Freikorps
Gestapa
Gestapo
GNP
Gosplan
GPU GUlag
GUPR
IG Farben
ITK
ITL
IWM
KGB Komsomol
NAIl
NI
NKGB
NKVD
Abbreviations
B undesarchi v -Berlin (Lich terfelde )
Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv (Freiburg)
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter
revolution
and Sabotage
Communist
Party of the Soviet Union
Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (German Workers' Party)
Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National
People's Party)
Free Corps (volunteer militia)
Geheime Staatspolizeiamt (Secret State Police Office)
Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police)
Gross National Product
State Planning Commission
State Political Directorate
Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps
Main Administration of Forced Labour
Interessengemeinschaft Farben AG (Interest Group
Dyes)
Corrective Labour Colony
Corrective
Labour Camp
Imperial War Museum (London)
Committee
of State Security
All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League
National Archives II, College
Park, Maryland
National Income
People's Commissariat of State Security
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
xxv
NSDAP
OGPU
OKW
PFI
POW
PRO
Rabkrin
RSHA
SA
SD
SLON
SS
USSR
ABBREVIATIONS
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
(National Socialist German
Worker's
Party)
All-Union State Political Directorate
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces)
Proof and Filtration Camp
prisoner of war
Public Record Office, Kew, London
Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate
Reich Sicherheitshauptamt (Reich
Main
Office of
Security)
Sturmabteilungen (Storm detachments)
Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service)
Northern Special
Purpose Camps
Schutzstaffel (Protection Squad)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
Throughout the text the word ton refers to metric tonnes. Other
weights and distances have been rendered in metric measurements
where possible.
The word billion is used to denote one thousand
million (or milliard). I have chosen to use the term Soviet
Union in
preference
to the acronym
USSR throughout the text, chiefly on
aesthetic grounds. I have also chosen in most cases to spell National
Socialist in full rather than use the common term Nazi, which began
life as a piece
of political shorthand and was never used by the
regime to describe itself. The term communist is used lower case
where it describes the movement
or ideology in general, but in upper
case where it refers specifically
to the Soviet Communist
Party. There
were many varieties
of 'communist', even in the Soviet
Union, and
its use should not be taken to imply only the Soviet form.
XXVI
OGPU
OKW
PFI
POW
PRO
Rabkrin
RSHA
SA
SD
SLON
SS
USSR
ABBREVIATIONS
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
(National Socialist German
Worker's
Party)
All-Union State Political Directorate
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces)
Proof and Filtration Camp
prisoner of war
Public Record Office, Kew, London
Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate
Reich Sicherheitshauptamt (Reich
Main
Office of
Security)
Sturmabteilungen (Storm detachments)
Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service)
Northern Special
Purpose Camps
Schutzstaffel (Protection Squad)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
Throughout the text the word ton refers to metric tonnes. Other
weights and distances have been rendered in metric measurements
where possible.
The word billion is used to denote one thousand
million (or milliard). I have chosen to use the term Soviet
Union in
preference
to the acronym
USSR throughout the text, chiefly on
aesthetic grounds. I have also chosen in most cases to spell National
Socialist in full rather than use the common term Nazi, which began
life as a piece
of political shorthand and was never used by the
regime to describe itself. The term communist is used lower case
where it describes the movement
or ideology in general, but in upper
case where it refers specifically
to the Soviet Communist
Party. There
were many varieties
of 'communist', even in the Soviet
Union, and
its use should not be taken to imply only the Soviet form.
XXVI
Preface
Hitler and Stalin have been part of my life for far too long. I was
interested in them as a precocious schoolboy
and have worked on or
around the two dictatorships for much of the last thirty years. As a
student I was
brought up under the old totalitarian school, which
explained dictatorial rule as domination
through fear by psychopathic
tyrants. The two dictators were still treated differently -Hitler as
an
unmediated monster, Stalin as a man forced by necessity to preserve
the
1917 revolution by savage means that were justified by the noble
ends
that Soviet communism claimed to represent. 'Did Stalin betray
the Revolution?' was the essay title I was given, a question
that sug
gested this was open
to interpretation. No one would have set the
question, 'Did Hitler betray the German people?' Hitler was a
man
apart, beyond discussion.
Thirty years
on the two men are set in a very different context. This
is not because they have been forgiven the terrible things that their
systems did to their
own and to other peoples, but because the systems
were
not simply a one-man show. For a long time now it has been
possible,
and very necessary, to write the history of these two dictator
ships from perspectives in which the
two dictators at the core play
only a small
and often distant part. These were large and complex
societies whose values, behaviour, aspirations
and development owed
something
to the overblown personality at the centre, but they were
obviously constructed
of many elements with their own trajectories,
their
own detailed social and political history, their own perpetrators,
onlookers
and victims. The more we know about the periphery, the
clearer it
is that the centre succeeded only to the extent that much
of the population accepted and worked with the two systems, or
XXVll
Hitler and Stalin have been part of my life for far too long. I was
interested in them as a precocious schoolboy
and have worked on or
around the two dictatorships for much of the last thirty years. As a
student I was
brought up under the old totalitarian school, which
explained dictatorial rule as domination
through fear by psychopathic
tyrants. The two dictators were still treated differently -Hitler as
an
unmediated monster, Stalin as a man forced by necessity to preserve
the
1917 revolution by savage means that were justified by the noble
ends
that Soviet communism claimed to represent. 'Did Stalin betray
the Revolution?' was the essay title I was given, a question
that sug
gested this was open
to interpretation. No one would have set the
question, 'Did Hitler betray the German people?' Hitler was a
man
apart, beyond discussion.
Thirty years
on the two men are set in a very different context. This
is not because they have been forgiven the terrible things that their
systems did to their
own and to other peoples, but because the systems
were
not simply a one-man show. For a long time now it has been
possible,
and very necessary, to write the history of these two dictator
ships from perspectives in which the
two dictators at the core play
only a small
and often distant part. These were large and complex
societies whose values, behaviour, aspirations
and development owed
something
to the overblown personality at the centre, but they were
obviously constructed
of many elements with their own trajectories,
their
own detailed social and political history, their own perpetrators,
onlookers
and victims. The more we know about the periphery, the
clearer it
is that the centre succeeded only to the extent that much
of the population accepted and worked with the two systems, or
XXVll
PREFACE
constructed their lives in ways that avoided as far as possible direct
contact with the dangerous powers
of the state, or approved the moral
purposes
of the dictatorships and applauded their achievements. A life
of Hitler and Stalin today has to be a history of life and times, or better
still, a history
that sets them in the societies that gave rise to them and
explores the dynamics
that held dictatorship together beyond the
simplistic image of omnipotent despot.
The scholarship
of the past twenty years has transformed our
understanding of both Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet
Union
because it has in large part focused on the many areas of state, society,
culture, science
and ideas which make up the history of this as of any
other age. This has been a recent process, for several reasons. The
opening
up of former Soviet archives has provided a stream of
Russian and western scholarship that has been challenging, original
and informed in ways
that were impossible with the rationed sources
of the Soviet period. German archives from the Third Reich were, in
general, open,
but there was a reluctance to engage with much of the
material in the long aftermath during which Germans came to terms
with Hitler.
Much of the best early history was written by non-German
historians,
but in the last decade or so there has been a veritable
explosion
of outstanding new research on every aspect of German
society -from pre-Hitler
to post-Hitler -by German scholars who no
longer have any diffidence in confronting the historical truths. This
analysis
of the two systems would not have been possible without such
an outpouring. Even an area so central to the history of the two systems
as the story
of the concentration camp has only been filled in properly
in the last few years, with often surprising results. I would like to
record the very great debt
that lowe to all the authors whose work
I have relied on here in order to supply the many missing parts of
the jigsaw around the figures of the two dictators. Reading the many
thought-provoking and innovative approaches to dictatorship has
been one
of the pleasures of writing this book.
I have many other scholarly debts to record. A great many people
have listened to me think through the arguments presented here,
not
least the many students who have taken my Comparing Dictator
ships course
at King's College, London, with such interest and enthusi
asm. Teaching them has been a stimulating experience, and I have
XXVlll
constructed their lives in ways that avoided as far as possible direct
contact with the dangerous powers
of the state, or approved the moral
purposes
of the dictatorships and applauded their achievements. A life
of Hitler and Stalin today has to be a history of life and times, or better
still, a history
that sets them in the societies that gave rise to them and
explores the dynamics
that held dictatorship together beyond the
simplistic image of omnipotent despot.
The scholarship
of the past twenty years has transformed our
understanding of both Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet
Union
because it has in large part focused on the many areas of state, society,
culture, science
and ideas which make up the history of this as of any
other age. This has been a recent process, for several reasons. The
opening
up of former Soviet archives has provided a stream of
Russian and western scholarship that has been challenging, original
and informed in ways
that were impossible with the rationed sources
of the Soviet period. German archives from the Third Reich were, in
general, open,
but there was a reluctance to engage with much of the
material in the long aftermath during which Germans came to terms
with Hitler.
Much of the best early history was written by non-German
historians,
but in the last decade or so there has been a veritable
explosion
of outstanding new research on every aspect of German
society -from pre-Hitler
to post-Hitler -by German scholars who no
longer have any diffidence in confronting the historical truths. This
analysis
of the two systems would not have been possible without such
an outpouring. Even an area so central to the history of the two systems
as the story
of the concentration camp has only been filled in properly
in the last few years, with often surprising results. I would like to
record the very great debt
that lowe to all the authors whose work
I have relied on here in order to supply the many missing parts of
the jigsaw around the figures of the two dictators. Reading the many
thought-provoking and innovative approaches to dictatorship has
been one
of the pleasures of writing this book.
I have many other scholarly debts to record. A great many people
have listened to me think through the arguments presented here,
not
least the many students who have taken my Comparing Dictator
ships course
at King's College, London, with such interest and enthusi
asm. Teaching them has been a stimulating experience, and I have
XXVlll
Introduction
Comparing Dictatorships
'In Russia and in Germany - and wherever totalitarianism
penetrated -men were fired by a fanatical faith, by
an absolute
unquestioning certainty which rejected the critical attitude
of
modern man. Totalitarianism in Russia and Germany broke the
dikes
of civilization which the nineteenth century had believed
lasting.'
Hans Kohn, 1949
1
The temptation to compare Hitler and Stalin is a compelling one. They
are popularly regarded as the twin demons
of the twentieth century,
responsible for different reasons
and in different ways for more violent
deaths
than any other men in history. They sit uneasily in comparison
with other contemporary dictators
or with those in earlier times. To
set Stalin and Hitler side by side is to join company with two of the
historical giants
of the modern age, whose dictatorships met head-to
head in the greatest
and costliest of all armed conflicts.
Two questions immediately arise: can the Stalin and Hitler dictator
ships be compared? Should they be compared? Tzvetan
Todorov, in a
recent
book on the crisis of the twentieth century, has answered yes to
both questions, on the ground that they shared the common character
istics
of a single political genus: totalitarianism.
2
This is an answer
with a long pedigree.
In the
1950S, when the West confronted Soviet
communism so shortly after fighting Hitler, it was easy
to see both
men as 'totalitarian' leaders, dominating systems that tried to impose
an absolute and ruthless authority over the populations under their
central control. Western political scientists tried
to fathom out how
they had defeated one monstrous dictatorship, only to be faced with a
XXXi
Comparing Dictatorships
'In Russia and in Germany - and wherever totalitarianism
penetrated -men were fired by a fanatical faith, by
an absolute
unquestioning certainty which rejected the critical attitude
of
modern man. Totalitarianism in Russia and Germany broke the
dikes
of civilization which the nineteenth century had believed
lasting.'
Hans Kohn, 1949
1
The temptation to compare Hitler and Stalin is a compelling one. They
are popularly regarded as the twin demons
of the twentieth century,
responsible for different reasons
and in different ways for more violent
deaths
than any other men in history. They sit uneasily in comparison
with other contemporary dictators
or with those in earlier times. To
set Stalin and Hitler side by side is to join company with two of the
historical giants
of the modern age, whose dictatorships met head-to
head in the greatest
and costliest of all armed conflicts.
Two questions immediately arise: can the Stalin and Hitler dictator
ships be compared? Should they be compared? Tzvetan
Todorov, in a
recent
book on the crisis of the twentieth century, has answered yes to
both questions, on the ground that they shared the common character
istics
of a single political genus: totalitarianism.
2
This is an answer
with a long pedigree.
In the
1950S, when the West confronted Soviet
communism so shortly after fighting Hitler, it was easy
to see both
men as 'totalitarian' leaders, dominating systems that tried to impose
an absolute and ruthless authority over the populations under their
central control. Western political scientists tried
to fathom out how
they had defeated one monstrous dictatorship, only to be faced with a
XXXi
INTRODUCTION
second, apparently even more sinister and unyielding than the first.
However, the development of a model for the ideal
or typical totali
tarian regime glossed over very real differences between systems classi
fied as 'totalitarian'. The term itself came
to be regarded as a description
of the apparatus of power and repression, ignoring the regime's wider
social, cultural
and moral ambitions, which is what the term had
originally encompassed when it was first coined in the 19
20S in Musso
lini's Italy. Historians by the 1960s generally turned their back on the
idea
of a generic 'totalitarian' system, preferring to focus on a narrative
that emphasized the peculiar character of each national dictatorship,
and played down the resemblances.
Since the collapse of European communism in
1989-91, discussion
of the two dictatorships has been refocused. A more historically sophis
ticated definition
of totalitarianism has been developed, one that high
lights the extent
to which the systems were driven by a positive vision
of an exclusive social and cultural utopia (often described with the
term 'political religion'), while recognizing
that the political and social
practices
of the regime were often very different from the utopian
aspirations.
It is no longer necessary to rely on a crude political-science
model
of 'totalitarianism' to define the two dictatorships; over the past
dozen years the detailed historical knowledge
of both the German and
the Soviet regimes has been transformed, thanks on the one hand to
the glasnost revelations in the Soviet
Union and the successor states,
and
on the other to a wave of critical scholarship in Germany that has
opened up many aspects
of the Hitler regime hitherto cloaked in
silence. This research allows us
to say with confidence, as Todorov
does, that the two systems were also 'significantly different from each
other', while sharing a
common totalitarian complexion.
3
The revelation of the scale and premeditated nature of Stalinist mass
murder has contributed to the view that Stalin was no better than
Hitler. 'Nazism and Communism, equally criminal' ran the title of an
article published in France in 1997 by Alain
Besan~on. It has even
been suggested
that a calculus of evil might exist which could make it
possible
to determine with more scientific precision which of the two
men was most wicked, though this was not
Besan~on's intention.
4
The
shock to former Marxists and fellow-travellers of Soviet communism to
discover that the Stalin regime really was built on blood unscrupulously
XXXIl
second, apparently even more sinister and unyielding than the first.
However, the development of a model for the ideal
or typical totali
tarian regime glossed over very real differences between systems classi
fied as 'totalitarian'. The term itself came
to be regarded as a description
of the apparatus of power and repression, ignoring the regime's wider
social, cultural
and moral ambitions, which is what the term had
originally encompassed when it was first coined in the 19
20S in Musso
lini's Italy. Historians by the 1960s generally turned their back on the
idea
of a generic 'totalitarian' system, preferring to focus on a narrative
that emphasized the peculiar character of each national dictatorship,
and played down the resemblances.
Since the collapse of European communism in
1989-91, discussion
of the two dictatorships has been refocused. A more historically sophis
ticated definition
of totalitarianism has been developed, one that high
lights the extent
to which the systems were driven by a positive vision
of an exclusive social and cultural utopia (often described with the
term 'political religion'), while recognizing
that the political and social
practices
of the regime were often very different from the utopian
aspirations.
It is no longer necessary to rely on a crude political-science
model
of 'totalitarianism' to define the two dictatorships; over the past
dozen years the detailed historical knowledge
of both the German and
the Soviet regimes has been transformed, thanks on the one hand to
the glasnost revelations in the Soviet
Union and the successor states,
and
on the other to a wave of critical scholarship in Germany that has
opened up many aspects
of the Hitler regime hitherto cloaked in
silence. This research allows us
to say with confidence, as Todorov
does, that the two systems were also 'significantly different from each
other', while sharing a
common totalitarian complexion.
3
The revelation of the scale and premeditated nature of Stalinist mass
murder has contributed to the view that Stalin was no better than
Hitler. 'Nazism and Communism, equally criminal' ran the title of an
article published in France in 1997 by Alain
Besan~on. It has even
been suggested
that a calculus of evil might exist which could make it
possible
to determine with more scientific precision which of the two
men was most wicked, though this was not
Besan~on's intention.
4
The
shock to former Marxists and fellow-travellers of Soviet communism to
discover that the Stalin regime really was built on blood unscrupulously
XXXIl
INTRODUCTION
spilled, and ideals distorted beyond recognition, produced a powerful
backlash. The publication in France in
1997 of The Black Book of
Communism, by former French Marxists, showed how far the left had
moved in recognizing that Stalin's dictatorship was based on a savage
criminality.s A recent study has
no doubt that Stalin was a psychopath;
studies
of Hitler's 'mind' focus on the pathology of evil.
6
The implicit
assumption -
that both Stalin and Hitler were cut from the same
bloodstained cloth -has blurred any real distinction between them.
Yet such a comparison
is just as intellectually barren as the earlier
attempt to tar all dictatorships with the same brush of undifferentiated
totalitarianism.
No one doubts the horrors at the heart of the two
dictatorships,
but
it is a futile exercise to compare the violence and
criminality of the two regimes simply in order to make them appear
more like each other, or to try to discover by statistical reconstruction
which was the more murderous.
The historian's responsibility is not
to prove which of the two men was the more evil or deranged, but to
try to understand the differing historical processes and states of mind
that led both these dictatorships to murder on such a colossal scale.
This
book is a contribution to that understanding. For all the efforts
to define the Hitler
and Stalin dictatorships as models of a shared
totalitarian impulse,
or a common moral depravity, equally guilty of
unspeakable crimes, there has been remarkably little literature that
offers·a direct historical, rather than polemical comparison. Here it is
necessary to explain what The Dictators is not about. The book is not
a nyin biography, though Hitler and Stalin feature throughout the
narrative. Alan Bullock, in his monumental dual biography Parallel
Lives, published in 1991, interwove the personal history of the two
dictators, and this approach does not need to be repeated.? There are
now excellent individual lives of both men, which have reconstructed
every aspect
of their biographies in careful detail.
8
Their life histories
are among the most closely examined
of any historical actors. Nor is
The Dictators a straightforward narrative history of the two systems.
There are many excellent accounts
of both, which again require no
reiteration.
9
The Dictators has been written with two purposes in
mind: first,
to supply an empirical foundation on which to construct
any discussion
of what made the two systems either similar or different;
second,
to write a comparative 'operational' history of the two systems
XXXlll
spilled, and ideals distorted beyond recognition, produced a powerful
backlash. The publication in France in
1997 of The Black Book of
Communism, by former French Marxists, showed how far the left had
moved in recognizing that Stalin's dictatorship was based on a savage
criminality.s A recent study has
no doubt that Stalin was a psychopath;
studies
of Hitler's 'mind' focus on the pathology of evil.
6
The implicit
assumption -
that both Stalin and Hitler were cut from the same
bloodstained cloth -has blurred any real distinction between them.
Yet such a comparison
is just as intellectually barren as the earlier
attempt to tar all dictatorships with the same brush of undifferentiated
totalitarianism.
No one doubts the horrors at the heart of the two
dictatorships,
but
it is a futile exercise to compare the violence and
criminality of the two regimes simply in order to make them appear
more like each other, or to try to discover by statistical reconstruction
which was the more murderous.
The historian's responsibility is not
to prove which of the two men was the more evil or deranged, but to
try to understand the differing historical processes and states of mind
that led both these dictatorships to murder on such a colossal scale.
This
book is a contribution to that understanding. For all the efforts
to define the Hitler
and Stalin dictatorships as models of a shared
totalitarian impulse,
or a common moral depravity, equally guilty of
unspeakable crimes, there has been remarkably little literature that
offers·a direct historical, rather than polemical comparison. Here it is
necessary to explain what The Dictators is not about. The book is not
a nyin biography, though Hitler and Stalin feature throughout the
narrative. Alan Bullock, in his monumental dual biography Parallel
Lives, published in 1991, interwove the personal history of the two
dictators, and this approach does not need to be repeated.? There are
now excellent individual lives of both men, which have reconstructed
every aspect
of their biographies in careful detail.
8
Their life histories
are among the most closely examined
of any historical actors. Nor is
The Dictators a straightforward narrative history of the two systems.
There are many excellent accounts
of both, which again require no
reiteration.
9
The Dictators has been written with two purposes in
mind: first,
to supply an empirical foundation on which to construct
any discussion
of what made the two systems either similar or different;
second,
to write a comparative 'operational' history of the two systems
XXXlll
INTRODUCTION
in order to answer the large historical question about how personal
dictatorship actually worked. The answer
to this question is central to
understanding how the two dictatorships emerged and
what kept them
both in being until the dictators' deaths.
Some areas of convergence are clearly visible, though the differences
are
no less striking. Both dictatorships emerged at a particular histori
cal moment and owed something to historical forces which can use
fully be compared. Both were representative in
an extreme form of the
idea of the 'super-personality', whose roots are said
to lie in the work
of the German philosopher-poet Friedrich Nietzsche. Both displayed
obvious operational similarities, in the nature of the state security
apparatus, the exploitation of the camp
on a wide scale, the complete
control
of cultural production, or the construction of a social utopia
on a mountain
of corpses. These are not accidental comparisons. Both
systems were aware
of the other, and reacted to that knowledge.
Hitler's dictatorship eventually launched a war of annihilation in order
to eradicate Stalin's dictatorship. Both dictators also briefly reflected
on
what might have been if they had co-operated rather than fought
each other. 'Together with the Germans,'
Stalin is said to have re
marked, 'we would have been invincible.'l0 Hitler, in February
1945,
assessing the options he might have taken in the past, assumed that
'in a spirit of implacable realism on both sides' he and
Stalin 'could
have created a situation in which a durable entente would have been
possible'.lJ Humanity was mercifully saved from this grim partnership
because more divided than united the ambitions
of the two men.
The dictatorships were
not constructed and run by one man alone,
however unrestricted the theoretical basis of his power. The recog
nition that dictatorship flourished on wide complicity, fuelled by a
variety of motives from idealism to fear, makes greater sense of their
durability and of the horrors both perpetrated. Both were regimes with
wide popular backing as well as deliberate victimization. They were
systems
that in an extraordinarily short period of time transformed
the values and social aspirations
of their populations. They were both
revolutionary systems which released enormous social energies and a
terrible violence. The relationship between ruler
and ruled was com
plex and multi-dimensional,
not simply based on submission or terror.
There
is now no doubt that each dictatorship depended on winning
xxxiv
in order to answer the large historical question about how personal
dictatorship actually worked. The answer
to this question is central to
understanding how the two dictatorships emerged and
what kept them
both in being until the dictators' deaths.
Some areas of convergence are clearly visible, though the differences
are
no less striking. Both dictatorships emerged at a particular histori
cal moment and owed something to historical forces which can use
fully be compared. Both were representative in
an extreme form of the
idea of the 'super-personality', whose roots are said
to lie in the work
of the German philosopher-poet Friedrich Nietzsche. Both displayed
obvious operational similarities, in the nature of the state security
apparatus, the exploitation of the camp
on a wide scale, the complete
control
of cultural production, or the construction of a social utopia
on a mountain
of corpses. These are not accidental comparisons. Both
systems were aware
of the other, and reacted to that knowledge.
Hitler's dictatorship eventually launched a war of annihilation in order
to eradicate Stalin's dictatorship. Both dictators also briefly reflected
on
what might have been if they had co-operated rather than fought
each other. 'Together with the Germans,'
Stalin is said to have re
marked, 'we would have been invincible.'l0 Hitler, in February
1945,
assessing the options he might have taken in the past, assumed that
'in a spirit of implacable realism on both sides' he and
Stalin 'could
have created a situation in which a durable entente would have been
possible'.lJ Humanity was mercifully saved from this grim partnership
because more divided than united the ambitions
of the two men.
The dictatorships were
not constructed and run by one man alone,
however unrestricted the theoretical basis of his power. The recog
nition that dictatorship flourished on wide complicity, fuelled by a
variety of motives from idealism to fear, makes greater sense of their
durability and of the horrors both perpetrated. Both were regimes with
wide popular backing as well as deliberate victimization. They were
systems
that in an extraordinarily short period of time transformed
the values and social aspirations
of their populations. They were both
revolutionary systems which released enormous social energies and a
terrible violence. The relationship between ruler
and ruled was com
plex and multi-dimensional,
not simply based on submission or terror.
There
is now no doubt that each dictatorship depended on winning
xxxiv
INTRODUCTION
the endorsement or co-operation of the majority of the people they
ruled,
and that they did not survive only from the fear that they
inspired. They each developed a powerful sense
of their own legitim
acy, which was shared by much
of the population; this sense of moral
certainty can only be comprehended by unravelling the threads
of the
moral garb in which the two systems were dressed.
During the course
of writing The Dictators it became clear how
important it was to reconstruct as faithfully as possible the world in
which they operated, however alien
or fantastical much of it now
appears sixty years later. To do this, it has been impossible to overlook
the dictators'
own words, either written or spoken. For most historical
characters this might seem
to be stating the obvious, but in these two
cases there has been a reluctance to engage with the views of men
whose actions
appear to speak louder than their words. Hitler's writing
is usually dismissed as irrational, muddled or unreadable. Stalin has
always been regarded
as an intellectual pigmy, with little or nothing
to contribute to mainstream Marxism. Yet in each case the dictator
said
or wrote a great deal, and on an exceptionally wide range of
subjects. They both saw themselves as figures on a very large historical
canvas. They
had views on politics, leadership, law, nature, culture,
science, social structures, military strategy, technology, philosophy
and history. These ideas have
to be understood on their own terms,
because they influenced the decisions
both men took and shaped their
political preferences, and, because
of the nature of their authority,
influenced in
turn the wide circle of politicians and officials around
them. They were not intellectuals (for whom neither man had much
respect -'They are totally useless
and detrimental', Hitler once
asserted
12
), but they did in each case define the parameters of public
political discourse
and exclude the ideas and attitudes of which they
disapproved. Their role in shaping ideology was central,
not marginal;
so, too, was the role ideology played in shaping the dictatorships.13
These ideas did
not develop in a vacuum. Neither dictatorship
was imposed from outside like some alien visitation. Neither was a
historical aberration, incapable
of rational explanation, though they
are often treated as if they were special, discrete histories, separated
off from
what went before and what came afterwards. The dictator
ships have
to be placed in context to understand the ideas, political
xxxv
the endorsement or co-operation of the majority of the people they
ruled,
and that they did not survive only from the fear that they
inspired. They each developed a powerful sense
of their own legitim
acy, which was shared by much
of the population; this sense of moral
certainty can only be comprehended by unravelling the threads
of the
moral garb in which the two systems were dressed.
During the course
of writing The Dictators it became clear how
important it was to reconstruct as faithfully as possible the world in
which they operated, however alien
or fantastical much of it now
appears sixty years later. To do this, it has been impossible to overlook
the dictators'
own words, either written or spoken. For most historical
characters this might seem
to be stating the obvious, but in these two
cases there has been a reluctance to engage with the views of men
whose actions
appear to speak louder than their words. Hitler's writing
is usually dismissed as irrational, muddled or unreadable. Stalin has
always been regarded
as an intellectual pigmy, with little or nothing
to contribute to mainstream Marxism. Yet in each case the dictator
said
or wrote a great deal, and on an exceptionally wide range of
subjects. They both saw themselves as figures on a very large historical
canvas. They
had views on politics, leadership, law, nature, culture,
science, social structures, military strategy, technology, philosophy
and history. These ideas have
to be understood on their own terms,
because they influenced the decisions
both men took and shaped their
political preferences, and, because
of the nature of their authority,
influenced in
turn the wide circle of politicians and officials around
them. They were not intellectuals (for whom neither man had much
respect -'They are totally useless
and detrimental', Hitler once
asserted
12
), but they did in each case define the parameters of public
political discourse
and exclude the ideas and attitudes of which they
disapproved. Their role in shaping ideology was central,
not marginal;
so, too, was the role ideology played in shaping the dictatorships.13
These ideas did
not develop in a vacuum. Neither dictatorship
was imposed from outside like some alien visitation. Neither was a
historical aberration, incapable
of rational explanation, though they
are often treated as if they were special, discrete histories, separated
off from
what went before and what came afterwards. The dictator
ships have
to be placed in context to understand the ideas, political
xxxv
INTRODUCTION
behaviour and social ambitions that defined each. That context is both
European and, more narrowly, Russian
and German. They were the
product of political, cultural and intellectual forces that were the
common stock
of early twentieth-century Europe. They were also, and
more directly, the product of particular societies whose earlier histories
profoundly shaped the character
and direction of the two systems.
The
common denominator was the impact of the First World War.
Neither dictator would ever have achieved supreme
power in two of
the largest and most powerful world states without that upheaval.
The war was massively traumatic for European society, but a more
profound upheaval for German and Russian society than it was for the
prosperous
and politically stable states of western Europe and North
America. Stalin was a creature of the Bolshevik revolution of October
I9I7, which transformed monarchist Russia in a matter of years;
Hitler's radical nationalism was forged from the moral and physical
disorder
of defeated Germany as the old imperial order fell apart. Both
states
had much in common. They had both been defeated in the more
limited sense
that they had sued for an armistice because they could
not continue the war effort. Failure in war opened the way in each
state
to a transformation of the political landscape. Russia went from
Tsarist empire
to communist republic in nine months; Germany went
from authoritarian empire to parliamentary republic in less than a
week. These changes provoked widespread political violence
and econ
omic crisis.
The Bolsheviks only succeeded in consolidating control of
the former empire in I92I, after four years of civil war and the
establishment
of an authoritarian one-party state. Germany experi
enced
two different revolutionary movements, one communist, one
nationalist; the second was used
to defeat the first in the early years of
the German republic, but was then stifled as the victorious Allies helped
the republican government briefly
to stabilize the new system. Both
states experienced a hyper-inflation
that destroyed the currency en
tirely
and dispossessed anyone with monetary wealth. In the Soviet
Union this served revolutionary purposes by rwt'ning the bourgeoisie;
in Germany it ruined a whole generation of German savers whose
resentments helped
to fuel the later rise of Hitler's brand of national
ism.14 Both states were regarded as pariah states by the rest of the
international community, the Soviet
Union because it was communist,
XXXVI
behaviour and social ambitions that defined each. That context is both
European and, more narrowly, Russian
and German. They were the
product of political, cultural and intellectual forces that were the
common stock
of early twentieth-century Europe. They were also, and
more directly, the product of particular societies whose earlier histories
profoundly shaped the character
and direction of the two systems.
The
common denominator was the impact of the First World War.
Neither dictator would ever have achieved supreme
power in two of
the largest and most powerful world states without that upheaval.
The war was massively traumatic for European society, but a more
profound upheaval for German and Russian society than it was for the
prosperous
and politically stable states of western Europe and North
America. Stalin was a creature of the Bolshevik revolution of October
I9I7, which transformed monarchist Russia in a matter of years;
Hitler's radical nationalism was forged from the moral and physical
disorder
of defeated Germany as the old imperial order fell apart. Both
states
had much in common. They had both been defeated in the more
limited sense
that they had sued for an armistice because they could
not continue the war effort. Failure in war opened the way in each
state
to a transformation of the political landscape. Russia went from
Tsarist empire
to communist republic in nine months; Germany went
from authoritarian empire to parliamentary republic in less than a
week. These changes provoked widespread political violence
and econ
omic crisis.
The Bolsheviks only succeeded in consolidating control of
the former empire in I92I, after four years of civil war and the
establishment
of an authoritarian one-party state. Germany experi
enced
two different revolutionary movements, one communist, one
nationalist; the second was used
to defeat the first in the early years of
the German republic, but was then stifled as the victorious Allies helped
the republican government briefly
to stabilize the new system. Both
states experienced a hyper-inflation
that destroyed the currency en
tirely
and dispossessed anyone with monetary wealth. In the Soviet
Union this served revolutionary purposes by rwt'ning the bourgeoisie;
in Germany it ruined a whole generation of German savers whose
resentments helped
to fuel the later rise of Hitler's brand of national
ism.14 Both states were regarded as pariah states by the rest of the
international community, the Soviet
Union because it was communist,
XXXVI
INTRODUCTION
Germany because it was held responsible for the outbreak of war in
1914. This sense of isolation pushed both states towards a more
extreme form
of revolutionary politics and the eventual emergence of
dictatorship.
Germany
and the Soviet
Union reacted to the seismic shifts in politics
and society ushered in by the Great War in ways that were determined
by their different complexion. Germany was a more developed state,
with two-thirds
of its population working in industry and services, an
established bureaucracy, an effective national system of schooling, and
a world-class scientific reputation. Russia was predominantly rural,
with some four-fifths
of its people working in the countryside, though
not all as farmers; welfare and education were both under-developed
by the standards
of the rest of Europe, and regional differences were
more marked as a result
of great variations in climate and the imperial
character
of Russian expansion across Asia in the nineteenth century.
Yet in some
important respects the division between Germany as a
'modern' state and Russia as a 'backward' state can be exaggerated.
Russia
had an extensive modern bureaucracy, a highly developed
culture (Dostoevsky was particularly
popular in Germany before
I914), a rapidly growing industrial and trading economy (which made
her the fifth largest by 1914) and a small but high-quality scientific
and engineering sector, among whose achievements was the first multi
engined heavy bomber, built in 1914.
In terms of political culture the gap was also less wide than might at
first appear. Both were federal systems with a good deal of decentral
ized administration; neither was a full parliamentary state, though
the
Tsar enjoyed wider powers than the Kaiser; more important, in
neither system did
modern political parties enjoy the kind of political
responsibility in government
that prepared them adequately
fSS what
happened after the war. In each state there also existed a sharp polariz
ation in politics, and a language
of political exclusion against the
radical enemies
of the empire; each state, dominated by conservative
elites,
had political police forces, and each regarded radical nationalism
and
Marxism as forces to be contained and combated. Though political
liberalism
of a more western kind existed in Russia and Germany
before
1914, it was a powerful force in neither, and was soon swept
aside in the 1920S. If the two states that gave rise to dictatorship had
xxxvii
Germany because it was held responsible for the outbreak of war in
1914. This sense of isolation pushed both states towards a more
extreme form
of revolutionary politics and the eventual emergence of
dictatorship.
Germany
and the Soviet
Union reacted to the seismic shifts in politics
and society ushered in by the Great War in ways that were determined
by their different complexion. Germany was a more developed state,
with two-thirds
of its population working in industry and services, an
established bureaucracy, an effective national system of schooling, and
a world-class scientific reputation. Russia was predominantly rural,
with some four-fifths
of its people working in the countryside, though
not all as farmers; welfare and education were both under-developed
by the standards
of the rest of Europe, and regional differences were
more marked as a result
of great variations in climate and the imperial
character
of Russian expansion across Asia in the nineteenth century.
Yet in some
important respects the division between Germany as a
'modern' state and Russia as a 'backward' state can be exaggerated.
Russia
had an extensive modern bureaucracy, a highly developed
culture (Dostoevsky was particularly
popular in Germany before
I914), a rapidly growing industrial and trading economy (which made
her the fifth largest by 1914) and a small but high-quality scientific
and engineering sector, among whose achievements was the first multi
engined heavy bomber, built in 1914.
In terms of political culture the gap was also less wide than might at
first appear. Both were federal systems with a good deal of decentral
ized administration; neither was a full parliamentary state, though
the
Tsar enjoyed wider powers than the Kaiser; more important, in
neither system did
modern political parties enjoy the kind of political
responsibility in government
that prepared them adequately
fSS what
happened after the war. In each state there also existed a sharp polariz
ation in politics, and a language
of political exclusion against the
radical enemies
of the empire; each state, dominated by conservative
elites,
had political police forces, and each regarded radical nationalism
and
Marxism as forces to be contained and combated. Though political
liberalism
of a more western kind existed in Russia and Germany
before
1914, it was a powerful force in neither, and was soon swept
aside in the 1920S. If the two states that gave rise to dictatorship had
xxxvii
INTRODUCTION
anything in common it was an ambivalent attitude to the western
model
of development. Under the unfavourable conditions of the 1920S important political forces in the Soviet Union and Germany
turned their back
on the victorious West and pursued a more revolu
tionary course. Dictatorship was
not in either case an inevitable or
necessary outcome of
that history, but one that is comprehensible in
terms of the political culture
and moral outlook that preceded them,
and of the failure of alternative models of historical development.
Circumstances shaped the eventual emergence of dictatorship as much
as the ambitions
of their central actors. To recognize that the two
dictatorships were products of a particular set of historical conditions
reduces the temptation to see them only as a monstrous historical
caesura, for which historians are obliged
to use a special set of surgical
instruments when they dissect them.
The structure of
The Dictators is narrative in only a loose sense. It
begins with the rise to power and ends with war and racism, but the
matter in between
is explored through a number of central themes
essential to understanding
how and why dictatorship functioned the
way
it did. Not everything is given equal weight. There is little here on
foreign policy
or on the actual course of the military conflict except
where this
is obviously relevant.
Some familiar, and dramatic, episodes
are
not covered in detail where they do not contribute directly to the
explanation. The thematic approach has one particular advantage.
It
has proved possible to disaggregate some important issues that are
usually treated as a unity. For example, the 'Great Terror'
of I937-8
in the
Soviet Union has many distinct components which have their
own origins and trajectories. A coherent
'Great Terror' is a historical
construct rather
than a reality. The terror appears in most of the
chapters
that follow, a product of a number of distinct pressures and
ambitions which combined
to produce a deadly conjuncture in the
mid-1930s. The same can be said of the Holocaust. German anti
Semitism also appears in every chapter, but the strands
that contributed
to genocide -biological politics, the
world 'Jewish conspiracy', the
war with 'Jewish-Bolshevism', issues of national definition and identity
-become coherent only
at the point in late
I941 and early 1942 when
the key decisions were finally made to resolve these many different
issues through systematic mass murder. Reality
is more fractured and XXXVI11
anything in common it was an ambivalent attitude to the western
model
of development. Under the unfavourable conditions of the 1920S important political forces in the Soviet Union and Germany
turned their back
on the victorious West and pursued a more revolu
tionary course. Dictatorship was
not in either case an inevitable or
necessary outcome of
that history, but one that is comprehensible in
terms of the political culture
and moral outlook that preceded them,
and of the failure of alternative models of historical development.
Circumstances shaped the eventual emergence of dictatorship as much
as the ambitions
of their central actors. To recognize that the two
dictatorships were products of a particular set of historical conditions
reduces the temptation to see them only as a monstrous historical
caesura, for which historians are obliged
to use a special set of surgical
instruments when they dissect them.
The structure of
The Dictators is narrative in only a loose sense. It
begins with the rise to power and ends with war and racism, but the
matter in between
is explored through a number of central themes
essential to understanding
how and why dictatorship functioned the
way
it did. Not everything is given equal weight. There is little here on
foreign policy
or on the actual course of the military conflict except
where this
is obviously relevant.
Some familiar, and dramatic, episodes
are
not covered in detail where they do not contribute directly to the
explanation. The thematic approach has one particular advantage.
It
has proved possible to disaggregate some important issues that are
usually treated as a unity. For example, the 'Great Terror'
of I937-8
in the
Soviet Union has many distinct components which have their
own origins and trajectories. A coherent
'Great Terror' is a historical
construct rather
than a reality. The terror appears in most of the
chapters
that follow, a product of a number of distinct pressures and
ambitions which combined
to produce a deadly conjuncture in the
mid-1930s. The same can be said of the Holocaust. German anti
Semitism also appears in every chapter, but the strands
that contributed
to genocide -biological politics, the
world 'Jewish conspiracy', the
war with 'Jewish-Bolshevism', issues of national definition and identity
-become coherent only
at the point in late
I941 and early 1942 when
the key decisions were finally made to resolve these many different
issues through systematic mass murder. Reality
is more fractured and XXXVI11
INTRODUCTION
less historically clear-cut than much of the conventional narrative of
the two dictatorships suggests.
Comparison
is not the same as equivalence. Each of the thematic
chapters has been structured in ways
to make clear the contrasts
between the two systems,
not only the glaring differences of geographi
cal
and social circumstances, but less obtrusive differences in ideas,
political practice
and institutional development. There are clear differ
ences between the
two men: Stalin, obsessed with details of policy and
the daily control of those around him; Hitler, a man of grand visions
and sporadic, if decisive, interventions. No attempt has been made
here to suggest
that they were the same kind of personality (which
they clearly were not),
or that a generic 'dictator' or a generic 'dictator
ship' can be deduced from just these
two examples. There are, nonethe
less, striking similarities in the ways the dictatorships operated, the
way in which
popular support was courted and sustained, the way
in which state repression was set up
and the legal system subverted, in
the appropriation and exploitation
of culture, in the expression of
popular militarism and the waging of total war. For all the differ
ences in historical circumstance, structure and political outlook, the
patterns
of complicity and resistance, terror and consensus, social
organization and social ambition bear clear resemblances and, in some
cases, a
common European root. They were each the fruit of distinct
violent, utopian revolutionary movements which defy neat political
categorization.
There remains
an essential difference between the two systems that
no comparison should overlook. The Stalinist regime, and the Soviet
system
that produced it, was formally committed to building a commun
ist utopia, and found thousands
of communists outside the
Soviet
Union (whose varieties of Marxism often had little in common with
the Soviet version
or with Soviet reality) who were willing to endorse
it because
of their hostility to contemporary capitalism. Hitler and
National Socialism hated Marxism, as did a great many Europeans
outside Germany. Hitler was unswervingly committed
to constructing
a new European order based
on racial hierarchy and the cultural
superiority
of Germanic Europe. Despite their common rejection
of European liberalism and humanism, their revolutionary social
ambitions, their collectivism -both exclusive
and discriminatory -and
XXXiX
less historically clear-cut than much of the conventional narrative of
the two dictatorships suggests.
Comparison
is not the same as equivalence. Each of the thematic
chapters has been structured in ways
to make clear the contrasts
between the two systems,
not only the glaring differences of geographi
cal
and social circumstances, but less obtrusive differences in ideas,
political practice
and institutional development. There are clear differ
ences between the
two men: Stalin, obsessed with details of policy and
the daily control of those around him; Hitler, a man of grand visions
and sporadic, if decisive, interventions. No attempt has been made
here to suggest
that they were the same kind of personality (which
they clearly were not),
or that a generic 'dictator' or a generic 'dictator
ship' can be deduced from just these
two examples. There are, nonethe
less, striking similarities in the ways the dictatorships operated, the
way in which
popular support was courted and sustained, the way
in which state repression was set up
and the legal system subverted, in
the appropriation and exploitation
of culture, in the expression of
popular militarism and the waging of total war. For all the differ
ences in historical circumstance, structure and political outlook, the
patterns
of complicity and resistance, terror and consensus, social
organization and social ambition bear clear resemblances and, in some
cases, a
common European root. They were each the fruit of distinct
violent, utopian revolutionary movements which defy neat political
categorization.
There remains
an essential difference between the two systems that
no comparison should overlook. The Stalinist regime, and the Soviet
system
that produced it, was formally committed to building a commun
ist utopia, and found thousands
of communists outside the
Soviet
Union (whose varieties of Marxism often had little in common with
the Soviet version
or with Soviet reality) who were willing to endorse
it because
of their hostility to contemporary capitalism. Hitler and
National Socialism hated Marxism, as did a great many Europeans
outside Germany. Hitler was unswervingly committed
to constructing
a new European order based
on racial hierarchy and the cultural
superiority
of Germanic Europe. Despite their common rejection
of European liberalism and humanism, their revolutionary social
ambitions, their collectivism -both exclusive
and discriminatory -and
XXXiX
INTRODUCTION
the important role played by science in shaping their social ambitions,
the ideologies were distinctively different, which explains the eventual
hegemonic war between them. Soviet communism was intended to be
an instrument for human progress, however imperfectly crafted it now
appears, whereas National Socialism was from its very nature an
instrument for the progress of a particular people.
This claim for the social ambitions of the Soviet Union may ring
very hollow knowing
what has now been revealed about the murderous
character
of Stalin's rule. Social development under Soviet dictatorship
was, as the exiled Soviet writer Viktor Serge observed in his satirical
novel
of the Stalin years, completely ambiguous: 'There is sure pro
gress under this barbarism,' reflects one of Serge's doomed communist
characters, 'progress under this retrogression.
We are all dead men
under a reprieve, but the face
of the earth has been changed.'J5
People
in both dictatorships had to come to terms with the cost in political
freedom or human dignity or truth
that had to be paid so they could
be included in the new society. Though the ideological destinations
were distinctively different, each dictatorship exposed a wide gulf
between the stated goal and the social reality. Bridging the gulf was
a process
that lay at the heart of dictatorship as it distorted reality
and terribly abused those who objected. These processes were closely
related in the two regimes, Soviet and German; they form the core of
the analysis
of dictatorship with which this book is chiefly concerned.
xl
the important role played by science in shaping their social ambitions,
the ideologies were distinctively different, which explains the eventual
hegemonic war between them. Soviet communism was intended to be
an instrument for human progress, however imperfectly crafted it now
appears, whereas National Socialism was from its very nature an
instrument for the progress of a particular people.
This claim for the social ambitions of the Soviet Union may ring
very hollow knowing
what has now been revealed about the murderous
character
of Stalin's rule. Social development under Soviet dictatorship
was, as the exiled Soviet writer Viktor Serge observed in his satirical
novel
of the Stalin years, completely ambiguous: 'There is sure pro
gress under this barbarism,' reflects one of Serge's doomed communist
characters, 'progress under this retrogression.
We are all dead men
under a reprieve, but the face
of the earth has been changed.'J5
People
in both dictatorships had to come to terms with the cost in political
freedom or human dignity or truth
that had to be paid so they could
be included in the new society. Though the ideological destinations
were distinctively different, each dictatorship exposed a wide gulf
between the stated goal and the social reality. Bridging the gulf was
a process
that lay at the heart of dictatorship as it distorted reality
and terribly abused those who objected. These processes were closely
related in the two regimes, Soviet and German; they form the core of
the analysis
of dictatorship with which this book is chiefly concerned.
xl
I
Stalin and Hitler:
Paths to Dictatorship
' ... for a people's liberation from a great oppression, or for
the elimination
of a bitter distress, or for the satisfaction of its
soul, restless because it has
grown insecure -Fate some day
bestows upon it the
man endowed for this purpose, who finally
brings the long yearned-for fulfilment.'
Adolf Hitler,
Mein Kampf, 19251
It is spring 1924. The plenum of the Central Committee of the All
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) convened on 18 Maya few days
before the Thirteenth Congress
of the Party. That same day, Lenin's
widow handed over to the committee a sealed letter painfully dictated
by her invalid husband in December
1922. Five copies were made,
each closed with sealing wax.
Lenin's instructions to his wife were to
hand the letter over to the next congress
of the party in 1923, for he
was
too ill to address the delegates himself, but she waited until after
his death a year later
on
21 January 1924. The letter contained his
political testament.
It was opened and read out to select members of
the congress delegations,
and discussed by the Central Committee.
The testament
is best remembered for Lenin's condemnation of Stalin:
'Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary [in April 1922],
has concentrated unlimited power in his hands, and I am not convinced
that he will always manage to use that power with sufficient care.'2
Stalin knew the content even before it was opened; one
of Lenin's
secretaries, worried by the potential impact
of the testament, had
shown it to Stalin just after Lenin had finished dictating it. After
circulating it
to a handful of party leaders, Stalin had issued a curt
I
Stalin and Hitler:
Paths to Dictatorship
' ... for a people's liberation from a great oppression, or for
the elimination
of a bitter distress, or for the satisfaction of its
soul, restless because it has
grown insecure -Fate some day
bestows upon it the
man endowed for this purpose, who finally
brings the long yearned-for fulfilment.'
Adolf Hitler,
Mein Kampf, 19251
It is spring 1924. The plenum of the Central Committee of the All
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) convened on 18 Maya few days
before the Thirteenth Congress
of the Party. That same day, Lenin's
widow handed over to the committee a sealed letter painfully dictated
by her invalid husband in December
1922. Five copies were made,
each closed with sealing wax.
Lenin's instructions to his wife were to
hand the letter over to the next congress
of the party in 1923, for he
was
too ill to address the delegates himself, but she waited until after
his death a year later
on
21 January 1924. The letter contained his
political testament.
It was opened and read out to select members of
the congress delegations,
and discussed by the Central Committee.
The testament
is best remembered for Lenin's condemnation of Stalin:
'Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary [in April 1922],
has concentrated unlimited power in his hands, and I am not convinced
that he will always manage to use that power with sufficient care.'2
Stalin knew the content even before it was opened; one
of Lenin's
secretaries, worried by the potential impact
of the testament, had
shown it to Stalin just after Lenin had finished dictating it. After
circulating it
to a handful of party leaders, Stalin had issued a curt
I
THE DICTATORS
instruction to Lenin's assistant to burn it, not realizing that four more
copies
had already been locked away.3 What
Stalin also did not know
was that Lenin dictated an addendum a few days later, which might
have ruined his political career. Angered by Stalin's coarseness
and
arrogance he advised the party 'to devise a means of removing him'
and to appoint a replacement 'more tolerant' and 'less capricious'.4
Lenin's proposal, which might, so soon after his death, have carried
some weight with the
party faithful, was not put to congress. It was
discussed
at a closed meeting of the Central Committee.
One eye
witness remembered Stalin sitting on the steps of the committee's
rostrum while the testament was read
out, looking 'small and pitiable';
though his expression was outwardly calm
'it was clearly discernible
from his face
that his fate was at stake,.5 Grigory Zinoviev, backed up
by the committee chairman, Lev Kamenev,
who now sat at the table
in Lenin's armchair, proposed
that the testament be disregarded on
the grounds that Lenin was not himself when he wrote it. Stalin, it is
alleged, offered to resign, but was overruled by his allies in the party
leadership.
Some pretence was made at the Congress to encourage
Stalin to take Lenin's censure seriously and to behave with greater
decorum. Stalin was rescued not only by his own show of false modesty,
but also by the realities of the leadership struggle after Lenin's death.
Among the obvious successors little love was lost. Zinoviev and
Kamenev did
not want the flamboyant and gifted commissar for
defence, Leon Trotsky,
to inherit Lenin's mantle. By supporting Stalin,
they
thought they had an ally in the contest with their rival. It remains
an open question whether a hostile reaction from the Central Commit
tee
and the Congress after reading Lenin's letter might have unseated
Stalin,
but there is no doubt that the decision to ignore Lenin's last
request gave
Stalin a fortunate political reprieve which he grasped with
both hands. Twelve years later Zinoviev and Kamenev were executed
after the first
of the major Stalinist show trials.
6
That same spring in Germany, at a court hearing held in the dilapi
dated classroom
of a former infantry training school in a Munich
suburb, Adolf Hitler waited
to learn his fate for leading a coup the
previous November against the Bavarian government.
The
Putsch of
9 November was intended as the prelude to an ambitious 'March on
Berlin' to topple the republic and seize national power. The attempt
2
instruction to Lenin's assistant to burn it, not realizing that four more
copies
had already been locked away.3 What
Stalin also did not know
was that Lenin dictated an addendum a few days later, which might
have ruined his political career. Angered by Stalin's coarseness
and
arrogance he advised the party 'to devise a means of removing him'
and to appoint a replacement 'more tolerant' and 'less capricious'.4
Lenin's proposal, which might, so soon after his death, have carried
some weight with the
party faithful, was not put to congress. It was
discussed
at a closed meeting of the Central Committee.
One eye
witness remembered Stalin sitting on the steps of the committee's
rostrum while the testament was read
out, looking 'small and pitiable';
though his expression was outwardly calm
'it was clearly discernible
from his face
that his fate was at stake,.5 Grigory Zinoviev, backed up
by the committee chairman, Lev Kamenev,
who now sat at the table
in Lenin's armchair, proposed
that the testament be disregarded on
the grounds that Lenin was not himself when he wrote it. Stalin, it is
alleged, offered to resign, but was overruled by his allies in the party
leadership.
Some pretence was made at the Congress to encourage
Stalin to take Lenin's censure seriously and to behave with greater
decorum. Stalin was rescued not only by his own show of false modesty,
but also by the realities of the leadership struggle after Lenin's death.
Among the obvious successors little love was lost. Zinoviev and
Kamenev did
not want the flamboyant and gifted commissar for
defence, Leon Trotsky,
to inherit Lenin's mantle. By supporting Stalin,
they
thought they had an ally in the contest with their rival. It remains
an open question whether a hostile reaction from the Central Commit
tee
and the Congress after reading Lenin's letter might have unseated
Stalin,
but there is no doubt that the decision to ignore Lenin's last
request gave
Stalin a fortunate political reprieve which he grasped with
both hands. Twelve years later Zinoviev and Kamenev were executed
after the first
of the major Stalinist show trials.
6
That same spring in Germany, at a court hearing held in the dilapi
dated classroom
of a former infantry training school in a Munich
suburb, Adolf Hitler waited
to learn his fate for leading a coup the
previous November against the Bavarian government.
The
Putsch of
9 November was intended as the prelude to an ambitious 'March on
Berlin' to topple the republic and seize national power. The attempt
2
STALIN AND HITLER: PATHS TO DICTATORSHIP
was quashed in a hail of police bullets. Hitler threatened to shoot
himself the following day in the house where he was hiding out,
but
was alertly disarmed by the mistress of the household, who had recently
learned ju-jitsu.
7
He was caught that same day, and a few weeks later
was sent for trial
on a charge of high treason, alongside other leaders
of his small National Socialist party and the veteran world war army
commander Erich Ludendorff. The former Quartermaster-General
of the German army
had marched with Hitler towards the lines
of policemen and soldiers blocking the
path of the procession on
9 November and
had not flinched even after the police opened fire and
his companion had fled. High treason was a serious offence, which
carried a possible prison sentence
of twenty years' hard labour. After
threatening a hunger strike, Hitler decided to exploit the trial as a way
to publicize his brand
of revolutionary nationalism. He was fortunate
to
be tried before the Munich People's Court (Volksgericht), which was
scheduled for closure at the end
of March 1924 alongside other emer
gency courts set up in the immediate post-war era. An extension
of a
month and a half was granted to allow
what became popularly known
as the 'Hitler-Trial' to take place in Bavaria rather than Berlin.
8
The
trial lasted twenty-five days, from
26 February to the final judgment on
I April. Outside the temporary courthouse armed troops stood guard
behind rough barbed-wire barricades.
Most of the space in court was
taken up by three blocks
of seats allocated to the press, who came to
report the extraordinary political theatre
that
unfolded within.
9
Hitler was allowed to talk at inordinate length in his own defence.
He presented himself and his co-defendants as honest German patriots
bent on saving Germany from the condition
of 'permanent slavery' to
which she had been betrayed at the end
of the war in 1919 by those
who had accepted the Versailles settlement. The presiding judge, Georg
Neidhardt, was openly sympathetic with the nationalist right in
Bavaria, and gave Hitler the oratorical space he needed.
On the last
morning
of the proceedings Hitler dominated the court. The session
opened just after nine o'clock and closed
at 11.17. Although there
were
five other defendants, Hitler's final statement took up almost
two-thirds of the morning. He ended with a rhetorical flourish on the
theme
of historical redemption: 'Might you pronounce your
"guilty"
a thousand times, this eternal goddess [History] of the eternal court
3
was quashed in a hail of police bullets. Hitler threatened to shoot
himself the following day in the house where he was hiding out,
but
was alertly disarmed by the mistress of the household, who had recently
learned ju-jitsu.
7
He was caught that same day, and a few weeks later
was sent for trial
on a charge of high treason, alongside other leaders
of his small National Socialist party and the veteran world war army
commander Erich Ludendorff. The former Quartermaster-General
of the German army
had marched with Hitler towards the lines
of policemen and soldiers blocking the
path of the procession on
9 November and
had not flinched even after the police opened fire and
his companion had fled. High treason was a serious offence, which
carried a possible prison sentence
of twenty years' hard labour. After
threatening a hunger strike, Hitler decided to exploit the trial as a way
to publicize his brand
of revolutionary nationalism. He was fortunate
to
be tried before the Munich People's Court (Volksgericht), which was
scheduled for closure at the end
of March 1924 alongside other emer
gency courts set up in the immediate post-war era. An extension
of a
month and a half was granted to allow
what became popularly known
as the 'Hitler-Trial' to take place in Bavaria rather than Berlin.
8
The
trial lasted twenty-five days, from
26 February to the final judgment on
I April. Outside the temporary courthouse armed troops stood guard
behind rough barbed-wire barricades.
Most of the space in court was
taken up by three blocks
of seats allocated to the press, who came to
report the extraordinary political theatre
that
unfolded within.
9
Hitler was allowed to talk at inordinate length in his own defence.
He presented himself and his co-defendants as honest German patriots
bent on saving Germany from the condition
of 'permanent slavery' to
which she had been betrayed at the end
of the war in 1919 by those
who had accepted the Versailles settlement. The presiding judge, Georg
Neidhardt, was openly sympathetic with the nationalist right in
Bavaria, and gave Hitler the oratorical space he needed.
On the last
morning
of the proceedings Hitler dominated the court. The session
opened just after nine o'clock and closed
at 11.17. Although there
were
five other defendants, Hitler's final statement took up almost
two-thirds of the morning. He ended with a rhetorical flourish on the
theme
of historical redemption: 'Might you pronounce your
"guilty"
a thousand times, this eternal goddess [History] of the eternal court
3
THE DICTATORS
will laughingly tear up the petition of the state prosecutor and laugh
ingly tear up the judgment
of the court, for she pronounces us free!,lo
Even the prosecutor was seduced into describing Hitler as a
man with
a 'calling
to be the saviour of Germany'. Neidhardt imposed a prison
sentence
of five years (three less than the state attorney had demanded)
and a fine of
200 gold marks. He ought to have ordered Hitler's
deportation since he was
not yet a German citizen, but Austrian. Even
a five-year sentence might have ended Hitler's political career, but,
following a favourable
report on Hitler's exemplary behaviour in
Landsberg prison (where he was showered
with food, drink and flowers
from well-wishers, refused
to take part in prison sports -'A leader
cannot afford to be beaten at games' - and dictated Mein Kampf), he
was released
on
20 December I924.11 Neidhardt was rewarded more
generously
than Zinoviev and Kamenev; following Hitler's appoint
ment as Chancellor in January I933 he was made president of the
Bavarian high court,
and at the celebration of his retirement in I937
a letter from Hitler was read out praising the unstinting patriotism the
judge
had displayed throughout his career.
12
Both Stalin and Hitler owed a good deal to luck in surviving the
crises
of I924. Had the party leadership decided to honour Lenin's
last wishes, Stalin's survival
at the very heart of the party apparatus
might have become more problematic; had Neidhardt been a less
sympathetic jurist, Hitler might have ended up struggling
to become
Austria's
Fuhrer, not Germany's. Nevertheless neither man accepted
that good fortune had any part to play in their political survival. In an
interview
with the American journalist Walter Duranty, Stalin reacted
sharply
to a question about how much his career owed to good luck.
Uncharacteristically irritable, he banged his fist
on the table: 'What
do
you think 1 am, an old Georgian granny to believe in gods and devils?
I'm a Bolshevik and believe in none of that nonsense.' After a pause,
he added: 'I believe in one thing only, the
power of the human will.'
Hitler habitually attributed the course
of his career to the unseen hand
of Fate. Writing just after the war, Albert Speer observed that Hitler
'had pieced together a firm conviction that his whole career, with its
many unfavourable events and setbacks, was predestined by
Provi
dence to take him to the goal which it had set him'. This 'unshakeable
faith', Speer continued, was Hitler's central, 'pathological' character-
4
will laughingly tear up the petition of the state prosecutor and laugh
ingly tear up the judgment
of the court, for she pronounces us free!,lo
Even the prosecutor was seduced into describing Hitler as a
man with
a 'calling
to be the saviour of Germany'. Neidhardt imposed a prison
sentence
of five years (three less than the state attorney had demanded)
and a fine of
200 gold marks. He ought to have ordered Hitler's
deportation since he was
not yet a German citizen, but Austrian. Even
a five-year sentence might have ended Hitler's political career, but,
following a favourable
report on Hitler's exemplary behaviour in
Landsberg prison (where he was showered
with food, drink and flowers
from well-wishers, refused
to take part in prison sports -'A leader
cannot afford to be beaten at games' - and dictated Mein Kampf), he
was released
on
20 December I924.11 Neidhardt was rewarded more
generously
than Zinoviev and Kamenev; following Hitler's appoint
ment as Chancellor in January I933 he was made president of the
Bavarian high court,
and at the celebration of his retirement in I937
a letter from Hitler was read out praising the unstinting patriotism the
judge
had displayed throughout his career.
12
Both Stalin and Hitler owed a good deal to luck in surviving the
crises
of I924. Had the party leadership decided to honour Lenin's
last wishes, Stalin's survival
at the very heart of the party apparatus
might have become more problematic; had Neidhardt been a less
sympathetic jurist, Hitler might have ended up struggling
to become
Austria's
Fuhrer, not Germany's. Nevertheless neither man accepted
that good fortune had any part to play in their political survival. In an
interview
with the American journalist Walter Duranty, Stalin reacted
sharply
to a question about how much his career owed to good luck.
Uncharacteristically irritable, he banged his fist
on the table: 'What
do
you think 1 am, an old Georgian granny to believe in gods and devils?
I'm a Bolshevik and believe in none of that nonsense.' After a pause,
he added: 'I believe in one thing only, the
power of the human will.'
Hitler habitually attributed the course
of his career to the unseen hand
of Fate. Writing just after the war, Albert Speer observed that Hitler
'had pieced together a firm conviction that his whole career, with its
many unfavourable events and setbacks, was predestined by
Provi
dence to take him to the goal which it had set him'. This 'unshakeable
faith', Speer continued, was Hitler's central, 'pathological' character-
4
STALIN AND HITLER: PATHS TO DICTATORSHIP
istic.
13
Yet the crises of 1924 are a reminder that the rise of neither
man to dictatorship was in any sense preordained or irresistible. Hitler
was
no more the necessary outcome of German history than Stalin was
the inevitable child
of Lenin's revolution in 1917. Chance, as well as
ambition and opportunity, governed their rise
to supreme power.
There can be no
doubt that Hitler and Stalin were very different
personalities. There are superficial similarities,
but any inferences
drawn from the coincidence of certain factors in their biography have
to be made with great care. Both, it is said, were beaten unmercifully
by a tyrannical father: Stalin's a drunken cobbler, Hitler's a petit
bourgeois martinet. Each formed a close attachment
to their mothers.
Both rebelled against
an early religious education. Both were outsiders,
socially and nationally, from mainstream Russian
or German society,
Stalin a Georgian, Hitler
an Austrian. Each kept a strong accent that
helped to identify them as distant from the mainstream. Both embarked
on careers in the political underworld as terrorists, Stalin in the Russian
Social Democratic Party before
1914, Hitler in the shady world of
radical nationalism in Germany after
1918. Each served time in prison
for their political beliefs.
None of these comparisons was remarkable
or unique. Hundreds of Europeans in the early part of the century
were imprisoned for their
beliefs; many were 'outsiders', whether on
the
left or the right of politics. Most Europeans had some kind of a
religious education; few boys ill the late nineteenth century avoided a
beating,
but regular and brutal abuse, which both Stalin and Hitler
suffered, was also widespread.
On most other comparisons of person
ality traits, daily habits
or routines the two men were unalike.
Stalin's biographer has
to overcome two hurdles: on the one hand
there exists a wide chasm between the real history of Stalin's revolu
tionary career
and the mendacious life that was constructed in the
hagiographies
of the
1930S; on the other, the surviving accounts of
Stalin's personality gravitate wildly between the image of an implac
ably cruel despot, devoid
of human qualities, and the portrait of a
quiet, unassuming,
warm human being, the kind of man whose knee,
as the American envoy Joseph Davies
put it, 'a child would like to sit
on'.14 Stalin was a
man with different faces, and those faces changed
through time. Capturing the 'real' Stalin is to recognize that the fixed
5
istic.
13
Yet the crises of 1924 are a reminder that the rise of neither
man to dictatorship was in any sense preordained or irresistible. Hitler
was
no more the necessary outcome of German history than Stalin was
the inevitable child
of Lenin's revolution in 1917. Chance, as well as
ambition and opportunity, governed their rise
to supreme power.
There can be no
doubt that Hitler and Stalin were very different
personalities. There are superficial similarities,
but any inferences
drawn from the coincidence of certain factors in their biography have
to be made with great care. Both, it is said, were beaten unmercifully
by a tyrannical father: Stalin's a drunken cobbler, Hitler's a petit
bourgeois martinet. Each formed a close attachment
to their mothers.
Both rebelled against
an early religious education. Both were outsiders,
socially and nationally, from mainstream Russian
or German society,
Stalin a Georgian, Hitler
an Austrian. Each kept a strong accent that
helped to identify them as distant from the mainstream. Both embarked
on careers in the political underworld as terrorists, Stalin in the Russian
Social Democratic Party before
1914, Hitler in the shady world of
radical nationalism in Germany after
1918. Each served time in prison
for their political beliefs.
None of these comparisons was remarkable
or unique. Hundreds of Europeans in the early part of the century
were imprisoned for their
beliefs; many were 'outsiders', whether on
the
left or the right of politics. Most Europeans had some kind of a
religious education; few boys ill the late nineteenth century avoided a
beating,
but regular and brutal abuse, which both Stalin and Hitler
suffered, was also widespread.
On most other comparisons of person
ality traits, daily habits
or routines the two men were unalike.
Stalin's biographer has
to overcome two hurdles: on the one hand
there exists a wide chasm between the real history of Stalin's revolu
tionary career
and the mendacious life that was constructed in the
hagiographies
of the
1930S; on the other, the surviving accounts of
Stalin's personality gravitate wildly between the image of an implac
ably cruel despot, devoid
of human qualities, and the portrait of a
quiet, unassuming,
warm human being, the kind of man whose knee,
as the American envoy Joseph Davies
put it, 'a child would like to sit
on'.14 Stalin was a
man with different faces, and those faces changed
through time. Capturing the 'real' Stalin is to recognize that the fixed
5
THE DICTATORS
points in any description are, in reality, determined by the time and
circumstances when the account was made. The quiet, churlish, watch
ful Stalin
that features in many accounts by contemporaries of his
political adolescence grew into the avuncular, reserved
and capricious
statesman
of the I940s. The details of his early life are well known.
Born
on 6 December I878 in the small Georgian town of Gori, in
the distant Caucasian borderlands
of the Russian Empire, the son of
a shoemaker
and a washerwoman, Stalin's was a remarkably unpre
possessing origin for a
man who climbed to the pinnacle of power
fifty years later.
He began life as a proletarian revolutionary should,
disadvantaged
and unprivileged. He attended a local school, where his
remarkable memory struck his teacher as significant enough
to get him
a place
at a seminary school in Georgia's capital, Tiflis. Here the
thin-faced young boy, pock-marked from
an early bout of smallpox,
slightly bandy-legged, with a left
arm four centimetres shorter than it
should have been thanks
to a debilitating ulcer, made his first contact
with the Russian social democratic movement.
I5
He joined the movement aged eighteen and was expelled from the
seminary.
He was attracted to the uncompromising revolutionary
outlook
of Russian Marxism and the simple lessons of class warfare.
He joined the underground movement and lived in its dimly lit and
dangerous catacombs for the next seventeen years
of his life. Here he
learned
to survive by erasing his own person; Josef Dzhugashvili, the
name he was given
at birth, became first 'Koba', then at times 'David',
'Nizhevadze', 'Chizhikov', 'Ivanovich', until finally,
at some point
shortly before the outbreak of war in I9I4, he took the Russian word
for steel, 'Stalin'. He was absorbed entirely in the struggle, read widely,
wrote more
than his later detractors were prepared to admit, and
robbed banks to fund the cause. He was arrested at least four times
and exiled
to Siberia. He escaped, which from Tsarist exile meant little
more
than boarding a train and heading west. He was a delegate to
party conferences abroad, including the Fourth Congress in Stockholm
and the Fifth in London,
but crucial for his later elevation was his
decision
to side with the Bolshevik or 'majority' faction when the
Social Democratic
Party split in I903 over revolutionary tactics. Stalin
remained in the branch led by the young lawyer Vladimir Ulyanov,
whose
nom de revolution was Lenin. In I9 I 2, though in prison, he
6
points in any description are, in reality, determined by the time and
circumstances when the account was made. The quiet, churlish, watch
ful Stalin
that features in many accounts by contemporaries of his
political adolescence grew into the avuncular, reserved
and capricious
statesman
of the I940s. The details of his early life are well known.
Born
on 6 December I878 in the small Georgian town of Gori, in
the distant Caucasian borderlands
of the Russian Empire, the son of
a shoemaker
and a washerwoman, Stalin's was a remarkably unpre
possessing origin for a
man who climbed to the pinnacle of power
fifty years later.
He began life as a proletarian revolutionary should,
disadvantaged
and unprivileged. He attended a local school, where his
remarkable memory struck his teacher as significant enough
to get him
a place
at a seminary school in Georgia's capital, Tiflis. Here the
thin-faced young boy, pock-marked from
an early bout of smallpox,
slightly bandy-legged, with a left
arm four centimetres shorter than it
should have been thanks
to a debilitating ulcer, made his first contact
with the Russian social democratic movement.
I5
He joined the movement aged eighteen and was expelled from the
seminary.
He was attracted to the uncompromising revolutionary
outlook
of Russian Marxism and the simple lessons of class warfare.
He joined the underground movement and lived in its dimly lit and
dangerous catacombs for the next seventeen years
of his life. Here he
learned
to survive by erasing his own person; Josef Dzhugashvili, the
name he was given
at birth, became first 'Koba', then at times 'David',
'Nizhevadze', 'Chizhikov', 'Ivanovich', until finally,
at some point
shortly before the outbreak of war in I9I4, he took the Russian word
for steel, 'Stalin'. He was absorbed entirely in the struggle, read widely,
wrote more
than his later detractors were prepared to admit, and
robbed banks to fund the cause. He was arrested at least four times
and exiled
to Siberia. He escaped, which from Tsarist exile meant little
more
than boarding a train and heading west. He was a delegate to
party conferences abroad, including the Fourth Congress in Stockholm
and the Fifth in London,
but crucial for his later elevation was his
decision
to side with the Bolshevik or 'majority' faction when the
Social Democratic
Party split in I903 over revolutionary tactics. Stalin
remained in the branch led by the young lawyer Vladimir Ulyanov,
whose
nom de revolution was Lenin. In I9 I 2, though in prison, he
6
STALIN AND HITLER: PATHS TO DICTATORSHIP
was appointed to the Bolshevik Central Committee, the governing
body
of the party, and remained a member, save for a brief sabbatical
during the Great War, for the
next forty years. In 1913 he began a
four-year exile in
Turukhansk on a government stipend of IS roubles
a month; here he passed
much of his time hunting and fishing. A fellow
exile in 19
I 6 recalled the 36-year-old, by now an ageing veteran of
the youthful revolutionary struggle: 'Thick-set,
of medium height, a
drooping moustache, thick hair,
narrow forehead and rather short legs
... his speech was dull and dry ... a narrow-minded, fanatical man.'
Stalin was disdainful and taciturn, his attitude towards the people
around him 'rude, provocative and cynical' .16 Stalin's personality was
now set in terms still recognizable in the later dictator.
The revolution
of February 1917 made Stalin. He returned from
Siberia
to Petrograd and became one of a cohort of experienced acti
vists hoping
to use the collapse of the Russian monarchy as a stepping
stone
to social revolution. The heroic version of Stalin's revolutionary
contribution written in the
1930S has Stalin everywhere, in the thick
of crisis.
He became Lenin's closest collaborator and worked unstint
ingly
to prepare the way for the Bolshevik seizure of power in
October Y The reality was different, though Stalin was not as unobtrus
ive in the revolutionary year as later revisions of his role suggest. He
placed himself behind Lenin's policy, announced in April 1917, of
no compromise with the Provisional Government. His articles and
speeches
show a restless, uncompromising revolutionary, exposing the
dangers
of counter-revolution by less single-minded or opportunist
socialists,
and urging the party and the population to seize the initiative
by transferring power
to the toilers of Russian society. His narrow
views on party unity and a single party line, characteristic of the 193 as,
were fully developed in the ideological
and organizational turmoil
between the
two revolutions. In the soldiers'
Pravda in May he called
for
'one common opinion', 'one common goal', 'one common road' .18
It was Stalin who delivered the report of the Central Committee
in July
1917 that called for a break with the other socialist parties,
the Mensheviks
and Socialist-Revolutionaries, for supporting the
'bourgeois' government. His speeches demonstrate a clear grasp
of
political realities and a consistently revolutionary course. When the
final crisis
of the Provisional Government arrived in
October 1917
7
was appointed to the Bolshevik Central Committee, the governing
body
of the party, and remained a member, save for a brief sabbatical
during the Great War, for the
next forty years. In 1913 he began a
four-year exile in
Turukhansk on a government stipend of IS roubles
a month; here he passed
much of his time hunting and fishing. A fellow
exile in 19
I 6 recalled the 36-year-old, by now an ageing veteran of
the youthful revolutionary struggle: 'Thick-set,
of medium height, a
drooping moustache, thick hair,
narrow forehead and rather short legs
... his speech was dull and dry ... a narrow-minded, fanatical man.'
Stalin was disdainful and taciturn, his attitude towards the people
around him 'rude, provocative and cynical' .16 Stalin's personality was
now set in terms still recognizable in the later dictator.
The revolution
of February 1917 made Stalin. He returned from
Siberia
to Petrograd and became one of a cohort of experienced acti
vists hoping
to use the collapse of the Russian monarchy as a stepping
stone
to social revolution. The heroic version of Stalin's revolutionary
contribution written in the
1930S has Stalin everywhere, in the thick
of crisis.
He became Lenin's closest collaborator and worked unstint
ingly
to prepare the way for the Bolshevik seizure of power in
October Y The reality was different, though Stalin was not as unobtrus
ive in the revolutionary year as later revisions of his role suggest. He
placed himself behind Lenin's policy, announced in April 1917, of
no compromise with the Provisional Government. His articles and
speeches
show a restless, uncompromising revolutionary, exposing the
dangers
of counter-revolution by less single-minded or opportunist
socialists,
and urging the party and the population to seize the initiative
by transferring power
to the toilers of Russian society. His narrow
views on party unity and a single party line, characteristic of the 193 as,
were fully developed in the ideological
and organizational turmoil
between the
two revolutions. In the soldiers'
Pravda in May he called
for
'one common opinion', 'one common goal', 'one common road' .18
It was Stalin who delivered the report of the Central Committee
in July
1917 that called for a break with the other socialist parties,
the Mensheviks
and Socialist-Revolutionaries, for supporting the
'bourgeois' government. His speeches demonstrate a clear grasp
of
political realities and a consistently revolutionary course. When the
final crisis
of the Provisional Government arrived in
October 1917
7
THE DICTATORS
Stalin voted with the majority in the Central Committee in favour
of a coup. His speech, recorded in a brief minute, ended with the
following prescription:
'we must firmly and resolutely take the path of
insurrection' .19 Some of this revolutionary enthusiasm may have been injected later
when Stalin's collective works were published in the I940s. The coup
in October
I9I7 did not need Stalin for it to be successful, but there
can be no
doubt that in the bright air of politics above ground,
Stalin flourished.
No one has ever doubted that he was a committed
revolutionary
who, throughout I9 I7, saw revolution in terms of trans
ferring power
to ordinary men and women and destroying utterly the
society
of privilege that exploited them.
This was his metier, his reason
for living.
When the first Bolshevik government was formed on 26
October I9I7, Stalin was rewarded with the Commissariat of Nation
ality Affairs. This was, in the context
of a disintegrating multi-ethnic
state,
an important post, which Stalin exploited to prevent the non
Russian borderlands, including his native Georgia, from seceding from
the
new revolutionary community. His firm policy brought him into
major conflict with Lenin in
I92I, who preferred a looser federation,
and contributed to the unflattering references in the testament. Stalin
was one
of a dozen or so who formed the Bolshevik leadership corps.
In
October I9I7 he was chosen as a member of a seven-man 'Political
Bureau'
of the Central Committee, forerunner of the formal Politburo
set
up in I9I9, which Stalin also joined. In November he was named
as one
of four party leaders, together with Lenin, Trotsky and Yakov
Sverdlov,
who could decide on emergency issues without wider refer
ence.
20
His office was close to Lenin's, and he worked for him as a
political chief-of-staff in the critical early years of a regime confronting
civil war
and economic collapse. In I9I9 he was given the additional
post of Commissar for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Rab
krin) to try to ensure that the state apparatus functioned effectively and
to field the complaints of ordinary people. These many responsibilities
made him
an unsurprising choice as General Secretary of the party in
April
I922, when it was decided that the apparatus that serviced and
supported the Central Committee should be strengthened.
There are many conflicting accounts
of Stalin during the early period
of his public career, but most of them focus on Stalin as a political
8
Stalin voted with the majority in the Central Committee in favour
of a coup. His speech, recorded in a brief minute, ended with the
following prescription:
'we must firmly and resolutely take the path of
insurrection' .19 Some of this revolutionary enthusiasm may have been injected later
when Stalin's collective works were published in the I940s. The coup
in October
I9I7 did not need Stalin for it to be successful, but there
can be no
doubt that in the bright air of politics above ground,
Stalin flourished.
No one has ever doubted that he was a committed
revolutionary
who, throughout I9 I7, saw revolution in terms of trans
ferring power
to ordinary men and women and destroying utterly the
society
of privilege that exploited them.
This was his metier, his reason
for living.
When the first Bolshevik government was formed on 26
October I9I7, Stalin was rewarded with the Commissariat of Nation
ality Affairs. This was, in the context
of a disintegrating multi-ethnic
state,
an important post, which Stalin exploited to prevent the non
Russian borderlands, including his native Georgia, from seceding from
the
new revolutionary community. His firm policy brought him into
major conflict with Lenin in
I92I, who preferred a looser federation,
and contributed to the unflattering references in the testament. Stalin
was one
of a dozen or so who formed the Bolshevik leadership corps.
In
October I9I7 he was chosen as a member of a seven-man 'Political
Bureau'
of the Central Committee, forerunner of the formal Politburo
set
up in I9I9, which Stalin also joined. In November he was named
as one
of four party leaders, together with Lenin, Trotsky and Yakov
Sverdlov,
who could decide on emergency issues without wider refer
ence.
20
His office was close to Lenin's, and he worked for him as a
political chief-of-staff in the critical early years of a regime confronting
civil war
and economic collapse. In I9I9 he was given the additional
post of Commissar for the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Rab
krin) to try to ensure that the state apparatus functioned effectively and
to field the complaints of ordinary people. These many responsibilities
made him
an unsurprising choice as General Secretary of the party in
April
I922, when it was decided that the apparatus that serviced and
supported the Central Committee should be strengthened.
There are many conflicting accounts
of Stalin during the early period
of his public career, but most of them focus on Stalin as a political
8
STALIN AND HITLER: PATHS TO DICTATORSHIP
nonentity or lightweight. The origin of this damning judgement lies in
the memoirs
of a non-Bolshevik, Nikolai Sukhanov, published in I9 22,
who famously defined Stalin as a 'grey blur'; it was sealed by Trotsky's
later waspish description
of Stalin as the party's 'outstanding medioc
rity'.21
The view that Stalin's personality was flat and colourless and
his mental powers limited was widespread. In exile together in Siberia
during the war, Kamenev dismissed
what Stalin had to say with 'brief,
almost contemptuous remarks'.22 Lenin, it was said, justified appoint
ing Stalin
to a government post in
October I9I7 because 'no intelli
gence
is needed'; Stalin's name came last on the list of twelve
recommended commissars drafted by Lenin.
23
The image of the dull
bureaucratic time-server was captured in
an early nickname, 'Comrade
filing cabinet', 'tovarishch kartotekov,.24 Stalin's own behaviour and
personality lent weight to this image. He was outwardly modest and
unassuming, lacking the flamboyance and intellectual confidence of
many of his
colleagues. His voice was remembered as 'toneless'; his
oratorical skills were feeble, reading slowly from prepared scripts,
with occasional pauses
and stutters and just sufficient inflection to add
emphasis where needed
to texts that were methodical or formulaic.
Later critics found
that he talked like yesterday's
Pravda editorial,
which he
had probably written.
25
At meetings he was often observed
sitting
to one side, saying little or nothing, smoking cigarettes or a pipe
filled with foul-smelling tobacco,
but watchful and attentive.
It is easy to see why so many of his peers underestimated the
man sheltering behind the mask
of awkward modesty and intellectual
diffidence. Stalin was a master
at dissimulation. Where some saw only
a blank mind, there existed a shrewd, informed, cautious
and organized
intelligence. Stalin was
not stupid. He read voraciously and critically,
marking his books with queries, comments
and underlining. In the
I930S his library counted 40,000 volumes.
26
He wrote extensively
both before
19I7 and in the
I920S, works and speeches that ran to
thirteen volumes when they were published. His Marxism was thought
out carefully and presented in apparently clear, logical, consistent and
measured arguments. His prose, though later held up as a model
of socialist clarity, was pedestrian and unimaginative, though just
occasionally spiced with
an arresting metaphor, made more so by the
turgid passages
that surround it. He favoured what he called in I9I7
9
nonentity or lightweight. The origin of this damning judgement lies in
the memoirs
of a non-Bolshevik, Nikolai Sukhanov, published in I9 22,
who famously defined Stalin as a 'grey blur'; it was sealed by Trotsky's
later waspish description
of Stalin as the party's 'outstanding medioc
rity'.21
The view that Stalin's personality was flat and colourless and
his mental powers limited was widespread. In exile together in Siberia
during the war, Kamenev dismissed
what Stalin had to say with 'brief,
almost contemptuous remarks'.22 Lenin, it was said, justified appoint
ing Stalin
to a government post in
October I9I7 because 'no intelli
gence
is needed'; Stalin's name came last on the list of twelve
recommended commissars drafted by Lenin.
23
The image of the dull
bureaucratic time-server was captured in
an early nickname, 'Comrade
filing cabinet', 'tovarishch kartotekov,.24 Stalin's own behaviour and
personality lent weight to this image. He was outwardly modest and
unassuming, lacking the flamboyance and intellectual confidence of
many of his
colleagues. His voice was remembered as 'toneless'; his
oratorical skills were feeble, reading slowly from prepared scripts,
with occasional pauses
and stutters and just sufficient inflection to add
emphasis where needed
to texts that were methodical or formulaic.
Later critics found
that he talked like yesterday's
Pravda editorial,
which he
had probably written.
25
At meetings he was often observed
sitting
to one side, saying little or nothing, smoking cigarettes or a pipe
filled with foul-smelling tobacco,
but watchful and attentive.
It is easy to see why so many of his peers underestimated the
man sheltering behind the mask
of awkward modesty and intellectual
diffidence. Stalin was a master
at dissimulation. Where some saw only
a blank mind, there existed a shrewd, informed, cautious
and organized
intelligence. Stalin was
not stupid. He read voraciously and critically,
marking his books with queries, comments
and underlining. In the
I930S his library counted 40,000 volumes.
26
He wrote extensively
both before
19I7 and in the
I920S, works and speeches that ran to
thirteen volumes when they were published. His Marxism was thought
out carefully and presented in apparently clear, logical, consistent and
measured arguments. His prose, though later held up as a model
of socialist clarity, was pedestrian and unimaginative, though just
occasionally spiced with
an arresting metaphor, made more so by the
turgid passages
that surround it. He favoured what he called in I9I7
9
THE DICTATORS
a 'creative Marxism', and the body of his own political thought shows
a mind willing
to adapt Marx to existing realities as readily as Lenin
had done.27 From the central issue of creating a communist society he
never wavered. His view
of communism was single-minded rather than
narrow-minded. Early on in his public career he saw communism as a
historical necessity, even though the real history confronted by the
Bolsheviks in the
1920S made communism look simply utopian.
If Stalin was not stupid, neither was he an 'intellectual', a term
that he turned into one of abuse. His personality in the 1920S was, by
the standards
of a Lenin or a Trotsky, more obviously plebeian. He
was coarse and direct; he swore often, even at Lenin's wife, which
occasioned the damaging addendum to the testament. Swearing separ
ated off the real underclass in the movement from the educated and
genteel Bolshevik intelligentsia, and became endemic
to the new ruling
group
that Stalin surrounded himself with in the
1930S. Unable to
suffer politeness, quite ungroomed socially (at
an inter-Allied dinner
in
1943 he had to ask in embarrassment how to use the array of cutlery
besieging his plate), with little physical presence, Stalin resorted instead
to a brusque, even autocratic manner
.28 Unassuming to those he wished
to beguile, he could be irascible, vulgar, aloof or overbearing to subord
inates, and implacably cruel
to those he regarded for his own reasons
as enemies. Stalin may have been by nature vengeful and insecure; he
may have borrowed the culture
of vendetta from his native Georgia;
he was said by Kamenev to have read
and re-read Machiavelli during
his Siberian exile -nothing
is quite certain about the origin of his view
of political relationships.29 But as a politician he brought to a high art
the use and misuse of men.
There
is a telling anecdote, which may have been embellished (since
its source was Trotsky),
that after a dinner in
1924 Stalin, Kamenev
and the head
of the security service, Felix Dzerzhinsky, challenged
each other
to say what they most liked. Stalin chose the following:
'The sweetest thing in life
is to mark a victim, prepare the blow
carefully, strike hard, and then go
to bed and sleep peacefully.'30 True
or not, the story reveals a central element in Stalin's political make-up.
His view
of other people was cynical and opportunistic: those who
were useful to him he indulged as long as he needed them, those in his
way he did
not confront but outmanoeuvred. His habit of watching
10
a 'creative Marxism', and the body of his own political thought shows
a mind willing
to adapt Marx to existing realities as readily as Lenin
had done.27 From the central issue of creating a communist society he
never wavered. His view
of communism was single-minded rather than
narrow-minded. Early on in his public career he saw communism as a
historical necessity, even though the real history confronted by the
Bolsheviks in the
1920S made communism look simply utopian.
If Stalin was not stupid, neither was he an 'intellectual', a term
that he turned into one of abuse. His personality in the 1920S was, by
the standards
of a Lenin or a Trotsky, more obviously plebeian. He
was coarse and direct; he swore often, even at Lenin's wife, which
occasioned the damaging addendum to the testament. Swearing separ
ated off the real underclass in the movement from the educated and
genteel Bolshevik intelligentsia, and became endemic
to the new ruling
group
that Stalin surrounded himself with in the
1930S. Unable to
suffer politeness, quite ungroomed socially (at
an inter-Allied dinner
in
1943 he had to ask in embarrassment how to use the array of cutlery
besieging his plate), with little physical presence, Stalin resorted instead
to a brusque, even autocratic manner
.28 Unassuming to those he wished
to beguile, he could be irascible, vulgar, aloof or overbearing to subord
inates, and implacably cruel
to those he regarded for his own reasons
as enemies. Stalin may have been by nature vengeful and insecure; he
may have borrowed the culture
of vendetta from his native Georgia;
he was said by Kamenev to have read
and re-read Machiavelli during
his Siberian exile -nothing
is quite certain about the origin of his view
of political relationships.29 But as a politician he brought to a high art
the use and misuse of men.
There
is a telling anecdote, which may have been embellished (since
its source was Trotsky),
that after a dinner in
1924 Stalin, Kamenev
and the head
of the security service, Felix Dzerzhinsky, challenged
each other
to say what they most liked. Stalin chose the following:
'The sweetest thing in life
is to mark a victim, prepare the blow
carefully, strike hard, and then go
to bed and sleep peacefully.'30 True
or not, the story reveals a central element in Stalin's political make-up.
His view
of other people was cynical and opportunistic: those who
were useful to him he indulged as long as he needed them, those in his
way he did
not confront but outmanoeuvred. His habit of watching
10
STALIN AND HITLER: PATHS TO DICTATORSHIP
was the habit of a predator understanding its prey. Stalin was secretive
and disloyal, though quite capable
of winning trust from the same
individual he was in the process
of bringing down. 'Watch
Stalin
carefully,' Lenin was said to have repeated. 'He is always ready to
betray yoU.'3! Stalin made few close friends, though he could be jovial
and comradely when he chose to be so. Throughout his career he
carried a
profound distrust of other people that bordered later in life
on the pathological. His instincts were, as a consequence, vengeful and
capricious, even if his public persona in the
1930S radiated the image,
according
to one of many foreign visitors charmed by
Stalin, of 'a
pleasant, earnest ageing man'. 32
Stalin was an evident product of the long years of underground
politics, where
trust was hard to establish, police spies and provoca
teurs everywhere, secrecy
and self-reliance a second nature, and
betrayal a daily fact of life. He absorbed the values of the underworld
and brought them, honed by the harsh experiences
of the civil war, to
the practice of high politics. In the
1930S and 1940s, as the Soviet
Union's dictator, he behaved as if infiltration, concealment, betrayal
and bitter, party-splitting arguments over ideology and tactics -the
material world
of underground politics -somehow functioned still in
the mature environment
of a one-party state. Nonetheless the older
Stalin became a more effective and settled personality than the angry
young
man of the underground. He exploited the limitation of his
personality. His
glumeess became imperturbability; his awkward dif
fidence was transformed into unaffected modesty; his stilted speech
making evolved into a slow, deliberate, wry presentation, which could
last for three
or four hours. His facial expressions gave few clues to
the state of mind beneath.
Only his yellowish-brown eyes, which never
lost the habit
of darting to and fro, as though searching for the
vulnerabilities
of those he met, revealed to guests the alertness of the
mind behind the outward calm.
33
His working methods evolved with his personality. He was never
the mild party clerk
of popular myth, the bureaucrat-turned-dictator.
Nikolai Bukharin, the editor
of
Pravda in the 1920S and a principal
victim
of Stalin's later purges, picked out 'laziness' as Stalin's chief
trait, a view
that fits ill with the image of a tireless official outdistanc
ing his rivals by dint
of administrative stamina.
34
Stalin worked
II
was the habit of a predator understanding its prey. Stalin was secretive
and disloyal, though quite capable
of winning trust from the same
individual he was in the process
of bringing down. 'Watch
Stalin
carefully,' Lenin was said to have repeated. 'He is always ready to
betray yoU.'3! Stalin made few close friends, though he could be jovial
and comradely when he chose to be so. Throughout his career he
carried a
profound distrust of other people that bordered later in life
on the pathological. His instincts were, as a consequence, vengeful and
capricious, even if his public persona in the
1930S radiated the image,
according
to one of many foreign visitors charmed by
Stalin, of 'a
pleasant, earnest ageing man'. 32
Stalin was an evident product of the long years of underground
politics, where
trust was hard to establish, police spies and provoca
teurs everywhere, secrecy
and self-reliance a second nature, and
betrayal a daily fact of life. He absorbed the values of the underworld
and brought them, honed by the harsh experiences
of the civil war, to
the practice of high politics. In the
1930S and 1940s, as the Soviet
Union's dictator, he behaved as if infiltration, concealment, betrayal
and bitter, party-splitting arguments over ideology and tactics -the
material world
of underground politics -somehow functioned still in
the mature environment
of a one-party state. Nonetheless the older
Stalin became a more effective and settled personality than the angry
young
man of the underground. He exploited the limitation of his
personality. His
glumeess became imperturbability; his awkward dif
fidence was transformed into unaffected modesty; his stilted speech
making evolved into a slow, deliberate, wry presentation, which could
last for three
or four hours. His facial expressions gave few clues to
the state of mind beneath.
Only his yellowish-brown eyes, which never
lost the habit
of darting to and fro, as though searching for the
vulnerabilities
of those he met, revealed to guests the alertness of the
mind behind the outward calm.
33
His working methods evolved with his personality. He was never
the mild party clerk
of popular myth, the bureaucrat-turned-dictator.
Nikolai Bukharin, the editor
of
Pravda in the 1920S and a principal
victim
of Stalin's later purges, picked out 'laziness' as Stalin's chief
trait, a view
that fits ill with the image of a tireless official outdistanc
ing his rivals by dint
of administrative stamina.
34
Stalin worked
II
THE DICTATORS
tirelessly, but politics was his work. He neglected his commissarial
duties
to such an extent that he was publicly censured by Lenin. He
disliked bureaucracy and in 1924 withdrew from both his commis
sariats. The routine
work of the party secretariat was carried out by a
large team of officials
and assistants assembled by Stalin after 1922.
Stalin was an activist and a revolutionary, and remained so as long as
he was able. His personal routine in the
1930S has often been con
trasted with
that of Hitler, but there were resemblances. He rose late
and retired late; meetings and correspondence punctuated most days,
but he could also be absent at his dachas and in the
1930S took long
vacations. The evenings might involve a dinner, perhaps a film in the
Kremlin cinema,
and late-night discussions. He drank little, usually a
light Georgian wine,
but enjoyed watching the inebriation of his guests.
He welcomed the company of women, to
whom he could be charming
to the point of gallantry. Otherwise he would eat simply in the modestly
furnished three-room
apartment set up for him in the Kremlin. He
married twice, but the suicide of his second wife in 1931, which deeply
affected him, left him alone for the period
of his dictatorship, though
seldom celibate.
35
He never used his power for ostentation, which he
disliked
and ridiculed in others. His hatred of privilege remained with
him, though the elder statesman and world politician
of the years after
1945 dressed more formally
and, displ?ye~La greater /dignity than the
party politician
of the
1930S. //\/~';L-: /<
Any account of Stalin's life raises the question of what it was that
impelled him forward. His first post-glasnost Russian biographer,
Dmitri Volkogonov, assumed, as common sense might dictate,
that it
was power: 'the more
power he accumulated and kept in his hands,
the more power he wanted'
.36 Robert Tucker, in his classic biography,
assumed
that what Stalin wanted was not only power, but fame: 'Glory
... remained his aim.'3? Bukharin and Trotsky saw Stalin driven by
profound defects
of personality: envy, jealousy, petty ambitions.
38
Stalin left almost no account of his own motives. He once remarked
during the civil war,
at the successful defence of the Volga city of
Tsaritsyn, that he would willingly sacrifice 49 per cent if he could 'save
the
51 per cent, that is, save the revolution'. 39 He may have been driven
by envy
to ruin more successful or ambitious men around him, he may
have liked the plaudits
of dictatorship (though there is much evidence
12
tirelessly, but politics was his work. He neglected his commissarial
duties
to such an extent that he was publicly censured by Lenin. He
disliked bureaucracy and in 1924 withdrew from both his commis
sariats. The routine
work of the party secretariat was carried out by a
large team of officials
and assistants assembled by Stalin after 1922.
Stalin was an activist and a revolutionary, and remained so as long as
he was able. His personal routine in the
1930S has often been con
trasted with
that of Hitler, but there were resemblances. He rose late
and retired late; meetings and correspondence punctuated most days,
but he could also be absent at his dachas and in the
1930S took long
vacations. The evenings might involve a dinner, perhaps a film in the
Kremlin cinema,
and late-night discussions. He drank little, usually a
light Georgian wine,
but enjoyed watching the inebriation of his guests.
He welcomed the company of women, to
whom he could be charming
to the point of gallantry. Otherwise he would eat simply in the modestly
furnished three-room
apartment set up for him in the Kremlin. He
married twice, but the suicide of his second wife in 1931, which deeply
affected him, left him alone for the period
of his dictatorship, though
seldom celibate.
35
He never used his power for ostentation, which he
disliked
and ridiculed in others. His hatred of privilege remained with
him, though the elder statesman and world politician
of the years after
1945 dressed more formally
and, displ?ye~La greater /dignity than the
party politician
of the
1930S. //\/~';L-: /<
Any account of Stalin's life raises the question of what it was that
impelled him forward. His first post-glasnost Russian biographer,
Dmitri Volkogonov, assumed, as common sense might dictate,
that it
was power: 'the more
power he accumulated and kept in his hands,
the more power he wanted'
.36 Robert Tucker, in his classic biography,
assumed
that what Stalin wanted was not only power, but fame: 'Glory
... remained his aim.'3? Bukharin and Trotsky saw Stalin driven by
profound defects
of personality: envy, jealousy, petty ambitions.
38
Stalin left almost no account of his own motives. He once remarked
during the civil war,
at the successful defence of the Volga city of
Tsaritsyn, that he would willingly sacrifice 49 per cent if he could 'save
the
51 per cent, that is, save the revolution'. 39 He may have been driven
by envy
to ruin more successful or ambitious men around him, he may
have liked the plaudits
of dictatorship (though there is much evidence
12
STALIN AND HITLER: PATHS TO DICTATORSHIP
that he deprecated his extravagant glorification), but the one consistent
strand in all his activity was the survival of the revolution and the
defence
of the first socialist state.
Power with Stalin seems to have
been
power to preserve and enlarge the revolution and the state that
represented it, not power simply for its own sake. The ambition to
save the revolution became for
Stalin a personal ambition, for at some
point in the 1920S, perhaps after Lenin's death, Stalin came to see
himself as the one Bolshevik leader
who could steer the way with
sufficient ruthlessness
and singleness of purpose. His instinct for sur
vival, his unfeeling destruction
of thousands of his party comrades, his
Machiavellian politics,
point not to a personality warped by self
centred sadism,
but to a man who used the weapons he understood to
achieve the central purpose to which his life had been devoted since he
was a teenager.
The consequences of that singleness of purpose for
Soviet society were profound and harrowing, but for Stalin they must
have seemed justified by the one overriding historical imperative
to
construct communism.
Hitler's biography
is a more open one. The details of his life are
better
known and his views on a great many issues have survived in
his writing and recorded conversations.
The Hitler legend elaborated
in the
1930S was closer to the truth than the official version of Stalin's
past. Yet the innermost thoughts, which might have been poured
out
in a diary or a regular private correspondence, remain as sealed with
Hitler as they do with Stalin. Understanding Hitler's personality
is an
extraordinary challenge. The gulf between the awkward, undistin
guished, very private individual
and the public political Hitler, dema
gogue and prophet, seems all
but unbridgeable, whereas in
Stalin
private character was reflected in public persona. So remarkable is the
contrast in Hitler's case
that there has always been speculation that he
possessed some rare, scarcely understood psychological
or physical
element
that fascinated and entranced both those in his direct physical
orbit
and the crowds he began to harangue from the early
1920S. Not
even the supernatural was ruled out. Two British guests at a Hitler
rally in Berlin in
1934, seated in the stadium just feet behind him,
watched him captivate his listeners with the familiar rising passion
and jarring voice. 'Then an amazing thing happened,' continued the
account: '[we] both saw a blue flash
of lightning come out of Hitler's
13
that he deprecated his extravagant glorification), but the one consistent
strand in all his activity was the survival of the revolution and the
defence
of the first socialist state.
Power with Stalin seems to have
been
power to preserve and enlarge the revolution and the state that
represented it, not power simply for its own sake. The ambition to
save the revolution became for
Stalin a personal ambition, for at some
point in the 1920S, perhaps after Lenin's death, Stalin came to see
himself as the one Bolshevik leader
who could steer the way with
sufficient ruthlessness
and singleness of purpose. His instinct for sur
vival, his unfeeling destruction
of thousands of his party comrades, his
Machiavellian politics,
point not to a personality warped by self
centred sadism,
but to a man who used the weapons he understood to
achieve the central purpose to which his life had been devoted since he
was a teenager.
The consequences of that singleness of purpose for
Soviet society were profound and harrowing, but for Stalin they must
have seemed justified by the one overriding historical imperative
to
construct communism.
Hitler's biography
is a more open one. The details of his life are
better
known and his views on a great many issues have survived in
his writing and recorded conversations.
The Hitler legend elaborated
in the
1930S was closer to the truth than the official version of Stalin's
past. Yet the innermost thoughts, which might have been poured
out
in a diary or a regular private correspondence, remain as sealed with
Hitler as they do with Stalin. Understanding Hitler's personality
is an
extraordinary challenge. The gulf between the awkward, undistin
guished, very private individual
and the public political Hitler, dema
gogue and prophet, seems all
but unbridgeable, whereas in
Stalin
private character was reflected in public persona. So remarkable is the
contrast in Hitler's case
that there has always been speculation that he
possessed some rare, scarcely understood psychological
or physical
element
that fascinated and entranced both those in his direct physical
orbit
and the crowds he began to harangue from the early
1920S. Not
even the supernatural was ruled out. Two British guests at a Hitler
rally in Berlin in
1934, seated in the stadium just feet behind him,
watched him captivate his listeners with the familiar rising passion
and jarring voice. 'Then an amazing thing happened,' continued the
account: '[we] both saw a blue flash
of lightning come out of Hitler's
13
THE DICTATORS
back ... We were surprised that those of us close behind Hitler had
not all been struck dead.' The two men afterwards discussed whether
Hitler was actually possessed
at certain moments by the Devil: 'We ,~ame to the conclusion that he was.'40
~ Adolf Hitler was born on 20 April 1889 in the small Austrian town
of Braunau am Inn, the fourth child of his father's third marriage,
though his three older siblings all died in infancy. His father was a
customs official, and the family solidly lower middle class.
He died in
1900, and Hitler's mother, Klara, in 1907. He attended local schools,
where he showed some aptitude,
but at his senior school in Linz
he lost interest in learning. Like Stalin, Hitler was blessed with
an
exceptional memory. He left school at sixteen and moved from Linz
to Vienna, where he hoped to become
an artist or an architect. He was
not, as he later claimed, in poverty,
but lived from a sizeable legacy,
and from the sale of his pictures, mostly townscapes, which were
displayed in local galleries.
IIL.:l.901jle was rejected by the Vienna
Academy of Arts. His days were spent with
an assortment of Viennese
drifters, and his evenings
at concerts, where he heard Wagner operas
interpreted by the composer Gustav Mahler.
41
There are few clues to
the later politician in the
five years he spent as an adolescent in Vienna;
he was interested in
popular politics and attracted to
Pan-German
nationalism, but it is not clear at this early stage that his nationalism
was also explicitly anti-Semitic. Yet the shy, polite, socially gauche
young man, who could
at other times be rudely opinionated, devious,
self-centred
and insensitive towards his friends, was recognizably the
divided self
of the
1930S.
In May 1913 Hitler fled from Vienna to Munich to avoid Austrian
military service. The authorities caught up with him,
but for almost a
year he managed to avoid deportation until, in February 1914, the
24-year-old artist was forced to return to Salzburg, where the medical
inspectors pronounced him 'unfit for military
or auxiliary service' and
free
to return to Germany.42 In August that year Hitler heard the
announcement
of the outbreak of the First World War standing in the
Odeonplatz in Munich.
Two days later he volunteered to fight with
the German army, which found him fully fit. After a brief
two months
of training Hitler was sent to the campaign in Belgium and northern
France. Like thousands
of other young Europeans who flocked to fight,
back ... We were surprised that those of us close behind Hitler had
not all been struck dead.' The two men afterwards discussed whether
Hitler was actually possessed
at certain moments by the Devil: 'We ,~ame to the conclusion that he was.'40
~ Adolf Hitler was born on 20 April 1889 in the small Austrian town
of Braunau am Inn, the fourth child of his father's third marriage,
though his three older siblings all died in infancy. His father was a
customs official, and the family solidly lower middle class.
He died in
1900, and Hitler's mother, Klara, in 1907. He attended local schools,
where he showed some aptitude,
but at his senior school in Linz
he lost interest in learning. Like Stalin, Hitler was blessed with
an
exceptional memory. He left school at sixteen and moved from Linz
to Vienna, where he hoped to become
an artist or an architect. He was
not, as he later claimed, in poverty,
but lived from a sizeable legacy,
and from the sale of his pictures, mostly townscapes, which were
displayed in local galleries.
IIL.:l.901jle was rejected by the Vienna
Academy of Arts. His days were spent with
an assortment of Viennese
drifters, and his evenings
at concerts, where he heard Wagner operas
interpreted by the composer Gustav Mahler.
41
There are few clues to
the later politician in the
five years he spent as an adolescent in Vienna;
he was interested in
popular politics and attracted to
Pan-German
nationalism, but it is not clear at this early stage that his nationalism
was also explicitly anti-Semitic. Yet the shy, polite, socially gauche
young man, who could
at other times be rudely opinionated, devious,
self-centred
and insensitive towards his friends, was recognizably the
divided self
of the
1930S.
In May 1913 Hitler fled from Vienna to Munich to avoid Austrian
military service. The authorities caught up with him,
but for almost a
year he managed to avoid deportation until, in February 1914, the
24-year-old artist was forced to return to Salzburg, where the medical
inspectors pronounced him 'unfit for military
or auxiliary service' and
free
to return to Germany.42 In August that year Hitler heard the
announcement
of the outbreak of the First World War standing in the
Odeonplatz in Munich.
Two days later he volunteered to fight with
the German army, which found him fully fit. After a brief
two months
of training Hitler was sent to the campaign in Belgium and northern
France. Like thousands
of other young Europeans who flocked to fight,
STALIN AN'D HITLER: PATHS TO DICTATORSHIP
Hitler confessed to being 'tremendously excited'.43 The war made
Hitler, as revolution made Stalin. Hitler was
promoted to corporal
after a month,
:!nd won the Iron Cross, Second Class after two ('The
happiest day
of my life,' wrote Hitler to his Munich landlord). The
Iron Cross, First Class, was finally awarded in August
1918. He was
personally courageous
and exhilarated by the extreme nature of the
demands conflict made
of every soldier: 'risking my life every day,
looking Death straight in the
eye'.44 That he survived for four years,
while he watched thousands
of his colleagues killed, was mere chance.
The war was a far more formative influence
than the years in Vienna.
In
Mein Kampf Hitler called it 'the greatest and most unforgettable'
time
of my earthly existence,.45 He merged himself psychologically
with the struggle; he inured himself,
on his own confession, to the
demobilizing fear
of death. There is no reason to doubt that as a young
soldier
who had experienced relentless years under the abnormal and
brutalizing conditions
of the front, the fact of defeat was unendurable.
Hitler may have embroidered his description when he recalled the
armistice night in which was
born a fiery hatred for those who had
surrendered Germany to the Allies, but throughout his subsequent
career his political behaviour suggests a complete inability to separate
his
own psychological state from the historical reality he was trying to
confront.
He understood national defeat as if it were a direct personal
humiliation.
He bore within him an uncontrollable lust for vengeance
that bordered at times on the deranged.
46
Hitler began post-war life as an army agitator in Munich, employed
to inform on radical politics and give the occasional talk about the
dangers
of Marxism and the Jews. In September 1919 he joined a
small Munich political
party founded on 9 January that year by a
watchmaker, Anton Drexler,
who had previously been a member of
the Fatherland
Party set up in 1917 by a cross-section of radical
nationalist
and Pan-German politicians to rally support for war. Hitler
was member number
555 of the German Workers'
Party (enrolment
began with
number
501); in November 1919 he was appointed its
propaganda leader. In February 1920 the party changed its name to the
National Socialist German Workers' Party, and the twenty-five-point
party programme was published.
The following year, on 29 July 1921,
he was elected chairman of the party and in this capacity launched the 15
Hitler confessed to being 'tremendously excited'.43 The war made
Hitler, as revolution made Stalin. Hitler was
promoted to corporal
after a month,
:!nd won the Iron Cross, Second Class after two ('The
happiest day
of my life,' wrote Hitler to his Munich landlord). The
Iron Cross, First Class, was finally awarded in August
1918. He was
personally courageous
and exhilarated by the extreme nature of the
demands conflict made
of every soldier: 'risking my life every day,
looking Death straight in the
eye'.44 That he survived for four years,
while he watched thousands
of his colleagues killed, was mere chance.
The war was a far more formative influence
than the years in Vienna.
In
Mein Kampf Hitler called it 'the greatest and most unforgettable'
time
of my earthly existence,.45 He merged himself psychologically
with the struggle; he inured himself,
on his own confession, to the
demobilizing fear
of death. There is no reason to doubt that as a young
soldier
who had experienced relentless years under the abnormal and
brutalizing conditions
of the front, the fact of defeat was unendurable.
Hitler may have embroidered his description when he recalled the
armistice night in which was
born a fiery hatred for those who had
surrendered Germany to the Allies, but throughout his subsequent
career his political behaviour suggests a complete inability to separate
his
own psychological state from the historical reality he was trying to
confront.
He understood national defeat as if it were a direct personal
humiliation.
He bore within him an uncontrollable lust for vengeance
that bordered at times on the deranged.
46
Hitler began post-war life as an army agitator in Munich, employed
to inform on radical politics and give the occasional talk about the
dangers
of Marxism and the Jews. In September 1919 he joined a
small Munich political
party founded on 9 January that year by a
watchmaker, Anton Drexler,
who had previously been a member of
the Fatherland
Party set up in 1917 by a cross-section of radical
nationalist
and Pan-German politicians to rally support for war. Hitler
was member number
555 of the German Workers'
Party (enrolment
began with
number
501); in November 1919 he was appointed its
propaganda leader. In February 1920 the party changed its name to the
National Socialist German Workers' Party, and the twenty-five-point
party programme was published.
The following year, on 29 July 1921,
he was elected chairman of the party and in this capacity launched the 15
THE DICTATORS
Putsch that landed him in 1924 in Landsberg fQrtres~turnip.g him
overnight into a national political figure. Impressions
of the
youn/?
politician vary widely. Those who heard him speak, or were drawn to
his circle, described him in terms that might have been applied to a
popular preacher with the power of revelation. 'There was an unknown
fire that burned inside him,' recalled his close friend Max Amann.
47
But
much ofthe testimony suggests that Hitler was regarded as a misfit; his
appearance and behaviour when he was
not in performance were dull
and unremarkable, and his attempts to pose as the tribune of a betrayed
people often ludicrous.
The hallmark scruffy raincoat, the narrow
dark moustache, the floppy fringe of hair, the pale and slightly puffy
face, even the grey-blue eyes
that could look vacant and expressionless,
all made Hitler easily recognizable,
but no less unprepossessing.
There
is a revealing recollection of a meeting with Hitler in
1920 at
the Munich villa of the composer Clemens von Franckenstein which
captures the mixture
of social insecurity and strident demagogue
exactly. Hitler came with
other theatrical and artistic guests. He wore
gaiters
and a floppy hat, carried a riding whip, though he could not
ride, which he used as a prop by intermittently cracking it against
his boots.
He also brought his dog. He looked 'the stereotype of
a headwaiter'; he
sat with awkward reserve in the presence of his
aristocratic host. In the end he snatched
at a cue and began a political
monologue in a style
that stayed with him all his political life. 'He
went on at us like
(1 division chaplain in the army,' recalled another
guest. 'I got the impression
of basic stupidity.' Uninterrupted, Hitler
began
to shout instead of preach. Servants rushed in to protect their
master. When he
had left, the guests sat, so it was recorded, like a
group
of railway passengers who had suddenly realized they were
'sharing a
compartment with a psychotic'.48 The sense of profound
awkwardness or embarrassment that Hitler could produce in anyone
not captivated by the display made it difficult to silence him once a
discourse was under way. Hitler learned
to use this as a form of defence
agains~ contradiction or objection, battering his interlocutor into sub
mission.
Hermann Rauschning, a party leader in Danzig, observed
later, in
1933, that Hitler's tirades represented 'a conquest of inhi
bitions', which explained
'how necessary to his eloquence were shout
ing
and a feverish tempo,.49
16
Putsch that landed him in 1924 in Landsberg fQrtres~turnip.g him
overnight into a national political figure. Impressions
of the
youn/?
politician vary widely. Those who heard him speak, or were drawn to
his circle, described him in terms that might have been applied to a
popular preacher with the power of revelation. 'There was an unknown
fire that burned inside him,' recalled his close friend Max Amann.
47
But
much ofthe testimony suggests that Hitler was regarded as a misfit; his
appearance and behaviour when he was
not in performance were dull
and unremarkable, and his attempts to pose as the tribune of a betrayed
people often ludicrous.
The hallmark scruffy raincoat, the narrow
dark moustache, the floppy fringe of hair, the pale and slightly puffy
face, even the grey-blue eyes
that could look vacant and expressionless,
all made Hitler easily recognizable,
but no less unprepossessing.
There
is a revealing recollection of a meeting with Hitler in
1920 at
the Munich villa of the composer Clemens von Franckenstein which
captures the mixture
of social insecurity and strident demagogue
exactly. Hitler came with
other theatrical and artistic guests. He wore
gaiters
and a floppy hat, carried a riding whip, though he could not
ride, which he used as a prop by intermittently cracking it against
his boots.
He also brought his dog. He looked 'the stereotype of
a headwaiter'; he
sat with awkward reserve in the presence of his
aristocratic host. In the end he snatched
at a cue and began a political
monologue in a style
that stayed with him all his political life. 'He
went on at us like
(1 division chaplain in the army,' recalled another
guest. 'I got the impression
of basic stupidity.' Uninterrupted, Hitler
began
to shout instead of preach. Servants rushed in to protect their
master. When he
had left, the guests sat, so it was recorded, like a
group
of railway passengers who had suddenly realized they were
'sharing a
compartment with a psychotic'.48 The sense of profound
awkwardness or embarrassment that Hitler could produce in anyone
not captivated by the display made it difficult to silence him once a
discourse was under way. Hitler learned
to use this as a form of defence
agains~ contradiction or objection, battering his interlocutor into sub
mission.
Hermann Rauschning, a party leader in Danzig, observed
later, in
1933, that Hitler's tirades represented 'a conquest of inhi
bitions', which explained
'how necessary to his eloquence were shout
ing
and a feverish tempo,.49
16
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Documents with Different Content
Documents with Different Content
and children to care for the flocks and herds; but if the impending
danger appears to be great, the cattle are deserted and the women
and children are taken to a rendezvous specially planned for such an
emergency. If there is a need, the Boer woman will stand side by
side with her husband or her brother or her sweetheart, and will
allow no one to surpass her in repelling the attacks of the enemy.
Joan of Arcs have been as numerous in the Boer armies as they
have been unheralded.
The head of the military branch of the Transvaal Government for
many years has been Commandant-General P. J. Joubert, who,
following President Kruger, is the ablest as well as the most popular
Boer in South Africa. General Joubert is the best type of the Boer
fighter in the country, and as he represents the army, he has always
been a favourite with the class which would rather decide a disputed
point by means of the rifle than by diplomacy, as practised by
President Kruger. General Joubert, although the head of the army, is
not of a quarrelsome disposition, and he too believes in the peaceful
arbitration of differences rather than a resort to arms. By the
Uitlanders he is considered to be the most liberal Boer in the
republic, and he has upon numerous occasions shown that he would
treat the newcomers in the country with more leniency than the
Kruger Government if he were in power.
In his capacity of Vice-President of the republic he has been as
impotent as the Vice-President is in the United States, but his
influence has always been wielded with a view of harmonizing the
differences of the native and alien populations. Twice the more
liberal and progressive party of the Boers has put him forward as a
candidate for the presidency in opposition to Mr. Kruger, and each
danger appears to be great, the cattle are deserted and the women
and children are taken to a rendezvous specially planned for such an
emergency. If there is a need, the Boer woman will stand side by
side with her husband or her brother or her sweetheart, and will
allow no one to surpass her in repelling the attacks of the enemy.
Joan of Arcs have been as numerous in the Boer armies as they
have been unheralded.
The head of the military branch of the Transvaal Government for
many years has been Commandant-General P. J. Joubert, who,
following President Kruger, is the ablest as well as the most popular
Boer in South Africa. General Joubert is the best type of the Boer
fighter in the country, and as he represents the army, he has always
been a favourite with the class which would rather decide a disputed
point by means of the rifle than by diplomacy, as practised by
President Kruger. General Joubert, although the head of the army, is
not of a quarrelsome disposition, and he too believes in the peaceful
arbitration of differences rather than a resort to arms. By the
Uitlanders he is considered to be the most liberal Boer in the
republic, and he has upon numerous occasions shown that he would
treat the newcomers in the country with more leniency than the
Kruger Government if he were in power.
In his capacity of Vice-President of the republic he has been as
impotent as the Vice-President is in the United States, but his
influence has always been wielded with a view of harmonizing the
differences of the native and alien populations. Twice the more
liberal and progressive party of the Boers has put him forward as a
candidate for the presidency in opposition to Mr. Kruger, and each
time he has been defeated by only a small majority. The younger
Boers who have come in touch with the more modern civilization
have steadfastly supported General Joubert, while the older Boers,
who are ever fearful that any one but Mr. Kruger would grant too
many concessions to the Uitlanders, have wielded their influence
against him. Concerning the franchise for Uitlanders, General Joubert
is more liberal than President Kruger, who holds that the stability of
the Government depends upon the exclusiveness of the franchise
privilege. General Joubert believes that there are many persons
among the Uitlanders who have a real desire to become citizens of
the republic and to take part in the government. He believes that an
intending burgher should take an oath of fidelity, and afterward be
prepared to do what he can for the country, either in peace or war. If
after three or four years the applicant for the franchise has shown
that he worked in the interests of the country and obeyed its laws,
General Joubert believes that the Uitlander should enjoy all the
privileges that a native burgher enjoys--namely, voting for the
candidates for the presidency and the First Volksraad.
General Joubert's name has been connected with Transvaal
history almost as long and as prominently as that of President
Kruger. The two men are virtually the fathers of the Boer republic.
General Joubert has always been the man who fought the battles
with armies, while Mr. Kruger conducted the diplomatic battles, and
both were equally successful in their parts. General Joubert, as a
youth among the early trekkers from Natal, was reared amid
warfare. During the Transvaal's early battles with the natives he was
a volunteer soldier under the then Commandant-General Kruger, and
later, when the war of independence was fought, he became General
Boers who have come in touch with the more modern civilization
have steadfastly supported General Joubert, while the older Boers,
who are ever fearful that any one but Mr. Kruger would grant too
many concessions to the Uitlanders, have wielded their influence
against him. Concerning the franchise for Uitlanders, General Joubert
is more liberal than President Kruger, who holds that the stability of
the Government depends upon the exclusiveness of the franchise
privilege. General Joubert believes that there are many persons
among the Uitlanders who have a real desire to become citizens of
the republic and to take part in the government. He believes that an
intending burgher should take an oath of fidelity, and afterward be
prepared to do what he can for the country, either in peace or war. If
after three or four years the applicant for the franchise has shown
that he worked in the interests of the country and obeyed its laws,
General Joubert believes that the Uitlander should enjoy all the
privileges that a native burgher enjoys--namely, voting for the
candidates for the presidency and the First Volksraad.
General Joubert's name has been connected with Transvaal
history almost as long and as prominently as that of President
Kruger. The two men are virtually the fathers of the Boer republic.
General Joubert has always been the man who fought the battles
with armies, while Mr. Kruger conducted the diplomatic battles, and
both were equally successful in their parts. General Joubert, as a
youth among the early trekkers from Natal, was reared amid
warfare. During the Transvaal's early battles with the natives he was
a volunteer soldier under the then Commandant-General Kruger, and
later, when the war of independence was fought, he became General
Joubert. He commanded the forces which fought the battles of
Laing's Nek, Bronkhorst Spruit, and Majuba Hill, and he was one of
the triumvirate that conducted the affairs of the Government during
that crucial time. He has been Vice-President of the republic since
the independence of the country has been re-established, and
conducted the affairs of the army during the time when Jameson's
troopers threatened the safety of the country. He has had a notable
career in the service of his country, and as a reward for his services
he is deserving of nothing less than the presidency of the republic
after Mr. Kruger's life-work is ended.
General Joubert is no less distinguished as a diplomatist among
his countrymen than President Kruger, and many stories are current
in Pretoria showing that he has been able to accomplish many things
wherein Mr. Kruger failed. An incident which occurred immediately
after the Jameson raid, and which is repeated here exactly as
related by one of the participants of the affair, is illustrative of
General Joubert and his methods of dealing with his own people.
The story is given in almost the exact language of the narrator who
was the eyewitness:
"Shortly after Jameson and his officers were brought to Pretoria,
President Kruger called about twenty of the Boer commanders to his
house for a consultation. The townspeople were highly excited, and
the presence of the men who had tried to destroy the republic
aggravated their condition so that there were few calm minds in the
capital. President Kruger was deeply affected by the seriousness of
the events of the days before, but counselled all those present to be
calm. There were some in the gathering who advised that Jameson
and his men should be shot immediately, while one man jocosely
Laing's Nek, Bronkhorst Spruit, and Majuba Hill, and he was one of
the triumvirate that conducted the affairs of the Government during
that crucial time. He has been Vice-President of the republic since
the independence of the country has been re-established, and
conducted the affairs of the army during the time when Jameson's
troopers threatened the safety of the country. He has had a notable
career in the service of his country, and as a reward for his services
he is deserving of nothing less than the presidency of the republic
after Mr. Kruger's life-work is ended.
General Joubert is no less distinguished as a diplomatist among
his countrymen than President Kruger, and many stories are current
in Pretoria showing that he has been able to accomplish many things
wherein Mr. Kruger failed. An incident which occurred immediately
after the Jameson raid, and which is repeated here exactly as
related by one of the participants of the affair, is illustrative of
General Joubert and his methods of dealing with his own people.
The story is given in almost the exact language of the narrator who
was the eyewitness:
"Shortly after Jameson and his officers were brought to Pretoria,
President Kruger called about twenty of the Boer commanders to his
house for a consultation. The townspeople were highly excited, and
the presence of the men who had tried to destroy the republic
aggravated their condition so that there were few calm minds in the
capital. President Kruger was deeply affected by the seriousness of
the events of the days before, but counselled all those present to be
calm. There were some in the gathering who advised that Jameson
and his men should be shot immediately, while one man jocosely
remarked that they should not be treated so leniently, and
suggested that a way to make them suffer would be to cut off their
ears.
"One of the men who was obliged to leave the meeting gave
this account to the waiting throngs in the street, and a few hours
afterward the cable had carried the news to Europe and America,
with the result that the Boers were called brutal and inhuman.
President Kruger used all his influence and eloquence to save the
lives of the prisoners, and for a long time he was unsuccessful in
securing the smallest amount of sympathy for Jameson and his men.
It was dawn when General Joubert was won to the President's way
of thinking, and he continued the argument in behalf of the
prisoners.
"'My friends, I will ask you to listen patiently to me for several
minutes,' he commenced. 'I will tell you the story of the farmer and
the neighbour's dog. Suppose that near your farm lives a man whose
valuable dogs attack your sheep and kill many. Will you shoot the
dogs as soon as you see them, and in that way make yourself liable
for damages greater than the value of the sheep that were
destroyed? Or will you catch the dogs when you are able to do so
and, carrying them to your neighbour, say to him: "I have caught
your dogs; now pay me for the damage they have done me, and
they shall be returned to you."'
"After a moment's silence General Joubert's face lighted up
joyfully, and he exclaimed:
"'We have the neighbour's dogs in the jail. What shall we do
with them?'
suggested that a way to make them suffer would be to cut off their
ears.
"One of the men who was obliged to leave the meeting gave
this account to the waiting throngs in the street, and a few hours
afterward the cable had carried the news to Europe and America,
with the result that the Boers were called brutal and inhuman.
President Kruger used all his influence and eloquence to save the
lives of the prisoners, and for a long time he was unsuccessful in
securing the smallest amount of sympathy for Jameson and his men.
It was dawn when General Joubert was won to the President's way
of thinking, and he continued the argument in behalf of the
prisoners.
"'My friends, I will ask you to listen patiently to me for several
minutes,' he commenced. 'I will tell you the story of the farmer and
the neighbour's dog. Suppose that near your farm lives a man whose
valuable dogs attack your sheep and kill many. Will you shoot the
dogs as soon as you see them, and in that way make yourself liable
for damages greater than the value of the sheep that were
destroyed? Or will you catch the dogs when you are able to do so
and, carrying them to your neighbour, say to him: "I have caught
your dogs; now pay me for the damage they have done me, and
they shall be returned to you."'
"After a moment's silence General Joubert's face lighted up
joyfully, and he exclaimed:
"'We have the neighbour's dogs in the jail. What shall we do
with them?'
"The parable was effective, and the council of war decided
almost instantly to deliver the prisoners to the British Government."
CHAPTER IX
CAUSES OF THE PRESENT DISSENSIONS
The politicians and the speculators have been the bane of South
Africa. Ill-informed secretaries of the British Colonial Office might
augment the list, but their stupidity in treating with colonial
grievances is so proverbial as to admit them to the rank of natural or
providential causes of dissension. Until the Boer Government came
into the foreground, the politicians and speculators used South
Africa as a huge chessboard, whereon they could manipulate the
political and commercial affairs of hundreds of thousands of persons
to suit their own fancies and convenience.
It was a dilettante politician who operated in South Africa and
could not make a cat's-paw of the colonial secretary in Downing
Street, and it was a stupid speculator who was unable to be the
power behind the enthroned politician. And South Africa has been
the victim. Hundreds of men have gone to South Africa and have
become millionaires, but thousands remain in the country praying for
money wherewith to return home. The former are the politicians and
the speculators; the latter are the miners, the workingmen, and the
tradespeople.
It is a country where the man with a million becomes a
multimillionaire, and the man with hundreds becomes penniless. It is
almost instantly to deliver the prisoners to the British Government."
CHAPTER IX
CAUSES OF THE PRESENT DISSENSIONS
The politicians and the speculators have been the bane of South
Africa. Ill-informed secretaries of the British Colonial Office might
augment the list, but their stupidity in treating with colonial
grievances is so proverbial as to admit them to the rank of natural or
providential causes of dissension. Until the Boer Government came
into the foreground, the politicians and speculators used South
Africa as a huge chessboard, whereon they could manipulate the
political and commercial affairs of hundreds of thousands of persons
to suit their own fancies and convenience.
It was a dilettante politician who operated in South Africa and
could not make a cat's-paw of the colonial secretary in Downing
Street, and it was a stupid speculator who was unable to be the
power behind the enthroned politician. And South Africa has been
the victim. Hundreds of men have gone to South Africa and have
become millionaires, but thousands remain in the country praying for
money wherewith to return home. The former are the politicians and
the speculators; the latter are the miners, the workingmen, and the
tradespeople.
It is a country where the man with a million becomes a
multimillionaire, and the man with hundreds becomes penniless. It is
the wealthy man's footstool and the poor man's cemetery. Men go
there to acquire riches; few go there to assist in making it tenable
for white men. Thousands go there with the avowed intention of
making their fortunes and then to return. Those who go there as
came the immigrants to America--to settle and develop the new
country--can be counted only by the score. Of the million white
people south of the Zambezi, probably one half are mere fortune-
seekers, who would leave the country the very instant they secured
a moderate fortune.
These have the welfare of the country at heart only in so far as
it interferes or assists them in attaining their desired goal. They
would ask that Portugal be allowed to rule all of South Africa if they
received the assurance that the much-sought-after fortune could be
secured six months sooner. They have no conscience other than that
which prevents them from stabbing a man to relieve him of his
money. They go to the gold and diamond fields to secure wealth,
and not to assist in developing law and order, good government, or
good institutions.
The other half of the white population is composed of men and
women who were born in the country--Afrikanders, Dutch, Boers,
and other racial representatives, and others who have emigrated
thither from the densely populated countries of Europe, with the
intention of remaining in the country and taking part in its
government and institutions. These classes comprise the South
Africans, who love their country and take a real interest in its
development and progress. They know its needs and prospects, and
are abundantly able to conduct its government so that it will benefit
Boer, Englishman, Dutchman, Natalian, and native.
there to acquire riches; few go there to assist in making it tenable
for white men. Thousands go there with the avowed intention of
making their fortunes and then to return. Those who go there as
came the immigrants to America--to settle and develop the new
country--can be counted only by the score. Of the million white
people south of the Zambezi, probably one half are mere fortune-
seekers, who would leave the country the very instant they secured
a moderate fortune.
These have the welfare of the country at heart only in so far as
it interferes or assists them in attaining their desired goal. They
would ask that Portugal be allowed to rule all of South Africa if they
received the assurance that the much-sought-after fortune could be
secured six months sooner. They have no conscience other than that
which prevents them from stabbing a man to relieve him of his
money. They go to the gold and diamond fields to secure wealth,
and not to assist in developing law and order, good government, or
good institutions.
The other half of the white population is composed of men and
women who were born in the country--Afrikanders, Dutch, Boers,
and other racial representatives, and others who have emigrated
thither from the densely populated countries of Europe, with the
intention of remaining in the country and taking part in its
government and institutions. These classes comprise the South
Africans, who love their country and take a real interest in its
development and progress. They know its needs and prospects, and
are abundantly able to conduct its government so that it will benefit
Boer, Englishman, Dutchman, Natalian, and native.
The defects in the Government of Cape Colony and Natal are
the natural results of the handicaps that have been placed on the
local legislation by the Colonial Office in London, who are as ignorant
of the real conditions of their colonies as a Zulu chieftain is of the
political situation in England. The colonial papers teem with letters
from residents who express their indignation at the methods
employed by the Colonial Office in dealing with colonial affairs.
Especially is this the case in Natal, the Eden of South Africa, where
the dealings of the Colonial Office with regard to the Zulus have
been stupidly carried on. South African men of affairs who are not
bigoted do not hesitate to express their opinion that Cape Colony
and Natal have been retarded a quarter of a century in their natural
growth by the handicap of the Colonial Office. Their opinion is based
upon the fact that every war, with the exception of several native
outbreaks, has been caused by blundering in the Colonial Office, and
that all the wars have retarded the natural growth and development
of the colonies to an aggregate of twenty-five years. In this estimate
is not included the great harm to industries that has been caused by
the score or more of heavy war clouds with which the country has
been darkened during the last half century. These being some of the
difficulties with which the two British colonies in South Africa are
beset, it can be readily inferred to what extent the Boers of the
Transvaal have had cause for grievance. In their dealings with the
Boers the British have invariably assumed the role of aristocrats, and
have looked upon and treated the "trekkers" as sans-culottes.
the natural results of the handicaps that have been placed on the
local legislation by the Colonial Office in London, who are as ignorant
of the real conditions of their colonies as a Zulu chieftain is of the
political situation in England. The colonial papers teem with letters
from residents who express their indignation at the methods
employed by the Colonial Office in dealing with colonial affairs.
Especially is this the case in Natal, the Eden of South Africa, where
the dealings of the Colonial Office with regard to the Zulus have
been stupidly carried on. South African men of affairs who are not
bigoted do not hesitate to express their opinion that Cape Colony
and Natal have been retarded a quarter of a century in their natural
growth by the handicap of the Colonial Office. Their opinion is based
upon the fact that every war, with the exception of several native
outbreaks, has been caused by blundering in the Colonial Office, and
that all the wars have retarded the natural growth and development
of the colonies to an aggregate of twenty-five years. In this estimate
is not included the great harm to industries that has been caused by
the score or more of heavy war clouds with which the country has
been darkened during the last half century. These being some of the
difficulties with which the two British colonies in South Africa are
beset, it can be readily inferred to what extent the Boers of the
Transvaal have had cause for grievance. In their dealings with the
Boers the British have invariably assumed the role of aristocrats, and
have looked upon and treated the "trekkers" as sans-culottes.
Cape Colony Government House, at Cape Town.
This natural antipathy of one race for another has given glorious
opportunities for strife, and neither one nor the other has ever failed
to take quick advantage. The struggle between the Boers and the
British began in Cape Colony almost one hundred years ago, and it
has continued, with varying degrees of bitterness, until the present
day. The recent disturbances in the Transvaal affairs date from the
conclusion of the war of independence in 1881. When the Peace
Commissioners met there was inserted in the treaty one small clause
which gave to England her only right to interfere in the political
affairs of the Transvaal.
This natural antipathy of one race for another has given glorious
opportunities for strife, and neither one nor the other has ever failed
to take quick advantage. The struggle between the Boers and the
British began in Cape Colony almost one hundred years ago, and it
has continued, with varying degrees of bitterness, until the present
day. The recent disturbances in the Transvaal affairs date from the
conclusion of the war of independence in 1881. When the Peace
Commissioners met there was inserted in the treaty one small clause
which gave to England her only right to interfere in the political
affairs of the Transvaal.
The Boer country at that time was considered of such little
worth that Gladstone declared it was not of sufficient value to be
honoured with a place under the British flag. To the vast majority of
the British people it was a matter of indifference whether the
Transvaal was an independent country or a dependency of their own
Government. The clause which was allowed to enter the treaty
unnoticed, and which during recent years has figured so prominently
in the discussions of South African affairs, reads:
"The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or
engagement with any state or nation other than the Orange Free
State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward or the westward of
the republic, until the same has been approved by her Majesty the
Queen. Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if
her Majesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving
a copy of such treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately
upon its completion), have notified that the conclusion of the treaty
is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain, or of any of her
Majesty's possessions in South Africa."
When the contents of the treaty were published to the Boer
people, many of them objected strongly to this clause, and insisted
that it gave the British too great power in the affairs of the republic,
and a strenuous effort was made to have the offending clause
eliminated. In the year 1883 a deputation, which included Paul
Kruger, was sent to London, with a view of obtaining the abolition of
the suzerainty. This deputation negotiated a new convention the
following year, from which the word "suzerainty" and the stipulations
in regard thereto were removed. In their report to the Volksraad,
worth that Gladstone declared it was not of sufficient value to be
honoured with a place under the British flag. To the vast majority of
the British people it was a matter of indifference whether the
Transvaal was an independent country or a dependency of their own
Government. The clause which was allowed to enter the treaty
unnoticed, and which during recent years has figured so prominently
in the discussions of South African affairs, reads:
"The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or
engagement with any state or nation other than the Orange Free
State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward or the westward of
the republic, until the same has been approved by her Majesty the
Queen. Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if
her Majesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving
a copy of such treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately
upon its completion), have notified that the conclusion of the treaty
is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain, or of any of her
Majesty's possessions in South Africa."
When the contents of the treaty were published to the Boer
people, many of them objected strongly to this clause, and insisted
that it gave the British too great power in the affairs of the republic,
and a strenuous effort was made to have the offending clause
eliminated. In the year 1883 a deputation, which included Paul
Kruger, was sent to London, with a view of obtaining the abolition of
the suzerainty. This deputation negotiated a new convention the
following year, from which the word "suzerainty" and the stipulations
in regard thereto were removed. In their report to the Volksraad,
made in 1884, the deputation stated that the new convention put an
end to the British suzerainty.
February 4, 1884, in a letter to Lord Derby, then in charge of
British affairs, the deputation announced to him that they expected
an agreement to be contained in the treaty relative to the abolition
of the suzerainty. In his reply of a week later, Lord Derby made a
statement upon which the Boers base their strongest claim that the
suzerainty was abolished. He said:
"By the omission of those articles of the convention of Pretoria
which assigned to her Majesty and to the British resident certain
specific powers and functions connected with the internal
government and the foreign relations of the Transvaal state, your
Government will be left free to govern the country without
interference, and to conduct its diplomatic intercourse and shape its
foreign policy, subject only to the requirement embodied in the
fourth article of the new draft, that any treaty with a foreign state
shall not have effect without the approval of the Queen."
For a period of almost ten years the suzerainty of England over
the Transvaal was an unknown quantity. With the exception of
several Government officials, there were hardly any Englishmen in
the country, and no one had the slightest interest in the affairs of
the Transvaal Government. When gold was discovered in the Randt
in quantities that equalled those of the early days of the California
gold fields, an unparalleled influx of Englishmen and foreigners
followed, and in several years the city of Johannesburg had sprung
up in the veldt.
The opening of hundreds of mines, and the consequent increase
in expenditures, made it necessary for the Transvaal Government to
end to the British suzerainty.
February 4, 1884, in a letter to Lord Derby, then in charge of
British affairs, the deputation announced to him that they expected
an agreement to be contained in the treaty relative to the abolition
of the suzerainty. In his reply of a week later, Lord Derby made a
statement upon which the Boers base their strongest claim that the
suzerainty was abolished. He said:
"By the omission of those articles of the convention of Pretoria
which assigned to her Majesty and to the British resident certain
specific powers and functions connected with the internal
government and the foreign relations of the Transvaal state, your
Government will be left free to govern the country without
interference, and to conduct its diplomatic intercourse and shape its
foreign policy, subject only to the requirement embodied in the
fourth article of the new draft, that any treaty with a foreign state
shall not have effect without the approval of the Queen."
For a period of almost ten years the suzerainty of England over
the Transvaal was an unknown quantity. With the exception of
several Government officials, there were hardly any Englishmen in
the country, and no one had the slightest interest in the affairs of
the Transvaal Government. When gold was discovered in the Randt
in quantities that equalled those of the early days of the California
gold fields, an unparalleled influx of Englishmen and foreigners
followed, and in several years the city of Johannesburg had sprung
up in the veldt.
The opening of hundreds of mines, and the consequent increase
in expenditures, made it necessary for the Transvaal Government to
increase its revenues. Mining laws had to be formulated, new offices
had to be created, hundreds of new officials had to be appointed,
and all this required the expenditure of more money in one year
than the Government had spent in a decade before the opening of
the mines. The Government found itself in a quandary, and it solved
the problem of finances as many a stronger and wealthier
government has done.
Concessions were granted to dynamite, railway, electric light,
electric railway, water, and many other companies, and these
furnished to the Government the nucleus upon which depended its
financial existence. Few of the concessions were obtained by British
subjects, and when the monopolies took advantage of their
opportunities, and raised the price of dynamite and the rates for
carrying freight, the Englishmen, who owned all the mines, naturally
objected. The Boer Government, having bound itself hand and foot
when hard pressed for money, was unable to compel the
concessionaries to reduce their rates.
At that period of the Randt's existence the speculators
appeared, and soon thereafter the London Stock Exchange became
a factor in the affairs of the Randt. Where the Stock Exchange leads,
the politicians follow, and they too soon became interested in South
African affairs. Then the treaty of 1883 was found in the Colonial
Office archives, and next appears a demand to the Boer Government
that all British residents of the Transvaal be allowed to vote. The
Boers refused to give the franchise to any applicant unless he first
renounced his allegiance to other countries, and, as the British
subjects declined to accede to the request, the politicians became
had to be created, hundreds of new officials had to be appointed,
and all this required the expenditure of more money in one year
than the Government had spent in a decade before the opening of
the mines. The Government found itself in a quandary, and it solved
the problem of finances as many a stronger and wealthier
government has done.
Concessions were granted to dynamite, railway, electric light,
electric railway, water, and many other companies, and these
furnished to the Government the nucleus upon which depended its
financial existence. Few of the concessions were obtained by British
subjects, and when the monopolies took advantage of their
opportunities, and raised the price of dynamite and the rates for
carrying freight, the Englishmen, who owned all the mines, naturally
objected. The Boer Government, having bound itself hand and foot
when hard pressed for money, was unable to compel the
concessionaries to reduce their rates.
At that period of the Randt's existence the speculators
appeared, and soon thereafter the London Stock Exchange became
a factor in the affairs of the Randt. Where the Stock Exchange leads,
the politicians follow, and they too soon became interested in South
African affairs. Then the treaty of 1883 was found in the Colonial
Office archives, and next appears a demand to the Boer Government
that all British residents of the Transvaal be allowed to vote. The
Boers refused to give the franchise to any applicant unless he first
renounced his allegiance to other countries, and, as the British
subjects declined to accede to the request, the politicians became
busily engaged in formulating other plans whereby England might
obtain control of the country.
At that inopportune time Jameson's troopers entered the
Transvaal territory and attempted to take forcible possession of the
country; but they were unsuccessful, and only succeeded in directing
the world's sympathy to the Boers. The Jameson raid was practically
Cecil J. Rhodes's first important attempt to add the Transvaal to the
list of South African additions he has made to the British Empire.
The result was especially galling to him, as it was the first time his
great political schemes failed of success.
But Rhodes is not the man to weep over disasters. Before the
excitement over the raid had subsided, Rhodes had concocted a plan
to inflict a commercial death upon the Transvaal, and in that manner
force it to beg for the protection of the English flag. He opened
Rhodesia, an adjoining country, for settlement, and by glorifying the
country, its mineral and agricultural wealth, and by offering golden
inducements to Transvaal tradespeople, miners, and even Transvaal
subjects, he hoped to cause such an efflux from the Transvaal that
the Government would be embarrassed in less than two years. The
country which bears his name was found to be amazingly free from
mountains of gold and rivers of honey, and the several thousand
persons who had faith in his alluring promises remained in Rhodesia
less than a year, and then returned to the Transvaal.
The reports of the Rhodesian country that were brought back by
the disappointed miners and settlers were not flattering to the
condition of the country or the justice of the Government. Of two
evils, they chose the lesser, and again placed themselves under the
Kruger Government. When revolution and enticement failed to bring
obtain control of the country.
At that inopportune time Jameson's troopers entered the
Transvaal territory and attempted to take forcible possession of the
country; but they were unsuccessful, and only succeeded in directing
the world's sympathy to the Boers. The Jameson raid was practically
Cecil J. Rhodes's first important attempt to add the Transvaal to the
list of South African additions he has made to the British Empire.
The result was especially galling to him, as it was the first time his
great political schemes failed of success.
But Rhodes is not the man to weep over disasters. Before the
excitement over the raid had subsided, Rhodes had concocted a plan
to inflict a commercial death upon the Transvaal, and in that manner
force it to beg for the protection of the English flag. He opened
Rhodesia, an adjoining country, for settlement, and by glorifying the
country, its mineral and agricultural wealth, and by offering golden
inducements to Transvaal tradespeople, miners, and even Transvaal
subjects, he hoped to cause such an efflux from the Transvaal that
the Government would be embarrassed in less than two years. The
country which bears his name was found to be amazingly free from
mountains of gold and rivers of honey, and the several thousand
persons who had faith in his alluring promises remained in Rhodesia
less than a year, and then returned to the Transvaal.
The reports of the Rhodesian country that were brought back by
the disappointed miners and settlers were not flattering to the
condition of the country or the justice of the Government. Of two
evils, they chose the lesser, and again placed themselves under the
Kruger Government. When revolution and enticement failed to bring
the Transvaal under the British flag, Rhodes inaugurated a political
propaganda. His last resort was the Colonial Office in London, and in
that alone lay the only course by which he could attain his object.
Again the franchise question was resorted to as the ground of
the contention, the dynamite and railway subjects having been so
thoroughly debated as to be as void of ground for further contention
as they had always been foreign to British control or interference.
The question of granting the right of voting to the Uitlanders in the
Transvaal is one which so vitally affects the future life of the
Government that the Boers' concession of that right would be
tantamount to presenting the country to the British Government.
Ninety-nine per cent. of the Uitlanders of the Transvaal are no
more than transient citizens. They were attracted thither by the gold
mines and the attendant industries, and they have no thought of
staying in the Transvaal a minute after they have amassed a fortune
or a competency. Under no consideration would they remain in the
country for the rest of their lives, because the climate and nature of
the country are not conducive to a desire for long residence. It has
been demonstrated that less than one per cent. of the Uitlanders
had sufficient interest in the country to pass through the formality of
securing naturalization papers preparatory to becoming eligible for
the franchise.
The Boer Government has offered that all Uitlanders of nine
years' residence, having certain unimportant qualifications, should be
enfranchised in two years, and that others should be enfranchised in
seven years--two years for naturalization and five more years'
resident--before acquiring the right to vote.
propaganda. His last resort was the Colonial Office in London, and in
that alone lay the only course by which he could attain his object.
Again the franchise question was resorted to as the ground of
the contention, the dynamite and railway subjects having been so
thoroughly debated as to be as void of ground for further contention
as they had always been foreign to British control or interference.
The question of granting the right of voting to the Uitlanders in the
Transvaal is one which so vitally affects the future life of the
Government that the Boers' concession of that right would be
tantamount to presenting the country to the British Government.
Ninety-nine per cent. of the Uitlanders of the Transvaal are no
more than transient citizens. They were attracted thither by the gold
mines and the attendant industries, and they have no thought of
staying in the Transvaal a minute after they have amassed a fortune
or a competency. Under no consideration would they remain in the
country for the rest of their lives, because the climate and nature of
the country are not conducive to a desire for long residence. It has
been demonstrated that less than one per cent. of the Uitlanders
had sufficient interest in the country to pass through the formality of
securing naturalization papers preparatory to becoming eligible for
the franchise.
The Boer Government has offered that all Uitlanders of nine
years' residence, having certain unimportant qualifications, should be
enfranchised in two years, and that others should be enfranchised in
seven years--two years for naturalization and five more years'
resident--before acquiring the right to vote.
There is a provision for a property qualification, which makes it
necessary for the naturalized citizen to own a house of no less value
than two hundred and fifty dollars in renting value, or an income of
one thousand dollars. The residence clause in the Transvaal
qualifications compares favourably with those of London, where an
Englishman from any part of the country and settling in the
municipality is obliged to live two years and have certain property
qualifications before acquiring the right of franchise.
In full knowledge of these conditions the Uitlanders insist upon
having an unconditional franchise--one that will require nothing
more than a two-years' residence in the country. The Boers are well
aware of the results that would follow the granting of the
concessions demanded, but not better so than the Uitlanders who
make the demands. The latest Transvaal statistics place the number
of Boer burghers in the country at less than thirty thousand. At the
lowest estimate there are in the Transvaal fifty thousand Uitlanders
having the required qualifications, and all of these would become
voters in two years. At the first election held after the two years had
elapsed the Uitlanders would be victorious, and those whom they
elected would control the machinery of the Government. The
Uitlanders' plan is as transparent as air, yet it has the approval and
sanction of the English politicians, press, and public.
The propaganda which Rhodes and other politicians and stock
brokers interested in the Transvaal gold mines inaugurated a short
time after the Jameson raid has been successful in arousing the
people in England to what they have been led to believe is a
situation unequalled in the history of the empire-building. But there
is a parallel case. At the same time the British Parliament was
necessary for the naturalized citizen to own a house of no less value
than two hundred and fifty dollars in renting value, or an income of
one thousand dollars. The residence clause in the Transvaal
qualifications compares favourably with those of London, where an
Englishman from any part of the country and settling in the
municipality is obliged to live two years and have certain property
qualifications before acquiring the right of franchise.
In full knowledge of these conditions the Uitlanders insist upon
having an unconditional franchise--one that will require nothing
more than a two-years' residence in the country. The Boers are well
aware of the results that would follow the granting of the
concessions demanded, but not better so than the Uitlanders who
make the demands. The latest Transvaal statistics place the number
of Boer burghers in the country at less than thirty thousand. At the
lowest estimate there are in the Transvaal fifty thousand Uitlanders
having the required qualifications, and all of these would become
voters in two years. At the first election held after the two years had
elapsed the Uitlanders would be victorious, and those whom they
elected would control the machinery of the Government. The
Uitlanders' plan is as transparent as air, yet it has the approval and
sanction of the English politicians, press, and public.
The propaganda which Rhodes and other politicians and stock
brokers interested in the Transvaal gold mines inaugurated a short
time after the Jameson raid has been successful in arousing the
people in England to what they have been led to believe is a
situation unequalled in the history of the empire-building. But there
is a parallel case. At the same time the British Parliament was
discussing the subject of the alleged injustice under which the
English residents of the Transvaal were suffering, the colonial
secretary was engaged in disposing of grievances which reached him
from the Dutch residents of British Guiana, in South America, and
which recited conditions parallel to those complained of by the
Uitlanders. The grievances were made by foreign residents of
English territory, instead of by English subjects in a foreign country,
and consequently demanded less serious attention, but their justice
was none the less patent. The three thousand native Dutch voters in
British Guiana have no voice in the legislative or administrative
branches of the colonial government, owing to the peculiar laws
which give to the three thousand British-born citizens the complete
control of the franchise. The population of the colony is three
hundred thousand, yet the three thousand British subjects make and
administer the laws for the other two hundred and ninety-seven
thousand inhabitants, who compose the mining and agricultural
communities and are treated with the same British contempt as the
Boers. The Dutch residents have made many appeals for a fuller
representation in the Government, but no reforms have been
inaugurated or promised.
The few grievances which the Uitlanders had before the
Jameson raid have been multiplied a hundredfold and no epithet is
too venomous for them to apply to the Boers. The letters in the
home newspapers have allied the name of the Boers with every
vilifying adjective in the English dictionary, and returning politicians
have never failed to supply the others that do not appear in the
book.
English residents of the Transvaal were suffering, the colonial
secretary was engaged in disposing of grievances which reached him
from the Dutch residents of British Guiana, in South America, and
which recited conditions parallel to those complained of by the
Uitlanders. The grievances were made by foreign residents of
English territory, instead of by English subjects in a foreign country,
and consequently demanded less serious attention, but their justice
was none the less patent. The three thousand native Dutch voters in
British Guiana have no voice in the legislative or administrative
branches of the colonial government, owing to the peculiar laws
which give to the three thousand British-born citizens the complete
control of the franchise. The population of the colony is three
hundred thousand, yet the three thousand British subjects make and
administer the laws for the other two hundred and ninety-seven
thousand inhabitants, who compose the mining and agricultural
communities and are treated with the same British contempt as the
Boers. The Dutch residents have made many appeals for a fuller
representation in the Government, but no reforms have been
inaugurated or promised.
The few grievances which the Uitlanders had before the
Jameson raid have been multiplied a hundredfold and no epithet is
too venomous for them to apply to the Boers. The letters in the
home newspapers have allied the name of the Boers with every
vilifying adjective in the English dictionary, and returning politicians
have never failed to supply the others that do not appear in the
book.
Petitions with thousands of names, some real, but many non-
existent, have been forwarded to the Colonial Office and to every
other office in London where they would be received, and these
have recited grievances that even the patient Boer Volksraad had
never heard about. It has been a propaganda of petitions and letters
the like of which has no parallel in the history of politics. It has been
successful in arousing sentiment favourable to the Uitlanders, and at
this time there is hardly a handful of persons in England who are not
willing to testify to the utter degradation of the Boers.
Another branch of the propaganda operated through the Stock
Exchange, and its results were probably more practical than those of
the literary branch. It is easier to reach the English masses through
the Stock Exchange than by any other means. Whenever one of the
"Kaffir" or Transvaal companies failed to make both ends meet in a
manner which pleased the stockholders, it was only necessary to
blame the Boer Government for having impeded the digging of gold,
and the stockholders promptly outlined to the Colonial Office the
policy it should pursue toward the Boers.
The impressions that are formed in watching the tide of events
in the Transvaal are that the Boer Government is not greatly inferior
to the Government of Lord Salisbury and Secretary Chamberlain. The
only appreciable difference between the two is that the Boers are
fighting the cause of the masses against the classes, while the
English are fighting that of the classes against the masses. In
England, where the rich have the power, the poor pay the taxes,
while in the Transvaal the poor have the power and compel the rich
to pay the taxes. If the Transvaal taxes were of such serious
proportions as to be almost unbearable, there might be a cause for
existent, have been forwarded to the Colonial Office and to every
other office in London where they would be received, and these
have recited grievances that even the patient Boer Volksraad had
never heard about. It has been a propaganda of petitions and letters
the like of which has no parallel in the history of politics. It has been
successful in arousing sentiment favourable to the Uitlanders, and at
this time there is hardly a handful of persons in England who are not
willing to testify to the utter degradation of the Boers.
Another branch of the propaganda operated through the Stock
Exchange, and its results were probably more practical than those of
the literary branch. It is easier to reach the English masses through
the Stock Exchange than by any other means. Whenever one of the
"Kaffir" or Transvaal companies failed to make both ends meet in a
manner which pleased the stockholders, it was only necessary to
blame the Boer Government for having impeded the digging of gold,
and the stockholders promptly outlined to the Colonial Office the
policy it should pursue toward the Boers.
The impressions that are formed in watching the tide of events
in the Transvaal are that the Boer Government is not greatly inferior
to the Government of Lord Salisbury and Secretary Chamberlain. The
only appreciable difference between the two is that the Boers are
fighting the cause of the masses against the classes, while the
English are fighting that of the classes against the masses. In
England, where the rich have the power, the poor pay the taxes,
while in the Transvaal the poor have the power and compel the rich
to pay the taxes. If the Transvaal taxes were of such serious
proportions as to be almost unbearable, there might be a cause for
interference by the Uitlander capitalists who own the mines, but
there no injustice is shown to any one. The only taxes that the
Uitlanders are compelled to pay are the annual poll tax of less than
four dollars and a half, mining taxes of a dollar and a quarter a
month for each claim for prospecting licenses, and five dollars a
claim for diggers' licenses. Boer and Uitlander are compelled to pay
these taxes without distinction.
The Boers, in this contention, must win or die. In earlier days,
before every inch of African soil was under the flag of one country or
another, they were able to escape from English injustice by loading
their few possessions on wagons and "trekking" into new and
unexplored lands. If they yield their country to the English without a
struggle, they will be forced to live under a future Stock Exchange
Government, which has been described by a member of the British
Parliament as likely to be "the vilest, the most corrupt, and the most
pernicious known to man."[#]
[#] The Hon. Henry Labouchere, in London Truth.
The Boers have no better argument to advance in support of their
claim than that which is contained in the Transvaal national hymn. It
at once gives a history of their country, its many struggles and
disappointments, and its hopes. It is written in the "taal" of the
country, and when sung by the patriotic, deep-voiced Boers is one of
the most impressive hymns that ever inspired a nation.
there no injustice is shown to any one. The only taxes that the
Uitlanders are compelled to pay are the annual poll tax of less than
four dollars and a half, mining taxes of a dollar and a quarter a
month for each claim for prospecting licenses, and five dollars a
claim for diggers' licenses. Boer and Uitlander are compelled to pay
these taxes without distinction.
The Boers, in this contention, must win or die. In earlier days,
before every inch of African soil was under the flag of one country or
another, they were able to escape from English injustice by loading
their few possessions on wagons and "trekking" into new and
unexplored lands. If they yield their country to the English without a
struggle, they will be forced to live under a future Stock Exchange
Government, which has been described by a member of the British
Parliament as likely to be "the vilest, the most corrupt, and the most
pernicious known to man."[#]
[#] The Hon. Henry Labouchere, in London Truth.
The Boers have no better argument to advance in support of their
claim than that which is contained in the Transvaal national hymn. It
at once gives a history of their country, its many struggles and
disappointments, and its hopes. It is written in the "taal" of the
country, and when sung by the patriotic, deep-voiced Boers is one of
the most impressive hymns that ever inspired a nation.
THE TRANSVAAL VOLKSLIED.
The four-colours of our dear old land
Again float o'er Transvaal,
And woe the God-forgetting hand
That down our flag would haul!
Wave higher now in clearer sky
Our Transvaal freedom's stay!
(Lit., freedom's flag.)
Our enemies with fright did fly;
Now dawns a glorious day.
Through many a storm ye bravely stood,
And we stood likewise true;
Now, that the storm is o'er, we would
Leave nevermore from you
Bestormed by Kaffir, Lion, Brit,
Wave ever o'er their head;
And then to spite we hoist thee yet
Up to the topmost stead!
Four long years did we beg--aye, pray--
To keep our lands clear, free,
We asked you, Brit, we loath the fray:
"Go hence, and let us be!
We've waited, Brit, we love you not,
To arms we call the Boer;"
(Lit., Now take we to our guns.)
The four-colours of our dear old land
Again float o'er Transvaal,
And woe the God-forgetting hand
That down our flag would haul!
Wave higher now in clearer sky
Our Transvaal freedom's stay!
(Lit., freedom's flag.)
Our enemies with fright did fly;
Now dawns a glorious day.
Through many a storm ye bravely stood,
And we stood likewise true;
Now, that the storm is o'er, we would
Leave nevermore from you
Bestormed by Kaffir, Lion, Brit,
Wave ever o'er their head;
And then to spite we hoist thee yet
Up to the topmost stead!
Four long years did we beg--aye, pray--
To keep our lands clear, free,
We asked you, Brit, we loath the fray:
"Go hence, and let us be!
We've waited, Brit, we love you not,
To arms we call the Boer;"
(Lit., Now take we to our guns.)
"You've teased us long enough, we troth,
Now wait we nevermore."
And with God's help we cast the yoke
Of England from our knee;
Our country safe--behold and look--
Once more our flag waves free!
Though many a hero's blood it cost,
May all the nations see
(Lit., Though England ever so much more.)
That God the Lord redeemed our hosts;
The glory his shall be.
Wave high now o'er our dear old land,
Wave four-colours of Transvaal!
And woe the God-forgetting hand
That dares you down to haul!
Wave higher now in clearer sky
Our Transvaal freedom's stay!
Our enemies with fright did fly;
Now dawns a glorious day.
CHAPTER X
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE
Now wait we nevermore."
And with God's help we cast the yoke
Of England from our knee;
Our country safe--behold and look--
Once more our flag waves free!
Though many a hero's blood it cost,
May all the nations see
(Lit., Though England ever so much more.)
That God the Lord redeemed our hosts;
The glory his shall be.
Wave high now o'er our dear old land,
Wave four-colours of Transvaal!
And woe the God-forgetting hand
That dares you down to haul!
Wave higher now in clearer sky
Our Transvaal freedom's stay!
Our enemies with fright did fly;
Now dawns a glorious day.
CHAPTER X
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE
Ever since the Jameson raid both the Boers and the Uitlanders have
realized that a peaceful solution of the differences between the two
is possible but highly improbable. The Uitlanders refused to concede
anything to the Boer, and asked for concessions that implied a virtual
abandonment of their country to the English, whom they have
always detested. The Boers themselves have not been unmindful of
the inevitable war with their powerful antagonist, and, not unlike the
tiny ant of the African desert, which fortifies its abode against the
anticipated attack of wild beasts, have made of their country a
veritable arsenal.
Probably no inland country in the world is half so well prepared
for war at any time as that little Government, which can boast of
having less than thirty thousand voters. The military preparation has
been so enormous that Great Britain has been compelled, according
to the colonial secretary's statement to the British Parliament, to
expend two and a half million dollars annually in South Africa in
order to keep pace with the Boers. Four years ago, when the
Transvaal Government learned that the Uitlanders of Johannesburg
were planning a revolution, it commenced the military preparations
which have ever since continued with unabating vigour. German
experts were employed to formulate plans for the defence of the
country, and European artillerists were secured to teach the arts of
modern warfare to the men at the head of the Boer army. Several
Americans of military training became the instructors in the national
military school at Pretoria; and even the women and children
became imbued with the necessity of warlike preparation, and
learned the use of arms. Several million pounds were annually spent
in Europe in the purchase of the armament required by the plans
realized that a peaceful solution of the differences between the two
is possible but highly improbable. The Uitlanders refused to concede
anything to the Boer, and asked for concessions that implied a virtual
abandonment of their country to the English, whom they have
always detested. The Boers themselves have not been unmindful of
the inevitable war with their powerful antagonist, and, not unlike the
tiny ant of the African desert, which fortifies its abode against the
anticipated attack of wild beasts, have made of their country a
veritable arsenal.
Probably no inland country in the world is half so well prepared
for war at any time as that little Government, which can boast of
having less than thirty thousand voters. The military preparation has
been so enormous that Great Britain has been compelled, according
to the colonial secretary's statement to the British Parliament, to
expend two and a half million dollars annually in South Africa in
order to keep pace with the Boers. Four years ago, when the
Transvaal Government learned that the Uitlanders of Johannesburg
were planning a revolution, it commenced the military preparations
which have ever since continued with unabating vigour. German
experts were employed to formulate plans for the defence of the
country, and European artillerists were secured to teach the arts of
modern warfare to the men at the head of the Boer army. Several
Americans of military training became the instructors in the national
military school at Pretoria; and even the women and children
became imbued with the necessity of warlike preparation, and
learned the use of arms. Several million pounds were annually spent
in Europe in the purchase of the armament required by the plans
formulated by the experts, and the whole country was placed on a
war footing. Every important strategic position was made as
impregnable as modern skill and arms could make it, and every
farmer's cottage was supplied with arms and ammunition, so that
the volunteer army might be mobilized in a day.
In order to demonstrate the extent to which the military
preparation has been carried, it is only necessary to give an account
of the defences of Pretoria and Johannesburg, the two principal
cities of the country. Pretoria, being the capital, and naturally the
chief point of attack by the enemy, has been prepared to resist the
onslaught of any number of men, and is in a condition to withstand
a siege of three years. The city lies in the centre of a square, at each
corner of which is a lofty hill surmounted by a strong fort, which
commands the valleys and the surrounding country. Each of the four
forts has four heavy cannon, four French guns of fifteen miles range,
and thirty heavy Gatling guns. Besides this extraordinary protection,
the city has fifty light Gatling guns which can be drawn by mules to
any point on the hills where an attack may be made. Three large
warehouses are filled with ammunition, and the large armory is
packed to the eaves with Mauser, Martini-Henry, and Wesley-
Richards rifles. Two extensive refrigerators, with a capacity of two
thousand oxen each, are ample provision against a siege of many
months. It is difficult to compute the total expenditures for war
material by the Boer Government during the last four years, but the
following official announcement of expenses for one year will serve
to give an idea of the vastness of the preparations that the
Government has been compelled to make in order to guard the
safety of the country:
war footing. Every important strategic position was made as
impregnable as modern skill and arms could make it, and every
farmer's cottage was supplied with arms and ammunition, so that
the volunteer army might be mobilized in a day.
In order to demonstrate the extent to which the military
preparation has been carried, it is only necessary to give an account
of the defences of Pretoria and Johannesburg, the two principal
cities of the country. Pretoria, being the capital, and naturally the
chief point of attack by the enemy, has been prepared to resist the
onslaught of any number of men, and is in a condition to withstand
a siege of three years. The city lies in the centre of a square, at each
corner of which is a lofty hill surmounted by a strong fort, which
commands the valleys and the surrounding country. Each of the four
forts has four heavy cannon, four French guns of fifteen miles range,
and thirty heavy Gatling guns. Besides this extraordinary protection,
the city has fifty light Gatling guns which can be drawn by mules to
any point on the hills where an attack may be made. Three large
warehouses are filled with ammunition, and the large armory is
packed to the eaves with Mauser, Martini-Henry, and Wesley-
Richards rifles. Two extensive refrigerators, with a capacity of two
thousand oxen each, are ample provision against a siege of many
months. It is difficult to compute the total expenditures for war
material by the Boer Government during the last four years, but the
following official announcement of expenses for one year will serve
to give an idea of the vastness of the preparations that the
Government has been compelled to make in order to guard the
safety of the country:
War-Office salaries . . . . . . . . . $262,310
War purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,717,550
Johannesburg revolt . . . . . . . . . 800,000
Public works . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,650,000
----------
$9,429,860
Johannesburg has extensive fortifications around it, but the Boers
will use them for other purposes than those of self-protection. The
forts at the Golden City were erected for the purpose of quelling any
revolution of the Uitlanders, who constitute almost entirely the
population of the city.
One of the forts is situated on a small eminence about half a
mile north of the business part, and commands the entire city with
its guns. Two years were consumed in building the fortification and
in placing the armament in position. Its guns can rake not only every
street of the city, but ten of the principal mine works as well, and
the damage that their fire could cause is incalculable. Another fort,
almost as strong as the one in Johannesburg, is situated a mile east
of the city, and overshadows the railway and the principal highway
to Johannesburg. The residents of the city are greatly in fear of
underground works, which they have been led to believe were
constructed since the raid. Vast quantities of earth were taken out of
the Johannesburg fort, and for such a length of time did the work
continue that the Uitlanders decided that the Boers were
undermining the city, and protested to the Government against such
a course. As soon as war is declared and the women and children
have been removed from the city, Johannesburg will be rent with
War purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,717,550
Johannesburg revolt . . . . . . . . . 800,000
Public works . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,650,000
----------
$9,429,860
Johannesburg has extensive fortifications around it, but the Boers
will use them for other purposes than those of self-protection. The
forts at the Golden City were erected for the purpose of quelling any
revolution of the Uitlanders, who constitute almost entirely the
population of the city.
One of the forts is situated on a small eminence about half a
mile north of the business part, and commands the entire city with
its guns. Two years were consumed in building the fortification and
in placing the armament in position. Its guns can rake not only every
street of the city, but ten of the principal mine works as well, and
the damage that their fire could cause is incalculable. Another fort,
almost as strong as the one in Johannesburg, is situated a mile east
of the city, and overshadows the railway and the principal highway
to Johannesburg. The residents of the city are greatly in fear of
underground works, which they have been led to believe were
constructed since the raid. Vast quantities of earth were taken out of
the Johannesburg fort, and for such a length of time did the work
continue that the Uitlanders decided that the Boers were
undermining the city, and protested to the Government against such
a course. As soon as war is declared and the women and children
have been removed from the city, Johannesburg will be rent with
shot and shell. The Boers have announced their intention of doing
this, and the Uitlanders, anticipating it, seek safety in flight
whenever there are rumours of war, as thousands did immediately
before and after the Jameson affair.
The approaches to the mountain passes on the border have
been fortified with vast quantities of German and French ordnance,
and equipped with garrisons of men born or trained in Europe. The
approaches to Laing's Nek, near the Natal border, which have several
times been the battle ground of the English and Boer forces, have
been prepared to resist an invading army from Natal. Much attention
has been directed to the preparations in that part of the republic,
because the British commanders will find it easier to transfer forces
from the port of Durban, which is three hundred and six miles from
the Transvaal border, while Cape Town is almost a thousand miles
distant.
But the Pretorian Government has made many provisions for
war other than those enumerated. It has made alliances and friends
that will be of equal worth in the event of an attack by England. The
Orange Free State, whose existence is as gravely imperilled as that
of the Transvaal, will fight hand-in-hand with its neighbour, just as it
was prepared to do at the time of the Jameson raid, when almost
every Free State burgher lay armed on the south bank of the Vaal
River, awaiting the summons for assistance from the Kruger
Government. In the event of war the two Governments will be as
one, and, in anticipation of the struggle of the Boers against the
British, the Free State Government has been expending vast sums of
money every year in strengthening the country's defences. At the
same time that the Free State is being prepared for war, its
this, and the Uitlanders, anticipating it, seek safety in flight
whenever there are rumours of war, as thousands did immediately
before and after the Jameson affair.
The approaches to the mountain passes on the border have
been fortified with vast quantities of German and French ordnance,
and equipped with garrisons of men born or trained in Europe. The
approaches to Laing's Nek, near the Natal border, which have several
times been the battle ground of the English and Boer forces, have
been prepared to resist an invading army from Natal. Much attention
has been directed to the preparations in that part of the republic,
because the British commanders will find it easier to transfer forces
from the port of Durban, which is three hundred and six miles from
the Transvaal border, while Cape Town is almost a thousand miles
distant.
But the Pretorian Government has made many provisions for
war other than those enumerated. It has made alliances and friends
that will be of equal worth in the event of an attack by England. The
Orange Free State, whose existence is as gravely imperilled as that
of the Transvaal, will fight hand-in-hand with its neighbour, just as it
was prepared to do at the time of the Jameson raid, when almost
every Free State burgher lay armed on the south bank of the Vaal
River, awaiting the summons for assistance from the Kruger
Government. In the event of war the two Governments will be as
one, and, in anticipation of the struggle of the Boers against the
British, the Free State Government has been expending vast sums of
money every year in strengthening the country's defences. At the
same time that the Free State is being prepared for war, its
Government officials are striving hard to prevent a conflict, and are
attempting to conciliate the two principals in the strife by suggesting
that concessions be made by both. The Free State is not so
populous as the Transvaal, and consequently can not place as many
men in the field, but the ten thousand burghers who will answer the
call to arms will be an acceptable addition to the Boer forces.
The element of doubt enters into the question of what the
Boers and their co-religionists of Cape Colony and Natal will do in
the event of war. The Dutch of Cape Colony are the majority of the
population, and, although loyal British subjects under ordinary
circumstances, are opposed to English interference in the Transvaal's
affairs. Those of Natal, while not so great in numbers, are equally
friendly with the Transvaal Boers, and would undoubtedly recall
some of their old grievances against the British Government as
sufficient reason to join the Boers in war.
In Cape Colony there is an organization called the Afrikander
Bond which recently has gained control of the politics of the colony,
and which will undoubtedly be supreme for many years to come.
The motto of the organization is "South Africa for South Africans,"
and its doctrine is that South Africa shall be served first and Great
Britain afterward. Its members, who are chiefly Dutch, believe their
first duty is to assist the development of the resources of their own
country by proper protective tariffs and stringent legislation in native
affairs, and they regard legislation with a view to British interests as
of secondary importance. The Bond has been very amicably inclined
toward its Afrikander kinsmen in the Transvaal, especially since the
Jameson raid, and every sign of impending trouble between England
and the Boers widens the chasm between the English and
attempting to conciliate the two principals in the strife by suggesting
that concessions be made by both. The Free State is not so
populous as the Transvaal, and consequently can not place as many
men in the field, but the ten thousand burghers who will answer the
call to arms will be an acceptable addition to the Boer forces.
The element of doubt enters into the question of what the
Boers and their co-religionists of Cape Colony and Natal will do in
the event of war. The Dutch of Cape Colony are the majority of the
population, and, although loyal British subjects under ordinary
circumstances, are opposed to English interference in the Transvaal's
affairs. Those of Natal, while not so great in numbers, are equally
friendly with the Transvaal Boers, and would undoubtedly recall
some of their old grievances against the British Government as
sufficient reason to join the Boers in war.
In Cape Colony there is an organization called the Afrikander
Bond which recently has gained control of the politics of the colony,
and which will undoubtedly be supreme for many years to come.
The motto of the organization is "South Africa for South Africans,"
and its doctrine is that South Africa shall be served first and Great
Britain afterward. Its members, who are chiefly Dutch, believe their
first duty is to assist the development of the resources of their own
country by proper protective tariffs and stringent legislation in native
affairs, and they regard legislation with a view to British interests as
of secondary importance. The Bond has been very amicably inclined
toward its Afrikander kinsmen in the Transvaal, especially since the
Jameson raid, and every sign of impending trouble between England
and the Boers widens the chasm between the English and
Afrikanders of South Africa. The Dutch approve of President Kruger's
course in dealing with the franchise problems, and if hostilities break
out it would be not the least incompatible with their natures to assist
their Transvaal and Free State kinsmen even at the risk of plunging
the whole of South Africa into a civil war. W. P. Schreiner, the Premier
of Cape Colony, is the leading member of the Bond, and with him he
has associated the majority of the leading men in the colony. Under
ordinary conditions their loyalty to Great Britain is undoubted, but
whether they could resist the influence of their friends in the Bond if
it should decide to cast its fortunes with the Boers in case of war is
another matter.
Of such vast importance is the continued loyalty of the Dutch of
the two colonies that upon it depends practically the future control
of the Cape by the British Government. Being in the majority as
three to two, and almost in supreme control of the local
government, the Dutch of Cape Colony are in an excellent position to
secede from the empire, as they have already threatened to do, in
which event England would be obliged to fight almost the united
population of the whites if she desired to retain control of the
country. With this in mind, it is no wonder that Mr. Chamberlain
declared that England had reached a critical turning point in the
history of the empire.
The uncertainty of the situation is increased by the doubtful
stand which the native races are taking in the dispute. Neither
England nor the Boers has the positive assurance of support from
any of the tribes, which outnumber the whites as ten to one; but it
will not be an unwarranted opinion to place the majority of the
native tribes on the side of the Boers. The native races are always
course in dealing with the franchise problems, and if hostilities break
out it would be not the least incompatible with their natures to assist
their Transvaal and Free State kinsmen even at the risk of plunging
the whole of South Africa into a civil war. W. P. Schreiner, the Premier
of Cape Colony, is the leading member of the Bond, and with him he
has associated the majority of the leading men in the colony. Under
ordinary conditions their loyalty to Great Britain is undoubted, but
whether they could resist the influence of their friends in the Bond if
it should decide to cast its fortunes with the Boers in case of war is
another matter.
Of such vast importance is the continued loyalty of the Dutch of
the two colonies that upon it depends practically the future control
of the Cape by the British Government. Being in the majority as
three to two, and almost in supreme control of the local
government, the Dutch of Cape Colony are in an excellent position to
secede from the empire, as they have already threatened to do, in
which event England would be obliged to fight almost the united
population of the whites if she desired to retain control of the
country. With this in mind, it is no wonder that Mr. Chamberlain
declared that England had reached a critical turning point in the
history of the empire.
The uncertainty of the situation is increased by the doubtful
stand which the native races are taking in the dispute. Neither
England nor the Boers has the positive assurance of support from
any of the tribes, which outnumber the whites as ten to one; but it
will not be an unwarranted opinion to place the majority of the
native tribes on the side of the Boers. The native races are always
eager to be the friends of the paramount power, and England's many
defeats in South Africa during recent years have not assisted in
gaining for it that prestige. When England enters upon a war with
the Transvaal the natives will probably follow the example of the
Matabele natives, who rebelled against the English immediately after
Jameson and his men were defeated by the Boers, because they
believed a conquered nation could offer no resistance. The Boers,
having won the last battle, are considered by the natives to be the
paramount power, and it is always an easy matter to induce a
subjected people to ally itself with a supposedly powerful one.
The Zulus, still stinging under the defeat which they received
from the British less than twenty years ago, might gather their war
parties and, with the thousands of guns they have been allowed to
buy, attempt to secure revenge. The Basutos, east of the Orange
Free State, now the most powerful and the only undefeated nation
in the country, would hardly allow a war to be fought unless they
participated in it, even if only to demonstrate to the white man that
they still retain their old-time courage and ability. The million and a
half natives in Cape Colony, and the equal number in the Transvaal,
have complained of so many alleged grievances at the hands of their
respective governments that they might be presumed to rise against
them, though it is never possible to determine the trend of the
African negro's mind. What the various tribes would do in such an
emergency can be answered only by the chiefs themselves, and they
will not speak until the time for action is at hand. Perhaps when that
time does arrive there may be a realization of the natives' dream--
that a great leader will come from the north who will organize all the
defeats in South Africa during recent years have not assisted in
gaining for it that prestige. When England enters upon a war with
the Transvaal the natives will probably follow the example of the
Matabele natives, who rebelled against the English immediately after
Jameson and his men were defeated by the Boers, because they
believed a conquered nation could offer no resistance. The Boers,
having won the last battle, are considered by the natives to be the
paramount power, and it is always an easy matter to induce a
subjected people to ally itself with a supposedly powerful one.
The Zulus, still stinging under the defeat which they received
from the British less than twenty years ago, might gather their war
parties and, with the thousands of guns they have been allowed to
buy, attempt to secure revenge. The Basutos, east of the Orange
Free State, now the most powerful and the only undefeated nation
in the country, would hardly allow a war to be fought unless they
participated in it, even if only to demonstrate to the white man that
they still retain their old-time courage and ability. The million and a
half natives in Cape Colony, and the equal number in the Transvaal,
have complained of so many alleged grievances at the hands of their
respective governments that they might be presumed to rise against
them, though it is never possible to determine the trend of the
African negro's mind. What the various tribes would do in such an
emergency can be answered only by the chiefs themselves, and they
will not speak until the time for action is at hand. Perhaps when that
time does arrive there may be a realization of the natives' dream--
that a great leader will come from the north who will organize all the
various tribes into one grand army and with it drive the hated white
men into the sea.
It is impossible to secure accurate statistics in regard to the
military strength of the various colonies, states, and tribes in the
country, but the following table gives a fair idea of the number of
men who are liable to military duty:
Dutch. English.
Native.
Cape Colony 20,000 10,000
177,000
Natal 7,000 5,000
100,000
Orange Free State 10,000 ......
30,000
Transvaal 30,000 20,000
140,000
Rhodesia ...... 2,000
25,000
Swaziland and Basutoland ...... ......
30,000
------ ------ --
-----
Total 67,000 37,000
570,000
To him who delights in forming possible coalitions and war situations
this table offers vast opportunities. Probably no other country can
offer such a vast number of possibilities for compacts between
nations, races, and tribes as is presented in South Africa. There all
men into the sea.
It is impossible to secure accurate statistics in regard to the
military strength of the various colonies, states, and tribes in the
country, but the following table gives a fair idea of the number of
men who are liable to military duty:
Dutch. English.
Native.
Cape Colony 20,000 10,000
177,000
Natal 7,000 5,000
100,000
Orange Free State 10,000 ......
30,000
Transvaal 30,000 20,000
140,000
Rhodesia ...... 2,000
25,000
Swaziland and Basutoland ...... ......
30,000
------ ------ --
-----
Total 67,000 37,000
570,000
To him who delights in forming possible coalitions and war situations
this table offers vast opportunities. Probably no other country can
offer such a vast number of possibilities for compacts between
nations, races, and tribes as is presented in South Africa. There all
the natives may unite against the whites, or a part of them against a
part of the whites, while whites and natives may unite against a
similar combination. The possibilities are boundless; the probabilities
are uncertain.
The Pretorian Government has had an extensive secret service
for several years, and this has been of inestimable value in securing
the support of the natives as well as the friendship of many whites,
both in South Africa and abroad. The several thousand Irishmen in
South Africa have been organized into a secret compact, and have
been and will continue to be of great value to the Boers. The head
of the organization is a man who is one of President Kruger's best
friends, and his lieutenants are working even as far away as
America. The sympathy of the majority of the Americans in the
Transvaal is with the Boer cause, and, although the American consul-
general at Cape Town has cautioned them to remain neutral, they
will not stand idly by and watch the defeat of a cause which they
believe to be as just as that for which their forefathers fought at
Bunker Hill and Lexington.
But the Boers do not rely upon external assistance to win their
battles for them. When it becomes necessary to defend their liberty
and their country they reverently place their trust in Providence and
their rifles. Their forefathers' battles were won with such confidence,
and the later generations have been similarly successful under like
conditions. The rifle is the young Boer's primer and the grandfather's
testament. It is the Boers' avenger of wrong and the upholder of
right. That their confidence in their rifles has not been misapplied
has been demonstrated at Laing's Nek, Majuba Hill, Doornkop, and
in battles with natives.
part of the whites, while whites and natives may unite against a
similar combination. The possibilities are boundless; the probabilities
are uncertain.
The Pretorian Government has had an extensive secret service
for several years, and this has been of inestimable value in securing
the support of the natives as well as the friendship of many whites,
both in South Africa and abroad. The several thousand Irishmen in
South Africa have been organized into a secret compact, and have
been and will continue to be of great value to the Boers. The head
of the organization is a man who is one of President Kruger's best
friends, and his lieutenants are working even as far away as
America. The sympathy of the majority of the Americans in the
Transvaal is with the Boer cause, and, although the American consul-
general at Cape Town has cautioned them to remain neutral, they
will not stand idly by and watch the defeat of a cause which they
believe to be as just as that for which their forefathers fought at
Bunker Hill and Lexington.
But the Boers do not rely upon external assistance to win their
battles for them. When it becomes necessary to defend their liberty
and their country they reverently place their trust in Providence and
their rifles. Their forefathers' battles were won with such confidence,
and the later generations have been similarly successful under like
conditions. The rifle is the young Boer's primer and the grandfather's
testament. It is the Boers' avenger of wrong and the upholder of
right. That their confidence in their rifles has not been misapplied
has been demonstrated at Laing's Nek, Majuba Hill, Doornkop, and
in battles with natives.
The natural opportunities provided by Nature which in former
years were responsible for the confidence which the Boers reposed
in their rifles may have disappeared with the approach of advancing
civilization, but the Boer of to-day is as dangerous an adversary with
a gun as his father was in the wars with the Zulus and the Matabeles
half a century ago. The buck, rhinoceros, elephant, and
hippopotamus are not as numerous now as then, but the Boer has
devised other means by which he may perfect himself in
marksmanship. Shooting is one of the main diversions of the Boer,
and prizes are offered for the best results in contests. It is
customary to mark out a ring, about two hundred and fifty feet in
diameter, in the centre of which a small stuffed figure resembling a
bird is attached to a pole. The marksmen stand on the outside of the
circle and fire in turn at the target. A more curious target, and one
that taxes the ability of the marksman, is in more general use
throughout the country. A hole sufficiently deep to retain a turkey-
cock is dug in a level plot of ground, and over this is placed a piece
of canvas which contains a small hole through which the bird can
extend and withdraw its head. At a distance of three hundred feet
the bird's head is a target by no means easily hit.
Military men are accustomed to sneer at the lack of generalship
of the Boer forces, but in only one of the battles in which they have
engaged the British forces have the trained military men and leaders
been able to cope with them. In the battle of Boomplaats, fought in
1848, the English officers can claim their only victory over the Boers,
who were armed with flintlocks, while the British forces had heavy
artillery. In almost all the encounters that have taken place the Boer
forces were not as large as those of the enemy, yet the records
years were responsible for the confidence which the Boers reposed
in their rifles may have disappeared with the approach of advancing
civilization, but the Boer of to-day is as dangerous an adversary with
a gun as his father was in the wars with the Zulus and the Matabeles
half a century ago. The buck, rhinoceros, elephant, and
hippopotamus are not as numerous now as then, but the Boer has
devised other means by which he may perfect himself in
marksmanship. Shooting is one of the main diversions of the Boer,
and prizes are offered for the best results in contests. It is
customary to mark out a ring, about two hundred and fifty feet in
diameter, in the centre of which a small stuffed figure resembling a
bird is attached to a pole. The marksmen stand on the outside of the
circle and fire in turn at the target. A more curious target, and one
that taxes the ability of the marksman, is in more general use
throughout the country. A hole sufficiently deep to retain a turkey-
cock is dug in a level plot of ground, and over this is placed a piece
of canvas which contains a small hole through which the bird can
extend and withdraw its head. At a distance of three hundred feet
the bird's head is a target by no means easily hit.
Military men are accustomed to sneer at the lack of generalship
of the Boer forces, but in only one of the battles in which they have
engaged the British forces have the trained military men and leaders
been able to cope with them. In the battle of Boomplaats, fought in
1848, the English officers can claim their only victory over the Boers,
who were armed with flintlocks, while the British forces had heavy
artillery. In almost all the encounters that have taken place the Boer
forces were not as large as those of the enemy, yet the records
show that many more casualties were inflicted than received by
them. In the chief engagements the appended statistics show that
the Boers had only a small percentage of their men in the casualty
list, while the British losses were much greater.
MEN ENGAGED.
CASUALTIES.
BATTLES. British. Boer. British.
Boer.
Laing's Nek 400 550 190
24
Ingogo 300 250 142
17
Majuba Hill 600 150 280
5
Bronkhorst 250 300 120
1
Jameson raid 600 400 100
5
It is hardly fair to assume that the Boers' advantages in these battles
were gained without the assistance of capable generals when it is
taken into consideration that there is a military axiom which places
the value of an army relatively with the ability of its commanders.
The Boers may exaggerate when they assert that one of their
soldiers is the equal in fighting ability of five British soldiers, but the
results of the various battles show that they have some slight
foundation for their theory.
them. In the chief engagements the appended statistics show that
the Boers had only a small percentage of their men in the casualty
list, while the British losses were much greater.
MEN ENGAGED.
CASUALTIES.
BATTLES. British. Boer. British.
Boer.
Laing's Nek 400 550 190
24
Ingogo 300 250 142
17
Majuba Hill 600 150 280
5
Bronkhorst 250 300 120
1
Jameson raid 600 400 100
5
It is hardly fair to assume that the Boers' advantages in these battles
were gained without the assistance of capable generals when it is
taken into consideration that there is a military axiom which places
the value of an army relatively with the ability of its commanders.
The Boers may exaggerate when they assert that one of their
soldiers is the equal in fighting ability of five British soldiers, but the
results of the various battles show that they have some slight
foundation for their theory.
The regular British force in South Africa is comparatively small,
but it would require less than a month to transport one hundred
thousand trained soldiers from India and England and place them on
the scene of action. Several regiments of trained soldiers are always
stationed in different parts of the country near the Transvaal border,
and at brief notice they could be placed on Boer territory.
Charlestown, Ladysmith, and Pietermaritzburg, in Natal, have been
British military headquarters for many years, and during the last
three years they have been strengthened by the addition of several
regular regiments. The British Colonial Office has been making
preparations for several years for a conflict. Every point in the
country has been strengthened, and all the foreign powers whose
interests in the country might lead them to interfere in behalf of the
Boers have been placated. Germany has been taken from the British
zone of danger by favourable treaties; France is fearful to try
interference alone; and Portugal, the only other nation interested, is
too weak and too deeply in England's debt to raise her voice against
anything that may be done.
By leasing the town of Lorenzo Marques from the Portuguese
Government, Great Britain has acquired one of the best strategic
points in South Africa. The lease, the terms of which are
unannounced, was the culmination of much diplomatic dickering, in
which the interests of Germany and the South African Republic were
arrayed against those of England and Portugal. There is no doubt
that England made the lease only in order to gain an advantage over
President Kruger, and to prevent him from further fortifying his
country with munitions of war imported by way of Lorenzo Marques
and Delagoa Bay. England gains a commercial advantage too, but it
but it would require less than a month to transport one hundred
thousand trained soldiers from India and England and place them on
the scene of action. Several regiments of trained soldiers are always
stationed in different parts of the country near the Transvaal border,
and at brief notice they could be placed on Boer territory.
Charlestown, Ladysmith, and Pietermaritzburg, in Natal, have been
British military headquarters for many years, and during the last
three years they have been strengthened by the addition of several
regular regiments. The British Colonial Office has been making
preparations for several years for a conflict. Every point in the
country has been strengthened, and all the foreign powers whose
interests in the country might lead them to interfere in behalf of the
Boers have been placated. Germany has been taken from the British
zone of danger by favourable treaties; France is fearful to try
interference alone; and Portugal, the only other nation interested, is
too weak and too deeply in England's debt to raise her voice against
anything that may be done.
By leasing the town of Lorenzo Marques from the Portuguese
Government, Great Britain has acquired one of the best strategic
points in South Africa. The lease, the terms of which are
unannounced, was the culmination of much diplomatic dickering, in
which the interests of Germany and the South African Republic were
arrayed against those of England and Portugal. There is no doubt
that England made the lease only in order to gain an advantage over
President Kruger, and to prevent him from further fortifying his
country with munitions of war imported by way of Lorenzo Marques
and Delagoa Bay. England gains a commercial advantage too, but it
is hardly likely that she would care to add the worst fever-hole in
Africa to her territory simply to please the few of her merchants who
have business interests in the town. Since the Jameson raid the
Boers have been purchasing vast quantities of guns and ammunition
in Europe for the purpose of preparing themselves for any similar
emergency. Delagoa Bay alone was an open port to the Transvaal,
every other port in South Africa being under English dominion and
consequently closed to the importation of war material. Lorenzo
Marques, the natural port of the Transvaal, is only a short distance
from the eastern border of that country, and is connected with
Pretoria and Johannesburg by a railway. It was over this railway that
the Boers were able to carry the guns and ammunition with which to
fortify their country, and England could not raise a finger to prevent
the little republic from doing as it pleased. Hardly a month has
passed since the raid that the Transvaal authorities did not receive a
large consignment of guns and powder from Germany and France by
way of Lorenzo Marques. England could do nothing more than have
several detectives at the docks to take an inventory of the munitions
as they passed in transit.
The transfer of Lorenzo Marques to the British will put an
effectual bar to any further importation of guns into the Transvaal,
and will practically prevent any foreign assistance from reaching the
Boers in the event of another war. Both Germany and England tried
for many years to induce Portugal to sell Delagoa Bay, but being the
debtor of both to a great extent, the sale could not be made to one
without arousing the enmity of the other. Eighteen or twenty years
ago Portugal would have sold her sovereign right over the port to Mr.
Gladstone's Government for sixty thousand dollars, but that was
Africa to her territory simply to please the few of her merchants who
have business interests in the town. Since the Jameson raid the
Boers have been purchasing vast quantities of guns and ammunition
in Europe for the purpose of preparing themselves for any similar
emergency. Delagoa Bay alone was an open port to the Transvaal,
every other port in South Africa being under English dominion and
consequently closed to the importation of war material. Lorenzo
Marques, the natural port of the Transvaal, is only a short distance
from the eastern border of that country, and is connected with
Pretoria and Johannesburg by a railway. It was over this railway that
the Boers were able to carry the guns and ammunition with which to
fortify their country, and England could not raise a finger to prevent
the little republic from doing as it pleased. Hardly a month has
passed since the raid that the Transvaal authorities did not receive a
large consignment of guns and powder from Germany and France by
way of Lorenzo Marques. England could do nothing more than have
several detectives at the docks to take an inventory of the munitions
as they passed in transit.
The transfer of Lorenzo Marques to the British will put an
effectual bar to any further importation of guns into the Transvaal,
and will practically prevent any foreign assistance from reaching the
Boers in the event of another war. Both Germany and England tried
for many years to induce Portugal to sell Delagoa Bay, but being the
debtor of both to a great extent, the sale could not be made to one
without arousing the enmity of the other. Eighteen or twenty years
ago Portugal would have sold her sovereign right over the port to Mr.
Gladstone's Government for sixty thousand dollars, but that was
before Delagoa Bay had any commercial or political importance.
Since then Germany became the political champion of the Transvaal,
and blocked all the schemes of England to isolate the inland country
by cutting off its only neutral connection with the sea. Recently,
however, Germany has been disappointed by the Transvaal Republic,
and one of the results is the present cordial relations between the
Teutons and the Anglo-Saxons in South African affairs.
The English press and people in South Africa have always
asserted that by isolating the Transvaal from the sea the Boers could
be starved into submission in case of a war. As soon as the lease
becomes effective, Mr. Kruger's country will be completely
surrounded by English territory, at least in such a way that nothing
can be taken into the Transvaal without first passing through an
English port, and no foreign power will be able to send forces to the
aid of the Boers unless they are first landed on British soil. It is
doubtful whether any nation would incur such a grave responsibility
for the sake of securing Boer favour.
Both the Transvaal and England are fully prepared for war, and
diplomacy only can postpone its coming. The Uitlanders' present
demands may be conceded, but others that will follow may not fare
so well. A coveted country will always be the object of attacks by a
stronger power, and the aggressor generally succeeds in securing
from the weaker victim whatever he desires. Whether British soldiers
will be obliged to fight the Boers alone in order to gratify the wishes
of their Government, or whether the enemy will be almost the entire
white and black population of South Africa, will not be definitely
known until the British troop ships start for Cape Town and Durban.
Since then Germany became the political champion of the Transvaal,
and blocked all the schemes of England to isolate the inland country
by cutting off its only neutral connection with the sea. Recently,
however, Germany has been disappointed by the Transvaal Republic,
and one of the results is the present cordial relations between the
Teutons and the Anglo-Saxons in South African affairs.
The English press and people in South Africa have always
asserted that by isolating the Transvaal from the sea the Boers could
be starved into submission in case of a war. As soon as the lease
becomes effective, Mr. Kruger's country will be completely
surrounded by English territory, at least in such a way that nothing
can be taken into the Transvaal without first passing through an
English port, and no foreign power will be able to send forces to the
aid of the Boers unless they are first landed on British soil. It is
doubtful whether any nation would incur such a grave responsibility
for the sake of securing Boer favour.
Both the Transvaal and England are fully prepared for war, and
diplomacy only can postpone its coming. The Uitlanders' present
demands may be conceded, but others that will follow may not fare
so well. A coveted country will always be the object of attacks by a
stronger power, and the aggressor generally succeeds in securing
from the weaker victim whatever he desires. Whether British soldiers
will be obliged to fight the Boers alone in order to gratify the wishes
of their Government, or whether the enemy will be almost the entire
white and black population of South Africa, will not be definitely
known until the British troop ships start for Cape Town and Durban.
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offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth.
That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of
books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to
self-development guides and children's books.
More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge
connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an
elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can
quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally,
our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time
and fully enjoy the joy of reading.
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