(such as the right to free speech, to life, and to personal freedom). Indeed, private
property is also instrumental in assuring social peace, poverty reduction, and the
eradication of disease, hunger, and misery. In short, private property and the
rights to it form the cornerstone of capitalism as a system, the good society.
Denying individual private property rights and yielding these to the state can only
be a ticket to despotic, autocratic, and tyrannical rule (see Cirillo, 1966 for a
summary of the‘negative view’or what might happen if individual private
property rights are denied). This line of thought echoes—indeed, it magnifies—
Garett Hardin’s notion of‘the tragedy of the commons’and earlier philosophical
traditions on property such as the Lockean theory of property (Obeng-Odoom,
2016). The resulting policy implications have ranged from commodifying land
and enabling land markets to making land sector agencies market-oriented.
It is within this context that costly and large-scale registration of land has been
undertaken in Ghana (for land policy in Ghana, see Aryeetey et al., 2007; Obeng-
Odoom, 2013a), strongly suggesting that if there are‘problems in the land market’,
it must be because of an‘external (ity)’. In turn, it is more—rather than less—
commodification that is needed to internalize problems tofit the logic of the market.
In this chapter, I provide an alternative view: freedom without—or with
limited—individual private property in land and water resources. I draw on the
traditions of institutional economics that emphasize the social basis and function
of landed property (Ely, 1914), the commodification of which destroys freedoms
of all kinds (Polanyi ([1944] 2001: 76) in a way that generates social conflict or the
potential for such conflicts.
For an institutionalist analysis, I examine the institutions that structure, and are
in turn structured by, transforming property relations in the country and invert the
usual approach of measuring‘success’or‘failure’based only on the outcomes of
the present mode of property relations. Instead, I emphasize theopportunity costof
current land policy framed around specific ideas in new institutional economics. In
so doing, I turn to the precolonial conception of property to investigate the historic
debate on whether property is natural or naturalized (Schlatter, 1951), to look into
contestations about autochthony (Lentz, 2010, 2013) and its wider conflicts, which
characterize in the process of property transformation (Commons, 1924, 1934).
My interest is not in conflicts per se but how they arise, shape, transform, and are
indeed transformed by property—for freedom.
The chapter argues that the Nkrumahist idea of property, with its related
practices of property, led to troubling outcomes, including restricted freedoms
and maldistribution of asset wealth in sharp contrast to the rhetoric about property
and freedom under state socialism. However, the turn to‘private property’of the
new institutionalist and neoliberal since the fall of statist socialism has created much
worse levels of inequality and conflict. Not only has this property register further
restricted freedom, or fallen short of aggregating its individual freedoms into
collective freedom, but it has also set loose oppression among previously free
peoples and displaced entire villages. Such outcomes arising from the private view
of property warrant fundamental changes in society, but seeking a return to the
statist conception of property that pertained during the era of Nkrumah would
generate similar contradictions that pertained at the time and continue to date
(Owusu-Ofori and Obeng-Odoom, 2015). The precolonial property regime was
far moreres communisand evidently more conducive to social, economic, and
Property and Freedom 29